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 In my dissertation I argue that because the European Union and the United States of 
America have been largely treated as unique or at least special cases, both the literature 
on American-state building and that on European market integration have missed how 
close comparison alters both our descriptive views and social-scientific explanations of 
the shape of each polity. In particular, scholars have not sufficiently recognized that the 
European Union has gone further than the United States in many elements of the creation 
of a centralized, liberalized single market, nor have they produced explanations that 
account well for this development. 
 This study challenges the dominant assumption that the United States is generally 
more hierarchical and centralized than the European Union and more of a single free 
market in the sense of fewer allowable trade barriers. By analyzing the rules of market 
integration in services (over 70% of GDP), public procurement (15 – 20% GDP) and the 
regulated goods markets (goods like elevators with their own regulatory regimes), I 
demonstrate that in all these major cases the European Union has adopted rules that open 
exchange to competition more than the United States. While the actual integration of 
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flows on the ground is still generally less across European states than American ones, the 
political rules are more - and more liberally - integrated in Europe. 
 I offer an institutional and ideational argument to explain these differences, with 
two main parts. First, there is no American parallel to the institution of the European 
Commission, which is mandated to continually push liberalization forward. My research 
shows that Commission leadership has been critical to each of the examined cases. 
Second, broader norms of legitimate governance favor centralized authority - including 
liberalizing central authority - more in the European Union than in the United States. 
Despite all the criticism we hear of the European Union, the basic notion of federal 
governance of market integration is far more strongly accepted across Europe at both 
elite and mass levels than in the United States. As interview evidence in this study 
displays, many Americans consistently object to any role for the federal government. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Do we want the United States to be like Europe? […] the answer to this question 
is “no”. […] They are countries where jobs are most carefully protected by government 
regulation and mandated benefits are most lavish. […] Call it the Europe Syndrome”. 
Charles Murray, American Enterprise Institute,  
in The Washington Times, 2009, p. B02 
To begin this dissertation, consider a little tale about regulation and markets in 
two federal polities on either side of the Atlantic. In one, a state has just proposed to 
increase museum fees for out-of-state residents. In the other, the federal authorities have 
just advanced a law to “enshrine the right of non-discrimination, which would, for 
example, prevent [...] citizens being charged different entry fees to museums on the basis 
of their [residency]”. The latter polity sounds like it is coming much closer to a genuine 
single market. These two polities are the United States of America and the European 
Union (EU), but which is which? Though almost everyone would expect the United 
States to be closer to a full single market than the European Union, the first example is 
from Kansas, and the second from statements made by the European Commission on the 
effects of the EU’s 2006 services directive (Commission 2004; Kansas 2006). 
This is a trivial illustration, but it turns out to be the tip of the iceberg. In many 
substantial economic areas, as I will argue, the EU has adopted rules more like a single 
market than the US, both with respect to the centralization of the market (having a single 
set of coherent rules for exchange) and its liberalization (adopting rules that open 
exchange to competition). A brief look for instance at postal services and interstate legal 
practices is revealing. In the EU, the European Commission considers the postal services 
sector as a sector of “vital importance” not only for the “economic prosperity and social 
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well-being” by producing overall 1% of the EU’s overall GDP, but also for the “cohesion 
of the EU” (European Commission 2007a and 2007b; cf. COM (2006) 595 final, 2; Dierz 
and Ilzkovitz 2008). With the Postal Directives 97/67/EC, 2002/39/EC and 2008/6/EC, 
the European Union has decided on a strategy usually associated with the United States: 
competition across jurisdictional units in enforcing the gradual liberalization of this 
sector. Thus, each state retains the right to its own postal companies but has to open up its 
market to its competitors from other states and reduce to (nearly) zero any reserved 
domains. Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have completely 
opened up their postal markets years ahead of the 2013 final deadline for all member 
states.1 In the US, on the other hand, postal services remain a monopoly with very limited 
exceptions, such as international remail and overnight mail, and no liberalization in 
sight.2  
Interstate legal practice is another example where the European Union has been 
setting the bar for market liberalization for several decades now. As Michel Petite, 
member of EU Commissioner Cockfield’s Internal Market cabinet in the 1980s and 
                                                 
1
 According to the 2008 directive, the majority of member states must have fully liberalized their postal 
market by the end of 2010. 11 member states, mostly Eastern European member states plus Cyprus, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Malta, however, have received a derogation until the end of 2012. 
 
2
 The United States Postal Service (USPS) retains several key monopoly powers, including a monopoly 
over letter delivery, a mailbox monopoly, and the ability to suspend the delivery monopoly in certain cases 
(cf. Geddes 2003). The monopoly of delivering letters is (nearly) absolute. These exclusive rights to deliver 
letters are known as Private Express Statutes. American federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. 1693-1699) 
“prohibit anyone from establishing, operating, or using a private company to carry letters for compensation 
on regular trips or at stated periods over postal routes or between places where U.S. mail regularly is 
carried” (General Accounting Office 1996, 10). Yet, the Postal Service nevertheless went ahead and created 
“administrative exceptions for newspapers, magazines, checks (when sent between banks), data processing 
materials (under certain circumstances), urgent letters, and international remail” (Campbell Jr. 1996, 19). 
The last two represent today the main, even if still small, exemptions to the postal service’s overall letter 
monopoly. It is the suspension of the urgent mail or overnight monopoly which enabled companies, such as 
UPS and FedEx to prosper (cf. Cohen et al. 1999, 1-2). However, “federal law mandates that private-sector 
prices for the service must be at least $3 or twice the cost of the first-class equivalent” (Hudgins 1996: 
xviii; cf. USPS Appendix-U, 2002, 11). In 1998 a study by Price Waterhouse estimated that “about 90 
percent of domestic volume and about 80 percent of revenue was protected by the Private Express Statues” 
(USPS Appendix-U 2002, 12). 
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former Director of the European Commission’s Legal Services, sees it, lawyers should be 
allowed to practice freely across jurisdictions: 
[I]f you are trained as a German lawyer, the important [thing] is not so much that 
you know German law only, but that you are trained as a lawyer, [then] you will 
adapt to French law very rapidly (personal interview 2009). 
 
Thus, with the adoption of several directives since the mid-1970s, especially 
Directive 77/249/EEC on the freedom to provide services, Directive 89/48/EEC on the 
recognition of diplomas, and Directive 98/5/EC on the establishment of lawyers, the EU 
“explicitly permits the lawyer [from one EU member state] to practice law permanently 
in another EU member state, likely without any additional licensure requirements” 
(Perschbacher 2004, 747). Indeed, in the European Union today “it is theoretically 
possible […] that [a] lawyer may never have passed any formal examination nor even 
been required to formally register with the local court, and yet be able to assume the 
professional title of the host jurisdiction” (Perschbacher 2004, 747).  
Anti-competitive discrimination in the arena of interstate legal practice in the US, 
meanwhile, is still the rule and unlikely to change in the near future. Despite the far 
greater differences in legal practices across EU member states than between the sister 
states in the United States, the rules adopted in the European Union “are significantly 
more liberal than U.S. rules” (Perschbacher 2004, 747).3 Americans in this sector see 
separate state-level regulation – quite intentionally designed to set a high bar for offering 
services across borders – as normal and legitimate, as illustrated in the following 
comment by Allen Etish, chairman of New Jersey’s State Bar Association's task force on 
multijurisdictional practice: 
                                                 
3
 Following the conventions in the respective literature on American and European state-building and 
market integration, I will refer to the component units of the European Union as member states and the 
component units of the United States as sister states.  
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New Jersey has the unique geographic position of being surrounded by large 
jurisdictions. We feel we have an obligation to our citizens to ensure they are 
represented by people who know what New Jersey law is, rather than just slipping 
over a state border (cited by Capuzzo 2002). 
In the United States today, no single set of coherent rules governs the exchange of 
legal services. There is simply no US parallel to the EU’s overarching, federal-level 
framework allowing “nonresident lawyers the right to provide temporary interstate 
transactional services in states where they are not admitted to the bar” (Turina 2005, 
226). States not only retain the right to set the rules for the admission to the bar but also 
set the rules governing interstate legal practice and therefore the access to their own 
market. These rules, allegedly designed as “a type of consumer protection […] and for 
the efficient administration of court litigation”, are often seen as “mask[ing] a desire to 
protect the local legal profession against interstate competition” (Goebbel 2000, 308). As 
several European and American commentators see it, these “quite dramatic rules allowing 
free movement of lawyers” put in place by the EU to open exchange to competition are 
“more in consonance with modern commercial needs than the approach currently existing 
in the United States” (Lonbay 2005, 610; Turina 2005, 235). 
Yet, as the Charles Murray quote at the beginning indicates, such observations 
contrast strongly to near-universal assumptions of a relatively liberal, unified US and a 
relatively protectionist, fractious Europe in broader public or academic discussions. 
Pundits and scholars alike tend to assume that in terms of institutional shape the US is 
generally more hierarchical and centralized than the EU and in terms of market 
integration the former is more of a single free market than the latter in the sense of fewer 
allowable trade restraints. As Harvard scholar Frank Dobbin once put it: “In the United 
States, restraints of trade were associated with political tyranny, and policies adopted to 
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guard liberty by precluding restraints of trade were soon cast as positive measures to 
promote growth” (Dobbin 1994, 225). As another Harvard political economist, Benjamin 
M. Friedman, puts it, the United States is exceptional because “more so than any other 
large nation, America has maintained a flexibility and fluidity in its economic 
arrangements that has facilitated the continual reallocation of both labor and capital 
resources and has fostered economic initiative, entrepreneurship, and creativity”. For him 
America’s economic success is first and foremost due to two major factors. First, “[t]he 
absence of many of the restrictive labor practices and laws found in many other advanced 
industrialized economies, together with Americans’ willingness not just to change their 
workplace but to relocate their home, often over great distances, has allowed human 
resources to move to where they can be most productive”. Second, by “generally 
impos[ing] fewer burdensome regulations”, “public policy in America has played a 
positive role in creating a setting in which private initiative can flourish”. Thus, 
America’s success story is largely based on “what American [federal] government does 
not do (or at least does to a lesser extent than elsewhere)” (Friedman 2008, 88 – 89). In 
short, these authors, and many others, suggest that the US is almost the archetypal 
example of a large internal market with few barriers to the free exercise of competition 
across the entire polity. 
This perception that the US compared to the EU is home to a full-fledged and 
competitive internal market is reinforced by the fact that, as Goldstein has previously 
noted, “[m]ost people consider the United States to have been a sovereign nation since 
1787 and consider the states of the European Union to be sovereign nations today” 
(Goldstein 2001, 12). The underlying assumption is that the independent sovereign 
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nations composing the EU are going to be more reluctant in the creation and the practice 
of a free internal market and more protective about the jobs of their own respective 
markets. Consequently the European Union’s single market is often described as being 
riddled with exceptions and restraints on trade, where, according to The Economist, for 
instance, “France, Italy and Luxembourg have little lists of national champions they think 
should be immune from foreign ownership” and where “the merger of two French or two 
Spanish energy firms is acceptable, but a takeover of a French or Spanish firm by a 
German one is not" (The Economist 2006, 50). And Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Director of the 
European Studies Center at the University of Oxford, notes that even when working on 
completing the single market in the last decade, the EU has done so by “creat[ing] many 
kinds of firewalls against all-out competition à l’americaine” (Nicolaïdis 2007, 687). The 
US, on the other hand, is usually seen as “born as a commercial republic”, “addicted to 
the pace of commercial enterprise”, which “will never be Europe” (Brooks 2009). Thus, 
while the United States is acknowledged as a fully functioning federal polity with a 
complete internal market, the EU is continuously seen as facing the choice “between 
becoming a fully fledged United States of Europe, or remaining little more than a 
modern-day Holy Roman Empire, a gimcrack hodgepodge of ‘variable geometry’ that 
will sooner or later fall apart” (Ferguson 2010, 48).  
Despite being “only” a supranational organization, however, the EU, appears to 
have created a single market that in many significant and economically important areas is 
more complete and liberal than in the US. Simply as a descriptive statement about the 
world, this claim runs against a great deal of common wisdom and academic writing. But 
its larger importance concerns its implications for our analyses and theories that seek to 
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explain the shape of political arenas. We have a pattern that is much more puzzling than 
most experts on either side of the Atlantic have perceived. It calls for a comparative study 
that poses basic, general questions: how are single markets constructed? And why do 
multi-level governance entities pursue different trajectories in regards to having a single 
set of coherent rules for exchange (centralization) and adopting rules that open exchange 
to competition (liberalization)? 
While we have many coherent explanations for market integration and 
institutional outcomes about the US or about the EU, their empirical support tends to 
focus exclusively on one or the other of the two federal polities. Yet, when the respective 
logics of these explanations are applied to the two polities comparatively, they appear to 
be insufficient at best, leaving us to wonder why the EU went beyond the US in 
centralizing and liberalizing certain policy arenas and vice versa. 
The purpose of this study therefore is to compare the construction of single 
integrated markets in the United States and the European Union. The story which the 
following chapters will tell is that the emergence of strongly centralized rules for 
liberalized markets arise for two reasons: where executive institutions are given a 
mandate and strength to pursue liberalization, and where broader norms in society are 
accepting of the emergence of a centralized commitment to liberalization.  
By analyzing the rules of market integration in services (over 70% of GDP), 
public procurement (15 – 20% GDP) and the regulated goods markets (goods like 
elevators with their own regulatory regimes), I demonstrate that in all these major cases 
the EU has undeniably adopted rules that open exchange to competition more than the 
United States. While the actual integration of flows on the ground is still generally less 
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across European states than American ones, the political rules are more - and more 
liberally - integrated in Europe. Thus, in the case of public procurement the European 
Union has completely preempted the policy sector, establishing an EU-wide public 
procurement regime based on non-discrimination, transparency and economic efficiency, 
while in the US, states still freely discriminate against out-of-state bidders. The US 
Supreme Court, in the absence of Congressional preemption, has repeatedly validated the 
right of states to discriminate when acting in their roles of proprietor of their respective 
public domains or as employer leading to pervasive preferential treatment for in-state 
products and companies, including openly exclusionary preferences in various states. A 
similar pattern materializes in the services and even the goods sectors. As regards the 
former, in the United States providers from regulated professions cannot freely cross state 
borders and offer their services on a temporary basis while the EU has largely succeeded 
in liberalizing the services sector by facilitating the provision of temporary services 
across member states. Concerning the latter the European Union has put in place a 
regulatory regime that allows simultaneously for the elimination of technical barriers to 
trade in goods and the guaranteeing of high safety and health standards, while in the US 
important sectors of the goods market tend to remain disjointed among the great number 
of states and even local governments. In short, both in terms of strongly forbidding anti-
competitive practices by state governments and in terms of encouraging competition at 
the federal level, EU rules often aim for more “integration” than US rules. 
Though even experts on these polities rarely recognize it today, my findings 
therefore demonstrate that the EU has gone substantially further than the US in creating a 
centrally-governed and liberalized single market. I offer an institutional and ideational 
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argument to explain these differences, with two main parts. First, there is no US parallel 
to the institution of the European Commission, which is mandated to continually push 
liberalization forward. My research shows that Commission leadership has been critical 
to each of the cases I examine. Second, broader norms of legitimate governance favor 
centralized authority - including liberalizing central authority - more in the EU than in the 
US. Despite all the criticism we hear of the European Union, the basic notion of federal 
governance of market integration is far more strongly accepted across Europe at both 
elite and mass levels than in the United States. As interview evidence throughout my 
study displays, many Americans consistently object to any role for the federal 
government. 
The study will proceed as following. Chapter II will briefly review the literature 
on American state-building and European market integration. It will note that due to sui 
generis concerns for both the American and European polity direct comparisons of the 
two have been rare. In fact, although there are a great many books striving to explain the 
construction of a single market in the US or in the EU, not much work has been done 
from an empirically-oriented comparative perspective. Hence, in addition to solving an 
empirical puzzle, the study attempts to contribute to the still small but growing field of 
direct comparisons of the EU and the US which regards the two polities less as unique or 
economic rivals but as institutional peers. Despite the fact that most of the research has so 
far exclusively focused either on the American polity or the EU, similar coherent 
explanations of market building can be derived. I divide these explanations into three 
major categories: 1) structuralist-materialist / rationalist-functionalist; 2) institutional; and 
3) ideational / cultural. After briefly describing what reasonable expectations for market 
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building can be extrapolated from these approaches, I will lay out my own explanation 
for resolving the puzzle based on a combination of institutional and ideational elements. 
The argument is that in the analyzed policy areas the European Union has succeeded in 
having a single set of coherent rules for exchange and in adopting rules that open 
exchange to competition, because of an unusually strong executive institution with a clear 
liberalizing mandate – the European Commission – and because there is actually more 
acceptance of a strong central authority in the EU than in the United States. 
Chapter III describes the organization and legal framework of the public 
procurement regimes in the United States and the European Union. It will show that 
while the US looks as if it is largely settled in certain decentralized, fairly protectionist 
ways, the EU has gone much further in eliminating interstate barriers.  
After establishing firmly the descriptive claim, Chapter IV will attempt to explain 
these variations in centralization and liberalization across the two polities by emphasizing 
that the European Commission has actively pushed for the creation of an EU-wide public 
procurement by creating its own supportive environment for market liberalization in the 
procurement sector while a similar push has been so far absent in the United States.  
Chapter V strengthens the descriptive claim that the European Union has become 
more liberalized and centralized in a free market way than the US by contrasting the legal 
regimes in place for the provision of temporary services across state borders in the case 
of regulated professions, notably hairdressers. It will be pointed out that from a 
comparative perspective the recent literature on the EU services directive has it largely 
wrong in emphasizing the directive’s shortcomings instead of noting that it actually 
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establishes a more open and competitive internal market for services than the United 
States.  
Chapter VI analyzes again how we can account for the divergent outcomes. It 
argues that the services case is particularly noteworthy given that despite facing in this 
instance the most vocal opposition to further market liberalization, the Commission still 
emerged largely victorious, especially seen from a comparative perspective. Indeed, it 
appears that even in situations of vocal opposition to further market liberalization, a large 
enough consensus exists for the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. In the US on 
the other hand no federal-level actor has promoted further market integration by 
highlighting the remaining obstacles to the free provisions of services between sister 
states. Many actors are either unaware or deny that the present system poses significant 
costs. National organizations tend to refer back to the individual states and many are 
skeptical of federal-level solutions to the present situation. 
Chapter VII examines the goods market at the example of elevators. It reinforces 
the notion that European Union emerges here as the more liberalized internal market of 
the two due to an executive institution with a clear liberalizing mandate. It further 
demonstrates once more that the dominant culture in the US is characterized by asking 
for less government overall and not interfering with state rights. Federal-level 
intervention in the regulation of the market in the US is seen nearly exclusively in terms 
of hindering trade. It also observes that the European approach to the elimination of 
technical barriers to trade is envied by those actors acutely aware of both regimes and 
still confronted by a diversity of rules in place in the US. 
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Chapter VIII offers concluding reflections on what may be derived from this 
study for a better understanding of state-building and market integration in federal 
polities.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MARKET-BUILDING 
“Europe’s unique outcome in terms of integration is the result of its unique political and 
cultural history”. 
L. Alan Winters, in Europe Is Sui Generis, 2010, p. 2 
 
“[The] organizing principles and founding political institutions […] are […] 
qualitatively different from those of other Western nations. Hence the United States has 
developed as an outlier”. 
Seymour Martin Lipset, in American Exceptionalism, 1996, p. 13 
 
Both the literature on American state-building and that on European market 
integration have suffered largely from a very myopic view. Although there are many 
important scholarly studies on political and institutional developments, especially market-
building, in the United States and in the European Union, until a decade ago very few 
attempts have been made to compare them systematically. Comparisons were largely 
discouraged in emphasizing each entity’s exceptionalism and uniqueness. “American 
exceptionalism” and the sui generis character of the European Union were taken for 
granted. American exceptionalism especially stressed the unusual decentralization of the 
US in comparison to other nation-states. The EU literature, mostly focused on comparing 
the EU to other international organizations, emphasized, on the other hand, the unusually 
centralized nature of the EU. Scholars as a result tended to overlook the potential 
common characteristics between an uncommonly centralized international organization 
and an uncommonly decentralized state. 
In the last couple of years we have, however, seen some reversal of this trend. 
Comparisons between the EU and the US have become more frequent and accepted in the 
scholarly community. Indeed, it has been pointed out that while the two polities might be 
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exceptional in comparison with the European nation-states, they are less so when 
compared to each other. Leading scholars talk today about “institutional convergence” 
and both being examples of the same democratic model, a compound democracy, or 
practicing the same type of “regulatory federalism” (Fabbrini 2005, 2007; Kelemen 
2004).  
Still, although there are a great many books striving to explicate the construction 
of a single market in the US or in the EU, not much work has been done from an 
empirically-oriented comparative perspective. Some more conceptual, theoretical works 
have come out lately, laying the groundwork for the comparability of the US and the EU 
(Fabbrini 2005, 2007; McKay 2001; Menon and Schain 2006; Nicolaidis and Howse 
2001).  
However, the most well-known empirical work directly on constructing an 
internal market in Europe, Michelle Egan’s 2001 book Constructing a European Market: 
Standards, Regulation and Governance, limits its comparisons to some brief allusions at 
several junctures in the book and to the five final pages. In the absence of her announced 
subsequent study on a comparative look at 19th century American and 20th European 
market-building, we simply do not yet have a theoretically-informed and empirically 
careful comparative study on market-building in the two entities.  
This chapter therefore will in a first step briefly highlight why direct empirical 
comparisons of American and European market-building have so far been in short 
supply. It will touch on the shortcomings of the sui generis perspectives of American and 
European market-building and the recent attempts to move away from it. This section 
will especially try to make two major points. First, even those who would now argue that 
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the EU and US are highly comparable do not seem to have noticed that the EU has 
further liberalized its internal market than the United States by adopting a single set of 
coherent rules. Second, while there is a dearth of empirical comparative work of the two 
polities, general expectations can nevertheless be derived from the explanations made to 
separately explain American state-building and European market integration. In short, it 
does not matter so much whether one believes the US and the EU to be respectively 
unique or quite close on an imagined comparability scale, the logic of the arguments 
made in one case should be transferable to the other.  
Consequently, the second part of the chapter will review the arguments which 
have been made in the respective literatures of American state-building and European 
market integration. The existing approaches can largely be divided into three major 
categories: 1) structuralist-materialist / rationalist-functionalist; 2) institutional; and 3) 
ideational / cultural. The goal is to enrich our knowledge of the applicability of the 
existing theories by deriving from the different theoretical frameworks expectations on 
what we should see happening on the ground. This will help us to establish later on 
whether the existing approaches are sufficient to explain the empirical evidence in the 
ensuing case studies.  
In the third section, I will offer my own explanation. I will note that the empirical 
differences between the United States and the European Union in regards to the 
liberalization and centralization of the respective internal market can only be explained 
by taking simultaneously into account institutional and ideational explanations of market 
integration. Market integration is facilitated where executive institutions are given a 
mandate and strength to pursue liberalization, and where broader norms in society are 
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accepting of the emergence of centralized commitment to liberalization. I argue that the 
European Commission is such an unusually strong executive institution with a clear 
liberalizing mandate. A similar actor is absent in the United States. Moreover, this view 
predicts that there is actually more acceptance of a strong central authority in the EU than 
in the US. 
The fourth and last section briefly describes the qualitative methodology 
employed as well as the choice of public procurement, services and goods as the 
investigation’s case studies. 
Beyond American and European Exceptionalism 
To this day comparisons between the EU and the United States have been largely 
“partial and strictly impressionistic” (Donahue and Pollack 2001, 108; and personal 
communication 2006).4 A major reason for this is that journalistic as well as scholarly 
accounts have usually fallen in the exceptionalism trap when talking about American 
state-building and European integration.  
The prevailing wisdom has been that the United States of America and the 
European Union are so unique that any comparison with other polities and in particular 
with each other are considered a stretch at best, leading to very unique theoretical 
challenges. Thus, scholars making the case for the EU being sui generis have repeatedly 
pointed out that the EU is a novelty, representing a “Hegelian moment […] that has no 
current analogies” and that the EU represents an n=1 because it “is unique in the world as 
                                                 
4
 An important exception is Goldstein, who, somewhat similar to the  puzzle of this dissertation, explores 
the “evident paradox” why “the nominally sovereign government of the United States of America 
experiences several decades of overt and occasionally even violent official defiance of its authority by the 
member states of the American union, while the nominally sovereign member states of the European Union 
virtually from the start obeyed as a legitimate higher authority the dictates of the judiciary of their federal 
union” (Goldstein 2001, 15). 
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an experiment in political and economic integration, and hence students of European 
integration have only a single case – the EU itself – to study” (Caporaso et al. 1997, 1 and 
4).  
Americanists, for their part, have come repeatedly to the conclusion that the US is 
exceptional due to the absence of socialism and the dominance of a liberal tradition from 
the on-set (Hartz 1955; Lipset 1950, 1977; Lipset and Marks 2000) as well as the 
country’s unique institutional features characterized by a “combination of extremes [of] a 
highly developed democratic politics without a concentrated governing capacity” 
(Skowronek 1982, 8). Thus, not only does the United States remain “the least statist 
Western nation […] with its suspicion of the state and its emphasis on individual rights”, 
but “there can be little question that the hand of providence has been on a nation which 
finds a Washington, a Lincoln, or a Roosevelt when it needs him” (Lipset 1996, 14 and 
289). The US in short is blessed by its extraordinary historical circumstances and the 
derivative set of cultural and institutional features. Given therefore that the United States 
was created and developed differently, even in comparison to its North American 
neighbor Canada, it is argued that she also needs “to be understood differently – 
essentially on its own terms and within its own context” (cf. Lipset 1963, 1990; Shafer 
1991, v). While the roots of the concept of ‘American exceptionalism’ gets traced back as 
far as 1630 and John Winthrop’s “city upon a hill”, it is Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America which receives the honor for coining the phrase and anchoring it 
in the American consciousness and intellectual discourse (Calabresi 2006; Lipset 1991).5 
                                                 
5
 The expression ‘American exceptionalism’ goes back to Volume II, Chapter IX of Democracy in 
America, where Tocqueville notes that “[t]he position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and 
it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one. […] Let us cease, then, to 
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Today the term ‘American exceptionalism’ largely comprises three different meanings. 
First, it refers to a merely descriptive, particularistic, definitional view of the United 
States, i.e. it concerns itself simply with describing elements that are clearly 
differentiating the US from other places. Secondly, the term connotes that the US does 
not fit the standard account or model of how societies and nations develop and progress 
as delineated by the earliest modernization theorists and their intellectual successors. This 
second view has for the most part become discarded due to the overall demolition of a 
single, general model of political and economic development from which the US could 
deviate. The third approach, which is considered as keeping the concept of American 
exceptionalism “alive” and maintaining “its vigour” is “described as an effort to highlight 
distinctively American clusters of characteristics, even distinctively American ways of 
organizing the major realms of social life”, such as government, economy, culture, 
education, religion and public policy (Shafer 1991, viii; sic.; cf. Schuck and Wilson 
2008).6 
The reasons scholars have proffered why the US and EU are different and 
especially why they are not comparable are multiple, including arguments derived from 
                                                                                                                                                 
view all democratic nations under the example of the American people, and attempt to survey them at 
length with their own features”. 
 
6
 A fourth meaning of American exceptionalism can be found in the politicization of the term. It is 
frequently used in the press and by politicians to evoke a sense of superiority vis-à-vis other political 
systems and being partakers of a divine will. The focus is here much less on an analytical understanding of 
comparative differences and commonalities but rather on a self-congratulatory version of American 
exceptionalism. Mostly, but not exclusively used by the political right in the US, American exceptionalism 
in this sense is the idea of being an elect nation, a beacon of hope and liberty for the rest of the world, and 
being at the heart of the American cultural identity (cf. Madsen 1998). Thus, President Ronald Reagan in 
his farewell address to the nation on January 11, 1989 spoke once again about the “shining city” that is 
America, and former presidential candidate and Southern Baptist minister, Mike Huckabee observed that 
"[t]o deny American exceptionalism is in essence to deny the heart and soul of this nation” (quoted in 
Martin and Smith 2010). 
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disparate geographical, cultural, historical and institutional circumstances.7 It is not that 
scholars contend that one single factor per se makes comparison impossible, but rather 
that the combination of these different factors creates large hurdles for undertaking a 
rigorous comparison of the two political systems. 
Perceiving the United States and the EU as respectively unique, however, has led 
to much navel-gazing. Even scholars who point to the fact that EU integration studies in 
their original focus were everything else than a “clamor for “sui generis theory””, noting 
that the earliest scholars, such as Karl Deutsch (1957), Ernst Haas (1961) and Joseph Nye 
(1971) took a comparative approach to the study of regional integration, limit themselves 
largely to conceiving the EU in terms of an international organization which does not 
warrant much comparison with other nation-states (Caporaso et al. 1997, 1). In a series of 
short essays for example, well-known scholars, such as James A. Caporaso, Gary Marks, 
Andrew Moravcsik and Mark A. Pollack, engaged the question whether the EU 
represents an n of 1 and the fundamental theoretical challenges going along with it. Yet, 
in their conclusion and advice, while highly relevant for everyone wanting to escape the 
n=1 calamity, they still mostly restrict themselves to comparing the EU either to other 
international and regional organizations or to following King, Keohane and Verba’s 
methodological advice to “generate multiple observations within the EU” (Caporaso et al. 
1997, 5; King et al. 1994;). 8 
                                                 
7
 Cf. Hoffmann (2011) for a detailed account of the differences listed in the literature. 
 
8
 Gary Marks, however, already observes that some scholars have started recently to conceptualize the EU 
as a polity instead of simply an international regime or an example of a process of fundamental institutional 
change. While raising the caveat that the “EU is more diverse than” Switzerland, Germany, Canada and the 
USA, he concedes that reconceptualizing the EU with the help of “some meaningful underlying dimension” 
allows in the end for comparison “even assuming that the EU is unique” (Caporaso et al. 1997, 3). 
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Due to the emphasis on each polity’s uniqueness, few attempts have been made to 
conduct systematic comparisons of the USA and the European Union. This has led to the 
formulation of very similar explanations for market integration and state-building, but 
which have not been tested cross-polity wise. Such short-sightedness has hampered our 
understanding of the developmental similarities and differences of the two polities and 
weakens our understanding of each polity considered on its own. If the arguments we 
make about one polity are also logically applicable to the other, but turn out to be wrong 
there, then this poses a problem for the polity in which they may have looked right in the 
first place.  
The emergence in recent years of new scholarship on the comparability of the EU 
and the US with each other, however, has begun to reverse this trend. Most of those who 
have undertaken this new work, though, are specialists of the EU. Scholars of the 
American body politic still rarely engage in this kind of comparison and when they do, 
such as Theodore Lowi, they focus on “What can European Union learn from United 
States?” (Lowi 2006; sic). The reverse, of course, is as much applicable, but frequently 
gets overlooked, with maybe the notable exception of Goldstein (2001). Thus, most of the 
efforts so far have focused on a preliminary step, i.e. to demonstrate that the EU and the 
US are similar and that comparing them not only makes logically sense, but is 
appropriate to advance the research agenda. Much of the appropriateness of comparing 
the EU and the US rest on the observation that both polities exhibit a similar wide 
dispersal of power and the accompanying shunning of institutional concentration of it, 
compared to other advanced industrial democracies (Sbragia 2006, 16).  
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Thus, similar descriptive terminology has been used in recent years for the 
European Union and the United States. Zimmerman for instance uses the Imperium in 
Imperio, i.e. an empire within an empire, with each possessing substantial powers, 
concept to depict the United States, noting that “[t]here would be no federal system 
without the exercise of relatively autonomous political powers by a national legislature 
and subnational legislatures as political powers otherwise would be centralized in the 
national plane (a unitary system) or in the subnational plane (a confederate system)” 
(Zimmerman 2005, 97). This concept very well applies to the European Union today, 
where “[t]here is no issue area that was the exclusive domain of national policy in 1950 
and has not somehow and to some degree been incorporated within the authoritative 
purview of the EC/EU” (Schmitter 1996, 124). Therefore, the European Union 
“resembles nothing so much as the American conception of ‘marble cake federalism’, in 
which there exists no rigid delineation of authority among the federal and state levels of 
government” and where depictions of the EU as “a quasi-federal, “multilevel” or 
“multitiered” political system” have become more and more common (Donahue and 
Pollack 2001, 108; Pierson 1998, 28; cf. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 1). Sergio 
Fabbrini summarizes these perceptions in reasoning that the EU and the US “are two 
different species of the same political genus: the compound democracy” (Fabbrini 2007, 
3; sic). With the exception of Switzerland, both, the US and the EU, are the only two 
polities characterized by a multiple separation of power, both vertical and horizontal 
(Fabbrini 2005, 2007). Sbragia concurs in observing that in contrast to the EU’s member 
states as well as other parliamentary systems, such as Canada and Australia, the United 
States and the European Union are characterized “by the collective exercise of public 
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authority rather than by a ‘government’ which, as the executive, possess asymmetrical 
power vis-à-vis the legislature” (Sbragia 2006, 17). Consequently, according to these 
authors, “[t]he EU is unique vis-à-vis the European nation-states, but not in comparison 
with another continental federal experience like the American one” (Fabbrini 2005, 3). 
Indeed, given that the “institutional web of the EU governmental/governance system 
appears to be a species of a genus of democratic polities which are compound rather than 
unified - as is the case of the US”, […] it does not seem convincing to claim that the EU 
is a polity without any precedent, in the modalities of both its formation and its 
functioning, in the history of the democratic world” (Fabbrini 2005, 6).  
The European Union and the United States share another very important 
theoretical similarity with each other as well as with Switzerland and Germany. They are 
all examples of the “coming-together” type of federalism. Very simply put, we can 
differentiate between federations that came into existence by the devolution of an unitary 
state and those that came about as a result of the unification of existing states (Friedrich 
1968). Most of the modern federal entities, such as Belgium, Canada, India, Australia, 
and Spain, have to be characterized as “holding-together” federalisms, while the EU 
represents with the “older” federations, like United States, Germany and Switzerland, the 
“coming-together” type (Linz 1999; Lowi 2006, 95; Stepan 1999).9 Yet, Germany is not a 
compound democracy with multiple separations of power. Its powers are fused at the 
federal level. Switzerland, the US and the EU, are the only polities characterized by a 
multiple separation of power, both vertical and horizontal (Fabbrini 2005, 2007, cf. also 
                                                 
9
 Also it can be questioned how much modern Germany actually represents the ‘coming-together’ type of 
federalism given that the post-Third Reich Germany “arose from the disaggregation of a previously 
centralized state and not, as in the case of America, from the aggregation of previously independent units” 
(Fabbrini 2007, 88; Watts 1987, 1988). 
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Sbragia 2006). Yet, size and complexity can matter significantly, making the United 
States a better comparator to the EU and vice versa (Dahl and Tufte 1973). Thus, the 
limited demographic, geographic, economic size and international role reduces the value 
of Switzerland as comparator.  
Additionally, previous works, as described below, have highlighted in their 
theories the centrality of the internal market in the building of the US and EU polities. In 
both cases the establishment of a functioning internal market was one, if not the core 
mission of the EU since the Treaties of Rome and of the US since the drafting of the US 
constitution. 10 Much of American constitutional history and the growth of the European 
Union are similar in their focus on interstate commerce (Farber 1997, 1283). What is 
more, Zimmerman notes that the demise of the confederacy was predestined because of 
the “failure of the article to authorize Congress […] to regulate commerce” and that this 
defect was clearly “the most serious one and contributed greatly to the increasing public 
pressure for the amendment of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union” 
(Zimmerman 2002, 6, 2005, 28). Thus, one of the prime roles of the US constitution was 
to reduce interstate trade barriers. This observation is shared by Lowi who notes that 
“[c]ommerce was what had led to rejection of the Articles of Confederation after a dozen 
years, because confederation tolerated barriers to trade that interfered with creation of a 
common national market” and “[t]he new Constitution with its stronger national 
government produced policies that earned America the designation by Europeans as a 
                                                 
10
 Other authors, such as Alberta Sbragia (2002), who talks about the EU as being a ‘mirror image’, have 
argued that while in the past federalist entities like the USA started out as a defense compact, the EU was 
first constructed on an economic basis. Elazar makes a similar argument noting that the European 
integration process was the reverse of the American process, given that NATO already took care of the 
quest for security (Elazar 2001, 32-33; cf. Menon and Schain 2006, 6–7). While this might be true for the 
Articles of Confederation, it seems that this becomes less evident with the ratification of the US 
constitution and the establishment of the United States. Also, as has been noted earlier, the US similarly 
profited from Pax Britannica throughout the 19th century.  
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commercial republic" (Lowi 2006, 96; emphasis in original). Moreover, in the words of 
Geraint Howells, “[t]he Commerce Clause and the internal market Treaty provisions can 
be viewed as functional equivalents”, the differences being “mere semantics” (Howells 
2002, 603).  
Besides, it is generally the United States, not Switzerland or Germany, which serves as 
a point of reference for many politicians and scholars from the very onset of European 
integration. Using American imagery, Sir Winston Churchill called for an “United States 
of Europe”, 11 Jean Monnet founded the “Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe” in 1955 and Piero Malvestiti, the former president of the High Authority, 
invoked the American motto of e pluribus unum in front of the European Parliament not 
as a “mere literary tag” but as an “admonition, a precept, an aspiration” for the European 
Community and as “an eloquent and irrefutable example to confound any who may still 
imagine that federations or confederations must inevitably be weaker than unitary, 
centralized States” (Malvestiti 1960, 29). The European Commission in its market 
analyses tends also to use the US as the benchmark and comparator. Thus, Dierx and 
Ilkovitz from the European Commission write that “[a] priori, the US is an appropriate 
benchmark for this exercise given that it is a well integrated market of a size comparable 
to the EU” and that “[g]iven the other structural similarities, namely in terms of factor 
endowments, the US is a direct competitor to the EU for many products in the world 
market" (Dierx and Ilzkovitz 2008, 16). And during the run up to the 1992 single market, 
not only did the EU commissioned Cecchini report compare the market conditions, such 
as public procurement, with the US, but the team around the Internal Market 
                                                 
11
 While it is Churchill’s speech in Zürich in 1946, which made the term “United States of Europe” famous, 
it has longer antecedents. Churchill himself already employed the term in a Saturday Evening Post article 
on February 15th 1930 (cf. Lénárt 2003). 
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Commissioner Lord Cockfield actively studied the US at the time, among other things as 
regards VAT, adapting their arguments for market integration strategically based on the 
situation they found in the US (WS Atkins 1988; interviews with former EU officials in 
2009). 
Finally, big business deals with the European Union as they do with any other national 
government around the world. Consequently, in contrast to some scholars’ own views, 
big business did not and “do not perceive the European Community as some “would-be 
polity” (Cowles 1994, 48). For them “relations with Community officials and their 
involvement in the regulatory process is not some international regime comprised of 
states in an anarchic world, but a system of governance that embodies the rules, 
institutions and norms found in Member States” (Cowles 1994, 48). In short, the EU is 
seen and treated as a domestic political system. And once we admit the present 
exceptions of welfare and defense, the United States and the European Union look very 
similar as regards the allocation of policy function. 
But even those who would argue that the EU and the US polities are highly 
comparable do not make the case that the European Union has adopted rules that open 
exchange to competition further than its transatlantic neighbor. Indeed, is certainly not 
unreasonable in a first cut but arguably the obvious expectation of anyone, including 
experts on the polities as the introductory chapter noted, to imagine the United States to 
be a much more homogenized and centralized entity than the European Union.12  
                                                 
12
 Egan yet observes “that the European single market was established with much more interference upon 
the sovereign powers of states than in the United States” (Egan 2001, 85). However, it doesn’t become 
quite clear in what way the US is characterized by less interference and why.  As she notes herself, “Like 
the United States, the European Union has been confronted by clashes over the ‘reserved’ powers of 
constituent states” and “courts can shift positions in assessing the degree to which the federal level can 
restrict states regulatory activities” (Egan 2001, 107). 
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First of all, and in stark contrast to the United States, the EU in 2011 encompasses a 
wide variety of democratic political and market systems, such as federal and unitary 
states, presidential and parliamentary systems, constitutional monarchies and republics, 
liberal market and social market economies, etc. Given this greater institutional diversity 
within the European polity, it seems reasonable to expect that centralization, whether for 
liberalization or any other purpose, will never go as far in the EU as in the US. 
Second, the GDP per capita spread between states is much larger in the EU than in 
the US. It varies in the United States between $ 44,731 in the District of Columbia and $ 
22,008 in Mississippi. In the EU the GDP per capita in Luxembourg ($ 42,767) is about 7 
times the size of Latvia’s ($ 6,264) (United National Development Programme 2001, 
178; US Department of Commerce). The greater economic disparity among EU member 
states than US sister states assumedly leads to a greater variety of potential economic 
interests in the European Union. This in turn then leads to the reasonable expectation that 
the adoption of a single set of coherent rules for exchange is much harder to come by in 
the European Union than in the United States. 
Third, the European Union differs from the United States in regards to its lack of a 
common demos. It is home to twenty official languages, making communication and the 
creation of a common identity among its citizens difficult. As Weiler observes, the EU 
“does not presuppose the supreme authority and sovereignty of its federal demos” and 
therefore differs from any other federal state (Weiler 2001, 57). While some scholars 
expect that such a demos will develop over time (Hurrelmann 2005), others argue that 
empirical observation of existing federalist entities actually undermines the claim of a 
fundamental difference with other existing federal polities and the necessity of a federal 
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demos. Trechsel remarks that “in Switzerland institutional procedures have emerged […] 
allowing for the co-existence of a number of sub-national demoi, speaking different 
languages, belonging to different religious and cultural groups, in the absence of a real 
federal demos” (Trechsel 2005, 405). Fabbrini also disagrees with Weiler’s position in 
noting that the debate on the importance of a common demos in the EU is largely based 
on the experiences of the individual European nation-states and not the American 
experience. The former “have tended to assume the historical correlation” that 
“democracy came after the nation, or better after the nation-state was fully recognized” as 
“a logical necessity” (Fabbrini 2007, 49).13 In the United States, on the other hand, 
“nationality has been the product of the democratic process, not its precondition” 
(Fabbrini 2007, 49). However, Fabbrini does not make the claim that a common demos 
already exists in Europe. Thus the generally accepted view remains that the support for 
the integration process and the European Union is based on specific advantages rather 
than on a diffuse support for a European polity (cf. Hix 1999, 135–38). Additionally 
American identity has been forged together over time in fighting wars collectively against 
others. 
Fourth, the comparably much higher mobility rates of American citizens within their 
polity would also let us assume that there would be more pressure for instance to 
harmonize the American internal market and eliminate any barriers for its citizens than 
would be the case in Europe. According to the US Census Bureau 7.628 million people 
                                                 
13
 The notion common across Europe that a democratic regime requires a pre-identified demos was 
highlighted in the case Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Treaty of 1994 before the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). The court decided that the EU can “claim superior 
legitimacy over its member states only if its decisions are the democratic expression of the will of European 
demos, a condition ‘does not yet exist’” (Fabbrini 2007, 31). This decision, as correctly pointed out by 
Fabbrini, is largely the by-product of Germany’s own path towards modern democracy (cf. Fabbrini 2007, 
30–31). 
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moved to another US state in the period of 2002 – 2003, representing 2.69% of the US 
population (2004). Samuel Huntington, noting the absence of “intense attachments to 
particular localities” of individual Americans from the very beginning of the country, 
even talks about “the moving American,” lacking sustained territorial passion, loyalty, or 
commitment” (Huntington 2004, 50 and 52).14 In the European Union in contrast an 
estimated total of 6.951 million EU nationals lived in another member state as of January 
1st, 2003 (European Commission 2003).15 This nearly 7 million people represent about 
1.52% of the overall EU population. The difference in the mobility rate is actually much 
bigger in considering that the US percentage reflects only those who moved in one year 
while the EU percentage accounts for all EU nationals living in another EU member 
state, no matter when they moved. 
Fifth, the historical trajectories of the EU and the US, especially between their 
respective component units, vary considerably.16 It is generally argued that because the 
two polities developed in different centuries, they faced different external constraints and 
circumstances. Thus, while the US “has the status of being a very old political system” 
given that it is “governed under the oldest written constitution in the world” and had two 
centuries to develop, the EU on the other hand is considered a polity in its infancy, a 
product of WWII and the industrial age as well as predominantly an artifact of the Cold 
                                                 
14
 The high level of mobility in the United States compared to other nations has been frequently commented 
on by many different observers throughout American history (cf. Huntington 2004: 50).  
 
15
 This 2003 estimation is based on 25 member states, not including Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
16
 McKay, however, hints at that a closer look at the historical trajectories of the EU and the US actually 
reveals many significant similarities. Thus, even after having replaced the Articles of Confederation with 
the US Constitution, US defense remained in the hands of state-controlled militias until 1812, a national 
police force, the FBI, wasn’t created until the 1920s and a real Central Banking System until 1913 (McKay 
2001). Furthermore, early commentators saw an American people as a “chimera” in the first half of the 19th 
century, and states remained the key providers of transfer payments to the needy until 1930, 140 years after 
the ratification of the US constitution (McKay 2001). 
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War (Sbragia 2006, 15). In fact, the EU’s eventual demise was predicted with the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the bipolar world in which intra-EU relations 
were able to flourish (Mearsheimer 1990).17 Moreover, the historical trajectories of the 
individual EU member states are characterized by a greater diversity than those states 
composing the United States. Most of the US states, especially the original thirteen 
colonies largely shared and share, comparatively speaking, a much closer historical bond. 
In comparison therefore and despite its decentralized nature, the United States looks 
fairly homogenous at the macro-level.  
Most importantly, however, the entire subtext of the EU literature is that while the 
EU has become more centralized than any other international organization, it still falls 
short of being considered a state. Hence, while scholars won’t quite call the EU a ‘state’, 
no one is arguing that the US label as a ‘state’ should be questioned. As Magnette et al. 
argue, “the EU is not a state, and not likely to become one in the foreseeable future” 
(Magnette et al. 2003, 834). And Vivien A. Schmidt observes that “[a]s everyone reminds 
us, the EU is certainly not a nation-state” (Schmidt 2004, 976). According to this view, the 
United States is a full-fledge nation-state and the EU simply a young, still developing 
political system, which makes a comparison between the two rather awkward (Sbragia 
2006, 15). In other words, the United States is a single sovereign nation while the 
European Union is a composite of twenty-seven individual sovereign nations (cf. 
Goldstein 2001). Characterizations of the EU therefore as an “experimental polity”, “a 
regional state” of “ever-increasing regional integration and ever continuing national 
                                                 
17
 Fabbrini, however, points out  that the argument that the “the integration process of post-Second World 
War Europe was made possible by a sort of European isolationism - an isolationism protected by US 
military forces within NATO”, overlooks that the US was able to enjoy a similar isolationist experience in 
the 19th century thanks to the British navy (Fabbrini 2005, 19). 
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differentiation”, a “first truly postmodern political form” or as a major challenge for 
scholars of integration because of the EU’s “betweenness” have been common (Laffan 
1998, 236; Nicolaïdis 2007, 682; Schmidt 2004, 976; Ruggie 1993, 139–40). Dierx and 
Ilzkovitz also note that “the EU remains a less integrated market than the US: trade 
integration is still 70% lower in the EU than in the US and the price dispersion for 
tradeable between EU capitals remains higher in the EU than in the US" (Dierz and 
Ilzkovitz 2008, 3). And Sbragia concurs by contending that “even in the economic area, 
precisely the area in which the Union is the strongest” the EU lacks power in many 
important areas (Sbragia 2006, 23). She adds that “[i]n spite of having created an 
extremely important single market, it does not yet have an economic identity: no product 
carries a ‘Made in the EU’ mark; an EU patent does not yet exist, and the Union is not 
even considering an EU postage stamp” (Sbragia 2006, 23). Consequently that the 
European Union is more heterogeneous in nearly every sense than the US appears 
therefore to be obvious to most. As we will see later, however, this does not seem to be 
always the case when we look more closely. 
In sum then, one of the greatest shortcomings in the American and European 
literature on market and state-building has traditionally been a lack of comparison 
between the two. This is problematic, given that even if one only buys barely into the 
comparability of the two polities, one should be able to accept that the logic of arguments 
derived from studying one polity should be applicable to the other. Thus, even if one 
compares only to show that the two are essentially different, the logic of the arguments 
should still apply. Given the notorious difficulties of n=1 causal inference, this possibility 
for comparative leverage offers a crucial opportunity to better evaluate the various 
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arguments that have been made about either the US or the EU. In other words, 
exceptionalist arguments are “always theoretically sterile” and have led in the US and in 
Europe to “an unfortunate parochialism of political analysis” (Fabbrini 2007, 204). To 
gain a better understanding of either polity and what might be specific about them, it 
becomes necessary to compare them. Indeed, to use Fabbrini’s words, “specificity does 
not mean uniqueness, since specificity can be recognized as such only through 
comparison” (Fabbrini 2007, 204; cf. Sartori 1984). In short, it does not matter so much 
in the end where the two polities meet on an imagined comparability scale to accept that 
the theoretical arguments should hold up when comparing the two.  
The next section will therefore in a few words describe the main approaches to 
market-building in the respective American and European literatures and their empirical 
implications. These implications, as the rest of the dissertation will demonstrate, fall 
largely short of the empirical evidence. 
Three Views of Market Integration and State-Building 
If practically all scholars take as given that the US is more integrated and 
centralized than the EU, the literatures on market integration and state-building in these 
two polities display a contradictory emphasis. The EU integration literature—which tends 
to compare the EU, explicitly or implicitly, to other international organizations—is 
largely set up to explain how the EU became so centralized. For instance, Sbragia 
observes, that “[t]he centralization of power in Brussels is striking if one compares the 
organizational capacity embedded in the EU’s institutions with those of a traditional 
secretariat in an international organization” (Sbragia 2006, 22). Prominent books on the 
US state and market, conversely, are usually set up to stress that the US is a relatively 
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decentralized and fragmented state in comparison to more unitary states, especially 
European ones, and to explain why. Skworonek’s landmark book (1982) on Building a 
New American State was written to deal with exactly this question. It was the common 
wisdom presumption that the US should be more centralized that made his book so 
forceful. Other books on the American state and market have overlapping backgrounds. 
Thus, Bensel argues against the ‘conventional explanations’ that ‘an unregulated national 
market existed in the United States, almost as a birthright of national existence’ (Bensel 
2000, xxi). And Berk in Alternative Tracks documents multiple competing early-
American industrial orders, against the widespread impression that there has long been a 
strong entity called the ‘US economy’ (Berk 1994). By comparing the US with other 
nation-states, such as France and the UK explicitly (Dobbin 1994) or implicitly 
(Skowronek 1982, 5), and the EU with other free trade areas and custom unions, such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), or the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Winters 2010), both literatures, as the previous section 
has pointed out, reached a similar conclusion: the US and the EU are respectively one of 
a kind.  
Given that the arguments to explain a specific set of institutional outcomes have 
almost always been made about only one set of institutions, they appear, when placed in 
comparative perspective, to end up being reasoned backward from the outcome. Yet the 
explanatory frameworks being used to explain one or the other polity’s absence or 
present of a coherent set of rules for market exchange and the degree to how much they 
open exchange to competition are very similar. Hence, in theory, we have three different 
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coherent explanations of institutional outcomes and market integration. One category is 
“structural” in a materialist sense, and includes many other arguments that have also been 
called rationalist or functionalist. Another category is institutionalist. A third category 
incorporates ideational and cultural approaches to market building.  
 
Structuralist-Materialist & Rationalist-Functionalist Explanations 
I place here structural, materialist, rationalist, or functionalist arguments in the 
same category, given that they share the same idea in regards to how institutional 
outcomes come about (cf. Parsons 2007). All of these arguments have at their core the 
notion that a certain kind of institutions with a certain degree of centralization and 
liberalization is the direct result of the aggregation of rational individuals’ 
straightforward responses to an objectively real obstacle course of material challenges. In 
other words, actors are seen as having similar, constant preferences for material concerns, 
such as economic well-being, and act rationally to reach their goals given objectively 
available options. As Parsons has noted previously with respect to institution-building in 
the EU, scholars from this school of thought see centralization and liberalization 
outcomes “either as solving objective collective action problems among actors, or as 
securing objective distributional benefits for the actor(s) with the power to set rules 
(Parsons 2003a, 3; emphasis in original). Differences in outcome, according to the logic 
of these arguments, are largely due to people being “positioned differently in the 
‘material landscape’” or to “exogenous changes in the ‘material landscape which orient 
people toward new actions” (Parsons 2007, 51). In short, what the different variants of 
this school of thought have in common is that the variation in material structure explains 
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variation in institutional outcomes. Because people’s actions are simply rational reactions 
to a given external environment, similar material structures in the European Union and 
the United States should therefore lead to largely similar adoptions of a single set of 
coherent rules for exchange and rules that open exchange to competition.  
However, what distinguishes structural-materialist arguments from functionalist 
arguments is that the former focuses more on the rational interests of individuals or 
specific groups. Functionalists, on the other hand, concentrate their attention largely on 
the overarching needs of the political system, i.e. the needs of a specific polity to increase 
economic gains and efficiencies or to maintain or establish political stability and order. 
The first variant of this explanation, structural-materialism, therefore mainly 
concentrates on the traceable self-serving agendas of specific interest groups. Typical for 
structural-materialist arguments is the notion that market integration and centralization 
across sectors is a function of variation in the economic interdependence of private actors 
where rising interdependence leads to domestic politics and national preference formation 
which then via intergovernmental bargaining leads to the delegation of authority and a 
change in the organization of the market (Garrett 1992; McCurdy 1978; Moravcsik 1991, 
1998).  
In the American context the work American Law and the Marketing of the Large 
Corporation by McCurdy (1978) is an example of this logic. McCurdy contends that it is 
the rise of big business, which enabled integration of the national market in the US 
(McCurdy 1978, 633). The Supreme Court needed “litigants with sufficient resources to 
finance scores of lawsuits in order […] to combat the tendency of state government to 
mobilize counterthrusts against the Supreme Court’s nationalist doctrines” (McCurdy 
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1978, 648). It was in short these new big business groups which led due to a vigorous 
expression of their interests and strong pressure on domestic politics to further market 
integration and centralization.  
In the European context, works by Moravcsik (1998), The Choice for Europe, and 
by Garrett (1992), International cooperation and institutional choice: the European 
Community's internal market, are representatives of this logic. Moravcsik makes the 
claim that European economic integration is mainly the result of the decisions the 
politicians of the major member states of the European Union made in reaction to general 
structural economic pressures and to particular powerful business interests. Thus market 
building and liberalization in the EU is first and foremost the result of 
A series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued 
economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic 
producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental 
coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global 
economy (Moravcsik 1998, 3). 
Similarly Garrett argues that while steps towards internal market integration can 
be considered as a functional response to the changing patterns of market 
interdependence, conventional theories based on a functional orientation are only 
“helpful in delineating both the general environment in which cooperative solutions may 
emerge and the general institutional forms that such solutions may take” (Garrett 1992, 
560). Therefore, he emphasizes that such an approach “downplays the fundamentally 
political nature of most bargaining over cooperative agreements” and that ‘[b]oth the 
economic and the political institutions governing the internal market reflect the 
preferences of the most powerful countries in the EC: France and Germany’ (Garrett 
1992, 560–61).  
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Functionalist arguments represent a second variant. Instead of focusing on 
rationalist interest-group or coalition logics, functionalist arguments emphasize the 
shared interests of many socio-economic groups in functionally efficient institutional 
arrangements. David Mitrany, generally considered the father of functionalism, for 
instance advocated for the transfer of functional tasks from governments to international 
agencies to solve specific societal problems, such as war (Mitrany 1966, 1976). 
Explanations about market integration and liberalization based on functionalist logics of 
various sorts therefore tend to argue that whatever turned out in the US or EU was most 
functional in that case. In other words, the existence and form of present-day institutions 
is attributed to the functions they perform for the collective system as a whole (or for the 
powerful actors that benefit from a particular institutional arrangement). But problematic 
with this kind of explanations is that in this literature the existence of specific 
occurrences is simply explained with reference to the effects of those occurrences 
(Thelen 2004, 24). In short, functionalist scholars so far have generally focused more of 
their attention on institutional effects than institutional origins and change, leaving the 
lacunae filled with functional reasoning (Pierson 2000, 475–76).  
A prominent example of functionalist reasoning in regards to market building is 
Chandler. He for instance not only takes the existence of a national market in the United 
States for granted, but also argues that “the rise of the modern business enterprise in 
American industry” was an inevitability in that “it was little affected by public policy, 
capital markets, or entrepreneurial talents because it was part of a more fundamental 
economic development […], the organizational response to fundamental changes in 
processes of production” (Chandler 1977, 376; cf. Bensel 2000, 6–7). In brief, 
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“managerial capitalism” and the modern large corporation came about in the United 
States as a result of the size and homogeneity of the country’s market, which “hastened 
the adoption of new technologies”, “stimulated the rapid spread of fundamental 
innovations – the railroad, the telegraph, and the new coal technologies”, and 
“encouraged Americans to pioneer in the machinery and organization of mass 
production” (Chandler 1977, 498 – 99).  
Closely linked and generally subsumed into functionalist and structuralist-
materialist arguments, are transaction cost and efficiency based approaches to market 
building. Indeed, transaction cost, efficiency-based approaches have been very common 
in the multi-level governance and federalist literature and span both the functionalist and 
the structuralist-materialist variants. While struturalist-materialists, however, tend to 
highlight more the economic benefits and transactions costs of more narrow and specific 
groups, functionalist generally argue that outcomes are due to efficiency gains for the 
entire polity. The main focus of economic efficiency-based argument generally is on the 
correction of market failure and the reduction of transaction costs. In general the idea is 
that Coase’s notion of the nature of the firm gets extended to the establishment of a 
government and market integration (Coase 1937). Thus, a central government or state is 
supposed to emerge in those cases where a very short term contract would be 
unsatisfactory and where free-riding incentives threaten to prevent efficient bargains. 
Hence, a central government might be given independent authority to promote the 
efficient allocation of national resources. However, a single authority may also use its 
power for purposes that are inimical to allocative efficiency. Hence, ‘thriving markets 
require not only an appropriately designed economic system, but a secure political 
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foundation that limits the ability of the state to confiscate wealth’ (Weingast 1995, 1). 
Competition among various jurisdictional units is thus considered beneficial (cf. Tiebout 
1956). Consequently, in a multi-level governance entity or compound polity we should 
see the adjudication of authority to ‘the smallest area necessary to optimize the 
information available to the government decisionmaker […], while ensuring that it 
internalizes all the consequences of its activities’ (Triantis 1997, 1276). Oates calls this 
the basic principle of fiscal federalism and it has been the standard view of functionalist, 
efficiency-based arguments for a while (Oates 1997, 1323). In short, based on this model 
compound polities, like the EU and the US, should ensure that competition in diverse 
policy fields across jurisdictional units is alive and kicking. Zimmerman seems to support 
this view by arguing for a facilitative role for the US Congress in interstate commerce 
and in noting ‘the ability of [US] states to function as laboratories of democracies 
developing new solutions for problems’ (Zimmerman 2003, 36). 
Yet, in more recent years, newer efficiency-based arguments have come to argue 
the contrary, blurring the line and making predictions or explanations based on an 
efficiency model even harder. Alice Rivlin (1992) for instance argues that tax 
competition among the states leads to inefficiently low levels of public services. As Oates 
(1997, 1322) therefore notes, her ‘basic contention is thus that competition among 
jurisdictions (be they nation states within the European Community or political 
subdivision within a nation) leads to distorted outcomes in the public sector both in terms 
of fiscal and regulatory policies’. Competition at the state level is seen as destructive, i.e. 
as a system that needs to be carefully circumscribed to enhance efficiency by avoiding 
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races to the bottom. This then leads to the expectation of more harmonization, i.e. the 
adoption of a single set of coherent rules, of various policies, including tax policies.  
Thus, from a structuralist-materialist / rationalist-functionalist perspective we can 
anticipate to find empirical evidence supporting the following suppositions when looking 
at market centralization and liberalization in the EU and the US.  
Concerning more structural-materialist approaches to market building, we should 
first be able to find in both polities that an increase in economic interdependence in a 
market sector leads to demands for this sector to become centralized and liberalized to 
facilitate trade across the entire polity. In other words, the polity with the greater amount 
of economic interdependence can be assumed to be the polity which more likely has 
adopted a single set of coherent rules for market exchange. Second, based on the logic of 
the same variant, we should also see that the centralization and liberalization of a market 
sector is the result of the decisions of the most powerful states based on their national 
preferences derived from pressure groups. As a corollary, therefore, we should expect 
similar outcomes in both polities to the extent that the preferences of the most powerful 
interest groups are similar across the most powerful states in the US and the EU. Indeed, 
this explanatory variant lets us assume that what we see happening in the public 
procurement, services and regulated goods arenas in the EU are in the end the outcome of 
Europe’s most powerful states. By the same logic what we see happening in these policy 
arena in the United States should also be the result of America’s most powerful states. In 
fact, US sister states frequently see themselves comparable to sovereign EU member 
states. Former California Governor Schwarzenegger described his state as “a nation-state 
[…] acting as a new country” (Breslau 2007, 60). Furthermore, this variant expects us to 
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find strong evidence that the push for extensive market centralization and liberalization 
was primarily coming from powerful business interest groups within the states, 
particularly from the most powerful states. Business, especially the most competitive 
among them, consequently should have consistently been at the forefront of initiatives 
leading to further market integration and liberalization, bringing its full attention and 
resources to bear. 
As regards more narrowly functionalist arguments, in all cases similar economic 
circumstances and necessities should lead to similar institutional arrangements. The 
entire premise of such arguments it that we should see very similar (or at least 
functionally equivalent) institutional arrangements where we see similar underlying 
opportunities for efficiency gains. In other words, we should find that large variations in 
economic circumstances in a market sector leads to different outcomes in regards to the 
adoption of a single set of coherent rules and the adoption of rules for facilitating market 
exchange. Moreover, we should be able to observe similar responses to similar 
fundamental processes of economic development.  
 More concretely, if outcomes are indeed in the last resort based on reactions to the 
size and the homogeneity of a polity’s market as functionalist theories argue, the similar 
size and greater homogeneity of the US to the EU market would lead to the expectation 
that it is the United States which would have taken consistently more steps in integrating 
the public procurement, services and goods sectors. The opposite logic, i.e. the potential 
notion that due to greater complexity and more veto points a polity might have to 
centralize more to be able to function efficiently, simply does not hold up as a logical 
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extrapolation of this approach, given that this would imply that the most centralized and 
integrated polities must be those with the greatest number of obstacles. 
Consequently, given the similar sizes today of the European and American 
markets and similar technological stimuli and pressures on both sides of the Atlantic 
leading to, as Turina (2005, 225) has pointed out, “a broad geographical expansion of 
corporations’ areas of interest” and to the desire for instance of service providers to 
“break through established local barriers”, the argument by Chandler as well as in 
extension by McCurdy lead toward the assumption that the US will have taken by now at 
the very least steps not unlike the EU to eradicate still existing stumbling blocks to the 
sale of regulated goods, the provision of services, and to the free competition in the 
public procurement sector either out of commercial necessity or because of powerful 
business interests.  
Evidence in the later chapters, however, will show that the expectations derived 
from both, the rationalist-functionalist and the structuralist-materialist, variants do not 
hold up. First, despite similar economic constraints, the European Union ends up in 
having adopted a single set of coherent rules and rules that facilitate trade to a much 
greater degree in several important economic sectors than United States. Second, France 
and Germany, the EU’s two most powerful countries and the so-called ‘motor of 
European integration’, for instance, were the most resistant to the far-reaching 
liberalization of the European services market. Yet, a services market much more 
liberalized than in the US, specifically in regards to the temporary provision of services, 
has been put in place. Regarding public procurement, it is for instance especially some of 
the less-populated states and therefore usually considered the less powerful states in the 
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US that have the greatest barriers to public procurement, e.g. Wyoming, Alaska, or 
Hawaii. Third, business groups played a role but were neither at the forefront nor the 
critical catalyst of market-building in Europe. They, however, frequently tended to play 
an important supportive role for the European Commission. More importantly, however, 
the Commission in at least in one case ensured that business would play the role of strong 
supporter when dealing with potential member states’ resistance. On the other hand, 
business groups in the US either did not show any interest in further market centralization 
and/or liberalization or when they did show some interest, the feeling was that they could 
not do much because out of one or an amalgam of three reasons. First, to push for more 
market centralization and liberalization within the US would mean that they would have 
to favor one of their members headquartered in one state over another and that they 
cannot do institutionally. Second, nothing can be done because state rights would 
probably not let them ever reach a polity-wide outcome. Third, nobody really has so far 
taken the initiative for the entire polity and not just for their sector and they don’t want to 
take the risk or assume the costs. 
Institutionalist Explanations 
Path-dependence advocates assert that earlier institutional developments channeled 
people in certain directions later on (Sandholtz 1996). Concerning state-building in the 
United States, Skowronek for instance contends that “states change (or fail to change 
through political struggles rooted in and mediated by preestablished institutional 
arrangements” (Skowronek 1982, ix). Thus, the functionalist formulation is not only 
inadequate in “approaching state building as the natural and adaptive reaction of 
governments to changing conditions”, but also “distorts the history of reform” by 
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ignoring “the limitations of modern American state building” (Skowronek 1982, viii). In 
brief, Skowronek argues that centralization, and in extension market liberalization, or 
rather the lack of it in America compared to other unitary states can be explained by the 
low level of federal resources and the vested interests in the state level, dating back at 
least as far as the American Constitution. Hence, he observes that America is 
“distinguished by incoherence and fragmentation in governmental operations and by the 
absence of clear lines of authoritative control”, by “a meager concentration of 
governmental controls at the national level”, and by the fact that “the American 
Constitution has always been awkward and incomplete as an organization of state power” 
given that it was “[f]orged in the wake of a liberal revolt against the state” (Skowronek 
1982, viii, 8 and 287).  
Institutionalist explanations are the oldest tradition in the analysis of the European 
Union, going back to the writings of Ernst Haas in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Haas 
1958, 1961; cf. Rosamond 2005).18 Haas argued that the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community had the power to redirect the loyalties and expectations of political 
actors in the future. Thus, the assertion is that the creation of innovative, supranational 
institutions unintentionally changes the future behavior of political actors by changing 
their expectations. Actors start to shift some of their resources and policy efforts in the 
direction of further integration by envisaging “these new centres of authority as potential 
suppliers of outcomes that [are] consistent with their preferences” Rosamond 2005, 244).  
This leads to a self-reinforcing process which Haas called ‘spill-over’.  
                                                 
18
 Rosamond described the publication of Haas’s seminal work The Uniting of Europe (1958) as “the 
founding moment of the field of what we now routinely term ‘EUs studies’” (Rosamond 2005, 238). 
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While Haas’s neofunctionalist approach to market integration and state-building 
was largely abandoned by the late 1970s, even by Haas himself (1975), it saw a revival in 
the 1990s and 2000s (Stone Sweet 2010; cf. Rosamond 2005). Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz for instance attempt to explain centralization in the EU not only as a function 
of variation in the economic interdependence of private actors, and thus of the presence 
of active interest group demands for easier transnational exchange, but additionally 
emphasize the importance of policy feedbacks, path-dependence and institutionalization 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 22 – 25; cf. Pierson 1998). To answer therefore the 
question “why does integration proceed faster or further in some policy areas than in 
others?”, the authors contend that: 
We would look to variation in the levels of cross-border interaction and in 
the consequent need for supranational coordination and rules. In sectors 
where the intensity and value of cross-national transactions are relatively 
low, the demand for EC-level coordination of rules and dispute resolution 
will be correspondingly low. Conversely, in domains where the number 
and value of cross-border transactions are rising, there will be increasing 
demand on the part of the transactors for EC-level rules and dispute-
resolution mechanisms (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 14). 
In short, both, Skowronek and Sweet Stone and Sandholtz, argue that change is 
driven by demand for integration from non-state actors. Thus, while the latter stress the 
variation in the level of cross-border interactions, the former notes that “the expansion of 
national administrative capacities in America […] was a response to industrialism”, the 
disappearance of “the bucolic environment”, “[t]he close of the frontiers, the rise of the 
city” and “the end of isolation”, all changes leading to “raised demands for governmental 
capacities” (Skowronek 1982, 4, 8-9). The institutional outcomes of this change are, 
however, heavily channeled by the shape of previous delegations of power to the central 
state (or the lack thereof). In short, pre-existing institutional arrangements, mediated by 
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the presence or absence of active interest groups, hinder or facilitate mobilization in favor 
of more centralization, or create difficult-to-alter organizational constellations that either 
lend themselves to more centralization or do not. Crucial to institutionalist logic is that 
these pre-existing arrangements were not set up to deal with the same exact problems, but 
that the facilitation or obstacles that they present for subsequent decisions on 
centralization is unintended. 
It is important to distinguish here between broad institutionalist expectations and 
a more specific one. From a broad perspective à la Skowronek as well as Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz, the expectation is that the United States, comparatively, centralized more 
power and resources than the EU early on, and continued to build these resources and 
power over time. Consequently it seems like this should have led to greater centralization 
of rules in the key area of mark-building as well. We will see, however, that a more 
specific variant of an institutionalist hypothesis – whether or not a specific organization 
was given a clear mandate and at least some resources to pursue centralization and 
liberalization in market-building per se – is an important part of the story.  
Indeed, as will be described in more detail in the chapter’s next section on my 
own explanation, one specific institution might especially be responsible to explain the 
different degrees of centralization and liberalization in the US and EU. Thus, differences 
in the two entities might be an artifact of the unique role of the European Commission, 
which as an agent has the peculiar role of the guarantor of the treaties and promoter of an 
internal market, not lastly due to holding the sole right to initiate EU-wide legislation 
(Article 17 Consolidated version of the treaty on the European Union). Accordingly it can 
be hypothesized that the European Commission’s unique role as promoter and guarantor 
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of the internal market and the relative absence of having to carry out many other 
institutional functions, for instance in contrast to the US Supreme Court or federal 
government, leads to more attempts to centralize and liberalize policy sectors. 
Of course, readers should note that an explanation based on the European 
Commission as being an extraordinary policy actor could either be an institutional path-
dependence argument or an ideational one. They are, obviously, not mutually exclusive 
and might most likely exist in combination. Yet, it is important to be aware of the two 
different logics. Thus, on the one hand, the Commission can be seen as having been a 
fairly rational institutional innovation for early EU tasks that, because of its specific 
construction for those specific tasks, turned out to be a vehicle for a certain kind of 
centralization and liberalization later on. On the other hand, the EU Commission can be 
considered as having been endowed with a certain conceptual task and mandate—giving 
its members certain goals and legitimacy, and other actors certain expectations about how 
it would act—in a more cultural way.  
From an institutionalist perspective then empirical evidence should confirm 
across the two compound democracies the following hypotheses. First, especially from a 
broad institutionalist perspective, greater federal resources and lower levels of vested 
state interests lead to more centralization and liberalization. Second, the adoption of a 
single set of coherent rules and the adoption of rules that open exchange to competition 
should be greatly influenced by pre-existing institutional arrangements that hinder or 
facilitate the mobilization in favor of them. Third, particularly from a more specific 
institutionalist perspective, that takes into account the role of a strong executive 
institution, we should see the European Commission’s unique role as promoter and 
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guarantor of the internal market and the relative absence of many other institutional 
functions, in contrast to the Supreme Court or the US government, leading to more 
attempts to centralize and liberalize market-related policy sectors in the European Union. 
 Once again more concretely, based on Skowronek’s work, we should expect to 
see the polity with greater federal resources and lower levels of vested state interests 
leading the way towards more centralization and liberalization. Given the, comparably, 
obvious greater resources of the American federal government19 and the fact that while 
state interests in the US may be strong, they are certainly not to be assumed as strong as 
those of sovereign independent nation-states, we should expect the United States to be the 
polity to have adopted a single set of coherent rules of market exchange and rules to open 
up competition across the entire polity.  
Furthermore, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s approach leads to the clear expectation 
that given the higher rates of mobility across states in the US, we should find the United 
States to have at the very least integrated and liberalized market sectors as much as the 
European Union or even further. In other words the assumed pressure from the citizens 
more frequently moving across the polity should have led to greater pressure to remove 
any remaining barriers to trade in services, public procurement or goods in the US than 
the EU.  
What is more, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s argument leads us also to expect 
more US centralization since the earlier delegation of power to the central government in 
the US (while not large compared to other countries) was larger than the early delegations 
of power to the EU in a variety of ways. This delegation of power should have created 
                                                 
19
 The EU’s financial resources are severely limited given the budget cap of barely over 1% of the EU’s 
GDP. 
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federal entrepreneurs with an interest in more central power who should have generated 
more path-dependent dynamics of centralization and liberalization.  
Yet, as the ensuing empirical chapters will reveal, neither Skowronek’s nor Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz’s broad institutionalist explanations hold up to closer scrutiny when 
the logic of their arguments is transferred to the other polity. Comparably higher mobility 
rates and greater federal resources and lower levels of vested state interested have not led 
in the United States to an adoption of a single set of coherent rules as well as the adoption 
of rules for facilitating market access in the studied policy arenas in contrast to the 
European Union. The outcomes as will be shown are in fact contrary to the expectations.  
Ideational and Cultural Explanations 
Ideational and cultural explanations to market integration note that interest group-
based arguments frequently fail “to explain why a weak interest group in one country 
often wins a better policy outcome than its stronger counterpart in another country” and 
“why parallel interest groups in different countries believe very different policies to be in 
their interest” (Dobbin 1994, 6). What all the variants of ideational and cultural 
approaches largely share in common is that the market is not a given and does not arise 
automatically through adjustments of demand and supply via the price mechanism. 
Markets, in Polanyi’s words, are embedded in politics and society (Polanyi 1957). The 
state, according to Polanyi, must play a central and active role in managing markets. In 
other words, liberal market economies “could never exist in an apolitical or asocial 
space” (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 598). 
However, while explanations derived from ideational-cultural approaches usually 
tend to consider the degree of centralization and market integration to be the result of 
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different political cultures or having been constructed top-down by powerful political 
actors, they don’t agree whether one polity supports centralized authority and 
liberalization or only one or none of them. There are some arguments in the American 
context that say that the supports for centralized authority and for liberalization go 
together. According to this view, we can have centralized authority in the US context to 
the extent that it promotes liberalization. In other words, scholars espousing this view 
point to what centralized authority can legitimately do that is built on liberalization. On 
the other hand, there exist arguments in the American context, that point out that in the 
United States there is first and foremost a broad commitment to a certain conception of 
the state and that from this perspective it is not clear that it would be acceptable to have a 
strong state in the name of liberalization. 
Dobbin’s work on forging industrial policies in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France is an example of the former view (Dobbin 1994). He alludes to the 
fact that Americans are largely accepting governmental intervention in the market if it 
means increasing market liberalization. He argues that rationality, or rather what is 
perceived as such, is cultural. Different political traditions lead to different perceptions of 
and responses to similar problems, which then in turn explicate different industrial 
policies (Dobbin 1994, 22). Consequently in Britain, where “the political autonomy of 
individuals was constitutive of political order [, the] domination by government or other 
actors was [considered] destructive”, while in France “excessive privatism was [deemed] 
destructive” due to the fact that “central state concertation of society was constitutive of 
political order” (Dobbin 1994, 24–25). In the United States, in contrast, Washington 
became “the referee of a free market” focusing on “a policy of enforcing price 
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competition as a way of guarding Americans’ economic liberties against the demon of 
concentrated economic power” (Dobbin 1994, 2 and 24). In other words, culturally the 
United States not only focuses on market freedom, but also accepts government 
intervention, i.e. actions by centralized authority in the market, when it means increased 
liberalization. Thus, while “[d]irect governmental participation in industry became 
anathema” in the United States, market regulation with the goal of overcoming the 
political tyranny of market restraints “became the distinguishing feature of American 
industrial policy” (Dobbin 1994, 28). 
Bensel (2000) and Berk (1994) share with Dobbin the view that market integration is 
not simply the outcome of technological determinism and that markets are constructed. 
Yet, the former parts company with the latter when it comes to the idea that the US had 
only one viable political and economic tradition. Berk for instance observes that 
“industrialization and statebuilding in the United States were much more contested and 
open-ended than twentieth-century learning suggests” (Berk 1994, x). And Bensel also 
challenges the notion that “the national market was [either] a natural [or] an inevitable 
feature of the American political economy” and that “politics in the age of enterprise 
[are] epiphenomenal and adaptive” (Bensel 2000, 290; Berk 1994, ix). The construction 
of a national market was “strongly and persistently contested in national politics” in the 
nineteenth century (Bensel 2000, 11). Other authors, who espouse “a hegemonic 
“liberalism” as the major force in American political development” fail to see “that 
successful suppression of southern separatism and the creation of a national market free 
from local barriers were, in fact, truly stupendous accomplishments” (Bensel 2000, 
526).Thus, for Bensel market integration was the result of “elite-sponsored policies” 
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where the Republican Party as “developmental agent” played the key role in ensuring that 
the Supreme Court was packed with Republican judges, who insulated by life tenure 
appointments were able to suppress “state and local attempts to regulate interstate 
commerce” (Bensel 2000, xix – xx). The focus here was on an unregulated market. 
Hence, “[w]ith respect to the political construction of the national market, the United 
States Supreme Court, dominated by Republican appointees, instrumentally created the 
legal doctrines that suppressed both state and federal regulation of commerce” (Bensel 
2000, 518). These judges were chosen by presidents and confirmed by senators based on 
“their devotion to party principles” and their “attitude toward regulation of interstate 
commerce” (Bensel 2000, 7). The Republican Party was ultimately able to become a 
coherent policy-making organization due to the “emergence of a national party coalition 
centered in the manufacturing belt that exploited the distributive benefits available 
through tariff protection while articulating a broad vision of development with respect to 
interstate commerce and the gold standard” (Bensel 2000, 521). This broad vision was 
informed by “the conservative ideological orientation of the industrial and financial elite” 
who ”deciding what public policies might provide” the conditions of “fairly high rates of 
return and a disciplined focus on productive efficiency” focused on the creation of an 
unregulated national market and the adherence to the gold standard (Bensel 2000, 510). 
Despite being “a net political liability for the Republican party”, the party “choose to 
make construction of a national market economy one of the highest policy priorities the 
party would pursue” (Bensel 2000, 515 and 518). In short, Bensel contends the US 
national market “was politically constructed by the Supreme Court” to avoid it from 
being “balkanized into much smaller units” and ruling thus “out all but the most trivial 
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state and local regulations of interstate trade” (Bensel 2000, xix and 7). Consequently, 
while Bensel disagrees with Dobbin in regards to the existence of only one viable 
political and economic tradition from the birth of the United States forward, he does 
share with him the view that centralized authority and liberalization go together. 
The view that Americans accept centralized authority to the extent that it 
liberalizes markets however is not shared by all Americanist scholars. While Louis 
Hartz’s (1955) seminal work The Liberal Tradition in America was not about market 
liberalization per se, it can be deduced from his description of the Americans’ conception 
of the state that even a strong state in the name of liberalization would largely be 
abhorred. Hartz’s explanation of centralization and market integration is based on the 
idea of American exceptionalism. He emphasizes, similar to Dobbin, cultural differences, 
noticing the relative uniqueness of the American experience in contrast to Europe’s 
history. Hartz, however, comes to a different conclusion than Dobbin. Bruce Ackerman 
succinctly summarizes Hartz’s view in observing that  
Americans had never experienced anything like European feudalism. 
Since the first term in the [Marxian] three-stage sequence was lacking, 
America lacked the social ingredients necessary to spark the later 
movement from the second capitalist stage to the third socialist state. 
America was a case of arrested development, permanently frozen at stage 
two. […] Since Americans never were obligated to use state power to 
liberate themselves from feudalism, they were “born equal” and could 
afford to look upon the state as an unmitigated threat to natural liberty. 
The government that governs best governs least. Let the Europeans say 
otherwise (Ackerman 1991, 25–26). 
Therefore the United States should, in contrast to Dobbin’s cultural-based 
argument, not be expected to centralize many policy sectors given the structural, 
historical factors and the resulting American mindset. While disagreeing on the origins of 
the liberal nature of the American identity, proponents of a cultural nationalist view agree 
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with Hartz’s liberal thesis as regards the end result. Thus, while Hartz sees America as 
not being constrained and conditioned by a feudalist history, Huntington (2004) for 
instance contends that the liberal practices and values are due to the “cultural 
predominance of the white Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant stock” that created them in the 
first place (Fabbrini 2007, 43). Thus, the Anglo-Saxon whites were colonizers, and not 
immigrants like later groups, and therefore able to impose and continue to impose their 
liberal values and practices. Hence, while the liberal thesis contends that “American 
liberal nationalism [is] a necessity” and the cultural thesis argues that it is “the outcome 
of public policies and social relations” (Fabbrini 2007, 43), they both expect us to see 
similar attitudes towards central governments and markets. 
 By implication then the reticence in Europe to market integration via federal 
government fiat should be much less. Thus we should see policy sectors being centralized 
and liberalized in Europe, where they are not in the US despite similar economic 
pressures. This view seems to be supported by Aberbach et al., who note that ‘[o]n the 
administrative side, the American bureaucracy lacks the pre-democratic legitimacy that 
attaches to the monarchical, ex-monarchical, or Napoleonic bureaucracies of Europe’ 
(Aberbach et al. 1981, 23). Yet, the latter authors also observe that “American 
administrators have long had responsibility for promoting their policies and mobilizing 
their constituencies with an overtness and an intensity that is foreign to the European 
tradition”, which implies the possibility that on occasion the US bureaucracy might have 
succeeded in overcoming general reticence towards centralization, providing a different 
piece of the American exceptionalism mosaic.  
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In the European context, similar to the works on the American market by Berk 
and Bensel, Jabko (1999) stresses contingency. He observes that not only markets are 
constructed but also that alternative outcomes were very well feasible in the building of 
an European Union. Jabko contends that “there is little evidence that EMU was 
intrinsically in the economic interest of particular social groups” and that the “euro’s 
recent birth […] are neither the result of grandiose geopolitical design, nor the product of 
abstract economic necessity” (Jabko 1999, 486 and 488). Instead, similar to what I argue 
throughout this study and explain in more detail in the following section, Jabko 
emphasizes that liberalization needs a centralized organizational champion. This agent in 
the European Union is the European Commission. He writes that “[t]he advent of the 
economic and monetary union” was the direct result of “the political strategy developed 
within the European Commission in order to achieve that goal” (Jabko 1999, 475). He 
goes on to observe that “[a]s part of their integrationist agenda, Commission officials 
selectively marshaled the political and economic significance of Europe’s emerging 
Single Market” (Jabko 1999, 475). The Commission "induced key actors to reframe their 
preferences in terms of EMU” by “disseminat[ing] the notion that EMU altogether 
provided a coherent solution to the problems created by financial globalization and the 
end of the Cold War” (Jabko 1999, 475). 
Andrew Gamble (1988) in The Free Economy and the Strong States makes a 
analogous argument in regards to market liberalization in the United Kingdom during the 
Thatcher years. Market liberalization needs to be created. To ensure the construction of a 
liberalized market, a strong governmental agent with a liberalizing ideology needs to be 
put in place. He observes that one of the Prime Minister Thatcher’s main objectives was 
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“to revive market liberalism as the dominant public philosophy and to create the 
conditions for a free economy by limiting the scope of the state while restoring its 
authority and competence to act” (Gamble 1994, 4). Indeed, in Gamble’s words, if a free 
market program is to succeed, it requires a reorganization of the state by “strengthening 
the authority of government by limiting its size and scope” (Gamble 1994, 5, 1998, 231). 
In short, for Gamble Thatcherism was a “new hegemonic project”, involving “ideology, 
economics and politics, a politics of support and a politics of power”, which was geared 
towards establishing “a free economy and a strong state, as the new basis for a stable 
hegemony” (Gamble 1988, 222– 23). In other words, the liberalization of the British 
market was not only an ideological project by the Conservative party, but necessitated for 
its realization a restructuring, a strengthening of the governmental institutions. Only 
strong state institutions in favor of liberalization can overcome obstacles to a free market 
economy.20 
The relative open-endedness of many variants of ideational explanations to 
market integration due to political contestation also challenges the notion that we can 
predict which policy sector in the end will become more centralized and liberalized in the 
EU and which one in US. These explanations thus lead to the hypotheses that market 
integration and centralization is the result of elite constructions. Elites in favor of 
centralization and liberalization will lead to policy sectors being moved to the federal 
level. Moreover, the adoption of a single set of coherent rules and rules that open 
exchange to competition in different policy sectors is the result of many contingencies 
which makes prediction of outcomes impossible. They do, however, generate predictions 
                                                 
20
 Indeed Gamble observes that the state reorganization in Britain under Thatcher did not go far enough to 
liberalize the market. Further strengthening of the state needs to be undertaken to succeed in the 
establishment of a truly free market (Gamble 1988, 231). 
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about processes, i.e. about the kind of story we should see when we do observe 
centralization and liberalization. Thus, we should find evidence that those actors in favor 
of centralization and liberalization have been for instance in the key policy positions to 
make it happen or vice versa. 
 The ideational and cultural approaches to explain market-building lead then to the 
following assumptions as regards the evidence we should see when looking specifically 
at important market sectors. Ideational and cultural arguments would lead us first to 
expect that outcomes will be relatively homogeneous and similar across sectors within 
each of the entities but vary across the EU and the USA. Second, market integration and 
liberalization is the result of elite constructions. Elites in favor of centralization and 
liberalization will lead to the adoption of a single set of coherent rules for the entire polity 
and to rules facilitating trade across the entire polity. If ideational views mattered, we 
should be able to find evidence separate from the specific cases showing that elites 
favored centralization and liberalization more generally and on principle. Moreover, 
despite the fact that according to this view outcomes are often the results of many 
contingencies and therefore impossible to predict, we should nevertheless be able to offer 
prior and separate evidence of the ideational views of its advocates, contrast them to 
alternative views, and show that it was because the advocates of one particular view 
gained key positions or resources that a certain institutional design was chosen. 
As regards the notion of “American exceptionalism” derived from Hartzian 
thinking, we should expect to find evidence that greater distrust of federal government in 
the United States and the lack of bureaucratic legitimacy due to the absence of feudalism 
have favored the retaining of policy authority at the state level in contrast to the European 
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Union. As a corollary then when market centralization and integration did happen in the 
US, it should have been largely the result of an active American bureaucracy promoting 
their policies and mobilizing their constituencies. 
Ideational approaches by themselves, however, are far from being completely 
satisfying. If for instance, as Dobbin argues, the American cultural focus is really on 
enforced price competition and that the “United States’ market-enforcing industrial 
policies contribute to the conviction that free competition will induce efficiency in 
virtually every economic sector’” how then do we explain that public procurement, 
services and important goods sectors, as the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, are 
shielded from this enforced price competition and the postal sector remains a monopoly 
while the EU exactly employs this kind of enforcement in these sectors (Dobbin 1994, 
3)? It also leaves one to wonder whether the EU is for instance simply following French 
or British traditions, an amalgam of the two or already has created its own political and 
economic tradition. Moreover, if Bensel is right that market-integration is the result of 
Republican ideology pushing via the US Supreme Court for a politically constructed 
national market with the exception of trivial state and local regulations, why does then 
the “unregulated national market” in the US continue to regulate public procurement, 
services and certain goods at the state level while in the EU every effort is made to open 
up these policy sectors for free competition? These sectors are not more trivial in the 
United States than in the European Union as will be proven later on. 
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Facilitating Market Exchange: Executive Promotion and 
Societal Acceptance 
Given the apparent shortcomings of the standard approaches to market-building, I 
offer here an explanation based on an institutional argument playing out in a broad 
ideational context. I argue that taking the notion of American exceptionalism, in both the 
liberal or cultural nationalist form, and the role of the European Commission as 
centralization and liberalization catalyst due to its comparatively narrow mandate into 
serious consideration does a better job in explaining the cross-polity variation in 
outcomes. In other words, in combination the institutional and ideational elements 
explain better why the European Union has adopted a single set of coherent rules as well 
as rules that open exchange to competition much further than the United States than 
either of them alone could do. 
For instance in explaining the different paths towards market-building in the 
United States and the respective European nation states (not the EU), Fabbrini already 
incorporates implicitly Hartzian notions in emphasizing the institutional environment due 
to the absence of feudalism in the US and the diverging derivative ideological 
convictions. Thus he notes that 
In America, a modern market economy developed in the absence of a central 
state; in fact, the market was already developed when the federal state came fully 
into being at the turn of the nineteenth century (Nettle 1968).21 In Europe, by 
contrast, the pre-existence of a central state was a condition for the creation of the 
market, but it was also its constraint. In fact, the creation of a market economy 
required the dismantling of many hierarchical relations structured in both state 
and society, and it was much more difficult to achieve in Europe than in America 
(Fabbrini 2007, 90).  
 
                                                 
21
 Of course, Bensel (2000) and Berk (1994) would strongly disagree with this primordialist view. 
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Given the absence of a central state, American market-building, according to 
Fabbrini, became mainly the result of judicial action, while market-building in individual 
European nation states was the outcome of political projects (Fabbrini 2007, 80). The US 
Supreme Court was very active in the 19th century reducing interstate barriers. Its 
decisions “favored the dismantling of state trade barriers – a sort of negative integration 
of the national market – thus setting a legislative agenda for its subsequent positive 
integration by congressional legislation” (Fabbrini 2007, 93; emphasis in original ). Egan 
uses similar language when talking about market-building in the European Union. Thus, 
when talking about EU-wide market-building instead of market-building in individual 
nation states, she notes that “[i]n dealing with the discriminatory effects of regulatory 
barriers to trade, the European Court of Justice has played an active role in negative 
integration, by invalidating discriminatory national rules” and that “the Court has 
provided the window of opportunity for the Community to foster positive integration 
through the creation of a new regulatory regime” (Egan 2001, 108; emphasis in original). 
Yet, as the rest of this study will show, market integration in the US does not in very 
important aspects go as far in centralizing and liberalization trade in services, public 
procurement or certain goods sectors as in the EU. Why then the absence of positive 
integration in these sectors in the US and their presence in the EU when in both instances 
the respective Supreme Courts have played similar roles? I contend that the different 
ideas about the role of the state in market-building, deriving from a different history of 
state-building, and the limited but clear mandate of the European Commission are key to 
understanding why today we see differences in the EU and the US regarding the adoption 
of a single set of coherent rules and rules that open exchange to competition, with the EU, 
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contrary to the expectations by most experts, to be the one to facilitate trade more within 
its polity. 
Ideational Aspect: Societal Acceptance of a Strong  
Federal-Level Executive 
 
Broader norms of legitimate governance favor a centralized authority, even a 
liberalizing central authority, more in the EU than in the US. Thus, Fabbrini and Hartz 
are right when they note that the United States of American and individual European 
nation states have developed different attitudes towards central government. Yet, what 
needs to be taken into account is that these differences now also find their reflection in 
the attitude of Europeans towards the EU-level, i.e. federal-level, institutions. Thus, 
comparably and despite all the criticism we hear of the European Union in Europe, the 
basic notion of federal governance of market is far more strongly accepted across Europe 
at both the elite and mass levels than in the United States. This, of course, has its roots in 
the differences described by Hartz, Fabbrini and others regarding the US federal 
government and the individual European nation states. Thus, Fabbrini observes when 
looking at the US and the respective European nation states that “[u]nlike the Jacobin 
legacy for France, republican ideology in America merely deepened the distrust of 
national [that is, federal] mobilization” and that “[i]n Europe, by contrast the centralized 
state not only established the legal conditions for the birth of the market, but also 
intervened in its material structuring” (Fabbrini 2007, 91). He also provides us with an 
explanation on why, even after the US Supreme Court’s interventions in the 19th century, 
the US internal market might end up being less centralized and liberalized than it could 
be in observing that “the institutional dispersion of national sovereignty inherent in the 
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American political system, coupled with the legitimacy enjoyed throughout the 
nineteenth century and thereafter by the idea of an unrestrained market economy, 
prevented any direct intervention by the federal state” (Fabbrini 2007, 93; emphasis in 
original). However, while national sovereignty is even more dispersed in the EU than in 
the US, it is the different notion and legitimacy of a market unrestrained by federal 
government intervention which is significant. In the US the notion that a market 
unrestrained by federal-level intervention is akin to an open and competitive market is 
part of the country’s cultural and ideational make-up. In other words, federal-level 
intervention in the internal market is usually perceived in the US as trade hindering 
instead of facilitating. In Europe on the other hand, mercantilism “has created a public 
attitude toward the market based on the idea that it should pursue national strategies 
defined only by the state (i.e. by its political and administrative personne)l” (Fabbrini 
2007, 98; emphasis in original). Even after WWII, “the postwar European states became 
an economic actor per se, rather than the creator of the institutional conditions for a 
market economy” (Fabbrini 2007, 99). In Europe therefore, citizens tend to be more 
accustomed to the role of the state in the market and especially in the role of market 
creator and facilitator.  
In a 1970s study on attitudes of American business leaders on state involvement 
in the economy, David Vogel already observed that “[t]he most characteristic, distinctive 
and persistent belief of American corporate executives is an underlying suspicion and 
mistrust of government” (Vogel 1978, 45). He further noted that this belief “distinguishes 
the American business community not only from every other bourgeoisie, but also from 
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every other legitimate organization of political interests in American society” (Vogel 
1978, 45).  
While these broad differences in attitude towards central government and market 
intervention can partially explain the divergent policy outcomes in the European Union 
and the United States by highlighting the different levels of demand and acceptance for 
centralization in the name of market liberalization across the two polities, they are not 
sufficient to explicate the supply of them. 
 
Institutional Aspect: Executive Promotion of a Single Market 
 
Beyond the divergent attitudes about governance exist also an important 
difference in institutional mandates.  The institutional mandates in the EU, especially the 
Commission’s, depend more on market liberalization than do the similar mandates for US 
branches of government. The latter govern more broadly given that while the creation of 
a common internal market was arguably the main reason for abandoning the Articles of 
Confederation in favor of the US Constitution, it was not the only reason and mandate. In 
the EU, on the other hand, failure to create an European Defense Community, led the 
EU’s institutions to be narrowly focusing on market integration from the onset. Thus, 
although in comparative perspective it is not a very powerful executive, the European 
Commission is a rather unique organization. Essentially it is a well-endowed, official 
think tank with a basic mandate to propose more and more liberalizing and centralizing 
policies.22 Even if the EU executive is much weaker than the US one in broad terms, the 
                                                 
22
 Officially the three main tasks of the European Commission is to be the motor of integration by initiating 
legislation, to be the guardian of the treaties by ensuring that legal acts are applied by all member states and 
to be the executive body in most policy areas, by ensuring that EU decisions are put into practice (cf. 
Sabathil et al 2008). 
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Commission institutionalizes a running process that actively seeks out liberalizing, 
federalizing steps. This is consistent with the Commission’s role as motor of integration 
and the EU’s origins going back to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
the European Economic Community (EEC). Similarly, while the European Court of 
Justice is a rather narrowly-constrained court in comparative perspective - with a mandate 
based on liberalization but effectively barred from many areas - its very narrowness may 
have made it a more dynamic and aggressive actor over time. Precisely because the 
analogous US institutions were set in broader state-building perspective early on, they 
have not produced the same kind of constant drive toward centralization in market-
building policy areas.   
Thus, any explanation on the different outcomes in the EU and the US needs to 
incorporate the role of the European Commission as a strong executive-level actor with a 
liberalizing mandate. While there have been largely three different views on the 
significance of the European Commission in market-building with two denying it any 
decisive role at all, I contend that the Commission does make a substantial difference in 
the direction of further market integration especially as seen from a transatlantic 
comparative perspective (cf. Blom-Hansen 2010, 7).  
In the first view, scholars see the Commission as largely impartial or simply as 
balancing between multiple roles (Egeberg 2006; Hooghe 2001; Nugent 2001). These 
scholars mainly argue that the Commission is neither composed of nor acting primarily as 
representatives of their national government or as pro-integrationist competence-
maximizer. As Neill Nugent observes, “Commissioners do, for the most part, approach 
and undertake their duties and tasks in an impartial manner” (Nugent 2001, 115). And 
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Liesbet Hooghe reasons in her study on the European Commission that it is “misleading” 
to perceive the Commission as an unitary actor given that “[p]olitical preferences differ 
from office to office” and that “[e]uro-federalists work with defenders of state power and 
politically agnostic policy wonks” (Hooghe 2001, 193). In short, for her there is no 
systematic evidence showing that Commission officials are always pro-integrationist or 
following the positions of the member states that nominated them. 
According to a second group of scholars, Commission officials are to a certain 
degree simply henchmen for national governments. In this view the independent role of 
Commission officials is downplayed in favor of the influence of member states. These 
scholars point out that no substantial differences between the Commission and member 
states can really persist. Due to the procedures for selecting and appointing 
Commissioners, they cannot follow a more pro-integrationist agenda than desired by all 
of the member states (Döring 2007; Hug 2004; Wonka 2007). As Wonka puts it, “the 
European Commission should be considered neither a technocratic nor an overly 
independent actor in EU politics”, but rather as “a political […] actor with close political 
ties to EU member states” (Wonka 2007, 169). And Hug concurs by contending that “the 
preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint 
them” (Hug 2003, 41). Oxford professor Vernon Bogdanor yet goes a step further by 
commenting that the Commission even within the EU institutional system “enjoys very 
little autonomous power of decision-making” (Bogdanor 2007, 5).  
The third view, which mirrors the most closely my own evidence, is that the 
Commission has played a decisive role and continues to do so in market-building. This is 
not to say that within the Commission different opinions or assessments of its role and 
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impact cannot be found. Yet, overall and especially in key moments, Commission 
officials have played a significant role in furthering market centralization and 
liberalization especially as seen from a transatlantic comparative perspective. When 
interviewed about market initiatives and differences between the European and American 
internal markets, present and former Commission officials, as will be shown in more 
detail in the ensuing chapters, have regularly pointed to the creation of an internal market 
as their political objective and going even beyond the original demands and desires of 
their respective member states and how this ideologically differs from their 
understanding of the United States.  
As for instance a former member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet, the cabinet 
responsible for the EU’s internal market dossier in the 1980s, has pointed out in regards 
to pushing market centralization and liberalization with the creation of the now famous 
White Paper: 
The White Paper was the result of brain storming effectively by three, four or 
five, maximum six people. Perhaps I should say ten: Lord Cockfield, Adrian 
Fortescue, Michel Petite, myself, Brown, Paolo Cecchini, Jacques Delors, Pascal 
Lamy, François Lamoureux. Those probably were the key people in the 
Commission. At that time, the Commission was undoubtedly the driver. The first 
member state to jump on the Single Market Program in practical terms was 
France under President Mitterrand closely followed, thanks to us, by Margaret 
Thatcher, who was not naturally predisposed, but who was told by us that you 
better do something, the French are moving and it is in the interest of British 
industry. She instructed Lord Young who was her Secretary of State for Trade to 
do something about it, David Young, and he did. So the member states were 
really far behind, don’t even think about the European Parliament! Although they 
did start a Kangaroo group and there were various people there who were active. 
But it was us, we did it! (personal interview 2009; my emphasis). 
In short, the catalysts were neither the European Parliament nor the member 
states, but the Commission officials around Commissioner Cockfield and Commission 
President Jacques Delors. Member states apparently tended to follow, at least on 
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occasion, the coaxing of the Commission officials. The Commission’s catalytic function 
even more so found its expression in the deliberate change of framing the discourse 
away, where possible, from simply eliminating barriers to trade to “a market without 
frontiers” and especially to a “single market”. As Helmut von Sydow, former member of 
Commissioner Bangemann’s cabinet, noted 
An area without frontiers, frontiers in the sense of borders - frontiers are nearly 
again something positive in the English language - was only added by us in 1987 
as a definition of the internal market. Previously the treaty only mentioned the 
removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, people and capital. 
The definition of the target of an internal market without internal frontiers was 
only added in 1987 Single European Act because of the White Paper” (personal 
interview 2009; own translation).23 
But Commission officials have been repeatedly clear that they not only interpret 
Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 14 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community) as a market without frontiers, but 
reframed it into a single market. Thus, as Alastair Sutton, a member of Lord Cockfield’s 
cabinet, observed “that the “word “without” was a word, which was much discussed by 
us in 1985”. He continues 
We discussed whether to reduce frontiers or to abolish them. And so the whole, 
it’s vital that people understand this, the single market is based on the idea of an 
area without internal frontiers. Now the funny thing is, the US, Australia, and 
Canada […] have internal frontiers for many reasons, which we in theory at least 
do not. Of course you can immediately point to exceptions, derogations and the 
fact the member states don’t play by the rules. But in legal theory we have a 
single continental market without internal frontiers (personal interview 2009). 
                                                 
23
 “An area without frontiers; frontiers in dem Sinne von borders, frontiers ist ja im Englischen schon fast 
wieder etwas positives, das haben wir erst 1987 eingefuegt als Definition des Binnenmarktes. Vorher stand 
im Vertrag nur Abschaffung der Hemmnisse gegen den Warenverkehr, Dienstleistungsverkehr, 
Personenverkehr, und Kapitalverkehr. Die Definition des Ziel eines Binnenmarktes ohne interne Grenzen, 
das ist ’87 in der Einheitlichen Europaeischen Akte aufgrund des Weissbuchs nachgeschoben.“ 
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In other words, for Commission officials there is the clear perception that their 
mandate is a market liberalizing mandate which does not allow for any remaining barriers 
to trade between member states. 
Again this is not to say that member states or the general political environment at 
a given point in time do not matter at all. As Suzanne K. Schmidt notes, it is doubtful 
whether the European Commission will be as successful in furthering market access in 
situations where all member state governments object to a Commission directive “by 
putting pressure on ‘their’ Commissioners or appealing in unison to the Court” (Schmidt 
1998, 180). However, Commission officials frequently stand at the ready to push for the 
further elimination of any obstacles to a single market when the opportunity arises. 
Hence, as a fellow member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet, Sir Andrew Cahn remarked: 
I think the other thing is that the single market program was a really successful 
example of seizing the moment, seizing an argument when it was, when you 
know, seizing the crest of the wave and riding it when the political will was there. 
(personal interview 2009). 
And Schmidt herself observes that in situation where the opposition to Commission 
initiatives is not absolute, as in her study on market liberalization in the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission ends up “well beyond what the founding 
members envisaged, and what many contemporary observers believed to be possible” 
(Schmidt 1998, 181).  
Put differently, the Commission has been the linchpin of the promotion of a single 
market in Europe and in particular in the adoption of s single set of coherent rules for 
exchange as well as rules that open the exchange for competition. As Joana Cruz has 
previously noted,“[t]he very breath of integration has inevitably demanded that the 
Commission be more than just a “problem-solver” on behalf of Member States and that it 
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should operate as a self-consciously promotive institution charged with shaping European 
policy” (Cruz 2006, 1). And Majone (1996) famously argued that the Commission is best 
perceived as an institution that attempts to maximize its influence within the EU system. 
Wendon agrees by observing that “[t]he Commission is a strategically sophisticated 
bureaucracy with the ability to expand its own role” (Wendon 1998, 340). He 
demonstrates that even in less favorable circumstances, when the general political climate 
is not in favor of the Commission’s agenda, the Commission has the “strategic ability to 
understand the way in which policy images and institutional venues interact affects [its] 
ability to develop and expand EU policy” and acts accordingly (Wendon 1998, 339). And 
Schmidt further makes the case that the Commission has much more far reaching powers 
than simply being an agenda-setter. Indeed, she shows how the Commission “can force 
the adoption of proposals in the Council which would have been rejected”, “[b]y using its 
competencies as a guardian of the Treaty and as an administrator of European 
competition law strategically” (Schmidt 2000, 38).  
In sum, in my opinion, the EU continues the tradition of the material structuring 
of the market with the help of the European Commission as an explicit governmental 
agent, whose main role is market-building (supply function). The main difference being 
that today instead of pursuing classic and liberal mercantilism, the goal is to create a 
liberal market with increased economic flexibility. Europeans, even now in the new 
supranational setting of compound democracy, are more comfortable with state-driven 
market integration than the Americans due to the difference in the origins of their 
different systems. Hence, the idea of having the state intervene in market-building lingers 
on and gives the European Union a different twist as a compound entity from the 
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American (demand function). Indeed, Vogel notes that it is the early liberal, democratic 
nature of America à la Hartz and Huntington which leads American businessmen to be 
against enlarging government authority over the marketplace: 
It is the relatively democratic nature of the American state – embedded in popular 
ideals and in legal institutions prior to the development of industrial capitalism – 
that is in large measure responsible for the particular vehemence of the American 
bourgeoisie’s antagonism toward an expansion of government authority (Vogel 
1978, 61). 
Thus if, as I believe, a combination of institutional and ideational factors play a 
role, we should be able to see a confirmation of the following hypotheses. First, there 
should be clear evidence that the European Commission has been a central force in 
pushing for market centralization and liberalization in the analyzed cases. Second, there 
should be evidence that greater distrust of the federal government in the United States has 
favored the retaining of polity authority at the state level. Third, when market 
centralization and liberalization did take place in the US, it is due to specific, unique 
historical circumstances, which helped to avoid or overcome the general distrust. Fourth, 
when market centralization and liberalization did not happen in the EU, it is due not by 
expressed distrust in the federal-level institutions, but by specific institutional blockage 
by one or a handful of member countries.  
As the following chapters will show, the evidence largely confirms these 
hypotheses by showing that in all the major cases examined the European Union has 
adopted rules that open exchange to competition more than the United States and that the 
European Commission has largely been the driving force behind it. While business was 
generally and in the arena of services liberalization cautiously supportive of further 
market integration, it usually only followed the Commission’s lead or provided input 
when asked. In one case at least, public procurement, the Commission even clearly 
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established and fostered its own supportive environment among business leaders by 
providing space and resources for them to get together as the European Roundtable. 
Moreover, polls and my own interviews with business leaders and national organizations 
clearly demonstrate a much larger distrust of federal government intervention in the 
market in the United States than in the EU. Even in the case of liberalization of services 
in Europe, where the Commission encountered vocal resistance to its project by trade 
unions and notably the governments of Germany and France, the end result is a much 
more liberalized Europe than America for the provision of temporary services. And while 
the original legal act was amended, Commission personal in charge of implementing it 
have been clearly pointing out in interviews that the changes were largely cosmetic and 
have not influenced them on how to strictly enforce it based on their conceptualization of 
the original draft. Last but not least, what is striking in the United States it the absence of 
an actor that takes the entire market of the US polity into account and attempts to 
estimate the costs of the remaining obstacles to trade. Multiple times throughout the 
research actors in the United States noted the absence of such an institutional actor 
willing to undertake such work. 
Methodology and Case Selection 
Methodologically this study will focus on within-case and cross-case comparisons 
over time, analysis and process tracing to weigh the explanatory power of the competing 
arguments. To answer therefore the question why the EU and the US have pursued 
different trajectories in the adoption of a single set of coherent rules (centralization) and 
rules that open exchange to competition (liberalization), we would ideally look at the 
largest possible variety of policy sectors across the two polities.  
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One important caveat, however, is that this study does not concern itself with the 
implementation of rules and regulations on the ground, but focuses mainly on market 
centralization and liberalization provided by the legislative framework. The European 
Commission itself notes that the potential of the Single Market has not been fully 
exploited and that some instruments are not fully operational, e.g. "it is estimated that 
around 25% of enterprises that rely on this principle [mutual recognition] when selling 
gods [sic] have problems" (Dierx and Ilzkovitz 2008, 4). Thus, it is possible and even 
very likely that situations exists where the EU has put rules and regulations into place, 
which in the long run when completely implemented lead to a more liberalized sector, but 
which given the delay in implementation is presently in practice still at the same level as 
the US or occasionally behind it in its degree of market liberalization. However, from a 
theoretical perspective, it is the existence as well as the authority to make such rules and 
regulations which are interesting. 
 A comparative look across the two entities becomes necessary, first and foremost, 
because of the logic of the major arguments. While one answer to centralization and 
liberalization is that centralization and liberalization depends on the characteristics of a 
specific sector, i.e., that a certain sector might be more conducive to be centralized and 
liberalized, this argument is in direct debate with the ideational and polity-based 
arguments. These latter arguments, as argued above, contend that it is not so much the 
characteristics of the specific sector but rather the polity itself or the pre-dominant ideas 
in the polity which influence the policy outcome. Thus, we cannot get at a basic pattern 
without looking at cases across sectors and polity. Moreover, there might be more 
variations between entities than sectors. Hence, if we only look at variations within one 
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polity we might potentially overlook bigger differences between entities. In short, the 
comparative method across polities here allows exploring the possibility that similar 
economic pressures lead to different outcomes. Also more leverage can be gained 
potentially by verifying a wider pattern. 
An integrated market in the abstract has free movement of capital, goods, services 
and people, which are commonly called in EU-lingo the four freedoms. Centralization of 
authority in market-building usually reflects the idea that units below the federal level 
cannot contravene these liberties. Indeed, federalization of authority and liberalization are 
entangled in many ways. Thus, again the focus of this dissertation is on the adoption of 
single coherent set of rules for exchange for the entire polity as well as the adoption of 
rules that facilitate exchange to competition. 
Ideally cases should be chosen with a variation on the dependent as well as the 
independent variable. However, while it is usually easy to see the variations in the 
dependent variable in looking at the different outcomes, it is difficult to know what all the 
variations are regarding the independent variable before actually exploring them on the 
ground. In addition, even if we did know what a good number of independent variables 
were, we couldn’t do enough cases to carefully compare and test variation across many of 
them. Thus, I will focus on a small number of cases in trying to establish the causal 
mechanism for the different outcomes. In short, this project’s primary methodological 
focus will be on a small-n case study across cases but within-case causal inference within 
a two-case comparative framework. As Brady and Collier have noted previously “it is 
productive to think of these cross-case comparisons as helping to frame the analytic 
problem and to suggest causal ideas that are also explored and evaluated through within-
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case analysis” (Brady and Collier 2004, 100). In brief, a small-n methods focus is useful 
where few data exists, theories are relatively unclear or underspecified or for the 
development of new theories (Brady and Collier 2004; Van Evera 1997). Moreover, as 
has been pointed out elsewhere, the comparative method “is not about the description of 
sameness, but about variance among similar variables that operate within each system” 
and provides “an essential step in formulating, testing, or revising theoretical propositions 
(Menon and Schain 2006, 3).  
Yet, the range of potential internal market policies we could look at is, of course, 
very large and requires substantial narrowing. Thus, given the obvious time and money 
constraints, but the necessity to look comparatively at both compound polities, it makes 
sense at a first step look at some of the core economic areas of the respective internal 
markets, where the similarities between the US and the EU are usually considered as “the 
most striking” (Donahue and Pollack 2001, 108-9). 
The three policy sectors, public procurement, services and goods, examined in 
this study have therefore been chosen based on their overall economic importance and 
because they cover the vast majority of either polity’s internal market. Public 
procurement is commonly estimated as representing between 15 and 20 percent of GDP 
in the United States and the European Union (Manheim 1990; WTO 2009). For instance 
in the EU, the European Commission calculated that in 2002 total public procurement, 
i.e. the purchases of goodes, services and public works by governemnts and public 
utilities, within its internal market represented €1500 billion or about 16% of the EU’s 
GDP (Commission 2006). And in the United States, already in the late 1980s, “the 
market activities of state and local governments assume[d] an ever increasing share of 
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[the US] economy – now estimated as high as fifteen to twenty percent of the gross 
national product, as state and local investments grow to nearly a half-trillion dollars” 
(Manheim 1990, 589). Services, the largest economic sector by far in both polities, are 
generally estimated to represent over 70% of the American and European GDPs (CIA 
2010; cf. Gekiere 2006). And the freedom to trade goods by especially eliminating any 
remaining non-tariff technical obstacles to trade is regarded as “the paradigm case for 
[…] an economic system based on free trade and fair competition” (Dashwood 1983, 
183; cf. Mastromarco 1990; Pelkmans 1987). 
To better illustrate, however, the dynamics within some of these vast policy 
sectors, notably services and goods, I explore the examplary cases of hairdressers in the 
arena of services and elevators in the arena of goods. Both are, as will be described in 
more detail in the respective chapters, indicative of larger regulatory phenomena in these 
larger policy sectors. 
To differentiate between the hypotheses derived from the various theoretical 
approaches laid out in the previous section, this project has attempted to develop the 
historical record from multiple sources, including interviews with relevant actors on the 
two sides of the Atlantic, official transcripts of public hearings and legal documents as 
well as private and public reports, and secondary scholarship. Large parts of the research 
presented here are based on a series of in-person and phone interviews and email 
responses to questionnaires between Fall 2009 and Winter 2011. A research trip to 
Brussels and Paris in September 2009 led to in-person interviews with most surviving 
members of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet in charge of the internal market dossier in the early 
1980s as well as other present and former members of the European Commission, 
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including members of the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry and the 
Directorate General Internal Market. Other interviewees were, among many others, 
representatives of the European Parliament, U.S. and EU business and governmental 
organizations or agencies, such as the U.S. Business Roundtable; the US National 
Association of State Procurement Officers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the US 
National Association of Manufacturers, the US National Taxpayers Union, US 
governmental licensing agencies, ThyssenKrupp Access, Kone International, the US 
National Elevator Industry, the National Association of Barber Boards of America, the 
American Professional Beauty Association, and the National-Interstate Council of State 
Boards of Cosmetology. All in all over sixty interviews were carried out to supplement 
information found in primary and secondary literature to help gauging the validity of the 
different explanatory frameworks regarding market centralization and liberalization. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has emphasized throughout, for most of their respective history 
the literatures of American state-building and European market integration were, with 
rare exceptions, closed disciplines unto themselves. Thus, as Parsons has remarked 
earlier, “[s]cholars with deep expertise on both sides of the Atlantic are few and far 
between” (Parsons 2003b, 1). While most Europeanists concentrated their research efforts 
on comparing the EU to its classic field of comparison, other international organizations, 
Americanists, when doing comparative work at all, focused their attention on other 
nation-states. Both group of scholars just ended up declaring their objet d’étude as 
exceptional. In recent years, though, scholars have started to challenge the long-held 
notion that the United States and the European Union are sui generis. Yet no study seems 
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to have been done so far to actually compare systematically several policy areas across 
both polities to see not only whether the EU might have already gone beyond the US in 
centralizing and liberalizing specific policy arenas, but also to see whether the existing 
explanations of market-building need revision when applied to both polities. Indeed, one 
does not necessarily have to accept that the EU and the US are comparable political 
entities to acknowledge that at the very least the logic of the arguments that have been 
made concerning market building in one polity should be applicable to the other. 
As has been foreshadowed in this chapter, the standard explanations to market-
building – structuralist-materialist / rationalist-functionalist, institution and ideational / 
cultural – however, are falling short of the empirical evidence. Hence, I offer a more 
nuanced explanation of why in the examined major policy arenas of public procurement, 
services and goods, the European Union has in many important aspects succeeded in 
adopting a single set of coherent rules for exchange (centralization) and rules that open 
exchange to competition (liberalization) and the United States has not. My explanation is 
based on a combination of ideational and institutional elements. I contend that in all cases 
the presence or absence of a major institutional actor at the federal-level perceiving the 
polity’s market in its entirety and being endowed with a liberalization mandate has been 
critical in the different outcomes (supply function). The European Commission fulfills 
this role when it comes to market-building within the EU. In the US, on the other hand, 
no parallel explicit government agent exists, whose main role is to ensure the removal of 
obstacles to internal trade. Furthermore, ideationally the European Union and the United 
States differ when it comes to the acceptance of a federal government agent to intervene 
in the market (demand function). Based on the long-standing tradition in Europe of 
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having the state intervene in market-building, Europeans tend to be accepting or at the 
very least resigned to the basic notion of federal governance of market integration. The 
main difference to Europe’s past is that instead of pursuing classic and liberal 
mercantilism, the goal of the government agent today is to create a liberal market with 
increased economic flexibility.  
The rest of the study will proceed by looking at each of the three major economic 
sectors separately, starting with public procurement. In each instance, by comparing and 
contrasting the regulatory regimes in the US and the EU, I will first strengthen the 
descriptive claim that the European Union has liberalized and centralized each sector 
more in a free market way than the US, which appears to have accommodated itself to 
certain decentralized, fairly protectionist rules. After firmly establishing the descriptive 
claim, I will proceed to demonstrate, by carefully tracing each case, how the existing 
approaches to market-building are insufficient in themselves to explain the cross-polity 
pattern and how it can better be explained by a combined institutional-ideational 
approach. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU AND THE US: 
ORIGINS AND FRAMEWORK 
“There exists no starker form of discrimination against out-of-state commerce than when 
a state buys goods or services only from in-state suppliers.” 
Dan T. Coenen, Harmon W. Caldwell Chair in Constitutional Law, University of 
Georgia, in Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption, 1989, p. 443 
“Public procurement covers a sizeable part of GDP and is still marked by the tendency 
of the authorities concerned to keep their purchases and contracts within their own 
country. This continued partitioning of individual national markets is one of the most 
evident barriers to the achievement of a real internal market.” 
European Commission in the White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market, 
(COM) 85 310 fin, 1985, p. 23 
 
As these chapter’s introductory quotes indicate, an awareness exists on both sides 
of the Atlantic that public procurement not only represents an important part of the 
economy but that restricting public purchases to one’s own companies represents severe 
discrimination against one’s fellow member or sister states and poses a serious non-tariff 
barrier. This, however, as this chapter will try to demonstrate, is as far as the mutual 
awareness goes. While public procurement, i.e. the purchase of any goods and services 
by public authorities at all levels of government with taxpayer money, accounts for an 
equally large part of the two polities’ internal markets by making up between fifteen and 
twenty of each polity’s GDP, the European Union and the United States of America are 
very different in their respective internal regulations of the public procurement sector 
(Commission 2006; Mannheim1990; WTO 2010). This chapter will show that in terms of 
regulations for public procurement, which covers purchases as diverse as construction 
jobs, snowmobiles, coal, mulch, agricultural goods, recycled paper and printing services, 
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the European Union, has gone further than the United in adopting rules more like a single 
market, both with respect to the centralization of the market (having a single set of 
coherent rules for exchange) and its liberalization (adopting rules that open exchange to 
competition). While in the US anti-competitive discrimination among sister states in the 
public procurement sector is officially sanctioned and widely practiced, the European 
Union bars anti-competitive discrimination among its units. 
Similar to the EU and US market-building literature in general, as discussed in 
Chapter II, most of the scholarship on public procurement has been written separately 
about one case or the other. The public procurement literature has focused exclusively on 
either describing the EU public procurement regime or trying to grapple with the market 
participant exemption doctrine developed by the US Supreme Court, which forms the 
basis for continued discrimination among American sister states. This is partially the 
result of public procurement being “a specialist subject” (Bovis 2005, xix). Few attempts 
have been made to conduct systematic comparisons of the American and the European 
public procurement regimes and to highlight what the results of such a comparison might 
mean for our understanding of market-building in compound democracies. When 
attempts have been made (cf. Verdeaux 2003), the focus has mostly been on explaining 
the European regime to an American audience, the international, WTO dimension of 
public procurement and on purchasing by American federal agencies. This limited focus, 
however, overlooks the fundamental difference of how the US and the EU have 
structured their public procurement sector within their respective markets and how their 
approaches vary. This and the ensuing chapter attempt to fill in these lacunae and contend 
that the land of the federally regulated and centralized public procurement, aka the 
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European Union, is more indicative of a liberalized, complete internal market than the 
United States where federal preemption and a serious attempt to eliminate cross-state 
discrimination in the public procurement sector to this day is absent. There is presently 
no sign in the US of any serious movement to change it and state-level discriminatory 
laws are actually proliferating. As we will see in the next chapter, the best explanation for 
the difference is the role of the Commission as a federal-level entity specifically charged 
with creating a common market and a different attitude towards federal-level entities in 
this policy arena. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first will describe the legal 
public procurement framework in the United States, especially the origin and intellectual 
justifications for the market participant exemption, which undergirds the American 
regime. The second part focuses on the regulatory framework for public procurement in 
the European Union and its development over time. Part of the chapter’s focus will be to 
foreshadow how the justifications made in the American context for protectionist 
procurement could have easily been made by actors in the European Union, but which 
either haven’t been made or haven’t been successful in retaining sovereign rights over 
public procurement completely at the member state level, highlighting the fact that the 
EU ends up conceptually with a much more liberal procurement regime.24  
                                                 
24
 This is not to say that there are no limits whatsoever on the sovereignty of American sister states 
regarding public procurement in the absence of preemption. However, the sovereignty is quite substantive 
and qualitatively different from the EU member states. In the US, as we will see below, the US states retain 
extensive control and wide latitude as proprietor of one’s own public domain to discriminate against sister 
states when buying or selling products or services. The limits so far established by the U.S. Supreme Court 
concern cases where the state acts beyond its role as market participant and its actions have a downstream, 
regulatory effect and where other constitutional provisions besides the Commerce Clause, such as the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, might potentially make an ordinance or statute invalid. Last but not 
least, the U.S. Supreme Court has hinted at a natural resource exception to the market participant 
exemption to the dormant commerce clause. In Reeves v. William Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) the majority 
noted that “[c]ement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. Cf. Hughes v. 
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American Public Procurement Regime 
Notwithstanding efforts and aspirations to the contrary, interstate trade barriers have 
been common throughout American history. To overcome the previous lack of authority 
to remove barriers, the drafters of the US Constitution specifically incorporated five 
provisions designed to promote free trade. These provisions included the authority for 
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, the Indian tribes, among sister states 
(Art. I §8), the interdiction to levy export duties and to give preference to the ports of one 
state over the ports of any other state (Art. 1 §9), the interdiction for states to levy an 
import or export duty without the consent of Congress which may revise or abolish the 
duty (Art. I §10) and the proscription for any state to deny any of its privileges and 
immunities to citizens of sister states (Art. 4 §2). 
Moreover, the Constitution granted, as part of a list of delegated powers, Congress the 
authority ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof’ (Art. 1 §8). 
The general assumption, however, was that all other powers not specifically forbidden 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, (landfill sites); 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. 
S. 229 (1911) (same); Note, 32 Rutgers L.Rev. 741 (1979). It is the end product of a complex process 
whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials. South Dakota has not sought to limit 
access to the State's limestone or other materials used to make cement”. Thus, commentators have pointed 
out that it is different to keep resources, such as oil, fortuitously located within one’s borders from keeping 
for state residents benefits actively produced and gained through their own endeavors and that “[a] natural 
resources exception also is defensible because state hoarding of natural resources is distinctively disruptive 
of the goal of national unification” (cf. Coenen 1989, 456). 
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would be reserved to the states, which was made explicit with the Tenth Amendment.25 In 
short, the states were left with broad regulatory authority. 
Thus, non-tariff barriers have continued to exist for a long time.26 McCurdy notes that 
US “state legislatures also spun an effective web of barriers to internal commerce” and 
that “[s]tate and local officials prescribed marketing practices, enacted discriminatory 
schemes of mercantile licensing and taxation, proscribed the entry of unfavored articles 
of commerce, and devised inspection laws to improve the competitive position of their 
citizens relative to producers in other states” (McCurdy 1978, 634-35). These non-tariff 
barriers are generally the results of the states utilising their otherwise legitimate license, 
police, proprietary and tax powers (cf. Zimmerman 2003). But impediments as a result 
from regulatory authority and the powers of the states in general can be overcome in 
theory and practice. 
In total, there are four possibilities to remove interstate trade barriers in the US: 
reciprocity, congressional preemption, judicial decisions and interstate compacts 
(Zimmerman 2003). Reciprocity agreements are purely interstate arrangements. They 
have been quite common, but have not eliminated all non-tariff trade barriers. Interstate 
compacts, according to the U.S. Constitution generally need the consent of Congress. To 
this day, interstate compacts ‘have not been utilized’ to remove interstate trade barriers, 
focusing instead on the settling of boundary disputes (Zimmerman 2002: 54–55). 
Besides, short of involving every single state, interstate compacts as well as reciprocity 
                                                 
25
 U.S. Constitution, Amendment X: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
 
26
 Only in 2005 for instance, did the US Supreme Court struck down states laws which allowed in-state 
wineries to ship directly to consumers but not wineries from out of the state. (cf. Stout 2005; Wiseman and 
Ellig 2007). 
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agreements would rather lead to an America à la carte or a multi-speed America, to use 
phraseology from the European context.  
A ‘preemption revolution’, however, has taken place in the last several decades 
(Zimmerman 2005, xi). Congressional preemption refers to the right of Congress, based 
on the necessary and proper clause, the supremacy of the laws clause and, above all in 
regards to internal market-building, the interstate commerce clause, ‘to enact statues 
invalidating regulatory statutes and regulations of subnational governments’ and ‘to 
employ its constitutional powers to remove completely or partially concurrent and 
reserved regulatory powers of the states’ (Zimmerman 2005, 1). The U.S. Supreme Court 
generally distinguishes between two types of federal preemption of state action. First it 
recognizes preemption “where an “act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict 
with the law of the state” and second “where the state action does not actually conflict 
with federal statute, but Congress has decided to “occupy the field”” by passing a 
preemption statute (Locke 1994, 5). While only 29 nine preemption statues were enacted 
by 1900, by 2004 a total of 522 preemption statues had been passed (Zimmerman 2005, 1 
and 5). The enactment of preemption statues accelerated in the 2nd half of the 20th 
century. While only sixteen preemption statues were enacted in the 1940s and twenty-
four in the 1950s, the second half of the 1960s alone saw the passing of 36 preemption 
statues. The next three decades then witnessed a large increase of preemptions with 
respectively 102, 93 and 83 statues being enacted. In the period from 2000 to 2004 
another 41 preemption statues received Congressional approval. According to 
Zimmerman, “the bulk of these statutes involve commerce, finance, and health”, but with 
banking having emerged as an important area and civil rights and environmental 
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protection having played a role in the late 1960s (Zimmerman 2005, 205). Indeed, 
different acts by the US Congress, such as the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, reversing the McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945, which reversed a previous Supreme Court decision, indeed have 
shown that on occasion Congress does pre-empt, i.e. occupies the field, in regards to the 
functioning of the internal market. Zimmerman contends that the increase in preemptions 
is due to ‘[t]he greatly increased mobility of citizens and business firms, and inventions 
and technological developments spurred enactment of congressional statues that remove 
regulatory powers from states’ (Zimmerman 2005, 127). Yet, while there has been in 
Zimmerman’s words a pre-emption revolution taking place over the last couple of 
decades, this revolution has apparently not reached the public procurement sector. 
Indeed, while these many steps in pre-emption might lead us to expect that we would see 
something similar in public procurement, this is not the case. Not only do the American 
sister states continue to discriminate when it comes to public purchasing and selling., but 
barriers have actually increased in recent years. 
Already in 1940, Melder pointed out that forty-seven of the forty-eight states had at 
least one statute on the books giving preferential treatment to in-state products or 
companies (Melder 1940, 58). This practice is largely continued today, where the vast 
majority of sister states has tie-bid preferences as well as more specific preferences, such 
as up to 15 per cent limited preferences over the lowest out-of-state bidders and general 
exclusionary preferences for mulch and compost made in the state (Georgia), coal for 
heating state buildings (Pennsylvania), and all print jobs (Oregon) (Oregon State 
Procurement Office 2009; North Carolina Department of Administration 2006; 
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Zimmerman 2003, 6).27 In short, it is not unusual in the United States to find statues, such 
as Wyoming’s statute W.S. 16-6-105, which requires all state agencies and political 
subdivisions to grant preference of up to 5% “in all purchases for […] supplies, materials, 
agricultural products, equipment, machinery and provisions produced, manufactured or 
grown in this state” or supplied by a Wyoming resident capable of serving the same.28 
Indeed, Wyoming Secretary of the State’s website proclaims in its posted rules that the 
“in-state preference applicable to the procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, 
services, or the erection, construction, alteration, or repair of any public building, or for 
making any addition thereto, or for any public work or improvement assures that 
Wyoming resident bidders are afforded an advantage over out-of-state bidders; thus 
retaining as much of the taxpayer’s money within the Wyoming economy as possible” 
                                                 
27
 As of 2009, 47 sister states have some form of in-state preferences and conditions on the books. The only 
exceptions are New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Rhode Island. Oklahoma, however, has with 34 other sister 
states a reciprocal law on the books, which allows for the application of similar preferences in public 
procurement to businesses of those states which have preferences legally mandated. In addition, 34 sister 
states have tie-bid preference statues for in-state providers in case that two bids, one from an out-of-state 
and one from an in-state, turn out to be the same. The State of Oregon’s Procurement Office maintains a 
detailed list of state by state procurement preference data. It is available at: 
http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/SSD/SPO/reciprocal_detail.shtml  
 
28
 Full text of W.S. 16-6-105: 
Preference for Wyoming materials and Wyoming agricultural products required in public 
purchases; exception; cost differential; definition. 
(a) Every board, commission or other governing body of any state institution, and every person 
acting as purchasing agent for the board, commission or other governing body of any state institution or 
department, and every county, municipality, school district and community college district, shall prefer in 
all purchases for supplies, material, agricultural products, equipment, machinery and provisions to be used 
in the maintenance and upkeep of their respective institutions, supplies, materials, agricultural products, 
equipment, machinery and provisions produced, manufactured or grown in this state, and supplies, 
materials, agricultural products, equipment, machinery and provisions supplied by a resident of the state, 
competent and capable to provide service for the supplies, materials, agricultural products, equipment, 
machinery and provisions within the state of Wyoming. Preference shall not be granted for articles of 
inferior quality to those offered by competitors outside of the state, but a differential of not to exceed five 
percent (5%) may be allowed in cost of contracts less than five million dollars ($5,000,000.00) for the 
Wyoming materials, supplies, agricultural products, equipment, machinery and provisions of quality equal 
to those of any other state or country. 
b) As used in this section, "agricultural products" means any horticultural, viticultural, vegetable 
product, livestock, livestock product, bees or honey, poultry or poultry product, sheep or wool product, 
timber or timber product. 
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(Wyoming Department of Administration & Information, Document 1678; my 
emphasis).  
Continued discrimination against out of state commerce in the US today is mainly 
based on the state’s proprietary power and especially on the development of the market-
participant doctrine exempting states to the dormant commerce clause, discussed below. 
Moreover, while the privileges and immunities clause together with the full faith and 
credit clause, obligating states to recognise each other’s ‘public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings” (Art. 4 § 1), are generally conceived to “promote interstate citizenship by 
forbidding a state legislature to favor its citizens over visiting U.S. citizens from other 
states in terms of privileges and immunities” (Zimmerman 2002, 26), Chief Justice Fred 
M. Vinson of the US Supreme Court already opined in 1948: 
 
[T]he privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute. It does bar 
discrimination against citizens of other states where there is no substantial 
reason for discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of 
other states. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many 
situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it 
(Toomer v. Witsell, 344 U.S. 385 at 396 (1948)). 
In addition the U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the privileges and immunities 
clause does not apply to associations or corporations (Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 
(1928); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839)). Thus, “states are free to 
discriminate in terms of privileges and immunities against a foreign corporation 
(chartered by a sister state)” and might completely forbid the corporation “to conduct 
business in the state” (Zimmerman 2002, 27). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly validated the right of states to discriminate when acting in their roles of 
proprietor of their respective public domains or as employer (Zimmerman 2003, 5).  
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Market Participant Exemption 
The right to discriminate against sister states as proprietor of one’s own public 
domain is in the present day anchored in the market participant doctrine. This legal 
doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court exempts states from the dormant 
commerce clause as long as states act as participants in the market instead of as market 
regulators. Thus, over the last decades, “the Court has shielded from commerce clause 
attack blatant favouritism of local interests when a state or municipality buys printing 
services, sells cement, purchases goods, or hires workers” (Coenen 1989, 398). 
As alluded to above, the commerce clause not only grants Congress the right to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but was “one of the principal reasons for 
calling the constitutional convention” (Manheim 1990, 563). The framers intended, by 
centralization power of commerce, “to curb “Balkanization” of the economy and avoid 
“interstate economic rivalries of the sort that had undermined the Articles of 
Confederation”” (Manheim 1990, 563). Thus, according to Manheim, “[t]he commerce 
clause is now the Congress’ most prolific source of authority, enabling regulation in such 
diverse areas as civil rights and gun control, as well as trade and commerce” (Manheim 
1990, 563). While in the early years of the Republic, the Court “debated whether the 
clause granted exclusive or merely concurrent power to Congress”, it is now generally 
accepted “that a state may validly regulate its internal affairs, whether of trading or 
policy, without impeding Congress’ power over commerce” as long the effects of laws 
are truly local (Manheim 1990, 563–64). Then federal power would only trump when 
Congress actually decides to legislate in the same field. However, it is important to 
realize that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “even when Congress has not 
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acted, the “negative implications” of the commerce clause can displace state regulation” 
(Manheim 1990, 564). Thus, the “clause in its dormant state (i.e., unused by Congress)” 
preempts “state economic and commercial regulations which “erect barriers against 
interstate trade”” (Manheim 1990, 564). This restriction on state power, commonly called 
the dormant commerce clause, 29 derives from the basic purpose of the commerce clause 
itself: “the creation of a “federal free trade unit” to foster “material success” and the “the 
peace and safety of the Union”” (Coenen 1989, 399). In short, pre-emption doesn’t 
happen because Congress has passed a legislative act expressing its preference for 
national interests over local concerns, “but because state regulation in the instance 
impedes the fundamental right of free trade” (Manheim 1990, 564). Accordingly the U.S. 
Supreme Court considers state laws “that effect [sic] “simple economic protectionism”” 
as “subject to a virtually per se rule of invalidity”” and also condemns state regulations 
“that impose “an undue burden on interstate commerce”” (Coenen 1989, 399). These 
limits on state power were, however, first and foremost applied in cases “involving 
government regulation and taxation of private market activity” (Coenen 1989, 400). 
Hence, as the case law expanded under the dormant commerce doctrine, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has constructed a major exception to the clause with respect to state 
choices of their own trading partners in its roles as buyer or seller of products and 
services. This exception became known as the market participant exemption. 
                                                 
29
  The term “dormant” was first employed in relation to the commerce clause when Justice Marshall wrote 
in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) that “We do not think that the Act 
empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek can, under all the 
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant 
State, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject. There is no error, and the judgment is 
affirmed.” The Court in short upheld in this case a Delaware state law on the grounds that it didn’t infringe 
on the dormant commerce clause. 
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In 1976 the U.S. Supreme Court officially introduced the market participant doctrine 
in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The State of Maryland 
created a recycling program for abandoned cars, paying subsidies to automobile wreckers 
and scrap processors for destroying junked cars with a Maryland license plate. At the 
start of the program, subsidies were paid equally to in-state as well as out-of-state scrap 
processors. Later on, however, the Maryland legislature imposed more rigorous 
documentation requirements on sister state processors, leading to a decline of junked cars 
being processed by out-of-state companies and a lawsuit by a Virginia-based corporation.  
The U.S. Supreme Court decided six to three in favor of Harry R. Hughes, 
Maryland’s Secretary of Transportation, overturning a lower court’s decision, which 
previously found the Maryland law invalid on grounds that it represented "substantial 
burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce." Justice Powell on behalf of the 
Supreme Court’s majority argued that this case represents an absolute novelty noting that 
“until today, the Court has not been asked to hold that the entry by the State itself into the 
market as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce creates a 
burden upon that commerce if the State restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses 
within the State”. Based on the fact that “Maryland has not sought to prohibit the 
interstate flow of hulks or to regulate the conditions under which the flow may occur, but, 
rather, has entered into the market itself by offering bounties to bid up the price of hulks”, 
the Court held that “[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits 
a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and 
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others”.  
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 Consequently, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp formally established the doctrine 
that discriminatory actions by the state are exempt from the commerce clause and its 
negative implications as long as the state acts in the market in the role of a private trader. 
Only when the state acts in its distinctive governmental capacity, i.e. as regulator and 
imposer of taxes, is it subject to the commerce clause negative preemption. While the 
market participant doctrine wasn’t established until 1976, it does have some antecedents 
(cf. Manheim 1990, 577). Four years earlier already, a three-judge District Court upheld 
in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (MD Fla. 1972) a Florida statute 
compelling state agencies to acquire needed printing services from in-state shops. The 
U.S. District Court contended that "state proprietary functions" are exempt from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. This was then subsequently summarily affirmed without 
opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court (409 U.S. 904 (1972)). According to Manheim, the 
earliest advocate for a market participant doctrine may actually have been Chief Justice 
Waite 80 years earlier in Guy v. Baltimore 100 U.S. 434 (1879). While the majority of the 
Supreme Court opined that wharfage fees cannot be charged to vessels of sister states 
when such fees are not charged to local vessels of one’s own state, Chief Justice Waite 
argued that “discriminatory uploading charges on out-of-state goods were not invalided 
because the wharfs were owned by the city” (Manheim 1990, 577). 
The market participant doctrine was reinforced in Reeves v. William Stake, 447 
U.S. 429 (1980) when in a 5-to-4 decision the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation. For a period of over fifty years, the State of 
South Dakota has operated a cement plant selling its cement to both in-state as well as 
out-of-state buyers. Following a cement shortage in 1978, the State Cement Commission 
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changed policy restricting sales only to in-state residents. As a result, a concrete 
distributor from Wyoming, Reeves, Inc., which acquired over 90 percent of its cement 
from the state-run plant, filed suit. The U.S. Supreme Court held that South Dakota's 
resident-preference program for the sale of cement does not violate the Commerce 
Clause. Indeed, according to the majority of the Court, “South Dakota, as a seller of 
cement, unquestionably fits the "market participant" label more comfortably than a State 
acting to subsidize local scrap processors”. In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmum 
further reasoned that “[t]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and 
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace, and there is 
no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to 
operate freely in the free market”. The Court therefore acknowledges the “State's role as 
guardian and trustee for its people, and the recognized right of a trader to exercise 
discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal”. Moreover, “[t]o invalidate the 
program would discourage similar state projects and rob South Dakota of the intended 
benefit of its foresight, risk, and industry”. Consequently the Court emphasized the 
significance of a “healthy regard for federalism and good government” and the adverse 
effects a converse decision would have on state “experimentation in things social and 
economic”. Thus, a state acting in the market, like a business or customer, rather than as a 
market regulator, can discriminate when purchasing or selling products as owner of its 
own proprietary domain. 
Three years later a seven-judge majority once again applied the market participant 
rule in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
This time the case involved an executive order by the major of Boston, which compelled 
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all construction projects funded with city funds to be carried out by a workforce 
composed of at least 50 percent bona fide residents of the city. Then-Justice Rehnquist 
(re)asserted for the majority that “[w]hen a state or local government enters the market as 
a participant, it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause” and therefore 
“[i]nsofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction contracts 
for public projects, it was a market participant, and entitled to be treated as such under the 
rule of Alexandria Scrap Corp”.  
Two other cases, South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) and New 
Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach , 486 U.S. 269 (1988), refine the application of 
the market-participant doctrine. In both cases the Supreme Court declined to apply the 
rule. In the case of South-Central Timber, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources 
announced a requirement that before certain timber sold from state lands can be shipped 
outside the state, it has to be processed within the state first. South-Central Timber 
Development, Inc., an Alaska corporation purchasing timber and almost exclusively 
shipping it to Japan, filed suit. The U.S. Supreme Court in a four-Justice plurality 
considered the Alaskan requirement as invalid. Justice White noted that here “the State is 
more than merely a seller of timber” given that “]i]n the commercial context, the seller 
usually has no say over, and no interest in, how the product is to be used”. Thus, the State 
of Alaska is in this case acting as a regulator in imposing “conditions downstream in the 
timber processing market”. Furthermore, the Court observed that in this instance 
elements were present, which were absent in Reeves, “foreign commerce, a natural 
resource, and restrictions on resale”. In sum, the plurality argued that “the [market 
participant] doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the 
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economic power to dictate”, but that “[t]he limit of the market participant doctrine must 
be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a 
participant, but allows it to go no further” and that “[t]he State may not impose 
conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory 
effect outside of that particular market”. 
New Energy Company of Indiana involved an Ohio statute awarding a tax credit 
against the state’s motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold. However, 
the State of Ohio only provided the tax credit for ethanol produced within the state or 
produced in a sister state granting similar tax advantages to Ohio-produced ethanol. An 
Indiana company filed suit due to the fact that its own state did not have a sales tax 
exemption for ethanol and was therefore ineligible for the credit. While the State of Ohio 
invoked the market participant rule and argued that its tax credit was functionally 
indistinguishable from Maryland’s state subsidies, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
disagreed. Justice Scalia expounded for the Court that “[t]he market-participant doctrine 
has no application here”, because “[t]he Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its 
purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes -- a primeval 
governmental activity”. Thus, the Court concluded that “it [is] clear that Ohio's 
assessment and computation of its fuel sales tax, regardless of whether it produces a 
subsidy, cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private purchaser”. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also made clear in a similar case to White v. 
Massachusetts that the market participation exemption does not grant unlimited authority 
to favor local interests due to the fact that other Constitutional rules or laws might apply. 
Thus, in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of 
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Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), the Court held that “[a]lthough Camden may, without fear 
of violating the Commerce Clause, pressure private employers engaged in public works 
projects funded in whole or in part by the city to hire city residents, cf. White v. 
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204, an out-of-state 
resident's interest in employment by private employers on public works projects in 
another State is sufficiently fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony and 
sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation as to fall within the purview of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause”. In sum, the 8-to-1 majority argued that a city like 
Camden, New Jersey, can require that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and 
subcontractors working on city construction projects be city residents based on the 
market participant doctrine, but that at the same time such an ordinance may be called 
into account under Article IV of the US Constitution, Privileges & Immunities clause. It 
doesn’t matter that the law equally applies to other citizens of New Jersey, given that 
“they at least have a chance to remedy at the polls the discrimination against them”. 
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist therefore contended that “[t]he 
Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers” while “[t]he 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, on the other hand, imposes a direct restraint on state 
action in the interests of interstate harmony”. The latter is triggered by “discrimination 
against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern […], not regulation 
affecting interstate commerce”. Consequently the case was remanded to a lower court to 
decide whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause was violated in this specific case. 
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Government Procurement Agreement of Marrakech 
Besides restrictions from Constitutional provisions and the ever present 
possibility of preemption via Congressional legislation, one might also wonder how 
increased global trade and the accompanying world trade rules might have affected the 
state-federal balance of the public procurement framework in the United States. The short 
answer is not much at all. The existing regime within the United States is not much 
affected besides self-imposed restrictions by individual states. Indeed, one shortcoming 
of Verdeaux’s (2003) analysis of the EU and US public procurement regimes and legal 
developments following the multilateral Government Procurement Agreement of 
Marrakech, signed by the EU and US April 15, 1994, is effectively the short shrift given 
to internal arrangements in the United States. While claiming a comparative approach, his 
focus is mostly on US federal government procurement and explaining the EU regime 
despite his attempt at a comparative approach. Thus, he writes that 
from a U.S. point of view, competing for government contracts in the old 
continent still raises a number of questions: Is the regulation different 
from one country to another? Is there any European common government 
procurement procedure? […] answering these questions first requires 
understanding the legal framework of the public procurement system in 
Europe (Verdeaux 2003, 719). 
However, as can be deduced from the descriptions above, the U.S. public 
procurement raises at the very least similar questions. A simple focus on federal level 
U.S. public procurement substantially overlooks the different rules and regulations put in 
place at the state levels. It also completely neglects that in the United States, the states, in 
contrast to the EU public procurement regime, retain the potential to discriminate against 
out-of-state buyers and sellers. This has largely not changed with the entry into force in 
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1996 of the Marrakech Agreement. In short, the US regime in the end might require even 
more explaining than the EU regime.  
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) was signed separately from the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is one of the so-called 
“plurilateral” agreements included in Annex 4, which does not bind all WTO members. 
Earlier efforts to make government procurement part of internationally agreed trade rules 
led in 1979 to a first Agreement on Government Procurement in 1979. However, this 
agreement only covered central government entities and procurement of goods. The 
subsequent discussion to extend the coverage to sub-central government entities and to 
services, including construction services, led to the present GPA. Currently (2009) forty 
WTO Members are covered by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.30 
Article III of the agreement lays down the two major principle of the GPA: national 
treatment and non-discrimination.31 As Verdeaux points out, the national treatment rule is 
a common principle of world trade rules, “prohibiting any less favorable treatment for 
foreigners than for nationals”, while the non-discrimination goes further by prohibiting 
“any form of disguised discriminating measure” (Verdeaux 2003, 716). 
Most important here is, however, to understand that despite efforts to the contrary, 
the GPA does not automatically apply to all government procurement of the signatory 
countries. In addition to only including procurement above an individually-decided 
certain threshold value, the coverage of the GPA is determined with regard to each 
                                                 
30
 Canada; the European Communities, including the 27 member states; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; 
Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; 
Switzerland and the United States. 
 
31
 A third principle mentioned throughout the agreement is transparency. 
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contracting party in separate annexes, specifying explicitly which central (Annex 1), sub-
central (state-level) (Annex 2) and other entities (e.g. municipalities, public utilities) 
(Annex 3) are committing themselves to the agreement. Thus, while the U.S. Senate 
ratified the agreement and integrated it into American legislation, the agreement “did not 
change in substance the principles and rules already present in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)” (Verdeaux 2003, 716).32 These rules are only applicable to the U.S. 
states to the extent that they decided to adhere to the GPA. However, only thirty-seven 
states have decided to do so and mostly only for executive branch agencies or very 
specified state departments.33 With few exceptions, such as the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey as well as the Port of Baltimore and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, local government entities, i.e. counties and municipalities, are not part of the 
coverage in the United States. Furthermore, following the GPA agreement an apparent 
backlash has taken place against tying a state to federally negotiated trade policy. In 
subsequent free trade agreements fewer states have committed themselves even partially 
to rules related to public procurement. While thirty-seven states decided to submit at least 
some part of public procurement to the GPA, only twenty-one states plus Puerto Rico 
decided to do so for the 2005 Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade 
Agreement and only eight states plus Puerto Rico a year later in the 2006 U.S.-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement.34 
                                                 
32
 However, as Verdeaux points out, it does reduce some preference provisions of Buy American 
legislations by prohibiting discrimination against other signatories (cf. Verdeaux 2003: 716 – 717). 
 
33
 The thirteen U.S. states not part of the GPA in any shape or form are in alphabetical order: Alabama, 
Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Virginia and West Virginia. 
 
34
 U.S. States, which decided to adhere again mostly for their executive branches, to become part of United 
States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement are listed in the annex of chapter 9 on public procurement. They 
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In sum, the GPA has not changed the qualitative framework of the state-federal 
balance of the public procurement in the United States. States retain largely the right to 
discriminate against out-of-state buyers and sellers when acting as a participant in the 
market and not having voluntarily bound certain parts of their public procurement to the 
GPA. This, as we will see later, is in stark contrast to the coverage of the GPA in the 
European Union.  
Overall, analysts agree in their respective analyses that “the market participant 
doctrine is anything but uniform” and that the “rule has proven less inflexible than some 
initially feared” (Coenen 1989, 404; Manheim 1990, 580). There exists also agreement 
that “there is no consensus on the Court regarding the theoretical basis for market 
participant immunity” (Manheim 1990, 580). Even in circumstances where “a state looks 
quite like a buyer or seller choosing trading partners, the Court has left itself room not to 
treat the state as such” by always retaining the option of “recognizing an “exception” to 
the “general rule” or by characterizing the state as a “market regulator” notwithstanding 
its superficial appearance as a “market participant”” (Coenen 1989, 405). This, of course, 
creates a level of uncertainty for out-of-state and foreign bidders for state-level 
government contracts in the US. It raises questions, such as: How do the regulations and 
preferences in Louisiana differ from Rhode Island? Does the state have a tie-bid 
preference? Has the state bound itself to the GPA? What parts of its public procurement 
has been bound and at what threshold? Is the Supreme Court going to consider this 
ordinance or law conform with the market participant doctrine, but maybe not with the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause? 
                                                                                                                                                 
include eight states (Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, New York, Texas, Utah), plus 
Puerto Rico. 
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This being said, the contention is usually made that while no overarching theory 
of the market participant doctrine exists, the major rationales can be deduced from the 
existing Supreme Court decisions and the accompanying arguments. As will become 
clear subsequently, similar arguments should have had a powerful impact in the 
construction of the public procurement regime in the European Union. Thus, this chapter 
will now turn its attention to the perceived roots of the market participant exemption. 
 
Justifications for the Market Participant Exemption 
This section will pace in detail the different major arguments underlying 
protectionist procurement in the United States. A good understanding of these 
rationalizations of the market participant exemption is necessary to be able to highlight 
comparatively later on that while the same arguments should have been as powerful, if 
not more so, in the European context, they haven’t come up significantly in Europe. 
Consequently these justifications are, as argued below, also far from self-evident as 
explanations for the American rules. 
The market participant exemption does not derive from a single rationale or 
justification. As has been pointed out and argued previously by Coenen, “five key 
justifications underlie the market-participant rule” (Coenen 1989, 419). Manheim, while 
disagreeing with some of the major rationales, nevertheless identifies similar arguments 
as having been made in the search for a basis for market participant immunity. This 
section mostly follows Coenen’s rationalizations. Indeed, especially from an European 
perspective as we will see below, Coenen undertakes an intellectual balancing act by on 
the one hand admitting that there is “no starker form of discrimination against out-of-
state commerce than when a state buys goods or services only from in-state suppliers”, 
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and then to firmly proclaim that “the in-state purchasing preference does, and should, 
represent the classic form of state action protected by the market-participant rule” 
(Coenen 1989, 443-44). Thus, why according to American commentators should states be 
free to discriminate against other sister states? 
 The first and one of the most common arguments being made is based on the 
notions of fairness and sowing and reaping. Underlying this argument is the alleged 
distinction between the regulatory and taxation activities of the state and the state as 
trader in the marketplace. When acting as regulator, the state “compels private action 
through the exercise of raw governmental power” and “turns over nothing that belongs to 
it” (Coenen 1989, 422). This contrasts with the state “controlling and distributing its own 
resources” when buying or selling goods and services (Coenen 1989, 422). As regards the 
latter, “the state is not “regulating” commerce any more than is a private trader; it is 
“contracting”” (Manheim 1990, 583). The state therefore simply acts as administrator of 
the funds entrusted to it by the state’s people. Indeed, states, it is argued, are people who 
freely banded together and who as one collective activity engage in the accumulation of 
property. One of the essential features of property, according to this argument, is the right 
to exclude others. If this right to exclusion exist for individuals, it should also apply to a 
group of people calling itself state (Coenen 1989, 422). It is therefore “fair and consistent 
with broadly shared conceptions of property to let state governments favor state residents 
when selecting the recipients of the state’s own largess” (Coenen 1989, 420). Indeed, 
“[i]f all distinctions of state citizenship are removed, states’ raison d’être ceases and the 
central fabric of our constitutional plan is defeated” (Manheim 1990, 590). States should 
be able to sow where they reap. This rationale is boosted by the fact that the U.S. 
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Supreme Court in Reeves v. William Stake not only declared that each state has the “role 
as guardian and trustee for its people”, but also that it is appropriate for a state to 
“channel state benefits to the residents of the State supplying them”, even if “[a] cement 
program, to be sure, may be a somewhat unusual or unorthodox way in which to utilize 
state funds to improve the quality of residents' lives”. Moreover, when deciding whether 
a specific situation warrants the application of the market participation exemption, the 
major factor the Court looks at is whether it involves state ownership of the resource in 
question or not. 
One might make a case, however, that many nonresidents, who are doing business 
in the state, also contribute to a state’s income by paying taxes. Yet, Coenen dismisses 
this summarily by noting that by not residing in the state, nonresidents are also exempt 
from most state taxation and that the burden of exclusion is reduced by constitutional 
rules, which oblige a state to grant resident status to those who seek it. Thus, “[a] rule 
permitting resident preferences is less objectionable when residence itself may readily be 
obtained” (Coenen 1989, 425). Moreover, while a “person may not enjoy certain trading 
relationships with a state because she has chosen not to reside there”, she might on the 
other hand benefit from discriminations imposed on nonresidents by her own state 
(Coenen 1989, 425). Coenen adds that the state also always can decide to allocate the 
money exclusively to state residents through nonmarket channels and that in the end a 
line has to be drawn somewhere (Coenen 1989, 425–26). 
 While the first rationale was based on the notion that it is merely just and fair that 
a state directs its benefits directly to state residents, the second justification derives from 
the idea that a role for states as laboratories of experimentation is beneficial for the entire 
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federal polity. Coenen for that reason observes that “[m]eaningful local governance 
fosters experimentation and responsiveness to distinctive local conditions, facilitates 
choice by fostering diversity, and may increase both liberty and participatory democracy 
by keeping government near at hand” and that additionally “the allowance of substantial 
local control may promote the healthiest brand of nationalism by fostering pursuit of 
different traditions in a spirit of shared toleration” (Coenen 1989, 427). In short, judicial 
interference here would curtail severely state autonomy, the reason being that “state 
resources are the state‘s “own” in a way that the state’s regulatory powers are not” 
(Coenen 1989, 427). Meddling with a state’s limited resources is considered in a different 
ballpark than restricting a state’s “otherwise limitless power to coerce through 
government fiat” (Coenen 1989, 427). The market participant doctrine just simply 
responds to “concerns about state autonomy” (Coenen 1989, 427).35 
 The third major rationale proffered in conjunction with the market participant rule 
is the argument that the trade distortions effects of this rule are minimal in comparison to 
regulations or taxation. The reasoning is that “as a participant, a state is subject to the 
same market forces as a private trader” and the state’s ability to therefore “influence 
private behavior is limited to its market power” (Manheim 1990, 586-87). Thus, it is 
unlikely that interstate commerce will be burdened “to any appreciable degree”, but 
rather states will create new business as traders in the market (Manheim 1990, 587; cf. 
Gergen 1988; Tribe 2000). Regan for instance contends that “[t]he very fact that spending 
                                                 
35
 This second rationale reflects the fiscal federalism literature in the United States, which contends that a 
single, central authority may also use its power for purposes that are inimical to allocative efficiency and 
that competition among various jurisdictional units is beneficial (cf. Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972). Hence, 
Weingast for instance argues that a strong federalism helps to preserve free markets and contributes to 
economic development. He notes that ‘thriving markets require not only an appropriately designed 
economic system, but a secure political foundation that limits the ability of the [central] state to confiscate 
wealth’ (Weingast 1995, 1). 
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programs involve spending and are therefore relatively expensive as a way of securing 
local benefit makes them less likely to proliferate than measures like tariffs” and that 
accordingly they are “less likely to damage the economy seriously in the aggregate, if 
they damage it at all” (Regan 1986, 1194). Thus, “the built-in “expensiveness” of in-state 
marketplace preferences may brake the danger to commerce clause concerns that 
discriminatory state marketplace actions pose” (Coenen 1989, 434). In his concurring 
opinion in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp Justice Stevens also noted that “the 
commerce which Maryland has "burdened" is commerce which would not exist if 
Maryland had not decided” to enter into the market. This statement mirrors largely a 
Supreme Court decision from a century earlier, when Chief Justice Waite wrote in 
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) that “productions do not spring from 
commerce, but commerce to some extent from them”. Coenen adds to the overall 
argument by asserting that while “[t]he creation of a national free market is widely 
accepted as a major purpose of the commerce clause”, “the Framers’ central goal in 
forging the commerce clause was not to maximize economic efficiency”, but rather “to 
engender national solidarity” (Coenen 1989, 431 and 433). Hence, if in-state spending 
preferences create less damage than regulation or taxation, “then few nonresidents will 
take umbrage when a state does so; and if few nonresidents take umbrage, then their 
home states are unlikely to pursue the retaliations and reprisals the dormant commerce 
clause was meant to neutralize” (Coenen 1989, 434; cf. also Regan 1986, 1194). 
 The fourth and fifth justifications for the market participant exemption have to do 
with formal and institutional considerations. Coenen argues regarding the former that 
when courts interpret a statue they “must pay heed to the text’s language and legislative 
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history even if to do so produces results deemed unfair, unwise or dysfunctional” 
(Coenen 1989, 436). Thus, when commentators criticize the Court and other analysts for 
arguing, as in Reeves v. William Stake, that “[t]here is no indication of a constitutional 
plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market” by 
indicating that “there was no indication that they thought about state propriety policy at 
all”, they are approaching the constitutional question from only one direction” (Coenen 
1989, 435 and 437–38). In short, it doesn’t follow that because they didn’t think of it 
commerce clause limits would automatically be appropriate to discriminatory state 
proprietary policy. Hence, “[w]hen as here , constitutional language is at best obscure, the 
absence of a specific design to reach state discrimination in trading its own property 
cannot be dismissed as irrelevant” (Coenen 1989, 438). As regards the latter, the market 
participant exemption is an exemption to the dormant commerce clause. Thus, 
institutionally “Congress remains capable of protecting national interests in this area even 
if the Court holds back” (Coenen 1989, 438). For nearly a decade, however, it wasn’t 
quite so clear how far Congress actually could go in limiting state sovereignty by 
invoking the commerce clause. On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Hughes 
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp, the Court also curtailed congressional authority under the 
commerce clause by arguing in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 
that the Tenth Amendment trumps the commerce clause. In a 5-4 decision the Court 
decided that the U.S. Congress does not have the power to amend the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to force federal minimum wage upon state or municipal employees. Then-
justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that “Congress may not exercise that power so as 
to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the 
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conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made”. Jointly Hughes and National 
League of Cities were dubbed as the inauguration of “the era of the New Federalism” 
(Tribe 2000, 1088). Yet, the principles voiced in the National League of Cities “were 
never again deployed” to restrict congressional authority over commerce and were in fact 
voided nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528 (1985) (Tribe 2000, 1088). Garcia again involved the application of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to local and municipal employees, in this case to the employees of 
San Antonio’s public mass transit system. The Court overruled 5-4 its previous decision. 
Manheim observes that “[s]carely mentioning the Tenth Amendment by name, the 
Supreme Court held that there were little if any judicially discoverable and enforceable 
limits on Congress’ ability regulate the states” (Manheim 1990, 560). Locke adds that 
this decision amounts to a “trend away from judicially imposed restraints on 
congressional power under the commerce clause” (Locke 1994, 10). Justice Blackmum, 
indeed, wrote for the majority that “[i]f there are to be limits on the Federal Government's 
power to interfere with state functions -- as undoubtedly there are -- we must look 
elsewhere to find them”. This “elsewhere” turns out to be Congress as institution itself. 
Congress, due to its make-up, is considered “institutionally sensitive to state concerns” 
and the “guardian of state sovereignty” and therefore state sovereignty can be maintained 
by the institutional structure created by the Framers instead of judicially limiting it 
(Manheim 1990: 560-61). Accordingly, the Court’s majority comments in their decision 
that  
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from 
overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the 
selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the 
Federal Government. The States were vested with indirect influence over 
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the House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of 
electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. U.S.Const., 
Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § 1. They were given more direct influence in the 
Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator 
was to be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The 
significance attached to the States' equal representation in the Senate is 
underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting 
a State of equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V. The 
extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied 
on to insulate the interests of the States is evident in the views of the 
Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government “will 
partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade 
the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their 
governments" (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528 at 551 (1985)). 
Moreover, Garcia also brought into doubt the sovereign/proprietary distinction which 
props up the National Cities and the market participant decisions. The majority in Garcia 
observed that “[t]he problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor 
any other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful 
to the role of federalism in a democratic society” and that “[a]ny rule of state immunity 
that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions 
inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”. These comments lead Manheim to observe 
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s rejection of the sovereign/proprietary distinction in Garcia, 
in the context of interpreting Tenth Amendment limits on congressional power, strongly 
suggest that the distinction is not viable for other federalism purposes” and that the 
“preferred response to new-age federalism is for courts to yield their role as guardian of 
free trade in favor of congressional vigilance over this national interest” (Manheim 1990, 
623). Yet, the market participant exemption is not dead. In Building & Construction 
Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
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Massachusetts/ Rhode Island, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 218 (1993),36 the Supreme Court held 
that “[t]o the extent that a private purchaser may choose a contractor based upon that 
contractor's willingness to enter into a prehire agreement, a public entity as purchaser 
should be permitted to do the same. […] In the absence of any express or implied 
indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own property when it pursues its 
purely proprietary interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, 
this Court will not infer such a restriction”. As Locke points out that “[w]hile the Court 
never explicitly invokes the market participant doctrine, a careful reading of the decision 
reveals that the logic, as well as the language applied, are mere paraphrases of the logic 
and language used in Reeves and Alexandria Scrap” (Locke 1994, 13). Moreover, he 
concludes that “[e]ven without explicit adoption of the market participant doctrine, this 
case should stand for the proposition that if a state acts as a market participant, unless 
specific evidence of congressional intent to prohibit such action exists and is legally 
cognizable, the state’s action will not be preempted” by judicial decision (Locke 1994, 
14). Indeed, the Court here has even “tacitly extended the dormant commerce clause 
doctrine to a situation where Congress has enacted legislation” (Locke 1994, 12–13). 
Let’s summarize the findings so far. While retaining some interpretative 
flexibility, the market participant exemption continues to exist, enabling states to 
discriminate against sister states based on the notion that “when participating in a free 
market, [states] should be afforded the same rights as private businesses, since they 
would surely be saddled with the same burdens” (Locke 1994, 10). Thus, the market 
participant doctrine sets the general tone of public procurement in the United States. 
                                                 
36
 The case concerned the issue whether a prehire agreement on a state owned construction project would 
be valid as it would be in the private sector or whether the National Labor Relations Act passed by 
Congress in 1935 would make such an agreement illegal due to federal preemption. 
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Given that each state can decide for itself whether to bind itself to the GPA, what 
threshold to apply and what categories of public procurement to include, leaves some 
uncertainty for prospective out-of-state bidders. This is even more complicated by the 
fact that each state creates its own specific preferences and the possibility that a 
municipal ordinance or state law might be exempt from implications derived from the 
commerce clause but not from the privileges and immunities clause. And, in fact, 
protectionist measures in public procurement, as the next chapter will show in more 
detail, are actually spreading across the United States in recent years. Last but not least, it 
is worthwhile to reiterate once more that Congress has the power to preempt, i.e. to 
occupy the field of public procurement regulation, but hasn’t done so. Following the 
logic of Garcia, one reason might be that Congress is here the ‘guarantor of state rights’. 
Designed with many veto points and representing the local interests Congress might 
already institutionally not be very likely to intervene and preempt. However, it has done 
so in other cases. 
On the surface the justifications made in the US context for the market participant 
exemption as well as the institutional obstacles posed by Congressional veto points 
should travel well to the European Union. Indeed, given the EU’s greater heterogeneity, 
we should expect that, at the very least, similar arguments to ones made in the United 
States should have been at the center of the European political discourse. Thus, 
justifications, such as the notions that it is merely just and fair that a state directs its 
benefits directly to state residents (sowing and reaping argument), that subsidiarity should 
prevail (laboratories of experimentation & state autonomy argument) and that trade 
distortion is minimal in comparison to taxation and regulation (minimal impact 
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argument), should have also surfaced in the European Union and won out. Additionally, 
since most European states also have larger budgets and own more of the economy, the 
“market participant” style arguments appear to be more salient in the European context—
the states are market participants to a greater extent, so both this notion should be more 
obvious and the politics around it should be sharper. What is more, the European Union 
comprises as least as many if not more institutional hurdles. Most decisions have to pass 
by unanimity or qualified majority voting, which is actually more equivalent to 
amendment procedures in the United States than simple Congressional majority voting. 
Thus, the Council of Ministers, representing and protecting the individual state’s interests 
in the EU should have probably blocked any movements towards centralization and 
liberalization of the public procurement sector. Yet, as we will see shortly this is not the 
case in the European Union. Thus, what looks like very reasonable arguments and 
justifications when looking only at the American context raises interesting questions and 
reveals new insights regarding market–building in compound democracies from a 
comparative perspective.  
Thus, we will now turn our attention to the origins and framework of the public 
procurement regime in the European Union. 
 
EU Public Procurement Regime 
Public procurement is not directly referred to in the founding treaties of the 
European Union. This absence in the words of Verdeaux is evidence “that the subject was 
not really identified originally as an element of the construction of the Common Market”. 
Indeed, José M. Fernández Martín talks about public procurement’s evolution from “an 
uncelebrated origin” “to one of the chosen sons of the 1992 Internal Market Project” 
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(Fernández Martín 1996, 4). And Bovis characterizes public procurement regulation as 
the “the cinderella of the European integration [sic]”, because it was “[o]ften neglected as 
a discipline of European law and policy” and didn’t receive “equal priority to other 
regulatory regimes by the Member States of the European Union” (Bovis 2005, 1). Yet, 
despite its arguably Cinderella-style origins, public procurement is now one of the EU’s 
most prominent policy fields and its legal reach contrasts sharply with the legal 
framework in place in the United States. So how did this transformation from an 
uncomely maid to a policy princess take place? 
Origins of EU Public Procurement Regulations 
While there is a general “silence” in the words of Fernández Martín in the treaties 
creating the European Communities regarding public procurement, some of the basic 
principles and provisions in the EC Treaty of 1957 had a “major impact on the later 
development of the public procurement policy and still govern the philosophy of the 
public procurement regulation in Europe (cf. Fernández Martín 1996, 5; Verdeaux 2003, 
720). Generally the development of the EU public procurement regime can be divided 
into a pre-1984, post-1984 and a New Regime (since 2006) period. 
Pre-1984 EU Public Procurement Regime 
Commentators widely agree that the Rome Treaty does not contain any explicit 
provisions on public procurement apart from two relative obscure provisions, Article 183 
(4) and Article 296 (1) (b) (EC Consolidated Version).37 The former article deals with the 
                                                 
37
 Article 183 (4) For investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies shall 
be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons who are nationals of a Member State or of one of the 
countries and territories. 
Article 296 (1) (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection 
of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, 
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relationship between Member States and the Overseas Countries and Territories. While it 
stipulates that for Community-financed investments, participation in tenders and supplies 
shall be open on equal terms to all nationals of  Member States, “[a] general Community 
legal regime applicable to public contracts cannot be deduced from it” (Fernández Martín 
1996, 5; my emphasis). The second article provides an exemption from the applicability 
of EC legislation for products bought or sold in the military domain, an exemption, which 
applies to this day to the EU public procurement regime. Two general explanations are 
given for the absence of any express reference to public procurement in the Rome Treaty. 
First, along the intergovernmental line of thought (cf. Moravcsik 1998), some 
commentators, such as Flamme (1969), have hinted at the fact that member states might 
have been reluctant to include public procurement specifically in the treaty, because of 
the strategic importance of public procurement in pursuing social, political and economic 
objectives at home. Flamme supports this view by citing a letter by the then-Belgian 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers to the Confédération 
nationale de la Construction. In this letter the Belgian Secretary praises the wisdom of 
the treaty’s authors for not including precise language on how to regulate public 
contracts, because the national parliaments would probably not have accepted it during 
the treaty’s ratification process. 38  
                                                                                                                                                 
munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the 
common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes 
 
38
  “C’est avec sagesse que les auteurs du Traité ont résolu le problème par cette méthode, parce qu’il est à 
mes yeux certain que l’adoption de règles précises supprimant les discriminations en matière d’adjudication 
de travaux n’aurait pas été acceptée par les Parlements compétents lors de la ratification du Traité. Les 
traditions protectionnistes de certains pays de la Communauté sont, en effet, beaucoup trop fortes pour que 
ceci ait pu être espéré” (Lettre du Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers – a l’époque secrétaire aux Affaires 
économiques de Belgique et l’un des plus actifs négociateurs du Traité – au président de la Confédération 
nationale de la Construction, le 24 aoû1960)”, as cited in Flamme 1969, 272. 
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Fernández Martín, on the other hand, argues that this silence can better me 
explained by the fact that first the EEC Treaty, in contrast to the Euratom and ECSC 
treaties, has been “conceived as a Traité-cadre” only establishing general guiding 
principles and “an autonomous institutional decision-making structure whose task is to 
fill in the ‘deliberate’ regulatory gaps left by the Treaty” and second that the European 
founding fathers focused primarily on the reduction of tariff barriers to trade (Fernández 
Martín 1996, 5–6). Thus, Fernándex Martin notes that “[n]on-tariff barriers were not 
deemed as significant as they later became in the in 1960s and 1970s” (Fernández Martín 
1996, 6). This second argument is very much similar to the argument made in the 
American context where commentators have pointed out that the American founding 
fathers also focused more on taxation and regulatory policies, such as tariffs, when 
creating the commerce clause than on proprietary policies. 
While there are no direct references to public procurement in the Treaty on 
establishing the European Community, national public procurement regulations 
nevertheless were affected by the EEC Treaty. As pointed out by Bovis (1998), 
Fernández Martín (1996), Verdeaux (2003) and other commentators, several general 
provisions in the treaty have influenced the development of the public procurement 
framework from the on-start. Most notably provisions on the free movement of goods and 
the prohibition to barriers to intra-community trade (Articles 28 et seq.), on the freedom 
to provide services (Article 49), on the right of establishment (Article 43) , and most 
significantly on non-discrimination (Article 12). According to Verdeaux it is the last 
provision which “has driven most of the policy and judicial decisions in public 
procurement matters” (Verdeaux 2003, 720). Thus, “[a]ll of these provisions have been 
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motivated by the permanent concern of European regulators to strictly enforce one of the 
basic fundamental of Europe: the principle of nondiscrimination based on nationality” 
(Verdeaux 2003, 720). It is, however, the provisions on the free movement of goods, 
which “[r]ecognized by the European Court of Justice as applying directly to both private 
and government transactions in Europe, which led, according to Verdeaux, to “the first 
specific regulatory act of European authorities regarding public procurement” (Verdeaux 
2003, 720). Commission Directive 70/32/EEC “require[s] not to make the supply of 
foreign goods more difficult or onerous than that of national goods when awarding public 
supply contracts” (Fernández Martín 1996, 7). In the early 1990s, after the public 
procurement “revolution” as will see below, the European Court of Justice has also on 
various later occasions applied Article 28 (formerly Article 30) to national measures on 
public procurement, such as preferential procurement schemes. In Laboratori Bruneau 
Srl v Unità sanitaria locale RM/24 di Monterotondo39, confirming Du Pont de Nemours 
Italiana v Unità sanitaria locale No 2 di Carrara,40 the Court wrote that “Article 30 of 
the Treaty precludes national rules which reserve to undertakings established in particular 
regions of the national territory a proportion of public supply contracts” and “[t]he 
possibility that national rules might be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 92 
of the Treaty cannot exempt them from the prohibition set out in Article 30 of the 
Treaty”. 
Prior to the Directive 70/32/EEC, the Council issued two General Programmes 
concerning the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services and the abolition 
                                                 
39
 Case C-351/88 Laboratori Bruneau Srl v. Unità Sanitaria Locale RM/24 de Monterotondo [1991] ECR I-
3641 
 
40
 Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana v Unità sanitaria locale No 2 di Carrara [1990] ECR I-889 
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of restrictions on freedom of establishment based on the general EEC Treaty provisions. 
Fernández Martín observes that “[w]ith respect to public procurement activities, Member 
States were required to abolish restrictions progressively on freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide services arising from provisions and practices which, in respect 
of foreign nationals only, excluded, limited or imposed conditions on the power to submit 
tenders for, or act directly as a party or as a subcontractor in contracts with the State or 
with any other legal person governed by public law” (Fernández Martín 1996, 8). The 
General Programmes also “called for a “gradual and balanced” removal of restrictions, 
accompanied by the ‘desirable measures of co-ordination of national awarding 
procedures” (cf. Fernández Martín 19996, 8). This led, after the submission of proposal 
by the Commission in 1964, to the adoption of three directives: the liberalization 
Directive 71/304 and the co-ordination Directives 71/305, concerning the co-ordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, and 77/62, concerning the co-
ordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts. The latter two 
directives led the way towards “a positive Community policy” (Fernández Martín 1996, 
11). Building a public procurement policy based only on general provisions limited 
severely the scope of the Community. As Fernández Martín points out, “their negative 
character, prohibiting discriminatory conduct on the part of the State, prevented their use 
as instruments to solve the obstacles arising from national legal disparities” (Fernández 
Martín 1996, 10). Consequently, “[i]n the absence of Community harmonization 
measure, all provisions and administrative practices which were not of a discriminatory 
nature were to remain untouched”, meaning that “Member States continued to apply their 
own rules on public contracts, with their different time-limits, procedural requirements, 
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advertising rules, general conditions to be a candidate and so on” (Fernández Martín 
1996, 10). As we will see below, the Commission recognized this dilemma and advocated 
for a positive approach for public procurement.  
Thus, the two co-ordination directives were a first step forward to a full-fledged 
public procurement regime. The directives had as an objective to increase the 
transparency of public procurement procedures in the member states to make it easier to 
compete cross-nationally. The playing field was supposed to be leveled throughout the 
Community by, while largely respecting national administrative practices, coordinating 
them as far as possible. The directives distinguish between three procedures based on the 
degree of competition each of them allowed for. The “open procedure” and the “restricted 
procedure” allow for competition. They differ in the fact that in the open procedure any 
business or person can submit a tender, while in the restricted procedure anyone may 
submit a request for participation by proving that they fulfill the economic, financial and 
technical requirements delineated by the contracting authority, but then have to wait for 
the invitation to submit a tender sent out by the contracting author to those who turn out 
to be qualified. The third procedure is called the “single tendering procedure”. Contracts 
based on the last procedure are generally excluded from the directives and allow a 
contracting authority to negotiate the terms of contract directly with a supplier. The 
directives, however, contain a very narrow list of cases in which the single tendering 
procedure can be applied to. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has strictly 
interpreted the list in having “never accepted any of the justifications advanced by the 
defendants” (Fernández Martín 1996, 13). More significantly, however, is that the 
directives included obligations on behalf of the member states to advertise all contracts 
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awards, falling under the directives, Europe-wide in the Community’s Official Journal 
and to accept compulsory qualitative selection and award criteria. The qualitative 
selection criteria relate to the determination of the professional, financial, economic, and 
technical suitability of a tendering company. Contracting authorities are obliged to base 
their decisions on admittance of a tender or of invitation of tender in the case of the 
restricted procedure on these listed criteria. Should the tenderer fulfill the qualitative 
criteria, then the contracting authority has to base its final choice on the two awarding 
criteria established in the directives: either the lowest price or the most economically 
advantageous offer. The latter involving a variety of criteria, including price, running 
costs, aesthetic and functional characteristics, delivery date, cost-effectiveness, quality, 
technical merit, after-sales services and technical assistance. Last but not least, the two 
directives also introduced the concept of threshold for the applicability of the rules. Thus, 
the directives were only applicable to public supply contracts above 200,000 ECU and 
public works contracts above 1 million ECU. However, the preamble of the earlier public 
works directive stated the Commission’s intent to lower the threshold in the long run (cf. 
Fernández Martín 1996, 14).While the two directives represented a step forward for 
opening up the public procurement market in the Community, they were nevertheless 
limited in their scope. For instance the two directives did not deal with the enforcement 
stage of concluded contracts and did not apply to public contracts awarded by public 
authorities that managed transportation, water or energy services. The public supplies 
directive also excluded telecommunication services. Moreover, services not directly 
related to public works were also excluded from the two directives.41  
                                                 
41
 Two broad arguments in synch with functionalist-materialist arguments are presented in the literature to 
explain the early exclusion of utilities in the two co-ordination directives. First, the Commission itself 
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This relatively limited scope of the first public procurement-related directives in 
conjunction with the Commission’s original focus on tariff barriers might also explain 
why there has not been much conflict or attention surrounding these early directives. 
Fernández Martín’s research shows that “the Directives were peacefully enacted and that 
no substantial conflict arose between any of the Institutions, or between the supranational 
and national levels” (Fernández Martín 1996, 33). The Commission’s proposals were 
readily received by the Parliament and by the Council; the latter only making “minor 
modifications relating to the use of preferential public procurement” (Fernández Martín 
1996, 33. Fernández Martín also highlights the absence of debate in industrial and 
academic circles and the fact that “no elaborate survey proceeded the adoption of 
legislation in this area”, “[n]o Commission service was devoted, on an exclusive basis, to 
the subject”, the number of persons dealing with public procurement at the Commission 
was minimal, and “no substantial monitoring activity was noticeable” after the enactment 
of the directives (Fernández Martín 1996, 33).  
In sum, in the early years of the European Union public procurement regulation 
played more of a side issue in the process of European market-building. Yet, it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
argued in the preambles of the directives that utilities are subject to different legal statuses in the member 
states ranging from public, semi-public to private entities. Thus, practical reasons, according to the 
Commission hindered it to extend the scope of the directives to utilities. If they would have been included 
at the time, it would have distorted competition, because only public entities would have been covered 
while private ones would enjoy complete freedom of contract. Thus, the Commission decided to wait until 
a measure other than legal status could be worked out (cf. Fernández Martín 1996, 15). This happened over 
a decade later when EC Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September 1990 on the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunication sectors was passed. 
Fernández Martín, however, hints at another possible explanation, the reluctance of member states to 
transfer authority over procurement in the utilities sector to the Community due to the political and 
economic significance of the sector. He notes that “[w]hen the first Directives were drafted, the issue was 
not ripe for a political compromise. Due to their economic and strategic importance, these sectors are 
closely controlled by public authorities which are, moreover, their most important clients” and thus “[t]he 
reluctance of Member States to limit their economic discretionary powers by subordinating their 
contracting freedom in those sectors to Community regulation is not therefore surprising” (Fernández 
Martín 1996, 15). 
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remarkable in comparison with the US that the EEC was already making progress on 
procurement in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing on it (even if very narrowly) in the first 
five years of its existence. It took the US a very long time to focus on procurement and 
then the trend was towards a justification of trade barriers instead of their elimination. 
Moreover the side role that public procurement has played in the early decades of the 
EEC was about to change dramatically when in the mid-1980s, under the Delors 
Commission, a major push towards a more substantial, positive public procurement 
regime was undertaken.  
 
Post-1984 EU Public Procurement Regime 
The mid-1980s turn out be the pivotal moment in the creation of the EU’s public 
procurement regime. Fernández Martín talks of a “revolution”, a change from a large 
period of “inactivity”, where “the Commission’s sole significant action in the public 
contracts area responded more to the necessity of adapting the Community rules to the 
international obligations contracted under the GATT” than to improve the rules’ 
efficiency, to “sensational vitality” and a moment of transformation of public 
procurement “from a dormant to a highly dynamic topic” (Fernández Martín 1996, 16). 
The starting point appears to be the Commission’s 1984 communication to the Council 
assessing the practical results of the Directive on public supplies contracts.42 This 
communication was the result of a 1976 Council Decision inviting the Commission to 
provide such an assessment by 1980. The Economic and Social Committee of the 
European Community attributed the four year delay not only to “the Commission’s 
tardiness”, but also to the member states which didn’t even perform the “apparently 
                                                 
42
 EC Commission, Public Supply Contracts. Conclusions and Perspectives, COM (84) 717.  
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rudimentary statistical requirements of Directive 77/62” (ESC (86) 399, 1–2). In this and 
a second communication two years later43, the Commission emphasized the importance 
of developing a more positive, active public procurement regime by highlighting that “the 
impact of the Directives has been marginal” leading to a total absence of “integration” in 
the public procurement sector (COM (86) 375, 4). The Commission concluded that the 
general provisions in the EC Treaty and “the obligation not to take certain action 
contained [in it] is, as experience has shown, not sufficient to bring about the desired 
interpenetration of the public procurement market” (COM (84) 717, 4). Not only were the 
general provisions insufficient according to the Commission, but also the co-ordination 
directives did not have the desired effect. The Commission analyzed the effectiveness of 
the existing directives by studying the number of notices published in the Official Journal 
and then comparing it with the number of contracts awarded to businesses from other 
member states. While the Commission considered itself content with the steadily 
increasing number of public notices being published,44 demonstrating a general 
willingness by the member states to fulfill their notification obligations, the number of 
awards actually awarded to companies located in other member states was abysmal. Only 
around 1% of contracts in 1982 were given by the contracting authorities to companies 
located in another member state (COM (84) 717). This abysmal figure was confirmed, 
among others, in a 1987 French study by the Commissariat au Plan, which noted that 
“for public works contracts in the Community the share given to non-national firms was 
only 3.2 per cent in France, 2.0 per cent in Germany, 1.8 per cent in Britain, 1.5 per cent 
                                                 
43
 EC Commission, Public Procurement in the Community, COM (86) 375, followed two years later. While 
the first communication only focused on the public supplies directive, the Commission argued that the 
findings applied mutatis mutandis to the public works directive (cf. Fernández Martín 1996, 17).  
 
44
 COM (84) 717, 15 and Table I, and COM (86) 375, 4; cf. also Fernández Martín 1996, 18 
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in Spain” and “insignificant in Italy” (Fernández Martín 1996, 19). Thus, the 
Commission concluded that the “Directives were inadequate to ensure the achievement of 
their objectives” (COM (86) 375: 4). The Commission blamed the shortcomings on the 
limitations of the directives themselves as well as on the deliberate disregard of the 
respective member states’ procurement agencies.  
First, the scope of the existing regime was severely limited. Sub-national 
authorities, which account for over 40% of all public expenditure, did only rarely award 
contracts over the thresholds (cf. Fernández Martín 1996, 20). Utilities, a major consumer 
in the public sector, weren’t included, as mentioned above, and other public service 
contracts not directly related to public works were also not covered.  
Second, unequal competition conditions continued due to the fact that the 
directives were largely based on maintaining national provisions on public procurement 
leading to a lack of implementation uniformity. 
Third, enforcement was underdeveloped. As Fernández Martín observes, 
“effective mechanisms for the enforcement of the rules and an operative enforcement 
policy were lacking” and “the Commission had administered a laid-back approach which 
did not put Member States under any pressure to comply with the rules at any level” 
(Fernández Martín 1996, 10, 16 and 22). In the period between the 1977 public supply 
directive and the first assessment communication to the Council only two cases had been 
brought before the European Court of Justice (cf. Fernández Martín 1996). 
The particular ire of the Commission, however, was drawn, fourth, to the lack of 
application of the existing directives by the member states. The Commission noted that 
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there appeared to be a “deliberate underestimation of the contract value and overzealous 
division of projects” with the aim to avoid the thresholds (COM (84) 717: 13).  
It was these two communications in conjunction with the famous White Paper of 
1985 and the later so-called Cechinni Report, which provided the arguments for further 
action by the Commission. Especially the latter provided the economic rationale 
underlying the expansion and deepening of public procurement pushed by the EU 
Commission. The economic justification has been at the center for explanations of why 
the Commission has turned its attention towards an “active shaping of the contents of the 
policy” field and reneged on a “laid-back approach” (Fernández Martín 1996, 10, 16 and 
22). Verdeaux for instance contends that the share of public procurement “in the 
European economy explains the intervention of European regulators in a field not 
addressed in the founding treaty” (Verdeaux 2003, 720). And Fernández Martín observes 
that the findings of the Cecchini Report “provided the necessary economic excuse for the 
need to enter upon a new supranational policy in the field (Fernández Martín 1996, 23; 
my emphasis). Bovis also notes that with the removal of tariffs complete by 1969, the 
Commission was now free to start focusing on non-tariff barriers to trade, which included 
public procurement. In its White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market, COM 
(85) 310 fin, in 1985 the Commission identifies public procurement as a major economic 
sector hampered by non-tariff barriers, which to be eliminated as part over the overall  
goal to create a single market by 1992. Hence, the Commission noted, in addition to 
continued protectionism in public procurement being “the most evident barriers to the 
achievement of a real internal market”, that “Community-wide liberalization of public 
procurement is vital for the future of the Community economy” (COM (85) 310 fin, 23–
 122 
 
 
24). The Commission further argued that, while existing directives have not been 
completely successful, the general articles contained in the EEC Treaty provide the legal 
basis for further action in public procurement. The Commission observed accordingly 
that “[t]he basic rule, contained in Article 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty, that goods should 
move freely in the common market, without being subject to quantitative restrictions 
between Member States and of all measures having equivalent effect, fully applies to the 
supply of good to public purchasing bodies, as do the basic provisions of Article 59 et 
seq. in order to ensure the freedom to provide services” (COM (85) 310 fin, 23). Thus, 
while the White Paper and the subsequence Single European Act provided “the political 
and legal framework of the attempts of European institutions to tackle the issue of public 
procurement more effectively”, the specific impetus and justification for the 
Commission’s activity in the public procurement field was the publication of the very 
detailed Commission study The Cost of Non-Europe, known as the Cecchini Report 
(Bovis 1998, 222). In Bovis’s words, the Cecchini Report provided “empirical proof of 
the distorted market situation in the public sector” and emphasized “the benefits of the 
regulation of public procurement by European institutions (Bovis 1998, 221-22). In short, 
this report argued that the failure to complete the common market had considerable cost. 
An entire section of the report was dedicated exclusively to public procurement.45 The 
report argues that “by not encouraging intra-Community competition [in public 
procurement], it is implicitly supporting sub-optimal enterprises, which is reflected in 
European industry being less competitive in world markets” and makes “public 
expenditure […] higher than necessary” (WS Atkins 1988, Executive Summary, 1). It 
                                                 
45
 Consultants, WS Atkins Management. Research on the "Cost of Non-Europe": Basic Findings, the "Cost 
of Non-Europe" in the Public-Sector Procurement. Vol. 5, Part A: European Communities, 1988. 
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goes on to note that “the degree of import penetration in public purchases is much lower 
than for the economy as a whole” and predicts that an opening up the public procurement 
would lead to “potential savings in annual public expenditure of some 8 to 19 billion 
ecus” (WS Atkins 1988, Executive Summary, 3 and 6).46 Thus, the overall report 
emphasizes strongly that the existing two directives have “so far been very little effective 
opening up of public procurement”, demonstrated by the fact that import penetration to 
public procurement markets is a mere 1.7% on average47, although public procurement on 
supplies, works and services represents at least 15% of the EC-12’s GDP48 (WS Atkins 
1988, Executive Summary, 4, 7 and 16-18). The savings from further legislation and 
opening up of the public procurement sector therefore would derive “from new trade at 
the prices of the lowest cost country” (static trade effect: 3 – 8 billion ecus), “as a result 
of competitive pressure on prices in sectors not previously open to international 
competition” (competition effect: 1 to 3 billion ecus) and as a result of gaining 
“economies of scale arising from the restructuring of industry in the previously protected 
sectors” (restructuring effect: 4 – 8 billion ecus) (WS Atkins 1988, Executive Summary, 
7 and 10). Additional, not included, savings could derive from an accelerated rate of 
innovations and private sector purchasers benefiting from similar goods (WS Atkins 
1988, Executive Summary, 7). 
 Therefore, the Cecchini report provided the economic justification, and one might 
add fig leaf, for further action by the European Commission to deepen integration in 
                                                 
46
 The study is based on looking only a t five countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
 
47
 The report does admit, however, that the import penetration might be “an underestimate since purchasers 
do not always know whether contracts let with national suppliers include the supply of imported goods” 
(WS Atkins 1988, Executive Summary, 3). 
 
48
 The total of public purchasing expenditure as % of GDP in 1984 varies between 11.8% in Germany and 
21.8% in the UK (WS Atkins 1988, Executive Summary, 18). 
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public procurement. Fernández Martín for instance observes that “[n]ot surprising a 
common feature of most writings examining the EC regulation of public procurement is 
to stress the economic significance of the liberalisation of public procurement by 
referring to the conclusions of the Cecchini Report” (Fernández Martín 1996, 23). Bovis 
correspondingly observes that “[t]he rationale behind the whole process of the integration 
of the public markets of the Member States has been the establishment of an effectively 
competitive regime similar to that envisaged for the operation of private markets” (Bovis 
1998, 223). This process of further integration of public markets was ideologically 
bolstered by the dominant paradigm of liberal economic theories. Thus, Bovis puts 
emphasis on the fact that “European institutions have intellectually supported such an 
attempt (of liberalization public procurement), where enhanced competition in public 
markets could bring about beneficial effects for the supply side of the equation (industry), 
by means of optimal allocation of resources within European industries, rationalization of 
production and supply, promotion of mergers and acquisitions and elimination of sub-
optimal firms, creation of globally competitive industries, effects which are deemed to 
yield substantial purchasing savings to the to the public sector” (Bovis 1998, 223). 
Moreover, “perpetuating discriminatory and preferential public purchasing […] 
represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources (human and capital) throughout the 
common market at the expense of the public sector, which pays more than it should for 
equivalent or even better products or deliveries”(Bovis 1998, 224–25). And in a later 
article he notes that “the intellectual paternity of public procurement regulation can be 
traced in a neo-classical economic approach to market integration” and that “[s]avings 
and price convergence appeared as the main arguments for liberalizing the trade patterns 
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of the demand (the public and utilities sectors) and the supply (the industry) side of the 
public procurement equation” (Bovis 2005, 55 - 56). He notes, however, also that “legal 
arguments have emerged supporting the regulation of public procurement as a necessary 
ingredient of the fundamental principles of the European Treaties, such as the free 
movement of goods and services, the right of establishment and the prohibition of 
discrimination on nationality grounds”, which have already played a role in the very first 
steps towards an EU-wide public procurement regime and which were also noted in the 
1985 White Paper. Thus, trade patterns, in which “[p]rocurement by member states and 
their contracting authorities is often susceptible to a rationale and policy that favors 
indigenous undertakings and national champions at the expense of more efficient 
competitors (domestic or Community-wide)”, inhibits “the fulfillment of the principles 
enshrined in the Treaties” (Bovis 2005, 56; italics in original). Yet, it clearly appears to 
be the case that it is the economic importance of public procurement and the 
accompanying arguments which not only “made the opening up of public procurement a 
top priority on the Commission’s agenda”, but also “a ‘test case’ to measure the progress 
made towards the achievement of the 1992 ideal (Fernández Martín 1996, 23). Thus, 
“[g]iven the level of infrastructure  and the amount spent on it every financial year by the 
contracting authorities of the Member States, the public sector has acquired a significant 
dimension within the European integration process and the need to regulate it with the 
view to eliminating market distortions became imminent” (Bovis 1998, 225). This need is 
even bigger given the fact, according to commentators, that “the state and its organs, as 
contracting authorities possess a monopoly position in the sense that no one competes 
with them in their market activities” and they also “possess a monopsony position, as 
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firms engaged in transactions with them have no alternatives to pursue business” (Bovis 
1998, 227). Here a huge difference can be noted from the American perspective where 
the state, as purchasers of goods and services, is considered as acting in the market 
similar to other market participants as illustrated above.  
 The Commission, as will be described in more detail in the ensuing chapter, has 
been clearly at the center of the push for a more centralized and liberalized public 
procurement regime. Fernandez Martin’s for instance remarks upon the key role of 
Commission in pushing this agenda: 
It is true that the policy was carried out by all Community institutions, not just by 
the Commission. However, this should not conceal the fact that the main actors in 
the conception, justification, and implementation of the policy were the 
Commission services, who were especially active under the Delors’ Presidency. 
Thus, even though the public procurement policy is formally a Community 
policy, adopted on the basis of the Community’s decision-making process, the 
Commission bears most responsibility for its conception and implementation 
(Fernández Martín 1996, 23).  
In addition, the European Commission has not waited until the result of the Cecchini 
Report to restructure its directorate generals to focus more on public procurement. 
Fernández Martín reports that “[t]he renascence of public procurement policy is first 
witnessed by the serious restructuring of the Commission’s DG III ‘Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs’ services” (Fernández Martín 1996, 23). Prior to 1984 there was no 
division within the DG Internal Market to deal with public procurement exclusively. This 
changed with the creation in 1984 of Division 4 of Directorate C which a year later 
“became devoted exclusively to public procurement as an autonomous and independent 
area in the internal administrative structure of DGIII” (Fernández Martín 1996, 24). 
Further, “more far-reaching restructuring”, led in 1988 to the creation of an entire 
“Directorate specifically charged with the task of opening up markets to European-wide 
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competition” (Fernández Martín 1996, 24). The new Directorate was divided into two 
Divisions, respectively in charge of developing new legislative measures and dealing 
with implementation and enforcement issues. Moreover, the number of Commission staff 
assigned to public procurement was “increased substantially by more than 40 per cent”, a 
new Advisory Committee on the Opening-up of Public Procurement was established (EC 
Commission Decision 87/305/EEC) to serve alongside the 1971 established Advisory 
Committee for Public Procurement (EC Council Decision 71/306), a “Vademecum on 
Government Procurement” (EC Commission, OJ 1987, C358/1) was produced by the 
Commission, and last but not least in the first years over three hundred seminars and 
conferences have been sponsored by the Commission as part of an awareness campaign 
targeted at contracting authorities and companies (Fernández Martín 1996, 24–25). The 
Commission, moreover, had additional plans, such as the “the creation of a ‘Public 
Contracts Committee’ within the Commission with far-reaching monitoring competences 
which would include a right to intervene in national award procedures to defend the 
Community’s public interest”, which didn’t materialize (Fernández Martín 1996, 25; cf. 
COM (86) 375, 9). Nevertheless, the Commission put increased focus on a systematic 
initiation of Article 169 EC, now Article 226 (EC Consolidated Version), “proceedings 
against any known alleged violation and the encouragement of private persons and 
indivudals to address complaints to the Commission’s services” (Fernández Martín 1996, 
25).49 In addition, the Commission also put in place a computerized system (Tenders 
                                                 
49
 Article 226 (formerly Article 169 EC): If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the 
opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice. 
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Electronic Daily) to provide automatically information on any tenders published in the 
Official Journal. 
 As a result of this new-found emphasis on public procurement, legislative activity 
increased over the next couple of years leading to a string of directives directly related to 
public procurement getting passed in the late 1980s and 1990s amending, enhancing and 
extending the EU-level public procurement regime. While the Single European Act, 
similar to the previous EEC Treaty, didn’t include any specific provisions dealing with 
public procurement and while “several new powers were attributed to the Community in 
different policy areas, but none in the field of public procurement”, public procurement 
policy profited from a change in the Community’s decision-making procedures. 
Unanimity rules in the domain of public procurement were replaced by qualified majority 
voting based on the new Article 100(a) EC.50 As Fernández Martín observes, the result 
was then that “[i]t took less than two years to enact the new public supply Directive and a 
little over one year in the case of the new public works Directive, whereas their 
predecessors took over four and five, respectively (Fernández Martín 1996, 26). The 
provisions in the new public supply and public works directives were “stricter and more 
far-reaching than those of the original Directives” Fernández Martín 1996, 26). The 
public works and supply Directives were first amended (Directive 89/440 amending 
Directive 71/305; Directive 88/295, amending 77/62), before they became consolidated 
due to the fact that the original and the amending Directives remained first separate texts 
leading to confusing legal rules spread over separate documents (consolidated public 
supplies Directive 93/36; consolidated public works Directive 93/37). The consolidated 
                                                 
50
 Another change involved the role of the European Parliament, which now as a result of the co-operation 
procedure (Fernández Martín 1996, 26 – 27). 
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Directives codified “the case law of the Court of Justice interpreting what entities or 
bodies are subject to Community law in general, and public procurement rules in 
particular” (Fernández Martín 1996, 28). The case law, however, in Fernández Martín’s 
assessment, “adopts the Commission’s position in this respect” leading to the widest 
application and definition of public authorities (Fernández Martín 1996, 28). The goal of 
defining public authorities as widely as possible is to “fight the recurrent practice in 
public procurement cases, whereby Member States resort to the fiction of declaring the 
bodies in charge of the management of public services as formally belonging to the 
private sector and, therefore, excluded from the discipline of the public procurement 
Directives” (Fernández Martín 1996, 28).  
Besides amending the procurement regime regarding public works and supplies 
contracts, new Directives were passed to extend the regime to public services (Directive 
92/50) and finally utilities (Directive 93/39). While the latter, due to the “supposed 
diversity and complexity” of the utility sectors, is subject to specific procurement rules,51 
the other three directives are “subject to the same set of rules for each of their 
procurements exceeding a specific threshold” (Verdeaux 2003, 721). The new directives 
slightly changed the threshold amount from the original directives in the field of public 
supplies (minimal reduction from 140,000 to 130,000 ECU) and more substantially in the 
field of public works, where the threshold was raised from 1 million to 5 million ECU to 
take into account “the rise in the cost of construction work and the interest of small and 
medium-sized firms in bidding for medium-sized contracts” (Directive 88/295, 
                                                 
51
 The first time utilities were covered by any European legislation, however, was Directive 90/531 (cf. 
Bovis 1998; Fernández Martín 1996).. This Directive was substituted three years later by this newer 
directive which now only included public supplies and public works contracts, but also public services 
contracts awarded by utilities. 
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Preamble). Thus, the raise was designed with the goal to partially protect medium and 
small firms from competition from larger companies (cf. Fernández Martín 1996, 29). 
The threshold for public services contracts was first set for 200,000ECU. The new 
directives were also geared towards increasing transparency in the awarding of public 
procurement contracts and the information obligations of the contracting authorities. 
Therefore, the directives made the use of the open and restricted procedures (i.e. with 
open competition) the rule while demanding from the contracting authorities to submit a 
justification why they used the non-competitive negotiated, formerly known as single 
tendering, procedure. Moreover, the contracting authorities are now subject to a pre-
information and a post-award obligation. Contracting authorities have to inform 
unsuccessful firms why they were rejected, have to publish an advance notice on how 
much total procurement they plan to award the following year, provide information to be 
published in the Official Journal on the results of all awards and under what conditions 
each actual contract has been awarded as well as prepare a detailed report on each 
contract award procedure, including, among others, information which companies were 
rejected and why and which company won and why, that needs to be kept on file and 
upon request needs to be forwarded to the Commission.52 It has to be noted here that the 
procurement directives, while now covering most types of procurement, including dual-
use supplies needed by the military, do exclude explicitly military equipment. 
 To facilitate the possibility of redress and to remedy shortcomings in the existing 
procurement regime, two Remedies Directives were also adopted by the Council in the 
following years (Directive 89/665 review procedures for public supply and public works 
                                                 
52
 For more detail on the rules and procedures covered by the public procurement directives, cf. Verdeaux 
(2003). Also confer Fernández Martín (1996) for some addition details on how the new directives have 
amended the pre-1984 regime. 
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and public services contracts; Directive 92/13 review procedures for public contracts in 
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors).53 The Remedies Directive 
became necessary, because “[c]ontrary to other Directives in other areas of Community, 
the public procurement Directives did not oblige Member States to introduce into their 
national legal systems such measures which are necessary to ensure adequate and 
effective means of redress in the form of claims by judicial process” and thus ”[n]national 
systems were to apply unchanged” (Fernández Martín 1996, 205). Yet, as Fernández 
Martín, points out that the 1989 “Remedies Directive is of a limited scope”, given that it 
only covers breaches of the obligations enshrined in the “public works, public supplies 
and public services directives “or in the national legislation implementing provisions of 
the Directives” (Fernández Martín 1996, 28 and 206). It doesn’t deal with potential 
infringements not directly related to Community obligations and, “[d]isputes which may 
arise between parties to a contract as regards the enforcement of the contractual clauses 
are still, in the absence of Community rules, regulated by existing national provisions”, 
leading to criticism by commentators and the European Parliament (Fernández Martín 
1996, 206-7). Bovis also points out the principle of the Member States’ procedural 
autonomy, i.e. Member States retaining “the power to select a court, a tribunal or an 
independent authority as the competent forum to deal with public procurement law” is 
problematic given that it still leaves a high level of heterogeneity and uncertainty (Bovis 
2006, 57) 
As regards international trade rules and the Government Procurement Agreement 
of Marrakech, similar to the United States, the EU’s adherence has not changed the 
qualitative framework of the internal public procurement regime. Council Decision 
                                                 
53
 For a detailed description, see Fernández Martín 1996, Chapter 8. 
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94/800 transposed the GPA into EU legislation simply extending the non-discrimination 
clause to non-EU Member States. Yet, one important difference between the United 
States and the European Union emerges right away. As Verdaux notes in passing, 
“[u]nlike the U.S. provisions, these principles are applicable to all subcentral authorities 
from the large Spanish provincias or German länder to the smallest city or even villages 
of Europe” (Verdeaux 2003, 717; emphasis in original). Thus, in contrast to the US, 
where each sub-central contracting authority was able to decide its adherence to the GPA, 
given the EU procurement regime, adherence to the GPA meant that all contracting 
authorities are automatically subject to it. Consequently the European Union ends up 
empowering a global-level deal to have much more reach than it has in the United States. 
 
New EU Public Procurement Regime (since 2006) 
Following a Commission Green Paper in 1996 and a 1998 Commission 
Communication the EU’s public procurement system was once again amended and 
modernized.54 The revision of the existing regime is seen “as an integral part of the 
Commission’s 2000 Work Programme, which pledged to modernize the relevant 
legislation for the completion of the internal market and at the same time implement the 
Lisbon European Council’s call for economic reform”’ (Bovis 2006, 29). The goal was to 
simplify, modernize and increase the flexibility of the existing public procurement regime 
with the goal to continue to fully integrate the public procurement market and to 
eliminate any remaining non-tariff barriers. To do so the new regime merges the four 
existing European directives into two legal instruments: the so-called "traditional" 
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 Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way forward, European 
Commission 1996; COM (98) 143 European Commission, Communication on Public Procurement in the 
European Union 
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Directive 2004/18/EC for public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts and Directive 2004/17/EC on the "special sectors" of water, energy, 
transport and postal services. In short, the new regime establishes a clear-cut dichotomy 
between the public sector and the utilities, largely a result of the liberalization process in 
the public utilities sector and the introduction of sector-specific regulations. As Bovis 
comments, the utilities “change in ownership from public to private has stimulated 
commercialism and competitiveness and provide for the justification of a more relaxed 
regime and the acceptance that utilities, in some form or another, represent sui generis 
contracting authorities, which do not need a rigorous and detailed regulation of their 
procurement” (Bovis 2006, 30; emphasis in original). Thus the new utilities directive 
allows for the total disengagement from public procurement rules should it be proven that 
a genuinely competitive regime has developed where purchasing patterns based on non-
economic considerations have been ruled out (cf. Bovis 2006, 53).55  
As regards the “traditional" directive applying to public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts, it covers generally all procurement 
contracts which have a value excluding VAT estimated to be no less than the following 
thresholds: 
- EUR 137 000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by central 
government authorities (ministries, national public establishments);  
                                                 
55
 However, a legal hole remains regarding public utilities and the GPA. Bovis summarizes this as follows: 
“The disengagement of the utilities procurement regime as a result of the operation of the relevant entities 
in competitive markets by virtue of Article 30 of the new utilities Directive does not apply to the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement. This represents a legal lacuna as the procedural flexibility envisaged 
in the European procurement regulatory regime does not cover entities covered under the GPA. 
Rectification of the problem would require amendment to the GPA with the conferral of concessions and 
reciprocal access right to the GPA signatories” (Bovis 2006, 54 – 55). 
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- EUR 211 000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by contracting 
authorities which are not central government authorities as well as certain 
products in the field of defense awarded by the central government authorities, 
concerning certain services in the fields of research and development (RTD), 
telecommunications, hotels and catering, transport by rail and waterway, 
provision of personnel, vocational training, investigation and security, certain 
legal, social and sanitary, recreational, cultural and sporting services;  
- EUR 5 278 000 in the case of works contracts.  
The thresholds are verified by the Commission every two years and their calculation of 
their value is based on the average daily value of the euro, expressed in special drawing 
rights (SDR), over the 24 months ending on 31 August for the revision with effect from 1 
January.56 The public procurement contracts which are excluded from the scope of the 
directive, include, among others, contracts covered by "special sectors" directives and 
contracts awarded with the purpose of providing or exploiting public telecommunications 
networks, contracts which are declared to be secret or affect the essential interests of a 
Member State (defense contracts), and contracts concluded pursuant to international 
agreements. Also some audiovisual services with special cultural and social significance, 
such as relates to the development, purchases and (co)production of broadcasting 
programs, but not including technical equipment, are excluded.  
 Thus, once again, in contrast to the sister states in the US, the EU Member States, 
above the specific minimum thresholds, do not retain the authority to discriminate against 
                                                 
56
 For those Member States which have not adopted the single currency, the European Commission 
publishes the values in national currencies of the applicable thresholds in the Official Journal. In principle, 
these values are revised every two years from 1 January 2004. 
 135 
 
 
bidders from other Member States, with exception of military equipment for the defense 
sector. Article 3 of the Directive 2004/19/EC clearly states that  
Where a contracting authority grants special or exclusive rights to carry 
out a public service activity to an entity other than such a contracting 
authority, the act by which that right is granted shall provide that, in 
respect of the supply contracts which it awards to third parties as part of its 
activities, the entity concerned must comply with the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
 The new public sector directive also “introduced a series of new concepts which 
are the product of jurisprudential inferences and policy refining of the previous legal 
regimes” (Bovis 2006, 32).57 These new concepts include, among others, the permission 
of entities governed by public law to compete alongside private sector companies for 
procurement awards as long as it doesn’t cause any competitive distortions injuring 
private tenderers, the creation of a new award procedure called competitive dialogue,58 
the creation of a central system of certification of private and public organizations for the 
purposes of providing evidence of financial and economic standing and levels of 
technical capacity in public procurement selection and qualification procedures, the 
possibility for contracting authorities to award contracts jointly and to establish a 
framework agreement between one or more contracting authorities and one or more firms 
with the purpose to establish the terms and conditions of public contracts to be awarded 
during a given period time period (maximum 4 years). The new Directive also provides 
for the rapid expansion of electronic public purchasing systems and electronic auctions.  
                                                 
57
 For a detailed description of these new concepts, see Bovis 2006.  
 
58
 The competitive dialogue has been set up alongside the traditional open, restricted and negotiated 
procedures. It is supposed to be used exceptionally when contracts turn out to be too complex to be 
awarded by using the open or restricted procedure and where the negotiated procedure is not justifiable. 
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 Concerning the inclusion of social and environmental considerations as part of the 
award criteria for public contracts, the new Directives, however, “remain silent” (Bovis 
2006: 40). Bovis observes that, given the ECJ’s case law, conditions relating to the 
performance of public contracts, such as on-site vocational training, the employment of 
the people experiencing particular difficulty in achieving integration, the fight against 
unemployment or the protection of the environment, “are compatible with the public 
sector Directive provided that they are not directly or indirectly discriminatory and are 
indicated in the contract in the contract notice or in the contract documents” (Bovis 
2006). While, following the insistence of the European Parliament, the draft Directives 
contained language related to workforce matters as part of awards criteria, it was 
excluded from the final Directives. Bovis considers the Commission’s stance that 
contractual performance can’t be employed as criterion for the awarding of contracts as 
“myopic” (Bovis 2006, 40). Yet, in Article 19 of the public sector Directive the 
Commission makes one concession to the Member States. They may reserve certain 
public contracts to sheltered workshops or provide for such contracts to be performed in 
the context of sheltered employment programs where most of the employees concerned 
are handicapped persons. While otherwise the socio-economic dimension is not explicitly 
emphasized in the Directive and the ECJ has maintained the importance of the overall 
economic approach, the Court has, nevertheless, over the years also recognized “the 
relative discretion of contracting authorities to utilize non-economic considerations as 
award criteria” (Bovis 2006, 42). In short, the ECJ has given the award criterion of ‘the 
most economically advantageous offer” a wide and flexible interpretation. In Gebroeders 
Beentjes v. The Netherlands, Case 31/87, the Court decided that combating long-term 
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unemployment cannot be part of selection criteria to disqualify potential tenderers, but 
could be part of the award criteria for public contracts in cases where the most 
economically advantageous offer is selected and as long as it has no direct or indirect 
discriminatory effect on tenders from other Member States and runs afoul of the earlier 
mentioned fundamental principles in the EC Treaty. In another case, the ECJ was asked 
to consider inter alia whether environmental considerations could be part of the most 
economically advantageous criterion. In Concordia Bus Filandia v. Helsingin Kaupunki 
et HKL-Bussuliikenne, C-513/99, the Advocate-General opined that contracting 
authorities are allowed do so as long as it doesn’t discriminate against alternative offers 
and that to be permissible they “must satisfy a number of conditions; namely, they must 
be objective, universally applicable, strictly relevant to the contract in question, and 
clearly contribute an economic advantage to the contracting authority” (Bovis 2006, 45–
46). Thus, the important point here to understand is while EU Member States can take 
into account some social-economic criteria when awarding contracts based on the most 
economically advantageous offer, they cannot, in contrast to the US, limit themselves to 
only in-state companies.  
As in the previous public procurement regime, the new public procurement 
directives were followed by a revised Remedies Directive. This new directive, aiming to 
improve the effectiveness of national review procedures for the award of public contracts, 
has been formally adopted and has been published as Directive 2007/66/EC on 20 
December 2007. Member States have until 20 December 2009 to implement the new 
Directive into national law. The new Remedies Directive introduces the concept of a 
‘standstill period’ before the conclusion of a public contract. Thus, rejected tenderers 
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have now the opportunity to initiate an effective review procedure when unfair decisions 
can still be remedied. The Directive obliges national courts to set aside a signed contract, 
by rendering it “ineffective”, if the standstill period hasn’t been complied with. 
Moreover, to combat illegal direct awards, national courts will now also be able to render 
contracts infective if they have been illegally granted without any prior competitive 
tendering or any transparency. In such circumstances, contracts will then need to be 
tendered once more. It is hoped that these new, stricter rules will provide even stronger 
incentives for companies to submit bids in other Member States. 
On the occasion of the adoption of the new public procurement directives and 
prior to the new Remedies Directive, the European Commission has also published in 
2004 a general assessment of the European public procurement regime established in the 
1980s. In a press statement (IP04/149) accompanying A report on the functioning of 
public procurement markets in the EU: benefits from the application of EU directives and 
challenges for the future, the then-Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein 
summarized the report by observing that “EU laws opening up procurement markets 
across borders have cut waste by slashing the prices central, regional and local 
governments pay for works, supplies and services. But there is plenty of scope for 
making public procurement markets even more efficient. Seizing this opportunity is 
crucial to Europe's competitiveness, to giving taxpayers high quality and good value for 
money and to creating new opportunities for EU businesses”. Focusing, not surprisingly, 
on economic factors, the report, indeed, reaches very favorable conclusions regarding the 
overall success of the public procurement regime, bolstering previous economic claims as 
well as arguing for the necessity of further steps. Thus, the report concludes that “there is 
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overwhelming evidence that the current [1980s] directives have actively contributed to 
reform in the public procurement markets” having led to a price reduction “by around 
30% (Commission 2004, 2). Moreover, “[b]etween 1995 and 2002, the number of 
invitations to tender published in the Official Journal as required by the directives has 
almost doubled” and the number of contract award notices also “more than doubled” in 
the same time period (Commission 2004: 7). The report also notes that in the past the full 
extent of cross-border procurement may have been significantly underestimated. While 
direct cross-border procurement remains very low at 3%, 30% of proposals are from 
subsidiaries in other countries (Commission 2004: 12). In addition, the success rate for a 
given firm to win an award contract only shows minor differences between domestic and 
foreign firms, with foreign owned subsidiaries slightly being more successful than 
domestic companies (Commission 2004, 13).  
However despite these highlighted successes, there is, as the quote of the former 
Internal Market Commissioner indicates, still general dissatisfaction with the very low 
level of direct cross-border procurement penetration and the fact that, given the 
thresholds, presently only approximately 16% of all European public procurement is 
published in the Official Journal. Thus, as Mardas et al. comment, “[p]ublic procurement 
remains only partially exposed to intra-EC competition and European governments find 
their way in preserving their "buy national" policies”, retaining “a "chasse privee" for 
local suppliers” (Mardas et al. 2008, 185). Yet, it should not be forgotten, especially in 
contrast to the American procurement regime, that even purchases falling below the 
thresholds nevertheless need to meet the general rules of the EC Treaty, prohibiting 
theoretically all discrimination against companies from other Member States. Indeed, the 
 140 
 
 
EU Commission appears to be diligent in holding Member States accountable. In 2005 
the Commission for instance decided to bring Germany before the Court of Justice in a 
case concerning the transport of works of art for temporary exhibitions, which Germany 
claims concern contracts below the Directive’s threshold and therefore didn’t need to be 
advertised. The Commission, though, expressed the view that these kind of public 
contracts can be quite important for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and that the 
ECJ has previously established that public authorities awarding such contracts have to 
ensure a sufficient degree of advertising, offering a fair chance to all potential bidders 
(IP/05/949). 
Additionally the Commission is well aware of these shortcomings advocating for 
further steps. Bolkestein accordingly notes that “[t]he adoption of the [new] legislative 
package after extensive negotiations is just the beginning: Member States now need to 
put it quickly into practice” (IP/04/149). And not only has a Remedies Directive already 
been adopted in the meantime, but the Commission is also presently working on 
clarifying the relationship between the general public procurement regime and the 
defense sector. Hence, in a Green Paper (COM (2004) 608) the Commission announced 
its intent to develop the debate on the case for Community action to establish a European 
defense equipment market. 
Any further step in liberalizing the public procurement regime continues to be 
justified in strong economic terms. Thus, in its 2004 report on the functioning of public 
procurement markets, the Commission reiterated that “competitive public procurement 
practices are essential for efficiency in public spending”, “[c]ompetitive, transparent 
procurement markets help public authorities acquire cheaper, better quality goods and 
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services at lower costs” and that “[a]s a result both the value of taxpayers’ money and the 
allocation of resources are improved” (Commission 2004, 3). But this time the 
Commission even goes further in establishing a link between public procurement and the 
Maastricht or euro convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. In continuing 
to liberalize the public procurement market and improve on it, conservative estimates 
would lead to spectacular results: “three countries would turn their budget deficits into 
surpluses and no euro zone Member State would run a public sector deficit that breaks 
the 3% limit” (Commission 2004, 5–6).  
An independent report published in 2006 commissioned by the Commission to 
evaluate the effects in the 15 Member States that were subject to the EU Procurement 
Directives 1992 - 2003 comes apparently to similar results. Thus, the consultant company 
Europe Economics notes that “[o]verall compliance has improved significantly” although 
it varies across the Member States from low compliance with publication rules in the 
Netherlands and Germany and better rates in Spain and the UK (Europe Economics 2006, 
ii). In addition, while “[o]verall the administrative costs for awarding authorities have 
gone up by 20-40 per cent” and the “[a]dministrative costs for suppliers […] rose by 30 – 
50 per cent” as a result of the Directives, “the balance of costs and benefits has been 
significantly positive” with prices being “lower than they would otherwise have been by 
more than 2.5 per cent (€ 6 billion) of contract value” and that after deducting the 
enforcement and compliance costs, the “overall welfare gain should therefore have been 
more than €4.25 billion a year by 2002” (Europe Economics 2006, ii – iv). However, the 
report also concludes that “the available information suggests that there is still significant 
non-compliance” and that while “there is a more level playing field […] comparison with 
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the efficiency of private sector procurement remains favourable to the private sector” 
(Europe Economics 2006: x). Moreover, the report’s authors also observe that “it should 
not be concluded from the fact that the Directives had had a significantly beneficial effect 
in the past that their scope should be extended or that they should be continued in force 
indefinitely” (Europe Economics 2006, xii). Indeed, “[a]s circumstances change, the need 
for the prescriptive requirements of the Directives may reduce, and a more generally 
deregulatory approach may become more appropriate” (Europe Economics 2006, xii). 
However, even such a long-run change in the public procurement regime would not 
change the overall qualitative difference between the European Union and the United 
States, where the latter continue to be allowed to discriminate against sister states in 
public purchasing and selling of goods and services  
In sum then, while maybe “[f]rom a legal point of view, the Directives did not 
allegedly intend to substitute national regimes with a Community one, but rather to set 
minimum uniform conditions to foster European competition for public contracts” at first, 
“the truth is that a complete Community policy in the area has developed” and continues 
to develop with the intent to eliminate any discrimination between Member States 
(Fernández Martin 1996, 34). In the European Union therefore today the Member States 
to not retain the right to discriminate against another Member State and to establish 
official “buy national policies” in public procurement. While in practice the European 
public procurement regime still is not as efficient and obstacle-free as desired by the 
Commission and others, no market participant exemption has been put in place to legally 
allow for discrimination. Indeed, such discrimination, besides being clearly interpreted 
against the spirit of the non-discrimination article in the foundational treaties, is seen by 
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the Commission as economic nonsense. Repeatedly the Commission has argued and 
demonstrated with subsequent in-house and external studies that an EU-wide public 
procurement regime is overall beneficial to the Member States and their taxpayers and 
the continuation of non-tariff barriers costly. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU AND THE US: 
EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE 
“I am sure there are some examples, I am sure there are some distortions, just as there 
are lots of distortions in Europe as well. But what I am saying as a generality in America 
if you are in California you cannot require that your motor vehicles bought by public 
authorities have to been manufactured in California. As a generality I don’t believe you 
for a moment that you are right. I don’t believe that in the state of Delaware you can only 
buy, you know, the state authorities, city authorities could only buy stuff produced in the 
state of Delaware. I just don’t believe it.” 
Sir Andrew Cahn; former member of Lord Cockfield Cabinet and until 2011 the British 
government’s Chief Executive of UK Trade & Investment (UKTI), 
personal interview 2009 
 
“We could send that guy [Sir Andrew Cahn] our procurement statutes and he would be a 
believer, I guess.”59 
Vern Jones – Chief Procurement Officer - State of Alaska, personal interview 2009 
 
The previous chapter has documented a striking contrast: the overall intent and 
direction of the EU, despite remaining obstacles and limitations, is to eliminate any non-
tariff barriers to the public procurement market, while in the United States during the 
same time a string of Supreme Court decisions and accompanying arguments have led to 
a legal justification for a continued separated public procurement market and even a 
recent proliferation of state-level laws in this area that are explicitly protectionist. A clear 
difference in the perception of the interaction between states as buyers of goods and 
services and the market also emerges here. The perception, right or wrongly, in the 
                                                 
59
 These quotes derive from a series of interviews carried out in 2009 and 2010. According to the state 
preference policies from NASPO's 2009 Survey of State Government Purchasing Practices publication, in 
South Dakota “[p]assenger vehicles must be purchased from a dealer licensed in the State of South Dakota” 
and in Minnesota “all all-terrain vehicles purchased by the commissioner (of natural resources) must be 
manufactured in the state of Minnesota” (NASPO 2009, Oregon State Procurement Office Reciprocal 
Preference Law website: http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/SSD/SPO/detail_mn.shtml; accessed August 20, 
2010). 
 145 
 
 
United States appears to be clearly that the contracting authorities are just one specialized 
area of the market among others, while in the EU, as noted earlier, public procurement 
has been seen as a market alongside the private market and therefore “[t]he rationale 
behind the whole process of the integration of the public markets of the Member States 
has been the establishment of an effectively competitive regime similar to that envisaged 
for the operation of private markets” (Bovis 1998, 223). 
Moreover, as the quotes at the beginning of this chapter indicate, it is noteworthy 
that even those involved in the creation of the common market in Europe and still active 
in international trade have a difficult time to believe that trade barriers exist in the US 
where they have been abolished in the European Union. Thus, while it may seem that the 
arguments made in the US, such as sowing and reaping, laboratories of experimentation 
and state autonomy, as well as the minimal impact argument, should be as compelling in 
the EU context, they don’t appear to have played a significant role in the latter as the first 
sections of this chapter will demonstrate. A common theme in the interviews with 
European officials was that either they have never heard of these types of arguments or 
that when a similar argument might have been brought up it was relatively easily 
countered and dismissed. In addition, even from the US perspective, these arguments 
don’t necessarily make always a lot of sense, though interview evidence suggests that 
they are nonetheless strongly believed by US actors.  
Indeed, this chapter will show that the attitudes towards the federal-level 
government solving economic issues has been (and continues to be) markedly different in 
the EU and the US, with the US being more reluctant, even if greater federal involvement 
would lead to greater market liberalization. Interviews with national US business 
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organizations, experts and politicians hinted at a more parochial thinking and approach to 
public procurement. 
However, this is not just a story about different ideational contexts, but rather 
about how powerful political players have mobilized arguments and strengthened 
elements of the discourse, leading most people to reproduce differently-slanted versions 
of the discourse of the market on either side of the Atlantic. As Parsons has previously 
noted, “members of a culture share a restricted set of ways of dealing with any situation”, 
which “limits and channels their strategic choices” (Parsons 2003a, 7). Accordingly, 
“people who share certain ideas agree on ways of diagnosing problems and organizing 
action”, although this does not necessarily mean they always agree on the desired 
outcome or even the exact action (Parsons 2003a, 7). It is here at the intersection of ideas 
and institutions where the presence of an institutional actor, such as the European 
Commission in the EU, and the absence of a similar actor in the US are most keenly felt. 
While on the one hand embedded in a larger culture, which accepts federal intervention 
in the market, the European Commission has, on the other, institutionalized the idea of a 
market without any borders to a greater degree than has been, at times, desired by the 
member states. It actively helps to shape and foster the acceptable discourse and 
solutions. These solutions, and the justifications for them, then in turn tend to slant 
towards a specific market-liberalizing direction. 
Thus, an important part of the explanation for the striking contrast in market 
liberalization and centralization in the field of public procurement seems to be 
attributable to the presence of the European Commission in promoting market integration 
to the greatest degree possible. The European Commission not only set the agenda but 
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also, in commissioning and distributing studies on costs, partially helped to create a 
positive business attitude towards the creation of a single market by demonstrating to big 
business and governments alike how much can be saved or gained by creating EU-wide 
markets and by giving the latter market policies initiatives to react to. In short, the 
Commission helped to shape the dialogue and channeled it into a specific direction. Thus, 
while business subsequently turned out to play an important supportive role in the 1992 
Single Market Project in general and in the transformation of the EU public procurement 
regime in particular, it is, however, rather the apparent absence of awareness of the 
potential significance of a free, internal public procurement market in US among 
American business federations, on which their European counterparts were modeled, 
which is remarkable. No agent in the US context so far seems to have pushed the issue of 
procurement liberalization for the entire American polity. 
In other words, difference between the two polities is largely due to the role of the 
Commission as a federal-level entity specifically charged with creating a common market 
and a different attitude towards federal-level entities in this policy arena. The 
Commission, in creating studies emphasizing the value of a single public procurement 
market and selling the idea to the member states, played the crucial role for the regime’s 
establishment and deepening and in shaping the discourse. While business has played a 
supportive role in the creation of the single market project in the 1980s (Cowles 1994), of 
which public procurement has been a major project, although its antecedent predates it, 
business didn’t play the key role. It is rather the absence of a united business front in the 
US prodded by a federal-level entity similar to the EU Commission which appears to 
partially explain, why barriers to trade in public procurement in the US persist. Indeed, 
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with the exception of state procurement officers, the elimination of barriers to trade in 
public procurement is not seen as an important issue in the US. Instead of eliminating 
barriers, we have seen in recent years an increase of such barriers with U.S. states being 
protective about their prerogative to buy only in-state.  
In sum then, each of the competing arguments fails to stand up to comparative 
evidence. While we might look to the role of business in promoting the EU public 
procurement regime (which it has done, at least somewhat), it is difficult to explain by 
this logic the odd silence of US business on similar issues. We might also look to the 
simple self-interest of less competitive state-level businesses in the US, which have 
clearly encouraged protectionist laws, but by this logic it is very hard to account for the 
much weaker defense of national procurement in the EU. We might also look at the 
interests of the largest, most powerful states composing the polities, but by this logic it is 
hard to account for why states, such as Germany and France, would accept liberalization 
and California and Illinois would not. In fact, it is many of the smaller states in the 
United States, Alaska, Wyoming, Hawaii, that have the most stringent protectionist 
measures. Institutional blockage within the American polity would also be insufficient in 
itself, given that in the EU originally unanimity and later qualified majority voting 
represents even greater institutional obstacles. Last but not least, we might look at the 
mobility rates of the polity’s citizenry and the resources of the federal government, but by 
this logic it is hard to account for why the US with higher mobility rates and greater 
federal resources has not acted, but the EU has. 
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Subsidiarity and Laboratories of Experimentation 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, one of the major arguments for continued 
discrimination in the field of public procurement in the US is the notion that subsidiarity 
should prevail. If we could accept this as an explanation for the US pattern, though, the 
idea that experimentation is beneficial for the entire federal polity should have, no pun 
intended, some purchase in the EU. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity has been 
enshrined in the EU Treaties, and the Remedies Directives for example have always put 
an emphasis on the principle of the Member States’ procedural autonomy. Member States 
in the EU also usually tend to invoke subsidiarity to keep their own prerogatives and 
therefore should have felt very comfortable with the notion that “the allowance of 
substantial local control may promote the healthiest brand of nationalism by fostering 
pursuit of different traditions in a spirit of shared toleration” (Coenen 1989, 427). Yet 
again the argument does not seem to have played a big role overall in the EU for making 
the case as in the US to discriminate against out-of-state bidders. In fact, it is striking that 
in the accounts of the EU public procurement regime’s evolution the debates over 
encroachments were absent despite the absence of a fully developed regime at the 
beginning of the EU until the 1980s. The EU member states could have carved out in the 
EU an exemption regarding public procurement as in the US but didn’t do so. It was 
perceived and argued from the beginning that the core principles of the EU, such as the 
non-discrimination of nationality, for building a common market didn’t allow for it. And, 
as one EU official has put it, the incorporation of thresholds for smaller-sized contracts 
already took into account any subsidiarity concerns, granting some “leeway to the public 
authority” and making such arguments mute from the onset (personal interview 2009). 
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Moreover, according to a former member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet, “it would be 
absurd not to apply the European procurement rules to cities, towns and villages and so 
on which straddle frontiers, because you would diminish, you know, opportunities for 
cross-border competition and economies of scale” (personal interview 2009). This is not 
to say that absolutely nobody made subsidiarity arguments to avoid or water down EU-
wide public procurement directives. Yet, such arguments were and are usually couched in 
terms of costs and not on fostering experimentation or taking into account different 
traditions. As an EU Commission official remarked to me, “there has always been a 
fringe of local politicians, very often from Germany, who were arguing to waive 
thresholds” and that “[c]ertain industries were arguing it’s too much red tape”, but at the 
same time you always have politicians and business arguing for more opening of the 
procurement market and the Commission’s involvement (personal interview 2009). In 
short, “certain business associations complain about red tape, overregulation, but it is 
more that kind of argument, the Community legislation is too heavy, and not so much as 
saying the area, the policy area such should not be subject to Community legislation at 
all” (personal interview 2009). 
Thus, while both the founding fathers in the US and in the EU might not have 
considered at all public procurement and the inherent non-tariff barriers going along with 
it, once the issues became raised in the 1970s and 1980s the EU and the US went 
divergent paths.  
Sowing and Reaping 
Let’s now turn to the sowing and reaping argument. Once again, according to this 
argument, states should be able to reap where they sow, i.e. use the tax money as they see 
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fit on their own in-state companies. Thus, the state is seen as an administrator of the 
funds entrusted to it by the state’s people and as a participant in the marketplace, which is 
considered to be starkly different from taxation or creating state regulation. To put it 
differently, “[t]he state supposedly looks out for its own economic interests rather than 
the well-being of third parties” (Manheim 1990, 581). Looking out for one’s own state’s 
interest and preferring hence one’s own citizens should also be very obviously the 
concern of the German, British or French government. Indeed, as the earlier Baron Snoy 
et d’Oppuers quote has shown and the fact that cross-border direct procurement is still 
very low serve as indicators that EU Member States could have easily bought into this 
argument. Yet, instead of carving out a similar exception on the same logic in the EU, the 
Member States create a public procurement regime based on the notion of complete non-
discrimination and opening up of the public procurement market. The European 
Commission has repeatedly pointed out that it is not in the overall economic interest of 
the Member States in general and taxpayers specifically to continue the practice of ‘buy 
national policies’ and segregated public procurement markets. The state, in short, would 
not be a good steward of the entrusted funds. Indeed, personal interviews and public 
records confirm this view and the difference with American thinking.  
In the US, legislators and officials across party lines, such as Connecticut 
Democratic Senator Prague and Oregon Republican Representative Bill Garrard, argue in 
favor of in-state preference bills by noting that “we have contracts in this state that go out 
of state”, “we should give any job we can to an in-state company” and that “Oregon 
taxpayers would like to have tax money stay within the state of Oregon” (Connecticut 
Senate Session Transcript May 2, 2008; Interview with Republican Oregon State 
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Representative Bill Garrard 2009). Rep. Garrard further emphasized that “it’s not about 
the cheapest, but the best” and that he doesn’t “want to go to the cheapest but the best 
doctor” and that we “first have to see for a while if the [out-of-state] providers are 
reliable” (personal interview 2009).  
European officials, on the other hand, largely shake their heads over such sowing 
and reaping thinking by noting that they haven’t heard of any such argument at the 
European-level in the Council or at other meetings, not even from Margaret Thatcher60 
(interview with Helmut Schmitt von Sydow 2009) and that “people genuinely believe, 
and I as a taxpayer by the way would believe that I want my money correctly spent and I 
couldn’t care less whether the engineer is from Birmingham or [somewhere abroad]” 
(Interview with Alastair Sutton). In fact, this argument is perceived as “anathema to any 
believer in an internal market”, because “it runs exactly counter [to] the very basis of the 
Treaty of Rome” (interview with Michele Petite2009).  
Moreover, as Wells and Hellerstein have observed concerning the American 
context, “if economic Balkanization is the evil that the commerce clause was designed to 
prevent, what difference does it make whether the evil is brought about by states acting in 
their governmental or proprietary capacities?” (Wells and Hellerstein 1980, 1125). And 
as Manheim points out correctly, “differentiating a state’s market participant role as 
guardian from its regulatory role as parens patriae and promoter of the general welfare is 
                                                 
60
 “Ich schliesse nicht aus das der ein oder andere gebracht hat. Auf jedem Fall ist es nicht gekommen bis 
auf der Ebene der Bruesseler, der Bruesseler Ebene. Es kann sein das hier und da eine nationale Stimme 
sich in dem Sinne geaeussert hat, etwas veroeffentlicht hat. Aber es nicht, dass im Rat der Europäischen 
Union oder im dem Ausschuss wo die nationalen Fachbeamten sind, das einer gesagt hätte, das ist mein 
Geld und ich will es nach nationalen Kriterien, selbst Maggie Thatcher nicht, ich werde es nach nationalen 
Kriterien verteilen. Denn wir haben, wir wollen das ihr das Geld am Besten einsetzen könnt, wenn ihr, so 
mehr ihr ausschreibt, um so mehr Offerten bekommt ihr und um so billiger konnt ihr einkaufen. Je billiger 
und besser ihr einkauft, um so besser ist es für den nationalen Steuerzahler” (Helmut Schmitt von Sydow 
2009). 
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often difficult” (Manheim 1990, 582). Hence, to allow a state as market participant to 
completely prohibit the buying of specific products from out-of-state suppliers or to grant 
preferential treatment of 10% to for instance agricultural or forestry products, including 
meat, seafood, produce, eggs, paper or paper products as the State of Louisiana presently 
does, does not look much different than from imposing a tariff on out-of-state companies, 
even if it is limited only to all state and local contracting agencies (cf. Oregon State 
Procurement Office 2010). Moreover, the underlying distinction between law and 
contract in the American context, with only the former being subject to judicial and 
constitutional restraint, is, to say the least, very thin. As Manheim argues: 
Government power in the United States is exercised through a wide 
variety of mechanisms. Aside from regulation and taxation, the state 
interacts with its citizens by conferring benefits, providing services and 
employment, buying and selling goods, and virtually every other form of 
social intercourse. If these are beyond judicial scrutiny merely because 
they are “contractual” in nature, then our political bodies have found a 
convenient way to escape constitutional constraint. Such a theory would 
invert the “social contract,” which posits society as a voluntary agreement 
among its members to be bound by ordered rules for their common 
welfare (Manheim 1990, 583). 
Coenen also makes the point that challenges to the sowing and reaping argument 
based on the notion that nonresidents often pay the state taxes that create the state’s 
property are rather unpersuasive . Nonresidents simply can benefit from discriminations 
imposed on nonresidents by their own state and in any case preferential rules are less 
objectionable when residency can easily be obtained (cf. Coenen 1989, 425). Thus, 
basically Coenen makes the argument that the right of establishment and freedom to live 
in any part of the union contributes strongly to the justification for the market participant 
exemption, because a company can simply move anywhere. In the EU, however, the 
same argument was summarily dismissed by the European Court of Justice. In Case C-
 154 
 
 
360/89, Commmission v. Italy, the ECJ evaluated whether an Italian law reserving a 
proportion of “public works to sub-contractors whose registered offices were in the 
region where the works were to be carried out, and which gave preference in the selection 
of candidates to joint ventures and consortia in which local undertakings were involved”, 
was conform to EU law (Fernández Martín 1996, 9). In its decision the Court rejected 
Italy’s claims “that no discrimination on the basis of nationality existed”, because “any 
foreign company could eventually benefit from the preference”, and considered them 
discriminatory, because “Italian companies were more likely to fulfill the criteria than 
foreign ones” (Fernández Martín 1996, 9–10). And nobody seems to have argued in the 
European Union that preferential treatment is just fine and should be allowed to continue 
because their own citizens can profit from their state’s own preferential procurement 
rules.  
Yet, in the US the practice continues and even seems to accelerate with arguments 
based on sowing and reaping being triumphant over potential alternative justifications for 
preferences, such as the environment. Oregon for instance recently enacted (2010) a new 
10% permissive agricultural preference bill. The author of the bill, Kathleen West, 
Sustainability Manager of Multnomah County, wanted originally only a 5% preference 
enacted based simply on distance with the goal of reducing the environmental impact of 
shipping agricultural goods from further away. However, West notes that “[w]hen I was 
figuring out how I was to frame the sale of this to go to the legislature, I originally started 
out with an environmental argument and I quickly found out that that wasn’t popular and 
that it didn’t resonate with people. And so then I switched it to a local economic 
argument, then everyone was wildly enthusiastic about it” (interview with Kathleen West 
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2010). Indeed, the new law (HB2763) passed the two chambers of the Oregon legislature 
without any vote of dissent. 
Minimal Impact 
The minimal impact arguments, i.e. that state proprietary activities are unlikely to 
impede commerce because they are subject to the same market forces as private parties, 
the effect on commerce is difficult to assess for state market entry and therefore 
preferential treatments don’t really create any complaints from other states in the polity, 
don’t hold up well either. Once again, the simple logic of the arguments should then 
apply to the European Union as well. For instance the argument that “the built-in 
“expensiveness” of in-state marketplace preferences may brake the danger to commerce 
clause concerns that discriminatory state marketplace actions pose” would have then to 
apply to European contracting authorities as well and make a centralized and liberalized 
European public procurement superfluous, too (Coenen 1989, 434). The same goes for 
the notion that “states as traders often “create” commerce, rather than impede it”; trade 
which wouldn’t exist without the state (cf. Manheim 1990, 587). Also the argument that 
while “state regulations or tariffs effectively prohibit interstate trade” and therefore the 
“state’s disruption of the “national common market” is plain and powerful”, “something 
different – and less threatening to social wealth-building – may well be happening when a 
state favors residents in trading its resources” is clearly applicable to the EU Member 
States (Coenen 1989, 433). But as illustrated briefly above, the market participant 
exemption has some trade distortions effects similar to tariffs, if admittedly limited to the 
state’s contracting authorities. However, the important point here again is that from the 
European perspective preferential treatments are seen as a powerful obstacle to a 
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common market and not used as a legitimization for continued separate public 
procurement markets. In addition, EU officials found this argument ludicrous when 
confronted with it in interviews. Sebastion Birch, former member of Lord Cockfield’s 
cabinet in charge of creating the internal market, observed that 
I would have been delighted if a member state had argued its potential to distort 
markets is far greater in taxation policies than in public procurement that would 
have been watching a member state shooting itself in the negotiation foot. But I 
am afraid that I don’t remember them being quite that stupid. The arguments that 
I tended to be exposed to were quite the contrary; member states jealously 
guarded their own illusion, in my view, [that] their own freedom to tax as they 
wish was not a distortion and was therefore not something that the single market 
should affect. Mrs. Thatcher even went so far to claim that the Single European 
Act had said nothing about taxation and [I] had to have it read out to her in my 
hearing by my boss (personal interview 2010). 
And, Michele Petite, also a former member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet and 
Director of Legal Services, easily dismissed “the built-in “expensiveness” part of the 
minimal impact as absurd in face of political reality. He observed that “experience in 
history shows that public entities do not act rationally” and that it is “naïve” to think that 
this won’t continue old style procurement politics where simply the “politically more 
involved, politically more aware” firms will win out. Thus, while “[r]ationally people 
should not need them [EU-wide procurement rules], is defeated in the face of reality” 
(interview with Petite 2009). And Birch clearly remembers that when any government 
attempted only to hint at the distinction between the proprietary and the sovereign role of 
the state that Cockfield “never worried about being rude” by responding that “that as a 
regulator you are not very effective and as a procurer you only shop at home. So I am 
afraid you fail on both counts” (interview with Birch 2009). 
It could then be argued that maybe the main difference between the European 
Union and the American public procurement regime rests in the fact that the US 
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“Framers’ goal in forging the commerce clause was not to maximize economic 
efficiency”, but rather “the core goal of the commerce clause was and is to engender 
national solidarity”, while the EU is set up with economic integration in mind (Coenen 
1989, 433). However, this overlooks that the goal of European integration going back to 
the European Coal and Steel Community was to increase solidarity among the Member 
States to the point of making military conflict impossible and, as has been noted in 
chapter II, that in the US “[c]ommerce was what had led to rejection of the Articles of 
Confederation after a dozen years, because confederation tolerated barriers to trade that 
interfered with creation of a common national market” and “[t]he new Constitution with 
its stronger national government produced policies that earned America the designation 
by Europeans as a commercial republic" (Lowi 2006, 96).  
The minimal effect arguments rely heavily on the notion that comparatively to 
taxation and regulation public procurement preferential treatments seem less hostile and 
that the potential economic damages are difficult to assess. Coenen even goes further by 
pointing out that “when a state passes out benefits in the specific context of making 
contracts to buy or sell, its presumed right to distribute benefits to its own citizens 
becomes aligned with the “long recognized right” of a trader to determine with whom it 
will deal” and that therefore “[i]f it is “obvious that a state may prefer its own residents in 
distributing its resources, then few nonresidents will take umbrage when a state does so; 
and if few nonresidents take umbrage, then their home states are unlikely to pursue the 
retaliations and reprisals the dormant commerce clause was meant to neutralize” (Coenen 
1989, 434). Thus, national solidarity is safeguarded. 
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Yet, this is wrong on both accounts. Similar to the European Union, public 
procurement in the US represents a huge amount of money and appears to be of great 
economic significance with huge potential for savings and reduction of state budgets and 
retaliations seem to be far more common than Coenen surmises.  
As has been shown repeatedly by the European Commission for the European 
Union, discriminatory procurement practices have huge economic repercussions. 
Commentators, such as Flamme, also already highlighted decades ago the economic 
importance of public procurement and therefore the necessity to communitarize it despite 
or rather because states used public procurement as social and economic policy 
instruments (Flamme 1969, 272-73).61 Hence, it doesn’t take a great stretch of the 
imagination to envision similar repercussions for the American economy. Indeed, 
Manheim has made the case that the minimal effects claims in the American context are 
bogus. He observed that “[a]s the market activities of state and local governments assume 
an ever-increasing share of our [US] economy – now estimated as high as fifteen to 
twenty percent of the gross national product […], as state and local investments grow to 
nearly a half-trillion dollars, and as the number of public employees reaches 
unprecedented levels, the claim that the effects on commerce by state market entry is 
“difficult to assess” rings hollow” (Manheim 1990, 589). Moreover, while, as McCue et 
al. (2007) note, acquiring data on how much American states are actually spending on 
purchased material and services any given fiscal year is extremely difficult and akin to a 
                                                 
61
 Flamme observes that “[v]u l’importance économique des «commandes publique» - le secteur public 
étant incontestablement le plus gros consommateur de produits industriels ainsi que de prestations de 
services ou de travaux immobiliers – une réglementation communautaire s’impose cependant d’autant plus 
qu’il s’agit en l’espèce de libérer des activités subordonnées plus que d’autres à l’emprise des Etats, 
soucieux d’utiliser les marches publics comme un instrument docile de leur politique économique, 
financière et sociale” (Flamme 1969, 272–73). 
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wild goose chase,62 some very conservative estimates can be made, which demonstrate 
the economic significance of public procurement in the United States. McCue et al. 
therefore estimate that “[v]ery simply, state and local governments are spending, 
conservatively, 25 to 40 per cent of every tax dollar on purchased materials and supplies 
for governmental funds and that “[t]he total costs for all purchases, including hidden 
payroll costs, waste and misuse, processing costs and inventories could bring the value to 
almost 50 per cent of the total budget” (McCue et al. 2007, 253). Moreover, 
“[g]eneralizing this to the entire population of state and local governments in the US, this 
value could range from $1.598 trillion (50 per cent of all expenditures) to $2.396 trillion 
(75 percent)” (McCue et al. 2007, 253). While not observing how much the elimination 
of preferential treatments might contribute to cost savings, the authors do point to similar 
benefits proffered by the EU Commission as regards the modernization of the public 
                                                 
62
 McCue et al. describe the question about how much money states spend on public procurement as a 
“question that typically cannot be answered by state and local government officials” and that “[i]n all 
honesty, no one really knows how much is spent, let alone how it is spent or among how many suppliers” 
(McCue et al. 2007, 252–53). When searching for the answer one gets shoved back and forward from 
financial to procurement officers (cf. McCue et al 2007, 252). Indeed, a personal inquiry with the Oregon 
Public Procurement Office and other procurement officials led largely to similar results. Here is the 
response by a Oregon Public Procurement Research Analyst in its entirety: “I estimate the amount of spend 
that takes place off of price agreements administered by this Office to be of the order of $300M annually 
but this is a wild estimate only. This spend includes spend from local governments that purchase from state 
price agreements through a cooperative program. Spend data on ten or so high volume commodity items 
such as office supplies, computer hardware, software, janitorial supply, photocopier rentals etc. for a 
cumulative period of 2.5 years ending December 2007 reveal that such local government and K12 
education institutions represent about 36% of the entire spend. This ratio pretty much holds over time with 
slight fluctuations. The cumulative spend was $262.2M, or $105M annually. This represents only a sample 
of all of the spend, presumably about 1/3 of it. There is also spend that is not managed by this Office, and 
there exists a myriad of ORS citations that give state agencies the authority to procure independently of 
SPO under specific circumstances. I understand Oregon to be about mid-range on a totally centralized - 
totally decentralized continuum. […]I have no figures on [public procurement as share of] GDP” (personal 
communication June 2009, my emphasis). Neither NASPO nor the National Association State Budget 
Officers (NASBO) were able to provide any data. Representatives of NASBO responded that “[w]e really 
don't follow public procurement although on our web site we have the Fiscal Survey and the Expenditure 
Report -- both of which have aggregate spending information for states, although not to the detail of 
procurement level spending” (personal communication, January 2010). Thus, while general estimates seem 
to exist highlighting the great amount of money involved in public procurement, complete centralized data 
is hard to come by. Indeed, many of the procurement specialists I talked to would love to see some data on 
the overall state procurement spending in general and specific costs involved with in-state preferences.  
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procurement regime. Thus, they argue that “if a local government, for instance, were to 
reduce transaction costs associated with the purchasing process by 5 per cent, this could 
net a 2.75 per cent tax reduction” and “in some cases the savings from more sophisticated 
purchasing practices could net much larger savings” (McCue et al. 2007, 253). Thus, 
analogous to the EU, where the Commission establishes a link between public 
procurement practices and the Maastricht budget criteria, McClue et al. point towards 
state budget crises by noting that “[d]uring difficult financial times where governments 
are looking for ways to reduce expenditures, the procurement process may be one area 
ripe for cost savings” (McCue 2007, 253). Furthermore, the European Commission itself 
in the Cecchini report took a closer look at American procurement practices and, while 
taking into account a potential over-estimate, observed that, according to an unpublished 
paper by Craig & Sailors from Houston University, “States with percentage preference 
laws spend 3% more in real terms per capita than other states, equal to $1.6 billion in 
1980” (WS Atkins 1988, 304).  
The impact of preference laws becomes even clearer when looking at, what 
appears to be on the surface, the least trade distorting preference law: tie-bid preferences. 
This is a preference to a local bidder only if that bid is identical in price to a bid from a 
non-resident firm, all things being equal. This is usually seen as “an acceptable and 
reasonable method for breaking tie bids in favor of the local vendor” and most states and 
sub-state procurement authorities have such a provision in their laws and regulations (Zee 
1989, 8). However, as the following example from Mississippi illustrates, already these 
“acceptable and reasonable” laws can and do have a huge impact on trade between sister 
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states. This example is even more illuminating given the dearth of any substantial data on 
the overall extent of the impact of public procurement preference laws.  
In November 2004 the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi affirmed the 
previous ruling of the circuit court and the decision of the Pontotoc County Board of 
Supervisors in favor of Hooker Construction, Inc., a resident contractor based in Thaxton, 
Mississippi, to repair and renovate the Pontotoc County courthouse (NO.2004-CA-
02446-COA). What happened? In early 2003, after receiving four constructions bids, the 
Pontotoc County Board awarded the contract to Hooker on the basis that it submitted the 
best, though not the lowest bid, at $936,000, referring to the in-state preference section 
31-7-47 of the Mississippi Code63. The low bidder for the contract, with a bid of 
$914,000, came from Billy E. Burnett, Inc., a non-resident contractor domiciled in 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Billy E. Burnett, Inc., which subsequently appealed the decision to 
the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County, which in turn affirmed the board’s decision. The 
Mississippi Court of Appeals agreed, arguing that “[w]e are not at liberty to set aside the 
decision of a board of supervisors unless that decision is “clearly shown to be arbitrary, 
capricious, or discriminatory or is illegal of without substantial evidentiary basis”. 
Moreover it affirmed the board’s belief that the two bids were “substantially equal” and 
concluded that “[e]specially in light of the fact that there was a mere 2.35% difference 
                                                 
63
 SEC. 31-7-47. Preference to resident contractors. In the letting of public contracts, preference shall be 
given to resident contractors, and a nonresident bidder domiciled in a state, city, county, parish, province, 
nation or political subdivision having laws granting preference to local contractors shall be awarded 
Mississippi public contracts only on the same basis as the nonresident bidder's state, city, county, parish, 
province, nation or political subdivision awards contracts to Mississippi contractors bidding under similar 
circumstances. Resident contractors actually domiciled in Mississippi, be they corporate, individuals or 
partnerships, are to be granted preference over nonresidents in awarding of contracts in the same manner 
and to the same extent as provided by the laws of the state, city, county, parish, province, nation or political 
subdivision of domicile of the nonresident. 
 While the statute itself is unclear in its language, the Mississippi Attorney General’s office has 
interpreted it as a tie-bid preference in the most recent instruction before the advent of this case (cf. 
Ms.Ag.Op. Winfield, January 29, 2004), as cited in Burnett v. Pontotoc County, NO. 2004-CA-02446-
COA, p. 6. 
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between the bids, we cannot find that the board of supervisors acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in awarding the contract to Hooker” (Burnett v. Pontotoc County, NO. 2004-
CA-02446-COA, p. 4; my emphasis). Thus, a bid difference of $22,000 is effectively 
interpreted as being zero. While, of course, this raises the question what percentage 
difference is not going to be construed any more as being substantially equal (5%, 10%?), 
it is even more significant that this shows that compared to exclusive and permissive in-
state preferences, even relative harmless tie-bid preferences, existing in over two-third of 
the US states can represent considerable costs to the overall US economy and the 
country’s internal market.  
In addition to the apparent economic importance of public procurement in the 
American compound polity, states do appear to take umbrage against preferential laws. If 
states wouldn’t take umbrage, than as Coenen argues, sister states would be unlikely to 
pursue retaliations. However, a simple tally of reciprocal, or rather retaliatory, laws on 
the books shows that in 2009 35 US sister states have enacted a law similar to 
Connecticut’s brand-new statute (effective October 1, 2009) which holds that 
“[n]otwithstanding any provision of law, in the award of a contract, after the original bids 
have been received and an original lowest responsible qualified bid is identified, a state 
contracting agency shall add a per cent increase to the original bid of a nonresident bidder 
equal to the per cent, if any, of the preference given to such nonresident bidder in the 
state in which such nonresident bidder resides” (Oregon Procurement Office 2010). An 
inquiry with the Oregon Department of Justice about whether they are aware of any 
specific cases where reciprocal laws have led to conflict between sister states led to the 
response by the Senior Assistant Attorney General that “the quick easy answer is yes”, 
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but that “the harder question is connecting the given statute or regulation to specific 
industries or businesses” (personal communication 2009). In any case, this indicates 
clearly that preferential treatment laws are seen as less innocuous as thought by 
commentators like Coenen. In fact, according to the latest NASPO survey, these 
retaliatory laws are on the rise. NASPO in its 2009 survey reported that “the use and 
breadth of preference policies seems to be increasing” and that four more states have 
added a reciprocal law since the last survey in 2007 (NASPO 2009, 6). Connecticut 
passed its reciprocity bill in 2008 with the wide support of the legislature and the local 
chambers of commerce. Tony Sheridan, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of 
Eastern Connecticut, was being cited in the Senate leadership’s press release as saying 
that “[t]he Chamber of Commerce of Eastern Connecticut has started a similar 'buy local' 
program and it is effective and popular. The Senate Democrats have my full support in 
their effort to keep tax dollars in Connecticut and help grow jobs” (Connecticut State 
Senate Democratic Leadership, June 16, 2008). 
 So where does this leave us? It appears that states, despite the potential for 
cost savings and the accompanying benefits for their taxpayers, tend to be reluctant to 
give up preferential treatment or buy national policies. This goes not only for the United 
States, but to some extent for the European Union as well, where Flamme has, as noted, 
pointed out that states have tended to see public procurement as a social and economic 
policy instrument (Flamme 1969, 273). Moreover, part of the goal of the Consolidating 
Directives in 1993, incorporating relevant ECJ case law, was to define public authorities 
as widely as possible with the intent to “fight the recurrent practice in public procurement 
cases, whereby Member States resort to the fiction of declaring the bodies in charge of 
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the management of public services as formally belonging to the private sector and, 
therefore, excluded from the discipline of the public procurement Directives” (Fernández 
Martín 1996, 28). Thus, here appears a certain similarity in logic with the American 
situation, where private firms and states as market participants are considered immune 
from the commerce clause. To gain a similar immunity from EU Directives and to be 
allowed to discriminate from whom to buy, Member States came up with this strategy of 
declaring public service bodies as private entities. This, along with the fact that 
compliance with the EU Directives varies largely, reveals that in practice not all EU 
Member States have always been keen of a centralized and liberalized public 
procurement regime. Yet, according to Boncompagni, head of the EU public procurement 
unit for over 20 years, the sowing and reaping argument was to say the least, not very 
strong in the EU, because to persist on the right to use one’s own tax monies for one’s 
own citizens’ businesses would mean not to be European. Indeed a difference in thinking 
about the polity emerges between the EU and the US. Interviewees in the EU, in contrast 
to the US, where state rights are emphasized over and over again in this context, none of 
the interviewees couldn’t imagine to leave procurement at member state level and allow 
for discrimination, because “[y]ou understand, this reasoning is a very national one” 
(interview with Boncompani 2009).  
Furthermore, as shown, the major arguments buttressing the American market 
participant would equally apply to the European, but haven’t played the same role. Yet, 
big differences exist between the European Union and the American public procurement 
regimes regarding the overall framework. Thus, while EU Member States repeatedly tried 
to declare public bodies as private entities, they first apparently never made the claim that 
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all contracting authorities should be immune based on a principle similar to the American 
market participant exemption and second they have not even been successful with 
making even this arguably more limited practice acceptable. Consequently, while the EU 
public procurement market is far from perfect, discriminatory practices in stark contrast 
to the US are not allowed. Indeed, while the EU’s regime might still lack in the practical 
effectiveness of its regime, “from a legal point of view the relevance of Community 
legislation is unquestionable” and in the EU the “pre-emption of national competences 
has been completed by the extension of a public procurement regime to the enforcement 
level by the adoption of the Remedies Directive” (Fernández Martin 1996, 35). In the US, 
on the other hand, we have not seen any similar preemption of public procurement. Thus, 
while some actors in the EU might have harbored potentially misgivings in the 1950s and 
later on to transfer authority to the EU for the liberalization of the public procurement 
market, the fact remains that the process of opening up public procurement continued 
beyond the 1980s with the implementation of a new regime in 2006.  
It is also not very satisfactory to point to the US Congress as ‘protector of state 
rights’ by arguing that preemption is unlikely because of the institution’s many veto 
points and that the fact that it represents local interests. As noted before, the European 
Union consists of at least as many if not more institutional hurdles with most decisions 
having to pass by unanimity or qualified majority voting, which is actually more 
equivalent to amendment procedures in the United States than simple Congressional 
majority voting. 
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Coming Together, Staying Apart: The Respected Presence 
of a Market Integrator 
So why, given that all indications point in the direction that the United States and 
the European Union as compound polities should have a similar approach to public 
procurement or that at the very least it should have been the United States which ended 
up with preemption and a more liberalized public procurement regime, did the EU come 
together while the US sister states stay apart? 
Based on the development of the respective procurement regimes, the presence or 
absence of a major federal-level agent, such as the European Commission, and the 
generally positively viewed perception of such an agent seems to largely contribute to the 
differences in outcome. As Fernández Martin has stressed “the main actors in the 
conception, justification, and implementation of the [public procurement] policy were 
Commission services” and “the Commission bears most responsibility for its conception 
and implementation” (Fernández Martin 1996, 23). It is the Commission, which in its 
White Paper and subsequent studies, such as the Cecchini report, singled out public 
procurement as a major area for intervention in completing a truly single market. The 
central role of the Commission in pushing for an EU-wide public procurement became 
clear throughout the interviews. Stefan Pfitzer, who works for the EPP (European 
People’s Party) in the European Parliament and was involved with the internal market 
work in the economic committee in the European Parliament in the 1980s, recollected 
that the idea to kick-start public procurement as a major EU-wide policy did not come 
from a particular member state but directly from the Commission (personal interview, 
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2009).64 And Michel Petite concurs that “[a]t the time and on this one the role of the 
Commission, I think was absolutely fundamental. Nobody had the expertise, the breath of 
coverage to produce any paper like the White Paper” and “[i]t was felt that [procurement] 
was a certainly a very important building block of [the single market]” (personal 
interview 2009). In short, the team around Lord Cockfield had the view that in order to 
remove discriminations and internal borders […] the best methodology was to list all 
types of obstacles to free circulation, free everything basically and to get rid of them 
systematically one by one” (personal interview 2009). Indeed, “the intention to cover all 
the ground of discriminations was absolutely clear in Delors’ and Cockfield’s minds” and 
Cockfield [...] kept claiming [that] if you left a single reason for maintaining controls at 
borders, then they would stay also for all kinds of other reasons” (personal interview 
2009). Thus, the approach of the White Paper was to leave “no stone unturned” by 
informing every Commission service that they had to list all remaining barriers to a 
complete single market or risk to be left behind in future debates and developments of the 
EU (interview with von Sydow).65  
Members of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet pointed out in the interviews that the EU 
Commission is not politically neutral but dedicated to market integration and that they 
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 “Wenn Ich mich richtig erinnere, dass die erste, das der Kick von der Kommission kam , die damals eine 
Argumentation ausgearbeitet hatte über die großen öffentlichen Ersparnisse, die die gesamten Haushalte 
der Unionsmitglieder haben können, wenn sie eine unionsweite Ausschreibung machen. Ich kann mich 
nicht daran erinnern, dass das aus seiner bestimmten Mitgliedsstaatenecke gekommen sei. Das war glaube 
ich eine Argumentation, die die Kommission ausgeartet hatte, um gerade eine Gemeinschaftsaktion zu 
begründen gegenüber den Mitgliedsstaaten”. 
 
65
 “Ins Weissbuch haben wir alles gebracht, was so oder so der Vollendung des Binnenmarktes im Wege 
stehen koennte. No stone unturned. Jeden Stein umgedreht, den einzigen Stein, den wir nicht umgedreht 
haben ist der innerdeutscher Handel zwischen Bundesrepublic und DDR. Aber alles andere wurde dort 
erwaehnt und angepackt. Schliesslich deswegen weil wir in einer etwas unbuerokratischen Art intern in der 
Kommission allen Dienststellen gesagt haben, ihr muesst jetzt sagen was fuer Gruende gibt es noch fuer 
Grenzkontrollen und fuer Grenzen. Wenn ihr es jetzt nicht erwaehnt, koennt ihr nicht mehr in ein oder zwei 
Jahren damitkommen.“ 
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were actively working on a strategy to persuade any potential doubters against integrating 
policy areas and that Lord Cockfield personally felt that public procurement needed to be 
included. Thus, Alastair Sutton stressed that  
there is one feature, factor, which distinguishes Europe from America today, 
which is that still the role of the European institutions is not neutral. Our political 
institutions are not neutral. They are committed to, legally, constitutionally, 
whatever the German Supreme Court may say, to market integration (personal 
interview 2009). 
And Robert Coleman, first director of public procurement in 1986 – 1991, after 
the procurement directorate had been set up, agrees that “there is no such driver with such 
a clear mission to the exclusion of others in the United States” (Interview with Coleman, 
2009). In short, “the United States government doesn’t have the same […] constitutional 
objectives fixed for it”, while “the Commission’s duty still is to develop an internal 
market in a broad sense and every Commission that takes office has to confront the fact 
that that’s what its founding documents say it much do” (interview with Coleman 2009). 
A view shared by Stefan Pfitzer who contends that “the lack to create an open public 
procurement market in the US is probably due to the fact that in the US there doesn’t 
exist an institution, such as the Commission, which not only has the legislative initiative, 
but also the mission to create open markets” (interview with Pfitzer 2009).66  
Now it can be argued that the Commission is a constant factor and therefore 
cannot explain as well variation in outcomes as regards why certain policy areas have 
been centralized and liberalized. That’s, of course, true to a certain extent. But, first of 
all, very broadly speaking in terms of the internal market the EU has made quite some 
constant progress over the last several decades. And secondly we just see a lot more 
                                                 
66
 “Vielleicht fehlt die Initiative die Marktgleichheit in der USA herzustellen. Deshalb weil dort eben nicht 
eine Behörde den Auftrag hat und das Initiativsrecht hat und g enau dafür da ist wie bei uns die 
Kommission“. 
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activity and consideration of change in the direction towards a more complete internal 
market than in the US. In short, the claim that the Commission with is unique mandate is 
the key source of this movement doesn’t mean that this is a single variable theory of 
market building where the presence or absence of a market integrator, such as the 
Commission, explicates everything. There are all sorts of things which affect the success 
of a Commission proposal, which in turn also broadly affects the pace and ambition of 
Commission proposals, not least the general economic environment. As an EU official 
remarked concerning the proposals creating a single market by 1992: “It was a sense of 
hastening to our doom while Japan and the US in particular were prospering. That was 
part of the motivation for both the proposal and the acceptance of that program” 
(interview with Birch 2009). Yet, the recent greatest recession in America since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s didn’t lead in the US to any policy proposals to create a 
liberalized public procurement market. Moreover, an EU official acknowledged that “it 
seems from the point of view of American states on [the] public procurement front, we 
might be seen to have overshot and to have gone further for fear of not getting there at all 
and actually pursu[ing] the intellectual rigor further: (interview with Birch 2009). 
In addition, it is certainly true that on any given proposals what the member states 
are willing to accept is the limit of what can happen, but the real contrast with the US 
here is that in the absence of any policy initiatives to push for a further deepening of the 
internal market, we don’t know what the formal political powers would accept in 
America. 
Furthermore, even where the Commission fails and encounters resistance it 
doesn’t give up trying to find new avenues, exhibiting an opportunistic wait and see 
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attitude which lets me predict that even in other policy areas the EU in the long run will 
end up more centralized and liberalized. Thus, Coleman notes that the Commission 
always comes back and finds a different solution when trying to reach the goal of further 
market integration when the first policy proposals fail: 
But you do see examples where [the Commission first failed]. The ports services 
are a very interesting example, I think it is the only area where the Commission 
has made two legislative attempts to liberalize and failed. Just hasn’t been able to 
generate the political momentum to overcome the resistance of those who have a 
stake in the present protectionist system. So does fail here, too, this approach. 
Nonetheless the Commission tends to come back then, not necessarily with another 
legislative proposal but some other way of trying to tackle the problem because it 
feels nonetheless that it has sufficient political support to keep trying. […] Of 
course, what drives the Eurosceptics mad is this kind of one way clockwork of the 
treaty mechanism (interview with Coleman 2010). 
Indeed, according to Helmut von Sydow the creation of a public procurement 
regime was only a question of priorities. He notes that they always felt, based on Article 
7 of the Treaty of Rome, the non-discrimination article, and the other articles dealing 
with the free movement of services and goods, that public procurement needed to be 
liberalized and that they had the authority to do so. Yet, despite the fact that the basic 
principle of non-discrimination was already anchored early on at the genesis of the EU, 
“the prohibition to discriminate remains a dead letter as long as public tenders are made 
behind closed doors, as long there is no transparency” and thus necessitates the active 
creation of specific directives, such as the very first coordinating directives 71/305 and 
77/62 (interview with von Sydow 2009).67 However, as noted in the previous chapter, 
                                                 
67
 “Wir, deswegen erwaehnte ich Cassis de Dijon, festgestellt haben, dass alle Handelshemnisse direkt 
durch Artikel jetzt 28, und 29 verboten sind. Von daher hat sich, glaube ich, intellektuell nie die Frage 
gestellt, ist das gerechtfertigt, brauchen wir das. Die europaeische Gemeinschaft is angetreten, um 
Diskriminierungen zu beseitigen, um Handelshemnise zu beseitigen, aber das Grundsatzgebot, damals war 
es noch Artikel 7, es gibt keine Diskriminierungen. Auf den Artikel brauchen wir nie wieder einzugehen, 
weil spaeter im Rest des Vertrages alles fuer Waren-, Dienstleistungsfreiheit usw., im Einzelnen bestimmt 
ist und weil unsere Vorschriften inzwischen weiter ausgelegt.werden. Das sind nicht nur 
Diskriminierungsverbote, sondern von nichtgerechtfertigen Hemnisen, jedesmal ein Gueterausgleich. Von 
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there was a general assessment that these early directives were insufficient. Indeed, the 
White Paper and the Cecchini report gave a new sense of urgency and sophistication to 
the creation of a positive procurement market. While as von Sydow points out, they 
already had a rudimentary economic calculation of the potential costs of a restricted 
procurement market, the Cecchini report has largely improved upon it.68 Yet, even the 
rudimentary calculation based on the argument that while private commerce purchased 
one-third of its goods from abroad, public entities only purchased only between 0.5 and 
1% of their goods from outside of their country and thus the public entities must not be 
acting economically rational, highlights some very important differences between the US 
and the EU. First, even before the Cecchini-Report, the Commission was trying to use 
numbers to impress the opening and deepening of an EU-wide public procurement 
regime, while the absence of numbers or anybody pushing for it in the US is glaring. 
Second, this argument and calculation based on the behavior of private businesspeople is 
in many regards the opposite of what has been made in the US. Recall that in the US the 
justification for the market participant exemption boils down to the notion that public 
entities can discriminate against other sister states when buying or selling goods or 
services for themselves because private people can do so. Here, however, the argument is 
                                                                                                                                                 
daher haben wir immer gesagt, oeffentliche Auftraege muessen liberalisiert werden. Es war hoechstens eine 
Frage der Prioritaeten war; an was gehen wir als erstes und was nicht. [...]Die Koordinierungsrichtlinien 
haben wir praktisch nur gemacht weil das Diskriminierungsverbot ein toter Buchstabe bleibt solange die 
oeffentlichen Auftraeg hinter verschlossenen Tueren vergeben werden, solange keine Transparenz 
herrscht.“ 
 
68
“Und das andere, sehr simple, fast demagogische Argument war, im Privatbereich, beim Handelsverkehr, 
Privatleute kaufen 1/3 im Ausland, oeffentliche Auftrage sind nur 0.5 bis 1%, also ist doch ist es doch 
wahrscheinlich das die oeffentliche Hand noch nicht oekonomisch einkaeuft, nicht nach rationalen 
Kriterien so wie es ein Privatmann machen wuerde. Und deswegen ist es moeglich im Bereich oeffentlicher 
Auftraege, da koennen sie wieder das Volumen nehmen und koennen sagen, wenn anstatt 1% 20 oder 30% 
im Ausland gekauft werden, dann komm das und das dabei heraus. Das waren die ersten beiden 
Grundzahlen mit denen wir gearbeitet haben. Dann hat Cecchini das in einer langen Arbeit mit einer 
grossen Equipe, lange Arbeit, ein halbes Jahr, vertieft.“ 
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that states need to (be made to) act more like private business people, because the actions 
of private businesspeople show that there is a great potential for cost savings. Of course, 
what emerges here is a difference in assumption as regards the respective starting 
position, so few is bought from another state in the EU, while in the US the assumption is 
that free competition across states usually exists. However, it is absurd to assume that this 
different assumption alone can explain the difference between the two polities, because 
this would suggest that the more a country trades internally, the more it should develop 
barriers to internal trade. 
The Commission, indeed, discussed long and hard on how to advance a single 
market and to convince any potential doubters from the need to tackle public 
procurement. According to Sebastion Birch, the Cecchini report was a key element in 
realizing Cockfield’s bureaucratic understanding that a true internal market can only be 
called a single market if it includes public procurement: 
We talked about it a great deal in the first couple of years we were there, but it 
was quite clear that if we were going to convince a lot of member states including 
the one my Commissioner had the most reason [to be] suspicious of,69 it was 
going to need proper, it’s going to need be given a proper framework and that was 
where Cecchini and the cost of non-Europe and so on came in and bore out in its 
conclusions that indeed public procurement was one of the, the biggest single 
things that needed doing. […] Delors and Cockfield were an extraordinary 
combination in that no two people could possibly be more different […] I don’t 
want to put Delors’s vision down, but he was much more general, much more 
political than Cockfield. Don’t forget nobody ever voted Cockfield into anything 
as a politician. He was a bureaucrat, who then became an appointed member of 
the House of Lords and was not a politician in that sense [of] a man of political 
vision, he was a man who was able to put political policies into practice very, 
very systematically. And he was probably the only member of the Commission 
that he was a member of that has ever read the Treaty of Rome three times from 
beginning to end. To him, you couldn’t possible have an internal market, a single 
market without public procurement. The whole logic would crumble (interview 
with Birch 2009). 
                                                 
69
 Birch refers here to Margaret Thatcher and the UK government. 
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Michele Petite concurs with Birch’s assessment of the importance and intent of 
the Cecchini report “to strike the mind with very high figures on the cost of non-Europe”, 
admitting that on occasions the report tended “to overvalue the cost argument” (interview 
with Petite 2009). Moreover, public procurement quickly developed into a key policy 
area for the overall single market project and the discussion surrounding it because “it 
was in fact the only major policy were clear numbers could be provided” (interview with 
von Sydow 2009). As von Sydow put it: “How are you truly able to calculate the 
rationalization effects in the car or other industries?” (interview with von Sydow 2009).70 
In short, making public procurement a banner policy area was a tool to convince 
everyone about the potential economic saving effects of a true single market, including 
other policy areas where the estimated numbers might have been harder to come by. 
Besides striking potential objectors with high figures, the Commission also 
actively changed strategy by adapting and switching arguments in promoting the creation 
of a true single market. Indeed, when it was well-known that great disparities existed in a 
given policy area in the US or it didn’t seem practicable to make successfully a case for 
harmonization in the EU, the EU Commission instead of arguing for harmonization of 
this policy area rather argued that such disparities in the US are a proof that it doesn’t 
hinder the opening of the market. Thus, the Commission only highlighted the existing 
disparities in America when it fitted its mission to further the single market. Accordingly 
one EU official recalls that  
I do remember that we did, we did, indeed, have arguments, my memory is not as 
good as Michele’s, [that] the argument, well, the Americans have lived with very 
                                                 
70
 “Im Weissbuch haben wir alle Themen angesprochen. Und dann wurde schnell gesagt, das [public 
procurement] is ein Hauptthema, weil es ein dicker Brocken ist. In Wirklichkeit war es der einzige Brocken 
wo man mit Zhalen kommen kontte. Wie wollen sie die Rationalisierungseffekte bei der 
Automobilindustrie oder anderswo in Ziffern fassen“? 
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large disparities between states without having to harmonize was raised and I 
think and my recall is that it was an enforcement context and it was to do with 
whether you could nevertheless police it without having physical barriers at, on 
roads, at borders. Whether it could be done, as we were arguing, by stop checks, 
by looking at the turnover of traders near borders to see whether even if every 
single person within 100 miles actually was a confirmed and registered alcoholic 
they could still sell quite as much booze or whatever was the context in which we 
were looking at that because I think we have accepted that there was it was not 
going to be a fruitful argument, look at how harmonized what state legislation is 
as between states, let alone neighboring states, because we would shoot ourselves 
in the foot, because we knew that it wasn’t (interview with Birch 2009). 
In short, the EU officials involved were aware that this was “ultimate[ly] a 
political negotiation [where] you shift your ground according to where your argument is 
the strongest”, admitting that “we only used the American example of strong differences 
between rights in the enforcement argument, because there aren’t physical barriers on the 
roads between the states on the whole rather than the harmonization argument” (interview 
with Birch 2009; my emphasis). Michele Petite, moreover, recalls that they were studying 
the US at that time in regards to the country’s varying sales tax, realizing then that while 
harmonization of VAT in the EU was neither a feasible argument to be made, given the 
US situation, nor an easy practicable solution, in the light of different positions of 
member states in the EU that at least a case could be made for a polity-wide minimum 
rate: 
The VAT issue was probably the most thorny one within the internal market 
debate. […] On VAT member states were opposed to any move, because you had 
to do with finance ministers, highly, whose only question was there will be 
evasion, which is a good issue, but focused solely, probably overfocused on that. 
[…]And at the time we had been studying the situation in the US with the sales 
tax in the US to check in real terms, in you know, on the ground what kind divest 
purchases are made when there are big differences in sales tax from state to state. 
And at the time the widest was between the State of Washington and Oregon. 
There was zero [in Oregon] and something like 9 or 10%, a high sales tax in 
Washington. And there was mission there sent there to study the effects of these 
differences. The result being that beyond 50 kilometers, people simple don’t go; 
or hardly any. Switch is really very minimal and finally the end product was that 
after all we not harmonized the rates but everybody should have a minimum rate 
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of 15%. So you would in fact, you would reduce the gap between two states. That 
was sort of the lesson from the US at the time (interview with Petite 2009). 
These examples show clearly that when the Commission has been aware of state 
rights and differences in the US, the Commission chose apparently only to employ them 
when it was useful to forward the market integration agenda. As regards public 
procurement specifically, the Cecchini report, as noted earlier, dedicated an eight-page 
section alone to the state- and local-level American public procurement regime stating 
that “[s]ome 20 states retain statutes allowing purchasers to give preferential treatment to 
in-State suppliers” and that “[p]reference policies are generally more stringent a lower 
levels of government” (WS Atkins 1988, 304). Yet, although this might have been 
valuable ammunition for anyone opposed to a liberalized EU-wide public procurement 
regime, “[i]t possible just shows that on the whole people don’t read these reports and 
therefore not enough people who might have made good capital out of that actually 
exploited it” (Interview with Birch). Indeed, while recognizing that “we were actually 
less conscious of the potential pitfalls of such comparisons”, an EU officials observed 
that “we endlessly discussed [the Cecchini report] with those who were producing it” and 
“thought we were really well-briefed on what the examples were we should be making 
use of in terms in the ways the US and other economies were organized” (Interview with 
Birch, 2009). 
It is especially in contrast with the US and in regards to the reaction and 
involvement of big business when the political entrepreneurship of the EU Commission 
emerges. As Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia (1994) have already argued in connection with 
the path-breaking Cassis de Dijon decision, it wasn’t the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the perceived legal audacity of the decision, but rather “the political use and 
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counteruse that was made of the rule”, which made the case famous (Alter and Meunier-
Aitsahalia 1994, 541). Indeed, according to the two authors the ECJ’s decision actually 
“softened the Court’s position regarding nontariff barriers” (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 
1994, 540). The Commission, however, “extracted from the decision those aspects useful 
for developing a new approach to harmonization policy, to satisfy its own political 
agenda of completing the internal market and furthering European integration” (Alter and 
Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994, 541). Thus, similar here, the Commission took the initiative to 
create reports to buttress its cost savings arguments and bring business alongside it. 
It could, of course, be argued that if it wasn’t the courts per se that the creation of 
polity-wide public procurement in the EU was first and foremost the result of the interest 
and lobbying of big business. There is something to be said for this, especially in the light 
of the absence of similar big business organizations pushing for it in the US. Certainly the 
courts and big business played an important supportive role in the process of 
transforming public procurement from its Cinderella-style origins to a major policy area, 
yet it was largely in reaction to policy initiatives taken by the EU Commission. 
First, there appears to be hardly any doubt that the very first steps towards an EU 
public procurement regime in the late 1960s and 1970s resulted from the action of 
European-level bureaucrats. Big business had not yet coalesced around Europe-wide 
policy issues. Overall there was a “lack of big business participation in the early years of 
the Community” with the result that “the mobilization and political activities of big 
business [was] a novel phenomenon for European multinationals” in the early 1980s 
(Cowles 1994, 195). Indeed, “the foundation for the European Common Market was laid 
and developed without the input or support of big business” and most big business 
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“policy statements were in response to Commission proposals and legislation” (Cowles 
1994, 42 and 114, Cowles’ emphasis). Hence, an European official confirms that 
in the 60s I doubt whether [public procurement] was driven by the industrial side. 
I would think hard men in many ways of the Coal and Steel Community and the 
others who have been recruited in Brussels, often bright young people who were 
going systematically through, looking at everything they needed to do create a 
common market. And because of the breath of the Treaty of Rome there was a 
possibility to address this issue and it was still nearly required because of the way 
the economies were not integrated with important public sectors in very close 
relationship with their national suppliers. So I would think it would be the 
technocrats, if you were (interview with Coleman 2009). 
And indeed the first call for liberalizing public procurement apparently emerged 
from the Commission paper commonly called the “Colonna Report” (COM(70) 100 
final)71 and not from business, which largely remained anemic. While the 1970 report 
therefore argued “for a stronger European industrial policy” and “the creation of a single 
European market thereby eliminating NTBs and opening up public procurement”, “there 
is little evidence that large European firms followed the developments closely” (Cowles 
1994, 122–23).  
Secondly, while the situation and the involvement of multinational corporations in 
the building of a common market changed in the 1980s, the Commission nevertheless 
remained at the heart of it. Thus, even Maria Cowles, whose first major research project, 
also largely based on first-hand interviews, focused on establishing the claim that big 
business hugely mattered in the creation of the single European market, provides, 
somewhat unwittingly, strong evidence that it was the Commission who was the linchpin 
and catalyst of the single market project in general and public procurement in particular. 
Thus, while she contends that “[t]he structural power of organized European big business 
                                                 
71
 The report was named after the former Internal Market and Services and the then Industry Commissioner 
Guido Colonna di Paliano. 
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[…] was the primary force behind the establishment of the Single Market program” and 
that “major industrialists were a driving force behind the Single Market Program”, 
mobilizing for “the first time in the early 1980s to assume a political role in Community 
policymaking”, Cowles also notes that the impact of Lord Cockfield’s and his team’s 
White Paper’s was not immediately apparent to businesses and member governments. In 
fact, business even asked Lord Cockfield to dial down and he refused. His response to 
business was to take it or leave it. Thus, Cowles writes that  
Unlike Commissioner Narjes, his predecessor, Cockfield and his associates 
managed to impose coherence on the single market concept. […] Cockfield was 
determined that the heads of state or government would act on the White Paper. 
First, he sent the document out only 10 days before the summit to give the 
Council member enough time to become “enthused” by the document, but to deny 
their officials ample opportunity to recognize the degree of national sovereignty 
that would be delegated to EC institutions under the plan. Second, Cockfield 
carefully listed in the White Paper the European Council’s earlier declarations 
supporting the creation of an Internal Market in order to hold the heads of state 
and government accountable for their words and to back up the document legally. 
[…] The immediate impact of the Cockfield White Paper was not readily apparent 
to big business, the Commission, or even the member governments. As an official 
of the ERT [European Round Table] secretariat noted, “The White Paper was born 
to the smallest fanfare, like a lead balloon. No one was interested. I can remember 
thinking ‘what a dull document’… Yet [in time we realized that it was] 
revolutionary.” Several ERT members believed that the White Paper was too 
ambitious and, therefore, that the member governments would never implement it. 
They approached the Commission to ask Delors and Cockfield to focus on 
specific legislation within the White Paper. Cockfield refused. In the 
Commissioner’s view, the integrity of the program could not be compromised. 
[…] The Commission’s message to the industrialists was the same as to the 
Member States – “take it or leave it”. Recognizing Delors and Cockfield’s solid 
commitment to the program, a number of ERT members actively began to 
promote the White Paper. Their promotional activities were directed at their 
respective governments as well as at their national business associations (Cowles 
1994, 243–45). 
In short, what this excerpt demonstrates is that big business followed the 
Commission’s lead by helping convince their own governments to agree to the goal laid 
out in the White Paper. Big business usually tended to react to the Commission’s 
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initiatives. It was the European Commission which “began meeting with chief executive 
officers of leading firms to promote European-level solutions to the economic malaise” 
(Cowles 1994, 43). Indeed, Cowles admits that even in the “official transference arena”, 
concerning policies involving the transference of powers, competence and/or funding 
from the Member States to EC institutions, or changes to the formal structures and/or 
procedures of the Community”, exactly the arena where member states and 
intergovernmentalist explanations should be the strongest that “[t]he European 
Commission, for its part, often is a facilitator in the policy process, though it may also 
serve as an agenda-setter in certain situations” and that it “played an important agenda-
setting role in the negotiations leading to the Single European Act, for example” (Cowles 
1994, 59). In fact, the first coming together of big business was the result of Commission 
activity. US companies specifically felt threatened by Commission policy proposals on 
multinational enterprises and the fact that they did not have a member state to speak up 
for them. Thus, recognizing  “the call for greater union activity and European collective 
bargaining agreements was not being made by the trade unions – but the Commission 
itself”, “prompted American MNEs to pay attention to the European Community” and to 
organize “the first ad-hoc MNE groups  […] at the EC-level” (Cowles 1994, 130 and 
133; my emphasis).  
This is not to say that business didn’t play a major role. Certainly the entry of the 
UK in the EU and with it the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) was a noteworthy 
factor in the shaping of the EU’s future industrial policy. Maria Cowles accordingly 
observes that the arrival of the UK in the EC in 1973 not only “changed the status of 
MNEs in Community policymaking”, but that “the CBI Europe Committee worked 
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diligently to champion European industrial policy both in London and in Brussels” and 
that “[o]ne approach, of crucial importance to certain sectors of industry, was to open up 
public procurement contracts among EEC member states” (Cowles 1994, 133–35). One 
of the key members of the CBI Europe Committee and “most ardent proponent of this 
approach” was Boz de Ferranti, president of Ferranti Ltd., a British electronics firm 
(Cowles 1994, 135). As Cowles remarks in a footnote: 
His company produced one of the world’s first computers, selling ten in the UK 
market. Ferranti soon discovered the difficulty in selling his computer outside the 
UK market. Ferranti’s business was challenged by IBM which succeeded in 
selling over 100 computers in its home market, the United States. For De Ferranti, 
the opening up of Europe’s public procurement markets was vital if his company 
was to effectively compete against the American companies. Ferranti would later 
be appointed as head of the Industry group of the EC Economic and Social 
Committee where the continued to promote the opening of public procurement 
markets. In 1979, he was elected to the European Parliament where he 
championed his belief in a common European market through the creation of the 
Kangaroo Club. The club’s publication, Kangaroo News, was later funded largely 
by multinational corporations – the first contribution coming from ICI” (Cowles 
1994, 135). 
Yet, the UK’s entry happened after the Colonna report and after the very first 
directive dealing with public procurement (70/32/EEC). Moreover, other trans-European 
business organizations, such as UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe),72 founded in 1958 “to track the political consequences of the 
community created by the Treaty of Rome”, “did not address technical barriers or public 
purchasing – two key areas of the Commission’s industrial program, and presumable two 
key areas of interest to European business” (Business Europe 2010; Cowles 1994, 137). 
Actually, realizing the relative impotence of UNICE vis-à-vis their own industries and 
governments, Étienne Davignon, European Commissioner for Industry from 1977 to 
1985, changed tactics “[i]n order to persuade Member State and Community officials of 
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 UNICE changed its name to BUSINESSEUROPE in 2007. 
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the need for Community action in the various industrial sectors” (Cowles 1994, 142-43). 
He took the lead by, for the first time, “bypass[ing] the more traditional forms of 
business representation in favor of individual European companies, and by also 
“bypass[ing] Member States, [he] would often bring his ideas to the heads of firms first 
who would later seek to influence their national governments on the merits of Davignon’s 
proposals” (Cowles 1994, 143; emphasis in original). Cowles, however, also 
circumscribes Davignon’s contribution to the setting the stage for an internal market and 
more particularly a polity-wide public procurement regime by observing that “[i]f 
Davignon’s work in industrial matters had a particular shortcoming, it was the lack of 
attention devoted to “internal market” matters such as standardization and non-tariff 
barriers” (Cowles 1994, 145). In her eyes it was the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists, which was the key promoter of an European internal market. She contends 
that “the ERT largely was responsible for setting the agenda of and for the Single Market 
Program – thus, relaunching the Community in the 1980s” (Cowles 1994, 200). 
Yet, her own evidence shows business not only reacting to Commission’s 
initiatives but the Commission’s involvement in creating its own supportive environment 
by suggesting the creation of the ERT in the first place. Thus, as mentioned above, 
Cowles notes Lord Cockfield’s refusal of big business’s request to dial down his team’s 
proposals made in the White Paper and the fact that “[i]n the aftermath of the Cockfield 
White Paper in 1985, multinational firms as well as other groups in the European 
business community were concerned with UNICE’s capacity to respond quickly and 
effectively to the growing amount of EC regulatory legislation (Cowles 1994, 178; my 
emphasis). Furthermore, it was Davignon, together with Volvo's Pehr Gyllenhammar 
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who formed the ERT, borrowing the name from the US Business Roundtable (Cowles 
1994, 213-14). It was, indeed, the Commission that suggested, initiated and gave aid to 
this new trans-European business organization, including providing its own building as a 
first meeting place. The ERT’s agenda was worked out from the inside of the “deserted 
offices of the Berlaymont over a series of Saturdays” in the presence of Étienne 
Davignon and other Commission officials (Cowles 1994, 214). Thus, not only did 
Davignon find “in Gyllenhammar the individual to take on the task of organizing such a 
group”,73 but Gyllenhammar “followed up on Davignon’s suggestion” and “enlisted the 
assistance of the Commission” in drawing up “a first list of potential industry members 
[…] in 1982” (Cowles 1994, 212–13). The idea was to get together a group of 
“progressive business leaders “who had a reputation beyond management, who had 
weight in public opinion, who had political influence (Cowles 1994, 213). In turn, the 
ERT staff then got prime access to Commission projects by having “direct links with all 
the Commission directorates with whom [their] projects fell” and by directly receiving 
from Commission staff “the “state of play” on” all relevant policy issues (Cowles 1994, 
225). In addition, Davignon “promoted the ERT’s activities with national officials” 
(Cowles 1994, 225). Thus, it shouldn’t come as a surprise “therefore, when the proposals 
of the French government’s industrial initiative in September 1983 largely reflected the 
ideas discussed in the original ERT memorandum”, which included a passage on the 
opening of public procurement markets (Cowles 1994, 231). The ERT hence seemed to 
have worked here as a transmission belt for the EU Commission. The ERT helped the 
Commission “[l]ater, when Member States appeared to hesitate in their support for the 
Cockfield White Paper and Single European Act” by using “negative incentives or “sticks 
                                                 
73
 In fact, by choosing the Swede Gyllenhammer, Davignon chose an EU ‘outsider’ at the time. 
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– namely the threats to disinvest from Europe if progress on the Single Market program 
was not forthcoming”, to change the mind of member governments (Cowles 1994, 275). 
In later year the Commission continued “to recruit ERT members to appear publicly with 
Commissioners at news conferences and/or to serve on high-level task forces”, which lent 
“legitimacy to the Commission’s programs and leadership capabilities” (Cowles 1994, 
258–59). And Davignon himself became an influential, official member of the ERT for a 
decade and a half after leaving the Commission in 1985. 
The situation in the US contrasts sharply with the European Union where, while 
business has played an important supportive role in the creation and transformation of an 
EU-wide public procurement regime, the Commission has been its initiator and main 
promoter. In fact, it appears that the Commission has created its own permissive and 
supportive environment by not only commissioning economic impact studies to convince 
any skeptics of the importance of liberalizing public procurement but also by fostering 
the formation of new business interlocutors and winning over new, influential actors 
through access and dialogue.  
A similar federal-level agent with a mandate to create a single market and deepen 
its integration is absent in the American institutional context. Thus, no general, sustained 
push for integrating public procurement by eliminating preferential treatment policies 
either by judicial fiat or congressional preemption has been made. Nobody has created a 
study figuring out what the cost of non-America is in the public procurement sector and 
then use it to convince state governments and business organizations. Therefore, it 
appears that the absence of an institutional feature in the United States focusing on the 
entirety of the common market strongly contributed to the differences. Indeed, McCue et 
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al. hint also at a general neglect and disinterest in public procurement in the US. They 
contend that “no one really cares about this very critical government function” (McCue et 
al. 2007, 253). Indeed, they try to explicate “[h]ow could any area of expenditure be so 
large and so forgotten” by observing that “[p]art of the answer may lie in the fact that it is 
buried by lack of interest and other priorities confronting managers, and has therefore 
stayed out of sight” (McCue et al. 2007, 253). The EU Commission, on the other hand, 
has shown great interest in creating a single, complete public procurement market based 
on a neo-classical concept of market economy. As Bovis has pointed out throughout his 
articles and books, the European public procurement regime “displays strong neo-
classical influences,” influences embracing “the merit of efficiency in the relevant market 
and the presence of competition, mainly price competition” (Bovis 2005, 109). In short, 
“[t]he connection between public procurement regulation and the neo-classical approach 
to economic integration in the common market is reflected in the criterion for awarding 
public contracts based on the lowest offer “ and the Commission’s skepticism “of any 
attempts to apply so-called “qualitative” factors in the award process” (Bovis 2005, 109 
and 111).  
As a matter of fact, while the EU Commission with its White Paper and the 
subsequent Cecchini Report has clearly laid out the economic impact which trade 
barriers in public procurement have for the overall European economy, a similar study in 
the US is absent; McClue et al.’s study presently being the best estimate available. State 
procurement officers and specialists have repeatedly noted their concern about the 
continuing practice of in-state preferences, but have toned down their official resistance. 
Thus, while the latest (2009) Survey of State Government Purchasing Practices 
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commission by the National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) 
expresses its concern that “[t]he use and breath of preference policies seem to be 
increasing”, the organization’s previous official position against these preferences has 
been revoked. Yet, the former president of NASPO and chief procurement officer of 
Alaska, Vern Jones, noted that “without doubt if you would poll the members they 
would overwhelmingly not be supportive of in-state preferences. I can tell you that” 
(interview with Vern Jones 2009). But American state legislators as well as the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) tend to express their resistance to any federal 
interference into state public procurement and frequently utter a preference for in-state 
preference in the absence of any complete economic impact study such preferences 
might have. Accordingly, the NCSL states as one of its four major concerns that “the 
federal government resist the temptation to preempt state laws” and specifically 
demands in regards to public procurement that the “USTR consult with state legislatures 
about state procurement practices” and that the “USTR should only be able to bind a 
state to an international procurement agreement following formal consent from the state 
legislature”, because “[s]tate procurement policy and practices often are set in state law 
and are sometimes designed to serve social or economic purposes beyond the mere 
provision of goods and services for state government use” (NCSL 2009a and b). The 
NCSL calls any other approach by the federal government as “unacceptable” and 
troubling (NCSL 2009b). And when the question of cost of possible preference bills are 
being raised in legislative debates, the answer often is that the assumed impact is either 
minimal or overall beneficial for the in-state companies. Thus, following Connecticut 
Senator Debicella’s inquiry whether there was “ever a public hearing on this topic [of 
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creating an advantage for in-state businesses when competing with certain out-of-state 
companies for state contracts]”, the reply by fellow Senator Williams was “no”, but 
“[t]his is a fairly benign tool that we can use that will at the same time provide some 
benefit, real potential benefit to Connecticut companies”.  In response Senator Debicella 
noted that “obviously, I won't even ask the question because we didn't have a public 
hearing on this, we have no data on this whatsoever, the number of instances that this 
would have actually been triggered in the last year”. And Connecticut Senator Lebeau, 
chairman of the Commerce Committee, rising in defense of Public Act 154 admits that 
“[w]e don't have the knowledge” and that “[w]e don't know how many companies this 
would have affected”, because “[t]hat would have been an enormous study to do, by the 
way, to figure out how many contracts could have possibly been impacted by this in the 
past, say, year”. Yet, he contends while “there's going to be a lot of instances where this 
[bill] is going to put Connecticut companies in play, “it’s benign” and “that there's very 
little harm to come from the bill, but it can do a lot of good” (Transcript Connecticut 
Senate, May 2, 2008).  
Given this known attitude and position of legislators and legislatures and the 
absence of any detailed impact studies, public procurement officers are reluctant to 
publicly state their misgivings because  
It’s not that, well, it’s not that you are worried about, you know, am I going to get 
fired if I do this, it is just, professional don’t take a position in an organization that 
they are a member of by virtue of their position. They don’t take a position in that 
organization contrary to their own state’s official position (interview with Vern 
Jones 2009). 
Hence, in the US, in contrast to the EU, where the Commission has taken the lead, 
there is no one actually pushing for a polity-wide procurement regime. Moreover, while 
public procurement officers are reluctant to take the lead, national business organization 
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are also not taking up the slack as hoped for by procurement officers.74 Indeed, you 
would expect that given the usual analytical perception that “[t]he US MNEs tend to 
share one binding philosophy of market liberalization unlike their European counterparts 
that hold different levels of consensus toward liberalization”, that there would be strong 
support to open up the public procurement market in the US by eliminating any 
remaining non-tariff barriers (Cowles 1994, 315). Yet, in the US, in the absence of a 
polity-wide organization advancing market integration, big businesses don’t even tend to 
see public procurement as a national issue or argue that in engaging this issue they would 
have to prefer members from one member state making up their organization over 
another. Thus, as one unidentified U.S. Chamber of Commerce official put it to me, the 
Chamber doesn’t “get into states”, because this would mean “we would chose winners 
and losers” and “we would have then to choose one [state member] chamber over the 
other” (interview December 2, 2009). Consequently official comments like these from 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. 
Business Roundtable are quite common: 
We don’t really have a formal position on that. (Joe Crea, Business Roundtable, 
2009) 
                                                 
74
 “I don’t know of any organized group, you know, like chamber of commerce or any other business 
associations nor procurement groups that are actively pushing it. There is one group called “National 
Institute of Governmental Purchasing”, NIGP, I believe they have, they may have a policy, but they are not 
there lobbying. The reason well, take my example. I was president of NAPSO and I was chairman of the 
Western States Contracting Alliance, WESCA, for years. I am the head of this national purchasing 
organization and the regional purchasing organization, which all its members probably or the majority at 
least believe that preferences are not good for business. Yet, am I going to go out to lobby Congress to 
overturn legislation that has been past in my state? How long would I you know, how long would I be 
allowed to do that [chuckles] by my employer here in the state who is on record as saying we like these 
preferences? It’s not going to happen. I think it would have to be, it would probably have to be some, from 
business groups, from the chambers, or like some associations, business associations, but obviously these 
preferences haven’t risen to the importance to them, for them to spent money and time doing it. Maybe they 
are just accustomed, resigned to their existence. I don’t know. I don’t know any organized opposition out 
there” (interview with Vern Jones 2009). 
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The Chamber, to my knowledge, has never commented on this issue. I believe 
many of the states do follow to some extent the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
as a model, but there are many differences across state lines. This has caused 
some companies to wish that there was a standard set of regulations across all 
states, but I am not aware of any significant push in the recent past to make this 
happen. Would be very difficult to make this happen anyway, many states rights 
issues. Companies that focus only on one state also would not want those 
regulations to change to be consistent across all states necessarily. Can be barriers 
to entry. (Chris Braddock, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009) 
The NAM has not to my knowledge focused on these issues of State and Local 
procurement.  Obviously we support transparent, fair, and competitive bidding in 
any sort of procurement.  But as a national organization we focus on national 
issues.  State manufacturing organizations are more likely to focus on state and 
local procurement rules and procedures. But, as you pointed out, the in-state 
companies may have a bias toward protecting their home turf. (Shaun Donelly, 
National Association of Manufacturers, 2009) 
As a result, what became quickly evident in the interviews, in addition to the 
decisive role of the Commission, is the different way of thinking about the market in the 
US and the EU. The conception of the market turned out to be much more parochial in 
the US than in the EU. Creating a common market in public procurement in the EU was 
seen as involving the entire system, the entire polity, while in the US state rights and state 
memberships in national business organizations were emphasized. In short, it appeared 
that in some ways there was and remains an absence of a national vision in the US. 
Moreover, as recent studies appear to confirm, businesses and average citizens in the EU 
are much more likely to turn to the federal-level institutions to resolve policy issues and 
express a greater level of trust in them, despite a growing Euro-skeptic literature 
worrying about the future of the EU,75 than in the United States. Thus, what we 
potentially see here in the EU then is, while not yet necessarily transference of allegiance, 
at least a much stronger acceptance by big business of a strong central government 
                                                 
75
 In fact, one of the problems of the Euro-skeptic literature is that it remains largely non-comparative, 
reaching dismal conclusions without noticing that other functioning democratic polities might even 
experience lower levels of support by citizens. 
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shaping industrial and market-integrating policies. Hence what might look at first glimpse 
as a major paradox that “European-based MNEs “tend to retain a stronger national 
identity” to their home governments than do American firms” due to “the historic 
relationship between firms and governments beginning with the early history of European 
industrialization”, might actually help to explicate why Europeans are more willing to 
work with the Commission (Cowles 1994, 17–18). European businesses are used to a 
strong bureaucratic state, given that it emerged alongside or even preceded the 
multidivisional firm and that had a very active role in the industrialization and economic 
growth of Europe, while the reverse is true for the US (Vogel 1978). Thus, the European 
Union and particularly the European Commission playing the active role of market 
integrator is nothing new and in many ways simply an extension of 19the and early 20th 
century policies to a larger geographic area.  
European officials hence repeatedly highlighted the importance of imagining the 
EU as a whole, noting that “[e]verybody was persuaded that to put all the industries in the 
Community in competition that would increase the gain” and that this “is the system in 
which anybody will earn money, if somebody is at a lower level than the other, they have 
the chance to ameliorate” (interview with Boncompagni 2009). This way of thinking 
diverges from the more parochial, protectionist way of perceiving the public procurement 
market in the US. An American procurement specialist accordingly noted that the EU and 
US difference for him is “partially a cultural issue”, because “within the US [you] take 
care of your own, your own state or your own county. We want the money here, we will 
lobby strongly for that and even though it seems if pure competition and complete free 
enterprise system across the states would be more cost effective, more efficient” 
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(interview with Matthews 2010). The desire not only to perceive but also to turn the US 
market into an amalgam of local markets became clear in an exchange with the author of 
Oregon’s new 10% permissive agricultural preference bill, Kathleen West: 
West: I don’t really know what to call [it] myself, but if you really want a sense of 
place that’s not the value that you, you don’t value just the cheapest good, no 
matter that it may destroy the local economy, it may destroy your sense of place. 
So I would rather pay more for goods and services if I know that I had a strong, 
resilient local economy. I have a good environment and I have a sense of place. I 
don’t want carrots from Georgia, I want carrots from Oregon. 
Hoffmann: But wouldn’t this also be shifting the costs if we buy more local, 
wouldn’t this affect a farmer somewhere else in the US and wouldn’t he lose 
revenue? 
W.: Yeah, that’s true, but you know what that’s, they need to do the same thing. 
H.: But then we would end up with each state having more and more in-state 
preferences and we would become more local, and have more barriers among the 
states. 
W.: Great. I would love that. I would love that. I don’t think that goods need to be 
shipped everywhere. If I could get my community to consume or to eat 50% of 
the food that is consumed here, that would be ideal for me (personal interview 
2010). 
This demonstrates again that in the absence of an influential agent dedicated to 
polity-wide market integration more local conceptions of market organization might win 
out. A focus on the more local also finds its expression in the general attitude of the 
American citizenry towards government in general and federal-level government in 
particular. A Spring 2010 by the Pew Research Center noted “[t]he public’s hostility 
toward government” and that “[r]ather than an activist government to deal with the 
nation’s top problems, the public now wants government reformed and growing numbers 
want its power curtailed”. In short, “there is less of an appetite for government solutions 
to the nation’s problems – including more government control over the economy” (Pew 
Research 2010, 1). While the numbers have gone down for all levels of government 
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(federal, state, local) as regards whether government has a positive impact or not, 
demonstrating an overall, system-wide weariness with government, American citizens 
continue to rate more local levels of government better (Table 1).  
Table 1: US: Positive Impact of Government on Daily Life in % 
 1997 2010 
Federal 50 38 
State 62 42 
Local 64 51 
 
What is striking, however, is not the apparent present-day decline of Americans’ 
trust in the federal government but its consistency over the decades. Only once since 
1972 have more than 50% of the American population trusted in their federal 
government, right after September 11. The only other time the American federal 
government enjoyed high levels of trust (47%) among the American population was at 
the beginning of the first Gulf War in 1991. For most of the time, however, trust levels 
hovered in the upper 20 and 30 percents (Pew Research 2010, 13–16). Presently only 
22% (!) of the American population say that they “can trust the government in 
Washington almost always or most of the time (Pew Research 2010, 2). The Pew 
Research study further notes that there is “no single factor that drives general public 
distrust in government” (Pew Research 2010, 4). Moreover, when it comes to the 
American federal government solving economic issues, especially those which might 
touch on (perceived) state and local issues, Americans are especially loath. Thus, the Pew 
Research study reports that “the public is wary of too much government involvement 
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with the economy” and that “most American (58%) say that “the government has gone 
too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system”, a 
percentage similar to October 1997 during the booming Clinton years (Pew Research 
2010, 9). In addition a “[f]ully 74% think that the federal government does only a fair or 
poor job running its programs” and a substantial majority (58%) “say[s] that the federal 
government is interfering too much in state and local matters” already (Pew Research 
2010, 7-8). Indeed, for political commentators, such as E.J. Dionne, this kind of 
“profound mistrust of power in Washington, D.C.”, has a long and established tradition 
going all the way back to the Anti-Federalists opposing the Constitution itself and “is not 
amenable to “facts” – not because it is irrational, but because the facts are beside the 
point” and thus “[f]or the anti-statists, opposing government power is a matter of 
principle” (Dionne 2010, A25). But it is not only the general population, but also 
American business leaders who are traditionally distrustful of government. Hence, 
according to David Vogel, “[t]he most characteristic, distinctive and persistent belief of 
American corporate executives is an underlying suspicion and mistrust of government”, 
and this “distinguishes the American business community not only from every other 
bourgeoisie, but also from every other legitimate organization of political interests” 
(Vogel 1978, 45). He notes further that “[f]or virtually all American businessmen […] a 
critical authoritative concept in terms of which they make sense of the world is the notion 
of governmental involvement as inimical to a sound economy and incompatible with a 
free society” (Vogel 1978, 46). Thus, for Vogel, “[w]hat is so striking about American 
business ideology is the remarkable consistency of business attitudes toward government 
over the last one hundred and twenty-five years” (Vogel 1978, 46).  
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The general attitude towards federal-level government in the US remarkably 
differs from the European Union where, while “trust in the EU has fallen from 48% in 
autumn 2009 to 42% in spring 2010”, “far more people continue to trust the EU than their 
own parliament (31%; +1) or their own government (29%; unchanged)” (Eurobarometer 
73, 15). More specifically, while the Commission’s trust levels consistently are lower 
than the EP’s, the trust levels are comparatively high when compared with the US, 
ranging usually in the mid and upper 40s since 1999 (Eurobarometer 71, 114). Thus, 
while in the US more citizens tend to trust their local and state governments than the 
federal government, the reverse is true in the EU. Here a majority of citizens trusts the 
federal-level institutions more than their member state governments and legislatures. 
Moreover, the 42% level of trust in the EU in Spring 2010 is 20 percent points higher 
than the trust expressed by American citizens in their federal government at the same 
time. More significantly, however is the fact that in the European Union, “Europeans 
want more decision-making at the EU level” (Eurobarometer 71, 147). In spring 2009, 
“an absolute majority of respondents believe that more decisions in a number of areas 
should be taken at the European level” (Eurobarometer 71, 147). Indeed, “support for 
taking more decisions at European level has risen over the years and in all the areas 
discussed” (Eurobarometer 71, 147). Support for more involvement of the EU ranges 
from a high 81% for fighting terrorism to a low of 60% fighting unemployment. 70 to 
72% want greater EU involvement and decision-making regarding health issues and 
ensuring economic growth (Eurobarometer 71, 148). This represents a striking contrast to 
the 58% of American who already say that the US government has gone too far in 
regulating markets. In fact, the high level of support for EU decision-making is not 
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temporary and even increased in several important areas. Thus, while a majority of EU 
citizens still prefers member state governments to decide in policy areas where the taking 
into account of local considerations are very obvious, such as education, cultural policy, 
rules for media and policy, “it is important to note that the number of policies in the EU 
domain (i.e. a Union responsibility) has always exceeded that in the national domain (i.e. 
a national responsibility) from 1992 to 2006 (Caporaso and Kim 2009, 26). In fact, as 
Caporaso and Kim also have noted, “the majority of Europeans favor joint decision-
making in the policy areas that were traditionally regarded as the core of national 
sovereignty”, such as foreign policy, currency, immigration, defense, and political 
asylum (Caporaso and Kim 2009, 26). 
The diverging attitudes in the EU and the US towards federal government in 
general and specifically as regards intervention in the market, even if it potentially means 
a liberalization of the markets, emerge therefore to be important part of the puzzle why 
the EU has been more successful in liberalizing public procurement. The more positive 
attitudes towards the federal-level creates, all things being equal, a more permissive 
environment for the EU Commission to enact its pro-market integration agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
As this and the previous chapter have shown, a closer look at the respective public 
procurement regimes of the United States and the European Union leads to very 
surprising and unexpected results. While in both entities actors are aware that preferential 
treatments for in-state suppliers are a form of stark discrimination and “one of the most 
obvious and anachronistic obstacles to the completion of the single market”, the 
European legal framework in public procurement clearly shapes up qualitatively 
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differently from the American regime (Asenjo 2007). But it is not in the United States 
where we end up with a liberal procurement regime. Starting with the first specific 
directives in the 1970s, the European Union has completely preempted public 
procurement establishing an EU-wide public procurement regime based on non-
discrimination, transparency and economic efficiency. This liberal procurement regime, 
despite notable shortcomings on the implementation and enforcement side, contrasts 
starkly with America’s protectionist procurement regime where states retain the right to 
freely discriminate against out-of-state bidders and where no federal preemption has 
taken place so far to overcome these barriers to achieve a genuine internal market. 
Indeed, around the same time as the EU was starting to implement its first procurement-
related directives with the intent to eliminate non-tariff barriers in public procurement, 
the US Supreme Court in a string of court cases, starting with Hughes v. Alexandria 
Scrap Corp. in 1976, establishes the market participant doctrine allowing for states to 
continue preferential, discriminatory treatment practices on the basis of states being 
conceived as acting as private traders when buying goods and services for their own 
needs. To justify the US Supreme Court’s decision and the US states’ practices, a number 
of arguments have been made to explicate the American protectionist procurement 
regime. These arguments based on the notions that states should have the right to reap 
what they sow, that states are laboratories of experimentation and that therefore 
protecting state autonomy in public procurement is beneficial for the entire polity and 
that the trade distortion effects of this rule are minimal in comparison to regulations or 
taxation should be, as this paper argued, as compelling in the EU context. However they 
don’t appear to have played a significant role and even from the US perspective, the 
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justifications don’t necessarily make always a lot of sense. Also the argument that general 
congressional reticence towards preemption measures as well as the inherent veto points 
in the institutional make-up of the US Congress can per se explain why there is no 
preemption of public procurement in the United States overlooks that federal preemptions 
in the US have increased over the last couple of decades and similar, if not more, veto 
points exist in the European Union. 
 It appears therefore that the difference in outcomes is mainly due to the unique 
role of the European Commission, which has identified public procurement in the 1980s 
as a major sector to liberalize to fulfill and evaluate the goal of a complete single market, 
and which follows a neo-classical economic approach of market integration. Not only has 
the Commission promoted market integration but also worked on creating its own 
supportive environment by helping to establish and develop the European Roundtable. 
Moreover, the European Commission is embedded in an overall more permissive 
environment regarding the role of government in market interventions. Trust levels for 
the Europe Union are higher in average than for member state governments and 
parliament, while the reverse is true for federal-level institutions in the US. 
The absence of a similar federal-level actor in the United States, on the other 
hand, looms large. This also shows that government intervention and regulation does not 
automatically mean a more restricted market. Indeed, as previously argued by Gamble in 
the British context, strong, central government policies can lead to a more open market 
outcome (Gamble 1988). This doesn’t mean at all that the federal-level institutions in the 
EU are stronger than those in the US, but it demonstrates that a federal-level advocate, 
taking into account the entire polity, and having a relatively circumscribed mandate 
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focusing on market-building can make a difference. Thus, in this case, the United States, 
the land of the unregulated public procurement market at the federal level does not end 
up to be also the home of the free, open, unrestricted public procurement market. Or to 
say it the words of Brian Clem, Oregon House Representative and sponsor of HB2763 
creating in 2010 the new permissible 10% in-state preference for all agricultural goods: 
“That’s very interesting. They [the EU] have a more perfect union then than we 
do ironically, at least economically a more perfect union” (personal interview 
2010). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
UNTANGLING TRADE BARRIERS: SERVICES IN THE EU 
AND THE US 
“[T]he separate states of the United States, for example, not only control 
admission into most professions, but often also into such diverse occupations as 
cosmetology, barbering, acupuncture, and lightning-rod salesmen. These controls 
are frequently used to keep out practitioners from other states.”  
Mancur Olsen in The Rise and Decline of Nations, 1982, 143 
“The directive established an EU “internal market in services through the removal of 
legal and administrative barriers to the development of services activities.” This means in 
practice that EU member states cannot impose extra requirements for foreign EU service 
providers, whether plumbers, hairdressers or IT experts, compared with home providers 
of these services”. 
Clive Archer in The European Union, 2008, p. 72 
By shunning comparison due to respective sui generis concerns, both the 
literature on American-state building and that on European market integration have 
overlooked the potential common characteristics between an uncommonly centralized 
international organization and an uncommonly decentralized state. This has led scholars 
to overlook that the European Union has already gone further than the United States in 
centralizing authority and eliminating interstate barriers in the economically important 
arena of services. Thus, the recent literature on the 2006 EU Service Directive, by mainly 
focusing on explaining why and how it falls shorts of the original Bolkestein draft76, has 
failed to notice that from a comparative perspective the EU has succeeded in liberalizing 
the services sector more than the US in many important aspects. 
                                                 
76
 The draft received its name from the then-EU Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein. Before 
becoming EU Commissioner Bolkestein was a government member and politician for the Dutch Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), a party known for its strong 
free market ideology.  
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Most authors, indeed, either grumble that the European Services Directive we 
have “is better than no Directive at all” and/or attempt to explicate how and why the final 
directive ended up to fall short of the original Bolkestein proposal (Barnard 2008, 324).77 
This is indeed the goal of Chang, Hanf and Pelkmans who concentrate their research on 
explaining “why and how the EU enjoys only the current, unambitious level of 
integration in the services sector” (Chang et al. 2010, 98; my emphasis). More recently, 
the European press, such as the Financial Times, laments in its headlines the “EU states’ 
slow progress on services directive” (Tait 2010). However, what the authors commenting 
on the EU Service Directive ignore is that from a comparative perspective the EU, by 
ending up with a services directive and other closely related directives, such as the 
Directive on the recognition of professional qualification (Directive 2005/36/EC), 
actually already establishes a more open and competitive internal market than the US, 
especially in regards to the delivery of temporary services. The term ‘temporary services’ 
refers to service providers who only occasionally provide services across borders either 
remotely via the internet or by temporarily operating in a member state in which they are 
not established. In other words it denotes the absence of a stable and continuous 
participation in the economic life of the host state by a service provider which is 
established in another state. The two quotes at the beginning of this chapter encapsulate 
nicely how different in principle the freedom of provision of services shapes up today in 
the United States and the European Union. 
This chapter and the next will focus on services not only because of the sector’s 
huge economic relevance to any modern market economy, representing the largest 
                                                 
77
 Schioppa thus talks about a “relative failure”, especially for Central Eastern European governments, and 
bewails that “the EU as a whole has lost, as the host-country rule now prevails” with the amended services 
directive (Schioppa 2007, 741) 
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economic sector in both the EU and the US with over 70% of GDP,78 but also because of 
the fact that the EU Service Directive has been the most well-known and controversial 
measure coming out of Brussels in a very long time, leading to “an unprecedented extent 
of politicization” (Schmidt 2009, 847). Indeed, it has been described as the only 
European directive recognized by a majority of European citizens (Chamla 2010, 1).79 
In analyzing the freedom to provide services, especially temporarily, across state-
borders in the EU and the US, I will contend that also in this economic sector the EU is 
more indicative of a liberalized, complete internal market than the United States, where 
federal preemption and a serious attempt to eliminate cross-state discrimination in 
services and other economic sectors presently is absent. While the actual integration of 
flows on the ground are still generally less across European states than American ones, 
the many political rules are more—and more liberally— integrated in Europe. 
As can be expected from an economic sector that comprises over 70% of GDP, 
business activities that constitute a service are varied, ranging all the way from 
amusement parks, museums, schools, financial services, security services, to waste 
management, health services, transport, advertising and crafts. The rules in place are 
largely the same for professions, which require years of graduate training, such as nurses, 
medical doctors, and architects, as well as for those occupations, usually conceived as 
                                                 
78
 According to the CIA World Factbook, services in the EU comprise 72.9% of GDP (2009 est.) and 
76.7% in the USA (2009. Est.). Cf. also Gekiere 2006. 
 
79
 “Quand vous demandez à un citoyen de vous citer une directive européenne connue, pour sûr, il vous 
répondra «Directive Bolkestein!» .” 
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non-professions, which do not require a post-secondary education and/or only on the job 
training, such as carpenters, file clerks, and cooks. 80  
To facilitate discussion and to illustrate empirically the differences in the adoption 
of rules that open exchange to competition (market liberalization) and the existence of a 
single set of coherent rules for exchange (market centralization) in the EU and US, I will 
concentrate the research exemplarily on one occupation (hairdressers). 
The profession of hairdresser, while perhaps appearing at first glance an 
insignificant, somewhat off the cuff choice and not a cause célèbre like the Polish 
                                                 
80
 One small exception is lawyers. What differentiate the liberalization of interstate legal practice in the EU 
from other services is that the legal profession was one of the earliest sectors being liberalized by sectoral 
directives and that the EU has decided to not fold the provision of legal services into the overall services 
directive. Moreover, what distinguishes lawyers is that in this case American legal professionals, at least 
some, have already been aware for quite some time that the EU has developed a more liberal regime, 
having, among others, argued that “the time has come for a reexamination of present state rules by state 
authorities and courts [in the US] to permit greater liberalization to some degree along the lines of the 
European Union model” (Goebel 2000, 309; cf. Goebel 1991 – 1992, 2004; Lonbay 2005; Spedding 1987; 
Turina 2005). The analytical end result, consequently, is the same with the EU having “created some quite 
dramatic rules allowing free movement of lawyers” (Lonbay 2005, 610). This conclusion is shared by 
Turina (2005) and Goebel (2000). The former notes that “the liberal approach adopted by the EU, with 
respect to temporary interstate transactional practice appears to be more in consonance with modern 
commercial needs than the approach currently existing in the United States (Turina 2005, 235). And the 
latter agrees by observing that “[s]ince the mid-1970s, the European Union (EU) or, more precisely, its core 
element, the European Community (EC), has recognized and protected more liberal rights for lawyers to 
engage in interstate practice than the United States. […] The picture is in sharp contrast with the much 
more limited legal rules governing interstate law practice within the United States. The rules of admission 
to the bar and rights of practice, including any tolerance of interstate practice, are set by the states. These 
state rules have traditionally been founded upon a dual concern for effective representation of clients, a 
type of consumer protection interest, and for the efficient administration of court litigation, a civil and 
criminal justice interest. Arguably, however, rules ostensibly set and enforced with these concerns in some 
instances mask a desire to protect the local legal profession against interstate competition” (Goebbel 2000, 
307-8). Moreover, given that the US Supreme “Court has in large measure accorded great discretion to the 
states in setting professional qualification standards and delineating the right of legal practice”, what is 
missing is a federal-level agent making the push for congressional preemption (Goebbel 2000, 308). 
Indeed, while in the US “by and large local lawyers have been able to take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by federalism to place high walls around their own preserve”, the “high degree of liberalization 
[in the EU] has occurred without any evidence of significant functional problems or risks to clients and 
without any serious opposition from national bar associations – despite differences in substantive laws and 
procedural rules far greater among the Member states than they are among the states of the United States” 
(Goebel 2000, 344).  
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plumber81, actually appears to be one of the most common examples cited in political 
(House of Lords 2005, Rapport d’information for the French Senate by Badré et al. 2004-
2005), administrative (Handwerkskammer Karlsruhe 2009; MoKomm 2010), journalistic 
(BBC 2006; Collet 2005; Klein 2006; LeMonde 2006; Tait 2010; Thollon and Rolin 
2006) and academic (Chamla 2010, 7; Chang et al. 2010, 105; Hohn 2006, 219; Ilies 
2007, 10; Saint-Paul 2007, 153) discussions surrounding the EU services directive. 
Damien Brousserolle, Professor at the University of Strasbourg, even talks of 
hairdressing as the “cas canonique” of the EU service directive (Brousserolle 2010, 10). 
This chapter here will therefore describe market liberalization and centralization 
with respect to hairdressers, whose freedom to provide temporary services and to 
establish themselves in another member state in the EU is anchored, as is the case for the 
majority of other services in the EU, largely in the now famous Directive on services in 
the internal market (Directive 2006/123/EC) and the lesser known Directive on the 
qualification of professional qualifications (Directive 2005/36/EC). In the United States, 
on the other hand, market access for services providers remains entirely in the hand of the 
individual sister states. Out-of-state hairdressers are confronted with serious obstacles, 
such as (re)taking exams, including passing law exams, before being allowed to cut hair 
across state borders for even just a single day. 
                                                 
81
 The Polish plumber played a key role in the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in France in 2005. 
As Martin Arnold has noted in the Financial Times: “This mythical, rarely seen figure has become the 
symbol of everything that is wrong with the constitution for French people, worried about an invasion of 
low-paid workers from new EU member states stealing their jobs and destroying their social system” 
(Arnold 2005). And Barnard points out that others have “argued that the Polish plumber embodied a serious 
challenged to citizenship, both national and European, because he was present on French soil but not 
subject to French regulation and operated under a more beneficial regime” (Barnard 2008, 330). More 
generally, in the words of Nicolaïdis, “the ‘Polish plumber’ has come to serve as the emblem for the denial 
of recognition in the EU” (Nicolaïdis 2007, 682). 
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The main focus of the analysis will be on the temporary provision of services 
rather than more permanent rights of establishment. Access to temporary provision of 
services is more revelatory of a real single market, given that a state could always say, “If 
you come in and meet our qualifications and standards and fill out the right papers, you 
can establish a business” without really changing its system. Granting an out-of-state 
practitioner temporary status is more importantly allowing him or her to provide services 
without first having to meet qualification standards by passing exams again and filling 
out a number of forms to gain market access. Temporary services provision seems 
especially important for market integration of a number of less highly educated service 
jobs. We might indeed expect such service providers to want to “try out’ their job in 
another country before making a longer-term decision to move, and exams and 
bureaucratic processes seem very likely to significantly deter them from undertaking such 
explorations. 
European Regime: Free to Cut, Color, and Curl 
With the enactment of the services directive (2006/123/EC) and the contemporary 
qualifications directive (2005/36/EC) hairdressers today are free to provide temporary 
services across state borders in the 27 member states of the EU and the three states 
forming part of the European Economic Area.82 The legal framework for this freedom is 
somewhat complex. If hairdressers are considered a “regulated profession” in a member 
then both directives apply. If not, only the service directive applies. For instance if a 
hairdresser from another EU member state wants to provide his or her haircutting 
services over the weekend or a couple of times throughout the year in Germany, he or she 
                                                 
82
 Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway 
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only needs to notify the competent authority one time annually that he or she plans to do 
so. In the case of Germany this declaration can easily be done via the internet. This 
requirement, however, does not derive from the service directive, but from the 
qualifications directive. Thus, the important distinction which needs to be made here is 
that in some states, such as Germany, hairdressers represent a regulated profession and in 
others not. In the case of a regulated profession both the qualifications and services 
directives apply.  
In the EU jargon, a regulated profession is a profession subject to regulations laid 
down in separate provisions, setting out qualification requirements and conditions for the 
pursuit of this profession. In other words, a regulated profession is a profession which by 
law or regulation requires authorization, registration or the equivalent in a member state. 
This authorization or registration is often connected with the requirement of a particular, 
specified education and training. Each EU member state determines which profession 
will be added to the list of regulated professions. The same profession may belong to the 
regulated professions in one country while it is not a regulated profession in other ones. 
In Germany for example the regulated crafts professions are listed in Annex A of the 
German crafts ordinance (Anlage A zur Handwerksverordnung) and include professions, 
such as plumber, glazier, carpenter, baker, butcher, dental technician, optician and 
hairdresser. An EU member state is free to add or subtract any profession to or from its 
list of regulated profession at any time in the future.83 From the moment that a state adds 
a profession to its list of regulated professions, the rules laid out in the qualifications 
                                                 
83
 The Commission maintains an on-line database containing all professions regulated in the member states. 
This database can be search by type of profession or by professions regulated in a specific member state: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.home  
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directive apply in regards to the freedom of providing services in addition to the services 
directive.  
In regards to non-regulated professions and the provision of temporary services, a 
service provider can provide cross-state border services without any further requirements. 
No notification of any competent authority or any other barrier applies. The principle 
here is, if you are established in your home country, you can go freely under free 
movement of service to any other EU member state. The service directive, however, 
allows for a derogation for qualifications for regulated professions. This is where then the 
qualification directive comes into play. In very simple terms, the service directive states 
that member states cannot maintain impediments to the free movement of services, 
except when there is a specific derogation. The services directive includes a derogation 
for the qualification directive, which was also already present in the services directive’s 
original draft. This derogation is not a derogation on professions, i.e. excluding entire 
professional fields, but it is a derogation on what the qualification directive allows. It 
means that a state can maintain a certain minimum of control over qualifications, even 
under free movement of services, as will be explained below.  
The two directives are therefore closely linked. They focus, however, on different 
aspects regarding the freedom to provide services. The 2005 qualification directive is 
mostly concentrating on the recognition of diplomas or certain levels of expertise in a 
given professional field. The service directive, on the other hand, is, in very general 
terms, covering everything that is not covered by the qualification directive. As an EU 
official has pointed out, “the services directive [came] after the qualifications directive 
and […] was trying to cover and to simplify all these other aspects that haven’t been 
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covered by the qualifications directive” (EU official, personal interview 2010). In other 
words, the qualification directive only focuses on the professional qualifications of a 
service provider and the educational attainment requirements a host country might 
impose while the service directive attempts to eliminate any other potential non-trade 
barriers to the delivery of services across state borders. Therefore a state that doesn’t 
regulate the profession of hairdressers itself, such as Denmark, Poland, Spain and the 
UK, cannot apply the qualification directive to any hairdresser coming from another EU 
member state. The host country might, however, still require a service provider to charge 
a fixed fee or to have a minimum of two assistants. Such regulations, which pose 
different barriers to the free provision of cross-border services than educational 
attainment, would then be tackled by the services directive.  
In addition, it is important to note that the EU services and qualification directives 
also distinguish between the temporary provision of services and establishment. This 
distinction is significant because only certain parts of the services directive and the 
qualifications directives apply to one or the other. Thus, while in the case of 
establishment certain national requirements, such as registration in a national professional 
registrar or to have an establishment in the host country, might upon examination by the 
Commission be deemed non-discriminatory and proportionate and can thus be imposed, 
the same requirements will be considered detrimental to the freedom to provide services 
on a temporary basis. For instance in the case of the qualification directive, when it 
comes to the establishment of regulated professions, be it an artificial inseminator, harbor 
pilot, milk inspector or a hairdresser, the host country retains the right to deny 
professional recognition and thus the pursuit of that profession when the service provider 
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is not able to “attest a level of professional qualification at least equivalent to the level 
immediately prior to that which is required in the host Member State, as described in 
Article 11” (Directive 2005/36/EC: Article 13, 1b). Article 11 of the qualification 
directive lays out the five different levels of qualifications. Of course, in comparison to 
the US, it is noteworthy to point out that the permission for employing stricter criteria for 
establishment are still tilted to greater liberalization in that it also allows for practitioners 
to provide services who not only attest to the educational level that is usually required 
from the host county but also one level below. This attestation, however, does not apply 
in the same manner for the temporary provision of services. Indeed, the qualifications 
directives clearly states in Article 5 that in regards to the free provision of services 
“Member States shall not restrict, for any reason relating to professional qualifications, 
the free provision of services in another Member State” as long as the service provider is 
legally established in another member state and his or her profession or the education 
leading to the profession is regulated or he or she has worked in the profession for at least 
two years during the preceding ten years (Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 5, 1). 
In short, establishment in the EU context refers to an economic activity by a 
service provider for an indefinite period of time and through a stable infrastructure from 
where the business of providing services is actually carried out. This contrasts with the 
definition for the free provision of services where the emphasis is on the temporary 
element of the provisions of services. Temporary provision of services is characterized by 
the absence of a stable and continuous participation in the economic life of the host state 
by a service provider established in another member state.  
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However, the lines between the two are not always absolutely clear. As the 
Commission itself points out “[t]he fact that the provision of services is temporary does 
not mean that the provider of services within the meaning of the Treaty may not equip 
himself with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State (including an office, 
chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is necessary for the 
purpose of performing the services in question” (Commission 2010).  
The cross-polity analysis undertaken here mostly concentrates on the temporary 
delivery of services across state borders. The conditions for the provision of temporary 
services are especially important for free market integration because they are so directly 
linked to cross border economic interaction. Once a service provider gets to the point of 
establishing, he has clearly chosen to invest and locate somewhere else at which point he 
is subject to the regulations of the host state. And, of course, these regulations and 
demands vary quite a bit whether we look across the US or the European Union. 
Nevertheless, once again, even in regards to establishment does the EU provide a general 
framework requiring not only the streamlining of authorization procedures, such as a 
single point of contact,84 but also black-lists national requirements particularly restrictive 
to the freedom of establishment and stipulates a rigorous review and elimination of any 
                                                 
84
 The service directive requires the set up of Points of Single Contacts, which are one-stop shops for 
service providers to complete formalities and procedures online at a distance. The Points of Single Contact 
(PSCs) aim to assist European service sector companies in navigating through sometimes very complex 
legal procedures. The Points of Single Contact additionally simplify the administrative processes by acting 
as a case manager for each company's activities. Nevertheless, the service of the points of single contact is 
optional. Entrepreneurs may always address themselves directly to the relevant authorities, if they prefer. 
The idea behind a single contact point is to have a place where SMEs can easily obtain information, submit 
applications and collect decisions or other replies without having to deal with a multitude of authorities at 
different administrative levels, as has been the case so far. They are meant to become the single 
intermediaries between businesses and public administrations. Furthermore, the PSCs will make it possible 
to complete procedures at a distance, by using ‘e-government applications’. The Commission’s website 
provides a link to all Points of Single Contact in all 27 member states and the 3 members of the European 
Economic Area: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/eu-go/index_en.htm  
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other national requirements with the exception that it can be proven to the Commission 
that the remaining requirements are non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason 
of public interest and proportionate (Directive 2006/123/EC, Articles 14 and 15).85 Yet it 
is especially the open market rules for the temporary provisions of services, which allow 
small service providers to test the waters before expanding or moving into a new state. 
Prior to establishing many people, especially those who are not part of the cosmopolitan 
elite or own major businesses, may presumably need to experiment first if they want to 
live somewhere else and whether they can even find work there. As an EU official noted, 
big companies don’t necessarily need as much relaxed rules, given that “they are well 
positioned and have not difficulties to comply with all the rules”. Indeed, as the same 
official further expounded, “we live here in Brussels and so not really at the border and 
nevertheless I have [now since the service directive] more and more recourse to German 
service providers, because they offer services or goods that are of interest to me, and I 
think that this is now a more common phenomenon and apparently is also attractive for 
the people to come over”, but to have this happen even more frequently “some things 
need more time and mentalities and interests will change” (personal interview, December 
2010). In short, it is especially the temporary element, which not only enables providers 
to try out delivering services in another state, but also customers to experiment with 
receiving such services. 
                                                 
85
 Prohibited requirements include, among others, the requirement that managers or shareholders are 
resident within the territory, a prohibition of having an establishment in more than one member state or 
making a provider choose between principal or secondary establishments or to choose between the form of 
an establishment such as agency, branch or subsidiarity. Requirements to be evaluated include, among 
others, an obligation on the provider to supply other specific services jointly with his service and fixed 
minimum and/or maximum tariffs.  
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In sum, today any service provider in the European Union is presumed to be able 
to easily provide services across borders without any administrative or technical barriers. 
The service directive does, however, allow under special and circumscribed 
circumstances the imposition of additional national regulations on incoming service 
providers. Article 16 of the Services Directive provides that Member States shall not 
make access to or exercise of a service activity in their territory subject to compliance 
with any requirement unless it is justified for reasons of: 1) public policy, 2) public 
security, 3) public health or 4) the protection of the  environment (Directive 
2006/123/EC, Article 16.3). The Services Directive yet makes it very clear that 
requirements which may potentially be justified by one of the four above mentioned 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest may in any case be imposed only if they 
are non-discriminatory as regards nationality or place of establishment and proportionate, 
i.e. they are suitable to attain the public interest pursued, do not go beyond what is 
necessary and cannot be replaced by less restrictive means (Commission 2010). 
Furthermore, the Commission is required to be notified about any requirement imposed 
based on public interest concerns and retains the right to reject them.  
The other major exception of course is the case of regulated professions, but even 
here the restrictions, which the qualifications directive allows to impose, are minimal in 
comparison to the United States. The presumption in the EU again is to ease the free 
movement of service as much as possible and stop any disproportionate or unjustified 
host state regulations. This means that citizens of the member states, who are legally 
established to pursue a profession or activity in one state, have the right to provide 
services in another state in the same profession or activity. 
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Hence, as noted above, in the case of temporary and occasional provision of 
services across state borders, the host state, based on the qualifications directive, can at 
the most ask the service provider from a state where the profession is not regulated to 
prove that they have pursued that profession in the home member state for at least two 
years during the 10 years preceding the provision of services. This requirement of two-
year professional experience, however, becomes null and void when the education and 
training leading to the profession or activity was regulated in the home country.  
Additionally for the provision of services for the first time, an EU member state 
may require a declaration to be made to the competent authority in written form, 
including the details of any insurance cover or other means of personal or collective 
protection with regard to professional liability. This declaration shall be renewed when 
there has been some substantial change in the information provided or once a year – if the 
service provider intends to provide temporary or occasional services in that member state 
during that year. To facilitate service provision, member states are obliged to make the 
declaration available via internet. But the directive is clear that the “service provider may 
supply the declaration by any means”, thus eliminating any concerns that one might have 
that a service provider might not be able to or not have access to a computer.86 Moreover, 
this declaration has to be free. To lever a fee is perceived akin to barrier for the provision 
of services in the EU. Last but not least a member state may require that the declaration 
be accompanied by the following documents: a proof of the nationality of the service 
                                                 
86
 This concern, for instance, was uttered by the president of the National Association of Barbers Board of 
America, who alluded to the idea that a system based on internet notification as in Europe would not be 
very successful in the US, because most barbers are from the low income strata and not “the sharpest knife 
in the drawer”. He notes: “Do you know why they [hairdressers] go to vocational school? Because they are 
not the sharpest knife in the drawer. And if you talk about going on the internet, we have many of them that 
walk into the barber board, hundreds, that pay their license because they don’t have a credit card, they don’t 
have a checkbook, they are living from mouth to mouth or hand to mouth and many of them will never get 
out of it” (personal interview 2010). 
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provider,  an attestation certifying that the holder is legally established in a member state 
for the purpose of pursuing the activities concerned and that he is not prohibited from 
practicing, even temporarily, at the moment of delivering the attestation, proof of two 
years of professional experience during the previous ten years – in the case of a regulated 
profession, that is not regulated in the home member state and in the case of a profession 
in the security sector evidence of no criminal convictions. It needs to be kept in mind, 
once more, that these requirements by a host country are only permissible when the host 
country is regulating the profession itself. It can for instance not require a prior 
declaration for professions, which the host country itself has not listed in the official list 
of regulated professions. Once the declaration is made, the service provider can start 
working immediately on the territory of the host state. He does not have to wait first for 
the green light to be given by the host state.87 
So what does this mean in practice? Given that the service directive allows for 
four categories of justifications it is imaginable that member states might invoke public 
security concerns or health concerns to impose new or to keep existing national 
requirements. In fact, when contacted why hairdressers are still listed as a regulated 
                                                 
87
 The qualification directive includes a derogation for professions that involves a potential threat to public 
health or safety. In such a case, the host state may verify the service provider’s qualification, which could 
delay when he or she can start to work. Yet, a service provider cannot be delayed indefinitely. Indeed, in 
the absence of a reaction of the competent authority within the second month of the receipt of completed 
documentation, the service may be provided (Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 7.4). Additionally, the health 
and safety derogation does not apply to regulated professions, which are covered additionally by sectoral 
directives in which the minimum training conditions were harmonized at Community level: doctors 
(Directive 93/16/EEC), nurses (Directives 77/452/EEC and 77/453/EEC), dental practitioners (Directives 
78/686/EEC and 78/687/EEC), veterinary surgeons (Directives 78/1026/EEC and 78/1027/EEC), midwives 
(Directives 80/154/EEC and 80/155/EEC), pharmacists (Directives 85/432/EEC and 85/433/EEC) and 
architects (Directive 85/384/EEC). This means that in principle the competent authority of the host state 
may not check the training and may not ask for documentation specifying the content of the training taken. 
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profession in Germany, while this is not the case in some other EU member states88 and 
after reducing the regulated professions from 94 to 41 with the reform of the German 
crafts law in 2004, the response by German authorities was that  
Hairdressing remains a regulated profession, because it is considered to be part of 
risk prone professions that is professions, which, when exercised improperly, pose 
health risks to or even threaten the life of customers. These regulated professions 
should therefore only be exercised by persons who actually "understand their 
trade" and who can prove this by having passed the exam for the master’s craft 
certificate (my translation).89 
 
So it is not a stretch to imagine that a member state might express concerns over 
different hygiene standards for hairdressers in different countries. As we will see later on, 
this is the case in the US; certain states at least claim to fear that hygiene standards in 
other states constitute a risk to public health. And indeed, even in the EU, a Commission 
official observed that on occasion “entire member states are trying to extent the concept 
of health and security to justify things that are kind of border line”. For instance a 
member state “will try to justify the possibility to ask for a test and to [put] restrict[ions] 
on many professions” because of health issues or hygiene standards. But “to be able to 
impose this test [the member state] would have to notify the Commission that for 
hairdressers according to the risk for health and security for the recipient they want to 
maintain the possibility” and then it “will be my colleague who will say yes or no” as 
regards to the proportionality of the requested requirement (personal interview 2010). In 
                                                 
88
 Hairdressers are presently regulated professions in 13 of the 30 countries composing the European 
Economic Area: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Slovakia (EU Regulated Professions Database 2011). 
 
89
“Das Friseurwesen ist deshalb zulassungspflichtig, weil es sich in diesem wie bei den anderen 
sogenannten gefahrgeneigten Berufen um solche handelt, in denen bei unsachgemäßer Ausübung Gefahren 
für die Gesundheit oder ggf das Leben der Kunden drohen. Diese zulassungspflichtigen Berufe sollen 
deshalb nur von Personen ausgeübt werden, die tatsächlich ihr "Handwerk verstehen" und dies durch die 
bestandene Meisterprüfung nachweisen können“ (Wilhelm Paul, Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, 
Landwirtschaft und Weinbau Rheinland-Pfalz, personal correspondence 2010). 
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the case of hairdressers, EU officials working on the services directive have clearly 
indicated that such a requirement would be considered disproportionate by the 
Commission. Indeed, while a member state might argue that there are substantial 
differences in training and would like to impose a theoretical or practical exam on the 
incoming service provider, such a requirement for hairdressers “would be very difficult 
for member states to justify that this is proportionate” (personal interview 2010). In fact, 
according to a Commission official, “it’s quite difficult to say that a hairdresser, who is 
coming, had only 1200 hours [instead of 1500 or 1800] and will create problems. This is 
hard to justify” (personal interview 2010). 
The same would apply if a host member state would require a criminal 
background check before allowing a hairdresser to provide temporary cross border 
services. For example, it could be imagined that a state which doesn’t regulate the 
profession and therefore can’t even ask for a simple declaration still would like to have 
only hairdressers come over the border with clean criminal records. The host country 
would have to justify the criminal record check under the service directive arguing that 
such a record check is justifiable under the public order exemption. The Commission in 
turn then would assess the request. However, as an EU official from the DG Internal 
Market & Services clearly emphasized to me, such a request for hairdressers would be 
absolutely “disproportional” (personal interview 2010). And a colleague from the same 
DG remarked that “[i]t’s already the case in some sectors and it will be more and more 
the case that we will make infringement saying [for example], we do not consider it 
justified that you ask about a criminal record for hairdressers” (personal interview 2010).  
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These examples clearly make evident not only the Commission’s statutory 
involvement in the implementation of the service directive but also the active 
involvement of its staff in making sure that any of these requirements, which member 
states might still see as “logical” and justified reasons, are debunked as unjustifiable and 
simply represent non-tariff trade barriers. This will be further elaborated in the next 
chapter. In the meantime, it is important to note that the service directive has reversed the 
burden of proof. It is not the obligation of a service provider to demonstrate to a court or 
the Commission that a particular requirement is not justified according to the European 
Union treaties, but the obligation of the member states to prove to the Commission that 
the maintaining or introduction of a requirement is indeed not only justifiable by one of 
the four exemptions but also proportionate. Moreover, the member state needs to 
demonstrate that the goal which the requirement tries to accomplish cannot be 
accomplished by any lesser intrusive means. And as the examples above have already 
shown, the Commission is not favorably dispositioned to such requests.  
American Regime: No Single Market for the Temporary 
Provision of Services 
In the United States, the fifty states retain the right to regulate the access to 
professions. This is not so different at first glance from the member states in the 
European Union, where each state retains the freedom to decide which profession is 
regulated or not and to decide for its own state what qualifications need to be obtained. 
Yet, as Mancur Olsen already noted in the early 1980s, the regulations in the US are 
largely maintained as non-tariff barriers to trade, “to keep out practitioners from other 
states”, no matter whether they practice “cosmetology, barbering, acupuncture” or any 
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other profession (Olsen 1982, 143). Moreover, as we will see in this chapter and the next, 
America sister states regulations are actually much more similar than many regulations 
across EU member-states—making the arguments for state-level regulation all the more 
clearly about a simple version of protectionism rather than substantive concerns about 
meaningfully different practices or norms. Whereas it might at least seem to make sense 
for Germans to be concerned about unregulated British hairdressers entering their market, 
the attitudes we see in the US — where Ohioans insist that Pennsylvanian hairdressers 
could only practice in Ohio if they undertake the full course of Ohio training, even 
though it varies only in trivial ways from Pennsylvanian requirements — seem very 
directly grounded in a straightforward rejection of single-market principles. 
The difference between the European Union and the United States of American 
becomes especially stark when temporary cross-border service provision and the overall 
framework for ensuring the existence of a complete internal market is examined. While 
the EU system allows for a certain measure of flexibility, it guarantees at the same time 
through federal-level regulation that the free access to each other member state is 
provided and non-tariff barriers are either eliminated or be proven to be justified and 
proportionate by a third party, the Commission. In short, the EU’s approach is to retain a 
certain measure of flexibility by meeting the overarching goal of a single market. The EU 
is therefore an example where federal-level intervention in the market increases freedom 
to trade instead of hampering free economic exchange. In the US, on the other hand, non-
tariff barriers to the provision of services persist with similar arguments having been 
debunked by the Commission in the European context. Indeed, in the absence of a 
federal-level agent making the trade liberalization argument, as the next chapter will 
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show, the existing non-tariff barriers are not always perceived clearly as such in the 
United States. Restrictions for services provision in general and for “the barbering 
profession, the oldest profession in the world, other than prostitution” in particular remain 
in place (personal interview with the President of the National Association of Barber 
Boards of American 2010). 
So what exactly is the situation in the United States today? The United States is 
clearly characterized by a highly fragmented system when it comes to the provision of 
services for regulated professions. Each state retains its own rules and grants permission 
to market access. Zimmerman for instance observes that the states’ licensing authority in 
the US has led to “[d]iscriminatory licensing requirements [protecting] individuals 
engaged in a specific profession in a state against competition by their counterparts in 
other states” (Zimmerman 2003, 6). In another place, in writing for the Certified Public 
Accountant Journal On-line he further notes that not only “[t]he regulation of various 
professions by the individual states has resulted in nonharmonious licensing standards, 
impeding individuals licensed by one state from practicing in sister states”, but that 
“[t]his problem has become more serious in the practice of public accountancy because of 
the increased need for accountants to travel to many states to serve clients with multistate 
locations” (Zimmerman 2004). Accountants, obviously, are not the only ones affected by 
the prohibition to provide temporary cross-border services without being first licensed in 
the host state. This affects any licensed profession, including hairdressers and 
cosmetologists.  
In most US states, there is a legal distinction between barbers and cosmetologists, 
but all fifty states require them and most other personal appearance workers to be 
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licensed. In most states, access to the market is governed by the state's health department 
and/or a Board of Cosmetology or Barber Board. In several states, despite being 
considered different professions, the Board of Cosmetology and Barber Board are 
administratively combined. 
Licensing requirements vary greatly from state to state and between hairdressers 
and cosmetologists. In general, a person must, however, have graduated from a state-
licensed barber or cosmetology school. In some states trainees can take apprenticeships, 
which can serve as a substitution for graduation from a licensed school. While usually 
requiring students to pass a written test and demonstrate an ability to perform basic 
barbering or cosmetology services, not all states require applicants to pass a practical 
examination. Some states require graduation from high school, while others require as 
little as an eighth-grade education, to become licensed in the state.  
Most importantly hairdressers are not legally allowed to provide services across 
state borders, even for a day and even if having been licensed in a sister state. Any 
provider needs to first make sure that he or she is also licensed in the state that he or she 
would like to give a haircut or wash hair. As the president of the National Association of 
Barbers Boards of America (NABBA) and member of Ohio’s Barber Board, Howard 
Warner, put it, “I don’t know of any state where you can walk in and not” get approval by 
the local state board of licensing before offering any services (personal interview 2010). 
A similar response was provided by the Texas Department. of Licensing and Regulation 
(TDLR). To practice cosmetology or barbering in the State of Texas a service provider 
first needs to ensure that he or she is licensed by the Texan authorities. As a TDLR staff 
member remarked, “You need to be licensed through the state in order to cut hair, to do 
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nails, to do facials [...] even if this is just one day or just on the weekend” (personal 
interview, November 2010). She went further on to explain that “we get people from all 
over the states [such as Oklahoma or New Mexico] who come here or even other 
countries who already have their licenses, but this is Texas law” and “in order to work in 
this state in that type of field it is required that you have a license from this state” 
(personal interview 2010). 
Thus, it is not surprising that Texas makes sure to strictly enforce its rules. As a 
KSAT 12 News Reporter titled his report of an incident in San Antonio in September 
2010: “Illegal Haircut Operation Found At Flea Market: State Issues Violations to Men 
Cutting Hair At Mission Flea Market” (Mylar 2010). Susan Stanford, spokeswomen of 
the TDLR is quoted saying that “He will not get off with a warning, there’s too many 
violations, and unlicensed activity we take very seriously” (Mylar 2010). The financial 
repercussions can be severe ranging from $500 to $3000 (Mylar 2010). 
Yet, this is not only the situation in Texas, but the general situation in the United 
States. Similar responses were given for instance by the Oregon Health and Licensing 
Agency (OHLA) and the Barber Board of Ohio (BBO). When asked whether licensed 
hairdressers from another state can legally temporarily practice in the state without 
having first been licensed by the host state, the former simply replied “no” while the 
latter emphatically stated that “[t]hey cannot just go out and start barbering! The barber 
laws were set up to serve and protect the public. […] It is not legal, no, no, no” (personal 
correspondence and interview 2010).  
The only way to be able to access another state’s market is to first acquire the host 
state’s license. However, this acquisition and the rules vary largely from state to state and 
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not all states have reciprocity with each other. There is no general policy which eases 
transborder provision of services on which service providers in the US can rely on. No 
complete list of rules and requirements for all states exists. 90 Service providers are 
obliged to always check with the specific state whether and how they can gain access to 
the local market.91 This in itself can represent a significant hurdle for a service provider 
for instance living in a tri-state area. 
In most cases a practitioner cannot even find out in advance whether a state has 
reciprocity with another state or not. Reciprocity is usually not publicly displayed and is 
decided on a case-by-case basis. As again a representative from the TDLR responds when 
asked whether Texas has reciprocity with all 49 other states,  
Not all. Not all. That’s the reason why we specifically ask from which state you 
are coming from. Oklahoma, obviously yes, you see that. Let me give you an 
example one that we do not, there is a list that only we have, that we can see, so 
we ask you specifically where you are coming from – Florida for example, no 
reciprocity, [also no reciprocity for] Illinois, Iowa (personal interview 2010; my 
emphasis). 
The situation is largely similar in Oregon with the exception that OHLA does not 
maintain a specific list: 
OHLA does not have a specific list. When the agency gets a request for 
reciprocity, our staff reviews the type of license the applicant currently holds in 
their home state and compares the standards required there against the Oregon 
standards for the requested license here (personal correspondence 2010). 
The common reason given why reciprocity is not granted automatically to 
licensed practitioners from other states, as is the case in the EU, is that the host state has 
                                                 
90
 BeautyTech, however, maintains a website, with information for many states and professions in the fields 
of personal appearance: http://www.beautytech.com/reciprocity/recip_a.htm 
 
91
 Even professionals in the field of regulations are not sure usually which state has reciprocity with which 
state. Comments, such as “I am not sure exactly which states have reciprocity with other states but there are 
as many as 35 or 36”, were typical (personal correspondence 2010). 
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different training hour requirements than the state from which the practitioner is hailing 
from and that this would endanger the safety of the public. Common responses from the 
authorities were  
If a particular state license is not accepted through reciprocity, the reason for this 
would be that the states training process, or exam process is not the equivalent of 
the Texas requirement for the same license. […] Because a lot of their courses 
and what they take do not match with what we take here, what is required. So the 
requirements are very different. For example we like for an operator to have 1500 
hours of study. They may not. They may only have 600. It can differ. Very 
different, it wouldn’t match ours. So that means they probably would have to take 
courses here to meet our requirements (personal correspondence with TDLR 
2010). 
because we need to ensure they are qualified to practice (personal correspondence 
with OHLA 2010). 
The greatest concern usually is that because of the different training hours, service 
providers from other states simply don’t know basic hygiene and sanitation rules: 
Licensure exists to ensure practitioners are qualified to protect the health and 
safety of the public. […] To prevent the spread of contagious disease and protect 
the health and safety of the public” (personal correspondence with OHLA, 
November 2010). 
“If you went to school in Pennsylvania or in Mexico or India or China or 
wherever, and you only had a 1000 hours, it would not be fair in Ohio to Ohio 
Barbers to give this person a license, because they have 1000 hours, they don’t 
know anything about our sanitation nor health rules or our laws and rules. So we 
require them to go to school for a particular period of time and now if you come 
in here from Pennsylvania and you have 20 years barbering experience or ten year 
or five years and you had the 1250, the Barber Board evaluates that person and 
says yes you can barber in our state. We will give you a test and you can barber in 
our state. We don’t hold them up (personal interview with BBO 2010). 
As especially the latter statement shows, non-tariff barriers to services provision 
and protectionist attitudes abound in the United States. Pennsylvania, one of Ohio’s 
neighboring states, here is considered to be in the same league as Mexico, China and 
India, major developing countries far removed from Ohio. It is argued that Pennsylvania 
residents might simply not be aware of basic sanitation rules as their good neighbors to 
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the east. Indeed, Pennsylvania’s actual 1250 hours of training are considered inadequate 
for understanding sanitation rules and how to cut hair in the Buckeye state, which 
requires 1800 hours of barber training. But then with 20 years of experience as a barber 
in Pennsylvania, the Ohio Barber Board, “handl[ing] each case individually”, might allow 
you to take a test to become licensed without extra courses (personal interview 2010). Of 
course this raises, among others, the question how a practitioner even after 20 years of 
practicing in the Keystone state actually would know the sanitation rules in Ohio. Can a 
Pennsylvania barber who always stayed in his state be assumed to have acquired Ohio’s 
sanitation knowledge through osmosis with time? Moreover if requiring a test, even if 
maybe not anymore any extra training, after 20 years of experience in a neighboring state 
is not holding up market access and is protectionist, what is?  
Now it needs to be kept in mind that these qualification requirements vary much 
more widely in the European Union, where one-third of the countries regulate access to 
the barber profession, such as Germany at one extreme with the requirement of five years 
of training before being allowed to practice independently, and others which do not 
regulate access at all (cf. House of Lords, Sixth report). In the United States the diversity 
is much smaller with all states regulating hairdressers. The training hours for a barber 
vary somewhat substantially from 1000 hours in Washington State to 1800 hours in Ohio 
and Wisconsin, but not close to the divide in Europe, which has made the provision of 
services across borders possible. Yet, in the United States, sister states deny regularly 
access to licensed professionals from other states by not granting any reciprocity. The 
Georgia State Board of Barbers for instance “does not endorse licenses from Alabama, 
California, Washington, D.C, Hawaii, Nevada, Washington or Oklahoma” and “for all 
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other states, endorsement will be granted or denied on an individual basis in accordance 
with the law” (Beautytech 2010). Oregon “does not offer reciprocity to Florida for their 
“special licenses,” which do not require any practical examinations whatsoever (personal 
correspondence with OHLA 2010). The same goes for Ohio, which does not grant 
reciprocity to licensed practitioners from Florida if they did not take a practical 
examination (personal interview 2010). And Arizona as of January 1, 2007, has only 
reciprocity with 27 sister states (Arizona Board of Barbers 2011). Furthermore, 
hairdressers who got licensed in their home state via an apprenticeship, which usually 
requires several hundred hours more than going to a licensed barber school (for example 
Alaska 1650 versus 2000 hours; Maine 1500 versus 2500 hours; Beautytech 2010), also 
have a much harder time to work in another state without going completely back to 
school. As Howard Warner observes, 
We don’t recognize an apprenticeship [in Ohio]. They do 500 hours [in New 
York] and then go into a shop and start working. And in Georgia, let’s say you are 
a barber student in Georgia, they tell you, you got two ways to do it, you can go 
and do an apprenticeship or you can go to a licensed barber school. If you go to 
the barber school, then you can reciprocity into other state. If you do an 
apprenticeship, nobody is going to recognize you, so you are stuck in the state of 
Georgia on apprenticeship (personal interview 2010). 
In short, in cases where there is no reciprocity, licensed professions from other 
states have to take extra courses to make up for the perceived lack of knowledge. But 
even where reciprocity exists, this does not mean automatic access to the local market. 
The granting of reciprocity in general only applies to admitting that the training hours are 
equivalent. States, as the quote from the member of the BBO has already indicated, still 
might require applicants to pass a written and practical test. Moreover, in many cases, 
states still impose additional restrictions, such as criminal background checks, law exams 
and a minimum amount of years of licensed experience, besides requiring the passing of 
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a practical and/or a theoretical exam. In other words, reciprocity only means that the host 
states consider the amount of training equivalent to the one acquired by the practitioner in 
his home state. The host state, however, is free to impose additional conditions for market 
access.  
As the TDLR points out, “part of the reason for licensing is for regulation and for 
criminal background checks” (personal correspondence 2010). Alabama and Idaho only 
grant reciprocity for cosmetologists after proving that in addition to the minimum training 
hours a practitioner from another state has at least respectively “five years of licensed 
experience“ or “practiced for at least three (3) years immediately prior to making 
application” (Beautytech 2010). OHLA additionally notes that “reciprocity between 
states appears to have become more restrictive”. The official reason given for this is that 
“[p]articularly in light of recent concerns related to potential fraud (false qualifications, 
test cheating, etc.) we want to ensure practitioners are who they say they are and can 
perform services on the public safely and effectively” (personal correspondence 2010). 
Increased non-tariff barriers are definitely the case in the Beaver State, where “for 
applicants through reciprocity, we recently established a requirement for out-of-state 
applicants licensed in other states to take and pass the Oregon Laws & Rules examination 
as well as an examination for each field of practice (barbering, esthetics, hair design, nail 
technology) in which they are applying” (personal correspondence 2010).92 It needs to be 
repeated that these are requirements for licensed practitioners from sister states with 
which reciprocity actually exists.  
                                                 
92
 Arkansas also requires for out-of-state licensed practitioner whose written and practical exams are 
recognized via reciprocity to still pass the Arkansas state law exam. Cf. official reciprocity form available 
at: 
http://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/programsServices/hsLicensingRegulation/Cosmetology/Documents/recipr
ocity/ReciprocityRequirements.pdf  
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The arguments typically made here in the United States, i.e. the ensuring of public 
health and safety, to maintain the regulatory barriers for hairdressers have been countered 
in the European Union. Thus, while derogations exist in the services directive for public 
safety and health, they are considered in the case of hairdressers to be either ludicrous or 
disproportionate. To recall, the European Commission has pointed out that a) other 
member states have also an interest in not endangering their public, so if professionals are 
licensed in one state, they should have free access in the other state to deliver temporarily 
services and b) that this hinders economic competition and therefore has an economic 
cost for the entire polity. Indeed, in the US there seems to be a lack of awareness in 
regards of potential costs for service providers.  
While in the European Union no costs are charged for service providers making 
an official declaration with the competent authority in a state where the profession is 
regulated, in the US the costs can be substantial when applying for a license while 
already being licensed in another state. These costs, of course, vary whether reciprocity 
or not exists. If no reciprocity exists, then in most cases an applicant needs to pay for 
additional training hours in addition to any fees charged by the regulatory authority. In 
cases where no reciprocity exist, but no additional hours are required, an applicant 
usually still has to pass an exam or two. This involves travel costs to specific exam sites 
on specific dates. In 2010 Arizona for example only offered exams in two cities, Tuscon 
and Phoenix, on a rotating basis on only eleven occasions throughout the year (Arizona 
Board of Barbers 2010). This complicates market access for out-of-state practitioners 
considerably. In states like Oregon exams, as described above, are even required for those 
applicants with which Oregon has reciprocity. In short, even in cases where reciprocity 
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exists, the costs are far from being non-negligible. A simple filing fee, for instance, for 
the recognition of reciprocity in Arizona costs a barber $175.00 (Arizona Barber Board 
2011). And of course a service provider has to repeat all these steps and pay again if he 
decides to deliver services in a third sister state.  The absurdity of it all can be perceived 
when we imagine a service provider licensed already in 49 states and having been 
practicing non-stop for several decades still being required to pass an exam and pay 
corresponding costs before being allowed to work just for a day in the 50th US state. 
Given that states, such as Oregon, still require exams even in cases where 
reciprocity exists, an applicant cannot be sure that he or she won’t face additional costs, 
besides filing fees, travel expenses for taking the exams, etc., due to failing the test, even 
if having practiced the profession for years in another state. It is difficult to figure out 
what the actual costs are overall for the US economy, given that data is not readily 
available. Nobody in the United States appears to have collected data as regards the 
potential overall economic effects the heterogeneity of rules might have on the services 
sector in general and in the personal appearance sector in particular. 
A very small indication for the potential cost factor for the economy is the number 
of reciprocity applications which have been denied because of not being able to pass the 
required exams in Oregon. Below, Table 2, shows that in the latest biennial 20% of 
licensed service providers in the personal appearance business from out-of-state have 
been denied a license. This number does not include those service providers who did not 
profit from reciprocity in the first place. 
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Table 2: Oregon Personal Appearance Business Reciprocity Applications: 
2009 – 2011 Biennium 
 
OHLA requires that all reciprocity applicants take and pass the state prepared 
examinations before obtaining certification (Source OHLA, personal 
communication 2010) 
Similar in Ohio, Howard Warner talks about a 10% refusal rate for reciprocity 
applications. He states that “we probably get 50 requests [per year] and we probably 
refuse 5” (personal interview 2010). But again these numbers only include practitioners 
who actually ask for reciprocity. It is not clear, how many are not included, because they 
are informed that they cannot apply for reciprocity. Moreover, Warner, who presently 
serves as the president of the NABBA representing over 300,000 barbers, is not aware of 
any national-level, polity-wide data. 
While these numbers of refusal provide some qualitative indications, hard 
quantitative data, to say the least, is hard to come by. Myra Irizarry, Government Affairs 
Manager for the Professional Beauty Association (PBA), the nation’s largest business 
organization of salon professionals representing salons and spas, distributors, 
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manufacturers and licensed professionals, was also not aware of anybody having gathered 
such data and replied that “I apologize, I do not have any data in regards to these 
questions” (personal correspondence 2010). Public authorities, moreover, usually do not 
perceive the existing fees and the heterogeneous rules across the internal market of the 
United States as non-tariff trade barriers and an obstacle to market access. Indeed, 
comments went so far to point out that this research here is on the wrong track: 
Our regulation at the state level is for public safety purposes, not for the economic 
protection of those already licensed to do business in the state. The costs of 
licensing in Oregon are meant to recover the costs of providing the regulatory 
service level necessary to ensure public safety, and no more. Each state sets its 
own standards for licensing. I am concerned that your dissertation may go off 
track if you don't understand that the licensing cost is not a tariff, and why the US 
model is different from the EU's (personal correspondence with OHLA 2010). 
And Howard Warner, president of NABBA, when asked about the overall 
economic impact the present heterogeneity of rules might present, replied “I don’t think 
there even is one truthfully” (personal interview 2010). Yet, when digging a little bit 
deeper, some awareness of the potential costs does exist. Warner himself recalls a 
situation where 
I had an experience just recently where it took 45 days to help somebody in 
Florida. I was so upset that I got a hold of my friend down there, and then they 
pushed the button and got it done. But it was sad, because they were dealing with 
the people that were doing the national testing and they wanted, the man 
graduated 25 years ago from an Ohio barber school and they wanted a transcript 
from that barber school, which had been out of business for 20 years. And they 
would not yield to that (personal interview 2010). 
Thus, while not recognizing that the present system in the United States has any 
economic repercussions, Warner himself got frustrated in this particular case where it 
took 45 days for a licensed professional from his state, who has been practicing for 25 
years, to gain market access in a sister state. What is more, the issue was only being 
resolved after the 45 days because Warner had a friend in the Florida system. Not every 
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applicant will be so lucky in similar circumstances. While not providing any data either, 
the Division of Professional Licensure of the state of Massachusetts at least honestly 
admits on its website that “the current reciprocity system can be a time consuming 
process that reduces professional mobility and delays an otherwise qualified applicant's 
ability to practice where needed” (Massachusetts 2010). In short, contrary to the system 
in place today in the EU, it is impossible to legally test the waters before moving to 
another state in the US. No mutual recognition in any form applies, be it a ‘state of origin 
principle’ or a vaguer obligation of American sister states to respect the right of providers 
to deliver services. 
Conclusion 
A closer comparison of market rules in the European Union and the United States 
for services leads once more results that even many US or EU experts may find 
surprising. Similar to the dynamics present in the public procurement case, the European 
Union ends up with a more liberal internal market regime in services than the United 
States, especially in regards to the provision of temporary services. 
As this chapter has made evident, in contrast to the European Union, in the United 
States today no comparable federal-level rules and general framework exist for 
guaranteeing temporary market access for temporary services providers of regulated 
professions from sister states. In other words, the European Union has adopted a single 
set of coherent rules for exchange in the services and also adopted rules that open 
exchange to competition where the United States so far has not. Non-tariff barriers to the 
provision of services proliferate in the United States.  
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In the United States a service provider, such as a hairdresser, would have to go 
through the courts to demonstrate how specific regulations to another state’s market 
actually pose an access barrier and might not be permissible under the commerce clause 
or the privileges and immunities clause. Of course, such an approach is expensive for 
individual companies and especially for small service providers; an argument which was 
used, as the next chapter will note, by the EU Commission to create the positive services 
regime in Europe. 
In short, providers from regulated professions cannot freely cross state borders in 
the United States and offer their services on a temporary basis in another sister state. 
They need first to be licensed in the host state, too. This licensing, even in the case where 
reciprocity might exist, can be very costly by still requiring from the service providers, 
among other things, to pass several exams and pay substantial licensing fees before 
cutting somebody’s hair for one single day.  
While many US states have entered into reciprocity agreements, these agreements 
vary from state to state, from profession to profession and are not universally applied 
across the entire polity, giving the American internal market the impression of a large 
patchwork quilt. Protagonists in the US either take the present situation for granted or 
deny the presence of any non-tariff barriers with economic consequences due to the 
heterogeneity of regulatory systems. Nobody, as the next chapter will argue in more 
detail, in the US has acted as an agent making the case for services liberalization by 
calculating the potential costs for the American internal market, which undeniably exist. 
Actors, when not denying that barriers exist in the US, either largely don’t tend to realize 
or desire the possibility to actually create services liberalization polity-wide, invoking 
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state rights, or hint strongly at the absence of a federal level actor that could push reform 
through.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
UNTANGLING TRADE BARRIERS: EXPLAINING THE 
DIVERGENCE IN THE SERVICES SECTOR 
“If you went to school in Pennsylvania or in Mexico or India or China or wherever, and 
you only had a 1000 hours [of training], it would not be fair in Ohio to Ohio Barbers to 
give this person a license, because […] they don’t know anything about our sanitation nor 
health rules or our laws and rules.” 
Member of the Ohio Barber Board, interview 2010 
“[I]f you take regulation of the professions, doctors, kinesitherapists, was pretty easy, 
because in a way the massive argument was, what do you expect, […] are the German 
citizens different from the French citizens across the border to the point that they need an 
expertise to be dealt with? So […] you end up with the sole argument that we want to be 
sure that the people are well-trained; okay that’s pretty easy. There is no other reason for 
discrimination.”  
Former Director General of the Legal Service of  
the European Commission, interview 2009 
This chapter will continue the argument that the difference in outcome of market 
centralization and liberalization between the United States and the European Union is 
mainly due to the unique institutional role of the European Commission, which 
incorporates in its institutional DNA a neo-classical economic approach of market 
integration, as well as a different ideological mind-set towards federal-level intervention 
in markets of the populations in the two polities. As the entry quotes already illustrate, 
the European Commission has pushed and actively shaped the present rules for the free 
provision of services by, among other things, taking apart similar arguments proffered in 
the US context to maintain non-tariff barriers to services provision. 
Overall, the European Commission has succeeded in going further than what 
member states asked for at the beginning of the liberalization of services. In fact, the 
Commission has, despite the protests the original Bolkestein draft of the service directive 
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has sparked in certain sectors of the European population and, especially among the EU’s 
two largest member states, France and Germany, succeeded in keeping the principle of 
origins,93 if not in name, but largely in spirit and practice alive for the provision of 
services. Moreover, while business in Europe, especially in the UK, was largely 
supportive of the Commission’s proposals, it did not strongly mobilize in favor of it. The 
lackluster behavior of organized business and the reluctance for further liberalization in 
the services sector by the EU’s two most influential member states undermines 
structuralist-materialist explanations to market integration. Explanations based on 
transaction costs fall short, too, given that mobility rates are much higher in the United 
States than in the European Union and that therefore greater pressure to facilitate trade 
should have at the very least brought about a similar outcome by now in the US. 
Likewise, institutional explanations focusing on the vested interests of member states and 
resources at the federal level cannot account for why in the European Union, in contrast 
to the United States, arguments, such as subsidiarity as a rhetorical cover for protectionist 
business interests, were not successfully mobilized.  
Moreover, despite the protest and the lukewarm response of business to further 
services liberalization, the European Commission, as this chapter will show, appears to 
remain embedded, comparatively, in an overall more permissive environment regarding 
                                                 
93
 The ‘country of origin principle’ is an extension of mutual recognition. According to the principle, 
service providers would be required to respect solely the rules and regulations of their country of 
establishment without being subject to host state’s rules. In short, it is the home state which is responsible 
for the regulation and not the host country where the service will be provided. It is important to note, once 
again, that ‘country of origin principle’ was only proposed for the delivery of temporary services, i.e. 
applicable only in the case of cross-border provision of services without establishment, not for services 
provider planning to establish themselves in another member state. In the later case, as described earlier, 
host country rules were and are still applicable. In addition, the draft also already foresaw a number of 
derogation of which the qualification directive was one. 
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the role of government in market interventions, even if the consequences mean additional 
market liberalization.  
All in all, in the US, not only the absence of leadership or any concerted effort to 
liberalize services, but also a reluctance by actors to turn towards federal level solutions 
and to perceive the entire polity as one single market feature prominently in the 
continuation of non-tariff trade barriers in America. Thus, the European Commission 
with its overarching political objective of a single market emerges here once again as the 
major policy entrepreneur, succeeding in shaving off trade barriers for services, such as 
hairdressers. In the US in contrast the freedom for hairdressers to temporarily provide 
services across state borders remains tangled up in 50 different state regulatory knots. 
European Regime: Commission Pushing the  
Liberal Market Envelope 
So how did we get there? How did the European Union end up with a law that not 
only requires member states to screen their legislation to check whether all requirements 
are necessary and proportionate and, if not, remove it, but also the setting up of a “Point 
of Single Contact (PSC) through which it is possible to identify and complete all 
necessary authorization processes at all levels of government from the comfort of an 
entrepreneur’s own home/office” (Barnard 2008, 323)? While the freedom to provide 
services rest, as described in the previous chapter, on multiple legislative instruments, 
this chapter will mostly focus on the service directive. Indeed, while the directive on the 
recognition of professional qualifications was largely ignored by the media and 
academics, the services directive evoked passionate and sometimes fierce reactions from 
all political quarters. As one EU official commented to me: 
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Yeah, it was very frightening that when it was this debate on the service directive, 
people were not aware that the qualification directive existed and that it covered 
many important things. Because when you ask the average citizen what they want 
from a professional from another country when he comes to your place, [they 
would answer] we want to be sure that he is a good professional. So that is mostly 
the qualification directive and [it] is not the fact that the legal form is this or the 
shareholding structure [has to be] that way. For the average citizen the important, 
the most important aspect again you can imagine is the diploma. But, I cannot 
explain why, there was absolutely no discussion around the qualification 
directive, but everything happened with the service directive, also the idea of 
social dumping, but the social aspect like the salary of the employees it has never 
been in the service directive. It never was in fact. But there was this wave to make 
polemics and to have politicians on this. So the service directive was used for 
something else (personal interview 2010). 
And another EU official noted that the oversight to take into account the 
derogation for qualifications, which might have alleviated at least some concerns not 
linked to worries about social dumping, can be summarized in “two simple words: 
ignorance and polemics!” (personal interview 2010). A view shared largely by Pascal 
Lamy, former EU Commissioner for Trade, who commented at the time of the debate 
over the Bolkestein draft that ‘”plumber-phobia” had been “cunningly manipulated” in a 
way that reminded him of “simply xenophobia”’ (cited in Arnold 2005). This high level 
of polemics finds its expression in the depictions of the secondary literature as well. 
Several authors describe the service directive as “one of the most disputed initiatives of 
secondary legislation in EC history” (Griller 2008, 381), “the legislative hot potato of the 
early twenty-first century” (Barnard 2008, 323), a “trial” and a “story full of personal and 
political drama, false accusations and genuine resentment, aggressive grandstanding and 
painstaking attempts at amicable settlement” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 717). 
Another researcher agrees by highlighting that the “hyperbolic rhetoric consumed 
reasoned analysis of the directive’s provisions and consequences” (Leslie 2009, 3). In 
short, the service directive was either perceived as “a wrecking ball” and a “Trojan horse 
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for increased liberalism in the eyes of opponents”, or as “a white knight that would rescue 
Europe from its inflexible labour market” (Chang et al. 2010, 97; Fritz 2004, 3; cf. 
Arnold 2005).  
Given the high degree of conflict and especially the fact that “[u]ntil then, internal 
market policies had gone mainly unnoticed”, a complete failure of the service directive 
would have been easily imaginable (Schmidt 2009, 847). Consequently, it is even more 
remarkable that the service directive, albeit in a slightly amended form, survived. Indeed, 
while most commentators so far on the service directive have pointed towards the 
differences between the original Bolkestein draft and the final version of the directive, i.e. 
the backpedaling to some degree of the Commission, what gets overlooked is that a) in 
comparison to the US, the EU is much more legally integrated in the service arena and 
that b) while the term ‘country of origin’, at the center of most of the controversy, has 
been removed, the principle and the spirit remains not only in the directive but more 
importantly alive in the eyes of those having drafted and now implementing the directive. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
Despite the huge outcry later on against the Bolkestein draft and the country of 
origin principle, services liberalization started out largely as a low dispute area. In fact, in 
the very early stages the service directive was not very much debated or controversial and 
there was wide consensus that services needed to be opened up more.94 As Chang et al. 
observe, “[t]he drafting of the 2004 Commission proposal was done with little fanfare” 
and only later on “took on greater political significance” (Chang et al. 2010, 98). The 
aspiration to create a single market in services in the European Union, however, has long 
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 The next couple of paragraphs follow closely the description of Bruno de Witte (2007) on “How did 
Services get to Bolkestein and Why?” 
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antecedents and goes all the way back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Besides the four 
fundamental freedoms of goods, people, capital and services, the Treaty of Rome also 
already included in Article 52 the freedom of establishment (today Article 49). Even the 
principle of mutual recognition, which later with the Cassis de Dijon case and the 
Commission policy entrepreneurship led to a new phase of market integration, as 
described in the previous chapter on procurement, was already anchored in Article 57 
(today Article 53) for the recognition of diplomas, an important part of facilitating the 
provision of services across state borders. Furthermore, in 1974 the European Court of 
Justice recognized in two important cases, Reyners Case 2/74 and Van Binsbergen, Case 
33/74, respectively the direct effect of today’s articles 49 and 56 on the freedom of 
establishment and on the freedom to provide services.  
These decisions connote that citizens of EU member states are entitled to be 
treated as nationals and that they can require competent national jurisdictions to apply 
articles 49 and 56 of the EC Treaty. Discriminations on the grounds of nationality are 
thus prohibited, and member states are obliged to modify national rules that restrict these 
two freedoms. Restrictions to be eliminated do include those national rules which are 
indistinctly applicable to domestic and foreign operators if they hinder or render their 
exercise less attractive, with delays and additional costs. Yet, these decisions only 
established a reactionary, instead of proactive, regime where the ECJ and the 
Commission are responsible for ensuring the implementation and the respect of the rules 
in the EU. Thus, while the Commission has the power to open infringement procedures 
against those member states who do not comply with their obligations, it does not create a 
positive services regime with legal clarity. Regulation and practices hindering the free 
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flow of services continued to abound in the member states. Such a system is especially 
expensive for small and medium service providers who do not have the time and 
resources to go to the courts or call upon the Commission to launch an infringement 
procedure against a member state and a specific regulation or practice. In its argument for 
the present-day service directive, the Commission in fact strongly argued that 
“infringements, especially for private citizens and SMEs, can be very slow, heavy-handed 
mechanisms” and “companies can go bankrupt before an infringement case even gets to 
the European Court of Justice”. Hence, the Commission argued that “new structures will 
be needed to create legal certainty, establish clear guidelines as to where mutual 
recognition applies, and improve administrative co-operation across frontiers” 
(Memo/01/5). Furthermore, the Commission noted that while infringements “are an 
essential part of the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaties, and will still be 
necessary in particular cases in order to ensure that the Internal Market rights of citizens 
and business are fully respected”, they are “not alone sufficient to meet the strategic 
objective of creating a well-functioning Internal Market for services”, where “the range 
and scale of the problems identified cannot be addressed by infringements alone” 
(Commission 2004 FAQ). Infringement cases only tend to concentrate on very narrow 
misapplications of EU law and do not eliminate barriers to trade in a more systematic 
way. Thus, while a member state might comply with an ECJ decision, the member state is 
not obliged to and usually doesn’t screen its legislation to ascertain that similar barriers 
don’t exist in other fields. 
In short, while decisions of the European Court of Justice in the 1970s established 
a negative regime of asking member states to stop discriminating, it didn’t point to what 
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needed to be done to facilitate services trade and to ensure a general, broad elimination of 
discriminatory practices. This is somewhat similar to what the situation is in the United 
States today, where an individual service provider might try to go through the court 
system to argue against potential discrimination based on the privileges and immunity 
clause. Yet, the burden of proof in the US today is, as it was at that time in the EU, on the 
individual service provider to demonstrate that a rule or practice is discriminatory.95 The 
burden of proof is not on the state to prove that the rule in place is absolutely necessary 
for some important justification, a justification which needs to be deemed reasonable and 
proportionate by a third actor. 
Indeed, overall, not much really changed with the Van Binsbergen and Reyners 
decisions. Non-tariff barriers to services remained and market integration was uneven, 
with free movement of capital and goods taking the lead while the freedom of services 
limped behind (Chang et al. 2010, 97-98). Lord Cockfield and his cabinet and the Delors 
Commission in general tried to create a single market in the 1980s; the term single 
market being itself a creation of the Single European Act resulting from the Cecchini 
report and the White Paper. As von Sydow, long time Commission official and member 
of Commissioner’s Bangemann cabinet, noted, the term single market was “created by 
us”, the Commission. The idea behind it was to go beyond the original treaties which 
only talked about a reduction of barriers to trade but did not clearly spell out or evoke a 
sense of an area without any barriers to trade at all.96 Thus, the term “single market” 
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 But even then, the EU Commission’s right to launch infringement procedures against member states on 
its own differentiates the US from the EU, where in the former no such institution exist to actively check 
for any non-tariff barriers to trade. 
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 “Das haben wir erst 1987 eingefuegt als Definition des Binnenmarktes, vorher stand im Vertrag nur 
Abschaffung der Hemmnisse gegen den Warenverkehr, Dienstleistungsverkehr, Personenverkehr, und 
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represented a conceptual enhancement, allowing the Commission later on to use it to 
argue against any remaining barriers and to make clear that there is no barriers still to be 
had. Yet, while freedom of services was already mentioned in the White Paper and in the 
Cecchini report and even noted as being as important as trade in goods for the return to 
prosperity of the European economy97, services ended up to not being given as much 
attention as the opening up of goods and public procurement in the 1980s. The focus at 
the time was mostly on the continuation of the already existing practice of creating 
sectoral directives for specific professions in the services arena; one of the earliest being, 
as being described in the next chapter, the freedom to provide services for lawyers across 
state borders. As Schmidt observes, “[t]hough services had been included in the internal 
market programme of 1992, only very few sector-specific directives resulted (such as 
insurance services) from a very long and cumbersome process” (Schmidt 2009, 847). De 
Witte slightly disagrees noting that “there was a fairly large number of services directives 
in the 1990’s”, but the overall effect on service liberalization was still minimal (De Witte 
2007: 5; cf. Craig 2002, 30). Especially Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services, which is technically concerned 
with the free movement of workers in the EU and is “formally a services directive in 
terms of its legal basis” was perceived not to “facilitate the free movement of services (as 
its legal basis requires) but hinder it”, given that “this directive forces [firms] to comply 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kapitalverkehr. Die Definition des Ziel eines Binnenmarktes ohne interne Grenzen, das ist ’87 in der 
Einheitlichen Europaeischen Akte aufgrund des Weissbuchs nachgeschoben“ (personal interview 2009). 
 
97
 In paragraph 95 of the White Paper, Lord Cockfield’s team wrote that “it is no exaggeration to see the 
establishment of a common market in services as one of the main preconditions for a return to economic 
prosperity. Trade in services is as important for an economy as trade in goods” (COM (85) 310 final). 
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with two different sets of labour law rules (those of their country of establishment and 
those of the country where they post workers)” (De Witte 2007, 5; emphasis in original). 
Indeed, except in certain professions such as doctors and lawyers, into the 2000s 
the free movement of services, either by free provision of services across frontiers or 
freedom of establishment in another member state, remained largely to be instituted only 
as non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. In practice these principles were still 
coming into conflict with national regulations with which those providing services had to 
comply and which differed significantly from one country to another. As stated by De 
Witte, “[t]here was a strong suspicion [within the European Commission] that the 
European Court of Justice, in its case-law, only dealt with the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg and that most impediments to trade in services remained hidden under the 
surface” (De Witte 2007, 6). The Commission frequently was unable to identify all of 
these “humanly and economically obnoxious impediments” to services trade “because the 
individual persons or firms suffering from those restrictions failed to take legal action, 
and because national courts, when confronted with such cases, failed to enforce the 
Treaty and/or to refer preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice” (De Witte 
2007, 5). That the sectoral approach to service liberalization as part of the 1992 Single 
Market Program wasn’t sufficient also found its expression in an increase in ECJ court 
cases in the in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when in the five year period from 2000 to 
2005 the ECJ decided on “3.5 times as many cases” related to services than during the 
previous five year period (140 cases versus 40 cases) (Hatzopoulos and Do 2006, 923). 
While it is not clear, whether this increase in cases is ”fortuitous” or whether it  either 
“indicates a growing awareness of long-existing restrictions to services trade” or maybe a 
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reflection of an actual increase of trade impediments in member states’ regulations, the 
important thing is that, in the eyes of the Commission, the latter two explanations “can 
serve as arguments for replacing the judicial approach with a comprehensive legislative 
approach covering all barriers to services trade” (De Witte 2007, 6). The opportunity for 
the Commission to embark upon further services liberalization arrived at the start of the 
new millennium. 
At the special European Council summit in Lisbon in March 2000, the heads of 
governments and states launched the Lisbon agenda, setting a “new strategic goal for the 
next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion” (Presidency Conclusions 2000; emphasis in original). This new agenda, 
by noting that “[t]he services sector is underdeveloped, particularly in the areas of 
telecommunications and the Internet”, called upon the Commission to come up with “a 
strategy for the removal of barriers to services” (Presidency Conclusions 2000). Yet, the 
Lisbon agenda itself was the direct result of the continuous prodding of member states by 
the European Commission. As Hywel Ceri Jones notes, the Lisbon agenda can be 
carefully traced back, through the series of previous European summits, directly to 
former Commission President Jacques Delors’ 1993 White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century 
(COM(93)700) (Jones 2005, 2). The 1993 White Paper served as “the launching point for 
the structural reform agenda which was needed to turn around the massive unemployment 
crisis which had been undermining the very fabric of European society” (Jones 2005, 2). 
It helped to provide “[a] new collective sense of urgency […] at the highest level to drive 
 243 
 
 
an across-the-board agenda of systematic change and help[ed to] create the conditions for 
a more competitive and cohesive Europe on the global stage” (Jones 2005, 2). In fact, for 
Jones, the Commission and especially Jacques Delors were the crucial actors: 
President Delors had the courage, conviction and vision to take the lead on these 
issues. His White Paper sought to put in place a combination of policies for the 
structural reform of the labour market and stability-oriented macroeconomic 
policies designed to stimulate economic growth. […] Armed with charts to 
illustrate the demographic challenges that lay ahead, Jacques Delors challenged 
the European Council to get its act together and commit itself to introducing 
radical reforms required both within individual Member States and at European 
level. Within the Commission, through sheer graft and his personal leadership and 
drive, President Delors had obliged the different Directorates-General to 
collaborate actively in building the White Paper and in setting out a long-term, 
inter-sectoral vision of the problems and possible solution. I was privileged to be 
a member of the core team he set up to coordinate this process within the 
Commission (Jones 2005, 2–3). 
In other words, the 2000 Lisbon Summit was only the moment when the 
European heads of state had finally “agreed […] to take ownership of the project” 
previously proposed by the Commission (Jones 2005, 8). Jones further notes that, 
“[a]lthough Europeans are undoubtedly sympathetic to Lisbon’s overall objectives, they 
have not been engaged in the process and the press is correspondingly disinterested” 
(Jones 2005, 8). Consequently, [t]he lack of public debate means that there is no bottom-
up pressure for the achievement of Lisbon’s goals” (Jones 2005, 8). This puts the 
Commission squarely at the center of the run-up to the Lisbon agenda and the subsequent 
market reforms in the services sector.  
Moreover, while giving the Commission a new official opening to tackle services 
liberalization in a new, much more far-reaching way, the call issued by the member states 
at the Lisbon summit, as De Witte clearly points out, was only an extension of the 
existing sectoral policy the member states have been accustomed to so far. The EU 
member states only “asked for the continuation of the sector-specific approach to internal 
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market legislation”, focusing in particular on three areas: electronic commerce; the 
services of general economic interest (gas, electricity, postal services and transport); and 
financial services” (De Witte 2007, 2). It didn’t represent a sea change. There was “no 
trace at all of the idea of a general directive on services” (De Witte 2007, 2). The member 
states did not ask for or foresee a horizontal approach to services liberalization, which 
would encompass all remaining services sector in one broad directive. They also did not 
demand and anticipate the transformation of mutual recognition into the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. Indeed, the idea of a directive which supplements the classic sectoral 
approach to services policy with a more comprehensive across the board approach, seen 
as “more closely reflect[ing] the way the real economy now works”, did not appear in any 
previous EU documents, such as the Commission’s Strategy for Europe’s Internal 
Market in 1999 (De Witte 2007, 2; Memo/01/05). It was the Bolkestein draft directive on 
services which was going to change that. 
By combining a horizontal approach and transforming, or better, extending the 
mutual recognition principle to services, the Commission undertook a ‘radical shift’ in 
market integration, what some commentators called a “bold directive”, “the most radical 
directive ever to address the single market for services”, “a ‘legal revolution’, or put it in 
softer terms, a major discontinuity in internal market law” (De Witte 2007, 1; Nicolaïdis 
and Schmidt 2007, 722). Undeniably, the Commission went further in the understanding 
of mutual recognition and the freedom of markets than other EU institutions, such as the 
European Court of Justice. Nicolaïdis and Schmidt note that “the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) balked at applying [mutual recognition] to services” (Nicolaïdis and 
Schmidt 2007, 719). And De Witte agrees by observing that 
 245 
 
 
This ‘regulatory competition part of the Bolkestein draft was more problematic, 
because, unlike the administrative simplification part, it represented a substantive 
shift compared to the ECJ’s case law, and compared to the Commission’s own 
approach in drafting internal market legislation. The case law of the European 
Court of Justice does not challenge, as a matter of principle, the application of the 
host country’s laws and regulations. The principle of mutual recognition, as 
adopted by the Court, simply meant that the host state must take into account the 
laws and regulations to which the service provider is subject in its home state, so 
as not to create unjustified double burdens. This is not the same thing as 
imposing, as a matter of principle, the application of the laws of the country of 
origin (De Witte 2007, 8). 
While both elements, ‘country of origin principle’ and horizontal legislative 
approach, have been applied before, it was especially the combination of the two, which 
turned out to be radical in the case of services liberalization (cf. Leslie 2009, 5). The 
horizontal approach had for instance already been employed in the public procurement 
directives as well as in the earliest general system directives on the recognition of 
qualifications, the precursors to the 2005 qualifications directive (cf. De Witte 2007, 4). 
The ‘country of origin principle’, on the other hand, was to a certain degree already 
employed in the Directive 89/552/EEC ‘Television without Frontiers’ and the Directive 
2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce (cf. De Witte 2007, 8; Leslie 2009, 5). But in these 
cases, the effect of the ‘country of origin principle’ was mitigated by the fact that “it was 
counterbalanced by an amount of harmonization which reduced the discrepancy between 
the laws of the home and host countries” (De Witte 2007, 8). This time, however, instead 
of focusing on a specific sector, the Commission was proposing a draft which would 
apply to a large range of services “without an attempt at listing those services (unlike 
what happens in the context of GATS)” (De Witte 2007, 8). The service directive would 
thus apply to all services activities and sectors that are not expressly excluded from its 
scope of application. The Commission calculated that this would encompass 
approximately 50 percent of GDP and 86% of the EU firm population (COM(2004)2 
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final: 6). Moreover, the Commission proposed in the case of temporary delivery of 
services “the much more radical idea that these services providers should in principle be 
regulated by the state of origin and not by the host state (Article 16 of the draft)” (De 
Witte 2007, 7; emphasis in original). The Commission this time did not include in the 
draft any harmonization propositions related to non-market concerns, such as cultural 
diversity in regards to broadcasting services. The only exceptions allowed for were 
derogations for public policy, public security, public health. These were, however, much 
more restrictive than “the general interest grounds for restriction recognized by the ECJ 
in its ‘mandatory requirements’ case-law, and could be seen to replace the Treaty-based 
grounds of derogation recognized by the ECJ” (De Witte 2007: 9; emphasis in original). 
This leads De Witte to conclude that the Commission here tilted the regulatory balance 
“away towards deregulation with only a little amount of re-regulation” and that non-
market values were not seen anymore “as positive objects for Community regulation, as 
they used to be in the earlier sector-specific approach”, but “were thus exclusively seen 
as grounds of derogation, to be rolled back as far as possible” (De Witte 2007: 8 – 9).  
To reiterate, the Commission with its draft proposal went further than the other 
major actors in the European Union by pushing liberalization of markets as far as 
possible. Indeed,  
[t]his important regulatory shift […] formed a distinct example of Commission 
entrepreneurship, since it has been advocated neither by the other EU institutions 
nor by major interest groups. It was the Commission’s own invention […] (De 
Witte 2007, 9; emphasis in original). 
My own interviews confirm De Witte’s assessment that the regulatory shift was 
largely the Commission’s own invention. Commission officials don’t see the regulatory 
shift as any “original idea” per se, but simply as an extension of principles already tested 
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in other directives and an attempt to box in member states as much as possible in their 
potential to maintain non-tariff barriers to services. In short, the interviews showed that 
the ‘country of origin principle’  
was drafted by the European Commission and my colleagues at the time. I was 
not there at the time, but it was my unit. When the people did this, it was people 
who work on the field of services, because there was already the e-commerce 
directive that was dealing with this question and enshrining the country of origin 
principle (personal interview 2010). 
The Commission staff transferred an idea born and applied in the e-commerce, 
and other similar directives, to the directive on services. The Commission, in sum, took 
initiative here, not by completely pulling something new out of thin air, but making 
creative use of an already established principle somewhere else. Commission officials in 
the interviews went out of their way to emphasize that the ‘country of origin principle’ 
for them was “only a kind of codification of the jurisprudence of the court” and actually 
not very creative at all (personal interview 2010). As a Commission colleague put it, “it’s 
not very original” (personal interview 2010). For the Commission officials, the ‘country 
of origin principle’ was simply an arch, a continuation of previous developments. Thus, 
an official contended that “it started with goods and Cassis de Dijon; it’s mutual 
recognition, mutual recognition and country of origin are very similar” (personal 
interview 2010). Yet the same official, when asked again about where the principle came 
from, hinted that the principle was not completely the same as mutual recognition, noting 
that the intent of it was  
to impose member states to own up. If member states had applied mutual 
recognition the way they should have, mutual recognition is that they must 
double-check what is already checked in another member state. So if the member 
states had done it, then there wouldn’t have been the need for the principle of 
origins. The principle of origins was kind of reversing the proof” (personal 
interview 2010). 
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Thus, similar to the situation when the Commission decided after the 1979 Cassis 
de Dijon decision that mutual recognition was the valid legal situation (cf. Alter and 
Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994), the Commission here again simply took the ‘country of origin 
principle’ as given and presented it as well-established. Von Sydow, former Commission 
official and member of Commissioner Bangemann’s cabinet,98 traces a direct line of the 
Commission activity of creating a philosophy of mutual recognition and country of origin 
by simple fiat. As he notes  
In the philosophy of Cassis de Dijon, in the philosophy, we first originally 
assumed, all people first assumed that the host country rules would always apply. 
I Germany, I was importer, may determine what technical rules can be imposed. 
But with Cassis de Dijon we changed it into the country of origin principle. If the 
goods have been legally manufactured and marketed in France, then it must 
therefore also be the country of origin principle. […] The Cassis de Dijon and the 
country of origin principle have been interpreted by the Commission as being the 
legal situation. The term ‘mutual recognition’ is not mentioned in the Cassis de 
Dijon decision. A year and a half later an interpreting communication was sent 
around stating that the decision also said that as long there is no harmonization, 
we have to do mutual recognition instead of harmonization. […] In this case the 
Commission has been extremely important, because it was the Commission that 
has pushed and pretended that this is the valid legal situation. […] Then we tried 
to put it into to place in the area of taxation, valued added tax, but then we also 
transferred it to services. […] Host country principle for those such as lawyers or 
doctors who want to permanently establish themselves in France. But somebody 
who only wants to cut hair once a week or who only creates architectural 
drawings, in these cases it is more than sufficient to be regulated only by the 
home country. We developed this to a philosophy via the Cassis de Dijon from 
several court decisions” (personal interview 2010; own translation; my emphasis). 
99
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 Bangemann was Internal Market Commissioner between 1989 and 1995 and then Commissioner for 
Industrial affairs, Information & Telecommunications Technologies from 1995 to 1999. 
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 In der Philosphie Cassis de Dijon, in der Philosophie gingen wir urspruenglich davon aus, gingen alle 
Leute davon aus, das immer das Bestimmungsland die Regeln aufstellt. Ich Deutschland ich war Einfuehrer 
kann festlegen wie die technischen Reglen sind. Ueber Cassis de Dijon haben wir das umgeaendert ins 
Ursprungslandprinzip. Wenn die Ware im Urlandssprungland Frankreich rechtmaessig hergestellt und in 
Verkehr gebracht worden ist, dann muss auch also Ursprungslandprinzip. [...] Cassis de Dijon und 
Ursprungslandprinzip, dass ist also Rechtssprechung interpretiert durch die Kommission. Cassis de Dijon, 
im Urteil steht das Wort gegenseitige Anerkennung gar nicht drin. Das Urteil war anfangs gar nicht, 
anderthalb Jahre spaeter eine interpretirierende Mitteilung gehaben und gesagt haben, das Urteil sagt ja 
auch, solange nicht harmonisiert ist, muss statt Harmonisierung machen wir gegenseitige Anerkennung. 
[...]In diesem Falle ist die Kommission sehr wichtig gewesen, weil sie das sehr gepuscht hat und so getan 
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This shows that the Commission was in the position to raise the stakes and had 
not only done so in the case of Cassis de Dijon but again in the case of services 
liberalization and the ‘country of origin principle’. Thus, while the “Heads of States 
assert the teleological credo of the need to complete the single market”, it is then the 
Commission that “takes the politicians at their word, in fact ‘upping the ante’ by 
proposing a radical generalization of the Court’s approach in pursuit of the completion of 
the single market for services” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 721). 
Moreover, Michel Petite, former Director General of the Legal Service of the 
European Commission and member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet in the 1980s, admits that 
in the case of services “the non-discrimination argument was pushed very far” (personal 
interview 2009). The ‘country of origin principle’ is based on leading restrictive 
arguments based on the difference between goods and services ad absurdum. Gérard 
Cornilleau, a deputy director of the French Economic Observatory (Observatoire français 
des conjonctures économiques, OFCE), for instance explained in an interview with Le 
Monde that it is different whether a customer buys a piece of clothing, which quality he 
can assess beforehand, and a haircut, which quality can only be assessed afterwards.100 
                                                                                                                                                 
hat als ob es Rechtslage ist. [...]Das haben wir dann bei im Steuerbereich, Mehrwertsteuer usw. 
hinzukriegen, aber das haben wir dann auch auf Dienstleistungenuebertragen. Es gab einige Urteile, die 
Cassis de Dijon, die haben das zur einer Philosophie verbracht. Bestimmungslandprinzip jemand fuer ewig 
nach Frankreich als Rechtsanwalt oder als Arzt muss sich dort, muss die dortigen Regeln befolgen. Aber 
jemand der nur fuer einmal pro Woche Haare schneidet, oder Architektenzeichnungen anfertigt, da reicht 
es ja dass er Zuhause zugelassen ist. Das haben wir zur einer Philosophie entwickenlt aus verschiedenen 
ueber Cassis de Dijon aus verschiedenen Rechtsurteile“ (personal interview 2010). 
 
100
 "Gérard Cornilleau : Il y a à cela une raison très simple, c'est qu'autant il est assez facile, quand il s'agit 
d'un bien, par exemple un vêtement, de vérifier sa qualité avant de l'acheter, de vérifier qu'il correspond 
bien à ce que le consommateur souhaite avant de l'acheter, pour les services, ce n'est pas le cas. Vous ne 
savez que votre coiffeur est bon qu'après qu'il vous a coupé les cheveux. Il y a donc une asymétrie des 
informations à propos des services entre productur et consommateur qui justifie une meilleure 
réglementation des services que des biens" (LeMonde 2006) 
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But in the eyes of Michele Petite, this difference is not only minimal but can also to a 
certain extent be put ad absurdum: 
The counterfactual to this, if you take regulation of the professions, doctors, 
kinesitherapists, was pretty easy, because in a way the massive argument was, 
what do you expect, in a way, are the German citizens different from the French 
citizens across the border to the point that they need an expertise to be dealt with? 
So you take it by the absurd in a way and you end up with the sole argument but 
we want to be sure that the people are well-trained; okay that’s pretty easy. There 
is no other reason for discrimination (personal interview 2009). 
In short, the Commission emphasized that it can be safely assumed that hair in 
France is not to be expected to be much different from hair in Belgium or Germany: 
Thus, a hairdresser which is trained and/or regulated or had at least a couple of years 
experience in the profession should be able to provide services temporarily across state 
borders without any further ado. Any remaining regulation to hinder such service 
provisions can generally be assumed as discrimination. The Commission’s strong liberal 
market stance found its echo in the debates surrounding the services draft in the British 
parliament. Not surprisingly the British parliament and government greatly welcomed the 
Bolkestein draft. The 6th report to the British House of Lords states that “[t]he United 
Kingdom Government takes the Commission's view that as much of the essential 
legislation that protects citizens and consumers is already harmonised at European Union 
level, the Country of Origin Principle is a realistic legal basis for delivering free 
movement of services on a temporary basis” (6th report, Section 87). The House of Lords 
agreed, affirming that “[w]e believe that the Country of Origin Principle is a realistic 
legal base for temporary service provision in any Member State” and that “[w]e are not 
convinced that health and safety should be exempted from the Country of Origin 
Principle”, especially given that “the economic benefits from applying the Country of 
Origin Principle temporary service provision as set out in the Commission's draft 
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Directive are greater than the threat to UK health and safety standards”. It is particularly 
small and medium enterprises that “will benefit from the application of the Country of 
Origin Principle which will enable them to effectively test the water in another Member 
State on a temporary basis, without having to fully commit to permanent establishment” 
(6th report, Sections 106–7 and 112). 
Yet, not only did the British government and parliament welcome the new 
services liberalization and echoed the Commission’s argument that the benefits are the 
greatest for small and medium enterprises, but also the Commission’s point that opening 
up services to hairdressers or architects does not endanger the general population: 
151. In general the UK Government takes a relaxed or consumer-focused 
approach to the issue of quality assurance. […] the UK Government are content to 
allow consumers to determine quality. So for instance, in the United Kingdom it 
is not necessary to have a relevant qualification to set up in business as a 
hairdresser. The UK's approach to quality assurance in this case would be that if 
in fact the hairdresser knows little of hairdressing, it is likely that their haircuts 
will be of poor quality and the salon is unlikely to prosper.  
152. By contrast in Germany, a hairdresser must, in order to call themselves a 
Friseur (hairdresser), have had an extensive training. Therefore, it is relatively 
unlikely that a poor haircut will be sold, but the price may be higher (this effect 
may apply particularly in professions where training requirements severely 
restrict entry). There is of course no necessary link between the higher price and 
better quality of the haircut, and the UK Government are content to let the 
consumer decide which hairdresser to patronise. The Institute for Chartered 
Surveyors made a similar point with regard to the service provision of architects: 
"A more liberalised market such as already exists in the UK and Ireland will not 
lead to a lowering of standards or put the public interest at risk. It is clear, for 
example, that buildings in the UK and Ireland are no less safe than those 
designed, constructed and maintained elsewhere in the EU (RICS) (6th report).  
This open and strong support for services liberalization was not an isolated case. 
At the onset the Commission was acting in a relative permissive environment, not least 
because services liberalization was “one of the few potential ‘hard law’ elements” in the 
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Lisbon agenda (De Witte 2007, 2). Yet, the Commission started out carefully and 
somewhat surreptitiously in pushing its market liberalization agenda and introducing the 
combination of the two elements, which later on were regarded as a radical shift in 
market integration: the horizontal approach and the extension of the mutual recognition 
principal. The two elements were introduced more and more prominently over a series of 
documents. Nonetheless the intent to approach services liberalization in only this radical 
way was a foregone conclusion, emerging for the very first time in the internal market 
strategy paper for services published December 29, 2000 as a response to the European 
Council’s call earlier that year at the Lisbon summit. Observers, however, might be 
excused for not noticing it right away, given that the horizontal approach was only 
mentioned as a possibility and the extension of mutual recognition to services not at all in 
the main part of the document. Under the headline “A targeted harmonization to tackle 
the remaining barriers” the Commission first gave the impression that harmonization will 
largely be limited to the usual sector-specific approach, before proceeding to suggest that 
“[i]f the barriers identified are horizontal in nature (common to several sectors or having 
consequential effect on the provision of other service activities), a horizontal legislative 
instrument and specific harmonisation measures will be needed” (COM(2000) 888, 11). 
In the Annex of the document, however, the Commission “was rather more sanguine” 
(De Witte 2007: 3). Here the Commission asserts that “[f]or barriers which are horizontal 
in nature, an instrument will be proposed containing […] [t]argeted harmonisation of 
requirements affecting several sectors” as well as “[a] mechanism to ensure that the 
Internal Market can be used by all European service providers as their domestic market, 
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notably through the efficient application of the principle of mutual recognition” (COM 
(2000) 888, 15; my emphasis).  
To say the least, Commission clearly put the cart before the horse by proposing 
already the remedy before identifying officially the barriers to services trade and what 
solutions this might necessitate. De Witte put it best by observing that this “indicates that 
the Commission had a pre-conceived view of the matter: even before it had accomplished 
the comprehensive analysis of existing barriers (to be undertaken in 2001), it already 
indicated what would be one of its main consequences: the proposal of global legal 
instrument to deal with those barriers” (De Witte 2007, 3; my emphasis). Given the 
Commission’s clear premeditation, it is unsurprising that the comprehensive analysis 
leading to an update of the market strategy paper in 2003 (COM(2003) 238) came to the 
conclusion “that a general legal instrument was indeed necessary to sweep away the 
cross-sector barriers to trade in services” (De Witte 2007, 3).  
When the Commission finally submitted its draft proposal (COM(2004) 2), which 
now openly included a horizontal approach to services liberalization combined with the 
‘country of origin principle’, on January 13, 2004, it was still at first largely welcomed. 
The draft was published “after it had received approving nods from the Council and the 
Parliament and from a number of interest groups” (De Witte 2007, 3). This was 
consistent with the support given by all the major actors to the Commission over the four 
previous years in regards to service liberalization. Thus, the Commission received “’full 
support’ of all the relevant actors of the EU (the Council, European Parliament, 
Economic and Social Committee, and Committee of Regions” for the 2000 internal 
market strategy paper for services, already suggesting, as pointed out above, a horizontal 
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approach to services liberalization (Chang et al. 2010, 98). As De Witte concurs, “[t]he 
idea of a ‘new deal for services’ had received the backing of the other European 
institutions, most importantly of the European Council”, when the European Council 
included services as “one of the few potential ‘hard elements’” in its Lisbon agenda (De 
Witte 2007, 2). The support for the horizontal approach in the words of Chang et al. was 
“unanimous” and “consistent” throughout the years following the Lisbon summit (Chang 
et al. 2010, 98 and 103). Nicolaïdis and Schmidt agree that “a horizontal approach was in 
fact consensual across EU institutions and member states” and that after “consult[ing] 
with national ministries over a period of two years”, the “national bureaucrats seemed to 
be more or less on [Bolkestein’s] wavelength” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 722). The 
European Parliament in 2003 even urged “that the Competitiveness Council reaffirm 
Member States’ commitment to the country of origin and mutual recognition principles, 
as the essential basis for completing the internal market in goods and series [...] 
welcome[ing] the proposals for a horizontal instrument” (European Parliament 
Resolution, January 13, 2003; cf. Chang et al. 2010, 99). This latter statement by the 
European Parliament indicates that even the EP was generally in favor of the horizontal 
approach and the accompanying ‘country of origin principle’.  
Why all of a sudden then the perception that the Bolkestein draft “had a chance of 
a “snow ball in the fire” of getting through” as expressed by Bolkestein’s successor, 
Charles McCreevy (cited in Kubosva 2006; cf. Mallinder 2006)? Protests against the 
draft started less than five months after its initial publication. On June 4, 2004, trade 
unions in Belgium demonstrated against the draft (cf. Fritz 2004, 4). The protests, 
“attended by about 5,000 people”, were supported by “a broad coalition of left-wing 
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political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with the lead taken by the 
two largest trade union confederations - the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions 
(Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens/Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond, CSC/ACV) 
and the Belgian General Federation of Labour (Fédération Générale du Travail de 
Belgique/Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond, FGTB/ABVV” (European Industrial 
Relations Observatory 2004). Trade unions in Finland similarly expressed their concerns 
about the draft directive at that time (European Industrial Relations Observatory 2004). 
At the heart of the protests was the notion that the ‘country of origin principle’ was an 
“usurpation of identity” of mutual recognition, i.e. the stripping down of mutual 
recognition “to its bare bones” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 717). The fear among 
protestors on the left was that the principle would “result in service employers locating 
themselves in countries with the lowest fiscal, social and environmental requirements and 
subsequently extending from this base their activities throughout the whole of the EU” 
(European Industrial Relations Observatory 2004). This position was, among others, 
echoed by Marco Rizzo, Member of the European Parliament for the Party of Italian 
Communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, PdCI), who considered the draft proposal “a 
fatal blow to the quality of life in the European Union” (Rizzo 2004). According to him 
and many others on the political left, “the danger lies in the by no means remote 
possibility of its providing a legal incentive for private companies to re-locate in 
countries with the most permissive fiscal, social and environmental requirements” with 
the consequence that “the new principle, once it became European law, would exert a 
strong downwards pressure on countries whose standards at present guarantee and protect 
the general interest” (Rizzo 2004).  
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The Commission was completely taken by surprise “by the vehemence of the 
opposition to the proposal” (European Industrial Relations Observatory 2004). The 
surprise is somewhat understandable, given that only months before the support for the 
service directive was broad and the Bolkestein directive included important derogations, 
last but not least in regards to qualifications and the posted workers directive. The 
Commission’s proposal clearly states that “[f]or the sake of consistency with that 
directive [Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services], Article 17 of this proposal for a Directive contains a derogation 
from the country of origin principle where these rules are concerned” (COM (2004) 2, 
13) In short, the services directive was not going to eliminate the rules established with 
the previous Posted Workers Directive. The same rules for posted workers, in contrast to 
self-employed workers, would still apply. Thus, a services company sending workers to 
another EU member state would still need to fully comply with that host state’s 
employment laws, including minimum wage laws. The Commission stated “emphatically 
that the proposal will not: allow social dumping by bringing in 'cheap' workers (European 
Industrial Relations Observatory 2004).  
Yet, the resistance against the services directive took on its own dynamics and the 
largely permissive environment for the Commission seemed to vanish. Chang et al. 
provide three possible and interrelated explanations for this shift from an environment of 
broad support to the emergence of sudden resistance in 2004. They distinguish between 
explanations relating to Eastern enlargement, ideas and domestic politics and institutions. 
First, the publication of the draft directive did indeed coincide with the EU’s 
largest enlargement to this day. The trade union protests in Belgium took place only a 
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month after the official admission of the new and generally largely poorer Eastern 
European countries. In the minds of Nicolaïdis and Schmidt “[t]here is little doubt that 
the EU’s biggest enlargement since its inception conditioned the reactions to the services 
proposal” (Nicholaidis and Schmidt 2007, 724). Trade unions feared that with the 
admission of so many poorer and less regulated member states, the services directive 
would clearly lead to the undermining of Western welfare states. The fact that there was a 
derogation for the posted workers directive was largely overlooked. Moreover, for three 
countries (Denmark, Germany and Sweden) were the host state control principle 
established in the posted workers directive was largely meaningless, the problem was not 
the service directive, but these countries’ unwillingness to enact minimum wage 
legislation.101 As Chang et al. correctly note, “[i]t was totally lost on EP legislators and 
many others that this impact has nothing to do with Bolkestein” and that “[t]hese effects 
[…] were solely due to the combination of enlargement and the absence of minimum 
wages in those countries” (Chang et al. 2010, 104–5).  
Second, Chang et al. highlights the role that ideology, in particular the 
demonization of the services directive played. They observe that “the impact of 
globalization on national social models found in western European countries had already 
caused much concern among governments and citizenry” (Chang et. al. 2010, 104). 
Hence the debate surrounding the services directive ended up to “emphasize the neo-
liberal tendencies of the EU” instead of “the merits of the proposal and likely effects on 
the economy and domestic labour” (Chang et al. 2010, 104). The anti-globalization mood 
                                                 
101
 As decided in Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, collective agreements as practiced in 
the three countries cannot be assumed to have automatically an universal application within the country. A 
clear declaration is necessary. Therefore, a specific rate of pay agreed on in a collective bargaining 
agreement cannot be considered to constitute a minimum rate of pay within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) 
of Directive 96/71 which member States are entitled to impose, pursuant to that directive.  
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was exacerbated by external circumstances, such as the French referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty and Eastern enlargement, which “made questions regarding the 
nature of the European economy and the European social model particularly relevant and 
prone to manipulation for short-term political purposes” (Chang et al. 2010, 104).  
The authors further note the absence of a successful and complete cognitive shift 
in the EU in regards to the free movement of services. As Chang et al. remark “change in 
beliefs is far from automatic, and the ability of knowledge-based experts to form an 
epistemic community and influence policy makers makes policy shift more likely” 
(Chang et al. 2010, 103). This time around, as will be noted more in detail below, the 
Commission and other epistemic communities provided compelling economic evidence 
too little, too late, to convince all doubters within member states of the overall benefits of 
the services draft to maintain the broad consensus once the draft was out.  
The third and favored explanation by Chang et al. involves the rapidly developing 
political situations in France and Germany. According to the authors, the domestic 
politics explanation for the sudden change in support of the services directive is the “most 
compelling” because “[w]hile explanations relating to ideas and eastern enlargement shed 
light on some of the long-term trends that were present during this time, only a domestic 
political explanation can account for the different reactions of the member states” (Chang 
et al. 2010, 106). Both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder faced important elections in 
the months after the publication of the Bolkestein draft. On France’s national holiday, 
July 14th, only 6 months after the draft proposal’s publication and two months after 
enlargement, Chirac announced that his government would hold a referendum in the 
following year on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Le Monde 2005). 
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While expecting to win, the campaign quickly turned out to be very divisive with 
opponents to the Constitutional Treaty latching onto “the discomfort of voters regarding 
the 2004 enlargement, playing on the prospect of Polish plumbers taking away French 
jobs as Anglo-Saxon-style capitalism took over” (Chang et al. 2010, 105; cf. Nicolaïdis 
and Schmidt 2007). To salvage the campaign and to deflect criticism away from the 
Constitutional Treaty, Chirac diverted “attention towards the Services Directive, 
attacking it on similar grounds and claiming to be the defender of the French social 
model” (Chang et al. 2010, 105). By forcing new parliamentary elections by September 
2005 through an orchestrated no confidence vote, Chancellor Schröder put himself in a 
similar situation and found a similar solution. While originally supporting the Bolkestein 
draft, Schröder changed tune when faced with the upcoming general election deciding his 
political future. To enhance his re-election chances, Schröder decided to move away from 
his centrist, economic policies, the so-called “Die Neue Mitte”, and move towards the 
leftist base by now positioning “himself as the protector of Germany’s social model and 
denounce[ing] the directive” (Chang et al. 2010, 105). The permissive environment for 
the Commission had clearly changed. 
While certainly the domestic developments and volte-face taking place in the two 
countries making up the moteur d’intégration, have been central, the Commission, for its 
part, also did not completely succeed to rebuild the permissive environment and rather 
tended to hunker down instead of going on the offensive. According to Chang et al., “the 
Commission played a relatively muted role” after the draft’s publication (Chang et al. 
2010, 110). Partially this appears to be due to a change in the leadership at the top of the 
DG Internal Market and Services, when Bolkestein was replaced by McCreevy in 
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November 2004 with the new incoming Barroso Commission. Günter Verheugen, 
Commissioner for Enlargement and then for Enterprise and Industry, serving in both 
Prodi’s and Barroso’s Commission, accused his colleague of “not working hard enough 
to sell the proposal” (Mallinder 2006). Likewise Nicolaïdis and Schmidt observe that 
McCreevy “opted for a low profile” and that the “[c]entrality for the Lisbon agenda was 
thus not sufficiently underlined” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 728).  
To complicate matters, the economic studies accompanying the draft proposal 
came out too little too late to completely turn the boat around. The Commission tried to 
justify “powerful legislative ‘medicine’ [...] by inflating expectations about its impact on 
growth and employment” (Leslie 2009, 3). Indeed, justifying “an ambitious […] 
acceleration of market integration” through economic benefit calculations is nothing new 
and has played an important role in the 1992 Single Market Program and the integration 
of the public procurement market, as described in the previous chapter (Leslie 2009, 6). 
What is more, “[t]here can be little doubt that a convincing economic case for a well-
functioning and ‘deep’ internal market for services would have had a positive effect on 
the debate and decision making about the internal services market” (Chang et al. 2010, 
100). Yet, the Commission’s endeavor here to convince member states of the great 
economic benefits of a radical approach to service liberalization, while not falling on deaf 
ears, turned out to be much harder to make and was not made in advance of the directive. 
As Chang et al. note, “in economic integration studies, services were neglected for 
decades” (Chang et al. 2010, 100).102 This is not only due to the greater difficulty of 
                                                 
102
 A strong call for paying more attention to services liberalization, if we want to truly understand the long 
term impact of a complete internal market, was already made by Jacques Pelkmans in 1992 when focusing 
on the “EC 92 as a challenge to economic analysis”. And Chang et al. add that”[h]owever, empirical work 
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calculating the benefits for the vast services markets in contrast to smaller sectors, but 
also the fact that in the services arena economic analyst tools were not as well developed. 
Moreover, it is also easily imaginable that the Commission did simply not try as hard 
because it thought that it did not have to due to the broad original support. 
The European Commission published on the same day as the Bolkestein draft the 
Extended Impact Assessment (EIA) for the proposed services directive (SEC(2004) 21). 
This document strove to make the economic case for the draft’s radical departure from 
past practice in combining the ‘country of origin principle’ with its application across 
multiple services sectors. Yet, maybe unsurprising given the decades long neglect of the 
services internal market in economics, the impact analysis turned out to be “soft, 
qualitative and incomplete” (Chang et al. 2010, 100). Unfortunately certainly for the 
Commission at this point, “the state of economic analysis – both analytically and 
empirically – was simply too undeveloped to construct a convincing case” (Chang et al. 
2010, 100). In short, “hard key figures […] were unavailable and many specific economic 
questions and expected frictions were neither understood nor addressed” (Chang et al. 
2010, 101). The result was that because “the economic case seemed to be rather weak and 
general for protagonists and so unconvincing for those with vested interests that they 
could easily afford to ignore it” (Chang et al. 2010, 100). This, of course, in turn 
“rendered the subsequent drastic politicization of the debate so much easier and left 
demagogy and unashamed misuse of information gaps without a firm answer” (Chang et 
al. 2010, 101). 
                                                                                                                                                 
on cross-border services provision in the EU remained scant and little progress had been made by 2004” 
(Chang et al. 2010, 112). 
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Because the information was not available, the Commission failed to put together 
its case. However, the relative low quality of the extended impact assessment from an 
economist view had also the positive effect of a wakeup call for empirical economists in 
Europe. Two additional studies were undertaken in the following months. One was 
commissioned by the EU Commission itself and the other was undertaken by a group of 
Dutch economists working for an independent government agency, the Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau or CPB). 
That a stronger and earlier economic argument might have helped to avoid the 
volte-face can be deduced from the Dutch case. While the Dutch, similar to France voted 
against the Constitutional Treaty, they nevertheless ended up steadfastly supporting the 
services directive. Chang et al. attribute this success to the economic epistemic 
community in the country, pitching the benefits of the services directive. They explain 
that “the CPB enjoys high stature and strongly influences government debates” and that 
“[o]nce it made its analysis the Services Directive did not become politically 
controversial the way that it had in other countries who lacked the authority of the CPB 
(such as France’s Conseil Economic et Social)” (Chang et. al. 2010, 104).103 
According to the Dutch economists, as a result of the services draft proposal, 
“commercial services may increase by 30-60 per cent, or when we express it as an 
increase of total intra-EU trade (i.e. including trade in goods) by 2 to 5 per cent” while 
“[f]or foreign direct investment in commercial services the EU proposal may lead to an 
increase by 20% to 35%.” (Kox et al. 2005, 9). This would translate into a rise of GDP in 
                                                 
103
 However, another potential explanation for the difference in outcomes in the Netherlands and France 
might be attributed less to the influence of a strong epistemic community among economists and politicians 
in the Netherlands, but rather to the fact that the Dutch polity tends to be profoundly more pro-free market 
oriented than the French polity. 
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the EU of between “0.3-0.6 per cent upon faithful implementation” (Chang et al. 2010, 
101). The Dutch study further concludes that it is “primarily the heterogeneity of national 
service regulations, rather than the intensity of national regulations that hampers bilateral 
trade and investment” and “[i]t is the heterogeneity that raises the (fixed) costs of 
providers of entering a new market” with “costs appear[ing] every time they want to enter 
a new market of an EU member state” (Kox et al. 2005, 25). In other words, it does not 
matter so much the degree of differences between regulations, i.e. some states having 
much stricter regulations than others, but simply the fact that there are different 
regulations between member states. This is especially interesting in the comparative light 
with the United States, where one might argue that the absence of services liberalization 
in America is merely due to the fact that maybe the regulatory differences are not as 
intense as they were in the EU and thus do not necessitate change. The Dutch economists, 
however, clearly point towards the heterogeneity of rules, i.e. the simple fact of having 
different sets of requirements, as the most costly for services freedom in an internal 
market. 
As requested by the Commission, Copenhagen Economics produced a study in 
January 2005. A second study, prepared for the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) on the ‘country of origin principle’ followed in November of the same 
year. In these studies the Danish economics calculated that the proposed services 
directive would bring about a consumption “increase by approximately 0.6 percent, or 
€37 billion” and thus “yield[ing] significant economic gains to all Member States, 
European consumers, businesses and governments” (Copenhagen Economics 2005a, 7). 
The analysis furthermore predicts a total value added in the services sectors of €33 billion 
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and a net employment gain of up to 600 000 jobs across the EU (Copenhagen Economics 
2005a, 8). Yet, the authors point out that given that the study only “includes 
approximately 2/3 of the economic activity covered by the Services Directive”, it “may 
therefore underestimate [the services directive’s] economics effects” (Copenhagen 
Economics 2005a, 7). In sum, the authors ascertain that not only “the economic benefits 
of the proposed Directive are considerable”, but that also the provisions relating to the 
‘country of origin principle’ are important piece of the puzzle accounting “for around 10 
% (€2-4 billion p.a. across the EU) of the total welfare gains from the Services 
Directive” (Copenhagen Economics 2005b, 5; emphasis in original; cf. Badinger and 
Maydell 2009).104 But these studies emerging several months after the Bolkestein draft 
did not succeed in changing the tone or content of the debate. As Chang et al. summarize, 
“[t]he economics literature demonstrate that the 2004 proposal offered substantial 
benefits, though such analyses came rather late in the debate and thus did not provide 
ammunition for the advocates of the Bolkestein directive during this period” (Chang et al. 
2010, 110). 
Moreover, the Commission was largely left alone in batting for the Bolkestein 
draft once opposition to it started to reframe the issue away from non-discrimination in 
the EU, “the absurdity of barriers” to services trade and the conveyance of “solidarity 
through open markets rather than harmonization” towards the undermining of the social 
welfare state (cf. Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 727–28; SEC(2004) 21) . While business, 
especially small and medium businesses, such as the Federation of Small Businesses in 
                                                 
104
 Of course, the flip side is that 90% of the economic welfare gains are not directly resulting from the 
‘country of origin principle’. Thus, as Chang et al., contend, the “true economic importance of the Services 
Directive was always to be found liberalization (including black lists of highly restrictive practices) of the 
right of establishment” (Chang et al. 2010, 107).  
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Britain, were strongly in favor of services liberalization (House of Lords Sixth Report: 
Section 90), they did not drive the integration process nor actively help the Commission 
to overcome any resistance to the services directive once push came to shove. The 
driving force overall was clearly the Commission and while business allowed for a 
passively permissive environment, once difficulty arose did not do much to help change 
minds or start a campaign which might have changed the outcome. Indeed, as Nicolaïdis 
and Schmidt comment, supporters of the directive not only “failed to mobilize on a par 
with its opponents”, but “employers’ associations did not emphasize their interest in 
liberalization” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 728). And Leslie observes that “German 
employers […] did nothing to support a move toward liberalisation of labour markets” 
(Leslie 2009, 10–11). McCreevy himself complained about the employers’ association 
lack of involvement in defending services liberalization vis-à-vis the trade unions 
(Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 731; cf. Mallinder 2006). Chang et al. concur by noting 
that  
It is striking that the European services business did not come up with its own 
estimates of empirical studies. With a proposal so crucial for the sector and so 
controversial in many circles, one would have expected the deep expertise of 
business to be brought in. The reason is likely to be the fragmentation of the EU 
services business over numerous sectors, sub-sectors and highly specialized 
activities, without any umbrella organization capable of devising a powerful, 
well-researched response. Of course, this also had consequences for strategy and 
tactics in the political turmoil in 2005 and 2006: business seemed overwhelmed 
by the political and social storm and many specific services merely chose to seek 
derogations from MEPs, rather than engage in clarifying the expected 
opportunities in markets and other economic implications (Chang et al. 2010, 
106).  
Hence, with the lack of vocal business support defending the original draft and 
persuasive economic data entering late into the game and given the politicization of this 
 266 
 
 
issue, especially in France and Germany, a compromise seemed ineluctable. The 
Commission ended up accepting “that the services market would have to be liberalized 
by less radical means and ma[king] clear that it would back a compromise rather than use 
its right to withdraw the proposal” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 730–31). In the end the 
Commission, however, was obliged to compromise not so much because of the actual 
content of the directive but because domestic-political motivations whipped up the 
opposition. Yet, while a compromise directive was worked out in the end, with the 
European Parliament playing a more active role than in the past regarding the depth of 
market integration, as noted below, the important fact remains that the European Union 
ends up with services liberalization and the United States does not, despite both polities 
being characterized by highly fragmented services sectors with business missing 
respective umbrella organizations.  
The secondary literature agrees that the final services directive was a compromise 
largely negotiated within the European Parliament., between the two large parliamentary 
blocks, the European People’s Party and the European Socialists. As a result of the 
Council being largely split on the services directive105 as well as being “more reactive 
than proactive, with much posturing done by member states like France, but little 
coordinated action”, the European Parliament came to enjoy “a substantial amount of 
autonomy” in the second draft of the services directive after the first draft turned out to be 
dead on arrival (Chang et al. 2010, 110). As Nicolaïdis and Schmidt agree, “the locus 
where political bargains were struck had changed from the Council to the EP” (Nicolaïdis 
                                                 
105
 Rumors circulated that due to the fact that East European MEPs voted again the initial compromise 
bargained in the EP, that they “were trying to organize a blocking minority in the Council, encouraged by 
the fact that the UK, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Hungary had spoken out for a 
more liberal solution” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 731).  
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and Schmidt 2007, 728). Ultimately the compromise ended up with bigger fanfare to 
calm vocal opposition than substantial change. 
The final product, as Chang et al., argue was influenced by “the decision making 
process of the European Parliament itself”, which led to a Social Democrat, the German 
Evelyn Gebhardt, to become the services directive’s rapporteur (Chang et al. 2010, 110; 
cf. Lindberg 2008). By arguing that the ‘country of origin principle’ proposed by the 
Commission was going beyond mutual recognition, she and her colleagues aimed at and 
succeeded in abolishing the term. As Nicolaïdis and Schmidt contend, for Gebhardt 
mutual recognition “was above all an ongoing process of political negotiations where the 
burden of proof would still be on the home state to show the equivalence of its rules” 
instead of the host country eliminating any of its rules that might pose barriers to services 
provision (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 729; emphasis in original). Given the 
abandonment of the ‘country of origin principle’ in favor of a vaguer obligation of 
member states to respect the right of providers to provide services,106 Nicolaïdis and 
Schmidt talk about the passed directive as a “minimalist result” and that “the EP had to 
formally sacrificed mutual recognition at the altar of crude criticism” (Nicolaïdis and 
Schmidt 2007, 732).  
Other major changes from the original draft to the final version include a more 
restricted scope of the directive as well as the adding of the environment as a justifiable 
reason for member states to maintain specific regulations. As regards the limitation of 
scope, exemptions to the services directive now include “health services, utilities, public 
                                                 
106
 The original Article 16 (1) phrasing “Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the 
national provisions of their Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field” was replaced by 
“Member States shall respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other than that in 
which they are established” (COM(2004)2 and Directive (2006)123). 
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transport, social and security services, temporary workers, gambling and lotteries, waste, 
audiovisual services, electronic communication, and financial and legal services” 
(Schmidt 2009, 859; cf. Barnard 2008). These changes lead Badinger and Maywell to 
conclude that “the SD in its final version is likely to miss its aim of completing the 
internal market for services as it will enable EU service provider to exploit the economic 
potential of Europe’s service sector fully”, because not only does the final version of the 
service directive “fall far short of initial expectations”, but also the “[n]on-anchoring of a 
home state law (country of origin) principle and simultaneously keeping up the present 
general system of prohibitions in the SD leaves Member States a sufficient degree of 
discretionary, that is restrictive, power” (Badiner and Maywell 2009, 714). In short, 
“removing the country of origin principle eliminates the heart of the SD” and that the 
“legal framework of the revised SD remains predominantly the same as under the current 
legal status quo” (Badiner and Maywell 2009, 711). And Robert Goebbels, Member of 
the European Parliament for the Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party (Lëtzebuerger 
Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei) involved in negotiating the compromise directive, rejoiced 
that “Bolkestein is really dead” (cited in Klein 2006; my translation).107 
Yet, while the term ‘country of origin’ has been removed and the scope of the 
directive reduced, the changes overall are rather token.108 Even Schmidt herself in a later 
                                                 
107
 “Bolkestein est vraiment mort” (cited in Klein 2006). 
 
108
 Griller, however, in assessing the amended directive strongly disagrees, noting that 
“In the final version, the country of origin was discarded. Not only was the heading of Article 16 changed 
into “Freedom to provide services”, but the cited passage was also changed to the more or less banal 
restatement of primary law that the Member States “shall respect the right of providers to provide series in 
a Member State other than that in which they are established”. Consequently, what would have been the 
most spectacular and substantive – although highly problematic – regulatory change the original proposal 
had foreseen, was deleted from the final version and consequently will not take place. […] [T]he debate on 
the Draft Directive not only led to the elimination of the principle but also to a messy list of exceptions as 
well as highly unclear wording regarding substantial obligations such as the freedom to provide services. It 
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article admits that “[b]y the back door, however, mutual recognition and home country 
control remain” (Schmidt 2009, 860). And Chang et al. note that the legal difference 
between the 2004 draft and the 2006 directive “is one of emphasis rather than something 
profoundly substantive” (Chang et al. 2010, 111). Indeed, “the ‘reversal’ of the country 
of origin principle looks less dramatic than many seem to have feared” (Chang et al. 
2010, 109).109 Moreover, Brunn observes that not only the ‘country of origin principle’ in 
the original draft was very radical, but also the list of grounds under which member states 
can enforce derogatory measures: 
This list of grounds […] is far more restrictive than the “rule of reason” grounds 
recognized by the ECJ. In that respect it can even be argued that the Directive 
transforms the present “proportionality” justification test for a host Member State 
restriction into a proper rule of conflict of law. It sets aside the regulation in the 
host Member State also when it is compatible with the Treaty (Brunn 2006, 24; 
my emphasis). 
This estimation that not only the ‘country of origin principle’ was radical but also 
the application and assessment of the proportionality rule was shared by some of the 
vocal opponents to the original Bolkestein draft, who understood the potential reach of 
the proportionality justification test. Thus, Thomas Fritz from the Berlin Working Group 
on Environment and Development vociferates: 
And, as the crowning glory of its proposal for a directive, the Commission places 
the Member States under its tutelage. Not only must they abolish numerous 
requirements, they must also secure the assent of the Eurocrats before they take 
any new measure. […] The bans laid down in the Directive apply to every 
administrative level and, consequently, breach the principle of subsidiarity 
enshrined in Community (Fritz 2004, 3). 
                                                                                                                                                 
has to be concluded that both in terms of legal clarity and substantive profess, the Directive is severely 
deficient” (Griller 2008, 392 and 420–21). 
 
109
 Of course, a psychological effect might arise due to the fact that the clear statement of the country of 
country of origin has been eliminated from the final version. This elimination might lead some service 
providers to be less encouraged to test the waters abroad (cf. Chang et al. 2010, 110). 
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Yet, this has not changed in principle with the final version of the services 
directive. Only the environment has been added to the list. The Commission is still free to 
set aside regulation simply based on the proportionality argument, even when the 
regulation otherwise might be compatible with the EU treaties. The Commission is judge 
and executioner at the same time. The victory of opponents to the original draft is 
therefore rather pyrrhic and largely cosmetic, especially when other commentators and 
the Commission personal implementing the directive are to be believed. 
In fact, when asked directly, Commission officials confirm the assessment. As 
one official pointed out to me: 
You will almost never find someone telling you that the new principle of origins 
and the old are the same. But when you read the service directive, the original 
draft and this one, if you take a real look, you will see difference is really small. 
But because there was always political marketing. I am French, I know it, because 
there was this thing on the French referendum and people kind of had to be 
reassured or even if it was not important, were given the message that everything 
must change, that everybody has been heard and that the text had been modified. 
But the truth is that the text had only be modified in some [small] aspect (personal 
interview2010; my emphasis). 
The same official went on to explain that 
Nothing would be different and I will tell you why. Because the original 
proposition was saying that you could only impose rules if they were 
proportionate and that you could justify under public order, public safety, public 
health. That was the original proposition. What was modified except the name and 
there was a lot of public communication that everything was changed, the only 
thing that was changed, that we added [was] the environmental protection 
justification. […] As I said the difference between the old version and the new 
version except for the communication and the name is very, very limited. […] 
Many people don’t want to say so but really legally when you take a look, the 
only difference is the addition of environmental protection which is very small 
because it is hard, it is quite difficult to justify (personal interview 2010). 
In the end it does not matter so much whether the ‘country of origin principle’ 
really still exists exactly to the same degree as in the original draft, but only that the 
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Commission thinks and acts that it does. This is even more relevant, given that Nicolaïdis 
and Schmidt observe that the balance struck in regards to the automaticity of access for 
service providers based on non-discrimination “in its extreme interpretation could 
eventually be regarded as an injunction of recognition” (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 
730). As the quotes above and in the previous section have demonstrated, it is, 
unsurprisingly, the extreme interpretation, the continuation of the ‘country of origin 
principle’ and automatic access for temporary services provision that the Commission 
conceives and applies. The Commission has every intention to ensure trade liberalization 
as was promised in the original draft.  
For instance a trade union representative has correctly noted, while first rejoicing 
over the removal of the ‘country of origin principle’, that it has not been replaced in the 
finished version by a host country principle: 
Regarding labor law, I feel that we can be at ease”, reckons Nico Clement in 
charge of the services brief on behalf of the Independent Trade Union of 
Luxembourg (Onofhängege Gewerschaftsbond Lëtzebuerg – OGBL). For him it 
is a success, which, however, doesn’t go far enough. “Anyway, we were not 
asking for such a horizontal directive.” The union member notes that the country 
of origin principle has not been replaced by a host country principle. “In principle, 
Luxembourg may still impose hygiene rules, such as for hair salons, based on the 
public health exemption. But the country will have to justify such an act, and each 
rule may be challenged before the European courts (cited in Klein 2006; my 
translation).110 
The muted optimism of the trade union representative that his country might still 
impose its own hygiene rules is actually wrongly placed. While theoretically the 
possibility exists for member states to impose their own hygiene rules, in practice any 
                                                 
110
 Du côté du droit du travail, j'ai l'impression que nous pouvons être tranquilles", estime Nico Clement, en 
charge du dossier à l'OGBL. Pour lui, c'est un succès, mais cela ne va pas assez loin. "De toute façon, nous 
n'étions pas demandeurs d'une telle directive horizontale." Le syndicaliste note que le principe du pays 
d'origine n'a pas été remplacé par un principe du pays de destination. "En principe, le Luxembourg peut 
encore imposer des règles d'hygiène, par exemple dans des salons de coiffure, au nom de la santé publique. 
Mais il devra s'en justifier, et chaque règle pourra être contestée devant les tribunaux européens." (cited in 
Klein 2006) 
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such rules would be considered disproportionate by the Commission as the previous 
section has demonstrated. Hence it becomes quickly clear that the changes ballyhooed 
due to public outcry were rather aesthetic to calm the opposition than substantial in actual 
practice. Consequently while the referendum in France, Eastern enlargement and the 
accompanying social dumping concerns played a very important role in the amending of 
the directive, they didn’t matter as much as some observers seemed to believe.  
Where does it leave us? The Commission has been the linchpin of the radical 
opening of services across the internal market. Neither the courts, nor the member states, 
nor business was pushing as far as the Commission in trying to open market 
liberalization. The Commission in the end was forced to compromise due to a change in 
the permissive environment, especially in the notable cases of France and Germany 
where internal politics, partially due to contemporaneous Eastern enlargement, forced a 
reversal of their respective supports of the original draft. Yet, despite being the most 
politicized directive coming out of Brussels in a very long time and the accompanying 
vocal resistance, particularly to the ‘country of origin principle’, services liberalization in 
the European Union remains very close to the Commission’s original goal, the 
compromise being more superficial than very significant.  
Indeed, the extraordinary thing about this story is how much influence the 
Commission has had in the end. Domestic-political timing and the coincidence of 
enlargement with the services directive made it extremely enticing for politicians to play 
up opposition to the services directive. These external circumstances put a certain limit 
on the European Commission’s influence. Moreover, in this case the European 
Commission botched the presentation of arguments for the economic benefits of the 
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services directive by making a strong quantitative economic argument too little, too late 
and by giving the impression that Bolkestein’s successor, McCreevy, was not going as 
strongly to bat for the original proposal. This, as has been pointed out, was only partially 
the fault of the Commission, given that services had been largely neglected by 
economists. Where a strong and independent economic analysis has been carried out, as 
in the case of the Netherlands, the economic efficiency argument appeared to have made 
a significant difference. No matter what the external constraints and the shortcomings of 
the Commission have been this particular case, the fact remains that not only a services 
directive has been passed, but that despite the amendments the changes are minimal, in 
particular in the eyes of those implementing it at the European level and most importantly 
in contrast to the United States. 
American Regime: No Federal-Level Agent for Market 
Liberalization 
While being riddled with numerous non-tariff barriers to the provision of services 
due to a patchwork of regulatory systems, several non-judicial options exist to facilitate 
market access in the United States, as has already been pointed out in the previous 
chapters.111 Harmonious state regulatory standards for instance can either be created via a 
type of reciprocity statute, either directly by the legislature or by the legislature granting a 
“state regulatory body to sign an interstate administrative reciprocity agreement with 
counterparts in other states”, or via an interstate or federal-state compact (Zimmerman 
2004, 1).  
                                                 
111
 Of course, the judicial option, as described earlier, exists, too. However, it limits itself to a service 
provider going to the courts arguing that a specific regulation poses an access barrier and is not permissible 
under the privileges and immunities clause or the commerce clause. This, as has been argued in the 
European context, is particularly costly for small service providers and decisions are usually limited to very 
narrow circumstances instead of broadly comprising the entire services sector. 
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Reciprocity so far has been chosen as the most common solution to the problem 
of discriminatory practices in the US states. Yet, reciprocity agreements have the 
disadvantage that they “require such [common, universal] standards to be separately 
legislated” (Zimmerman 2004). Each state legislature would need to pass a similar law 
stipulating similar rules and regulations granting access for licensed professional from 
another state. As noted above, reciprocity agreements are not universally and consistently 
applied across the United States, giving today the impression of an America à la carte. 
Compacts have the notable advantage that they are jointly negotiated by an x 
number of states, which can lead to bilateral, multilateral, sectional or national 
compacts.112 Compacts have the additional advantage that they “could create a 
nonlegislative mechanism (in the form of a commission with the authority to promulgate 
regulations)” to create uniform standards (Zimmerman 2004, 1). While not all, “most 
compacts are submitted to Congress for its grant of consent” as stipulated in Article 1, 
section 10 of the United States Constitution (Zimmerman 2004). Besides the granting of 
consent, compacts can also directly involve Congress. Thus, the possibility of a polity-
wide compact, including the direct involvement of Congress, to eliminate the remaining 
non-tariff barriers to the provision of services exists. However, compacts run in the end 
into the same hurdle as reciprocity agreements. Thus, while 
A regulatory compact can be national in scope, […] the prospects of persuading 
every state legislature to enact a draft compact are not good, based upon 
experience to date. Greater success might be achieved by the enactment of several 
regional interstate regulatory compacts on a given subject tailored to the particular 
needs of each region, with the possibility that future negotiations might lead to a 
                                                 
112
 As Zimmerman observes, “a compact may involve parts or all of two states or all 50 states, as well as 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, United States territories, and Canadian 
provinces” (Zimmerman 2004, 1) 
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merger of two or more regional compacts. […] In conclusion, the process of 
negotiating compacts to resolve complex issues is typically very time-consuming 
and on a number of occasions has not been successful. Prospects for enactment of 
a regulatory compact also will decrease should a statewide elected official, 
particularly the attorney general, object to a draft compact (Zimmerman 2004, 8). 
Compacts also allow for the possibility of opt-out clauses. While opt-out clauses, 
such as Article VII, section 4 of the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation113, usually 
help to facilitate the enactment of a compact, they are costly in that they undermine the 
original goal of such a compact, regulatory uniformity across the internal market (cf. 
Zimmerman 2004). In other words, because compacts are not automatically 
encompassing the entire polity and allow for the possibility of substantial opt-outs, they 
lead frequently to a segmented internal market similar to what exists today with 
reciprocity agreements. 
Another disadvantage of reciprocity and interstate compacts is that they have been 
sectoral in nature, i.e. they only have been created in the past to deal with one specific 
issue or profession. This is somewhat similar to the EU Commission’s earlier approach to 
services liberalization.114 Yet, in contrast to the United States, the European Commission 
has recognized the “horizontal nature of the barriers” where “[a]n analysis of the wide 
range of legal barriers reported shows that many of them are common to a large number 
of widely varying sectors of activity” (COM (2002) 441 final, 51). Thus, the European 
Commission has subsequentially fought for a horizontal approach, of which the services 
                                                 
113
 In July 2003 the current version of the model legislation was adopted. The Interstate Insurance Product 
Regulation Commission (IIPRC) was brought into existence once the threshold requirements of 26 states or 
40% of premium volume nationwide were met. This happened in 2006. Today (2011) the compact includes 
36 sister states representing over half of the premium volume. Source: IIPRC website at 
http://www.insurancecompact.org/history.htm  
 
114
 Of course, the major difference still being that the EU’s sectoral approach included all member states 
while interstate compacts or reciprocity agreements usually don’t encompass all US states.  
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and qualification directives encompassing the majority of services professions are the 
direct result. 
Moreover, in contrast to the US, the Commission has strongly argued that 
freedom of services is not the same as simple non-discrimination. Treating a service 
provider “as if he were established on its territory, and hence subject[ing] him fully to its 
legal system”, reduces “the principle of the free movement of services to a simple 
obligation not to discriminate” (COM (2002) 441 final, 51-52). An interpretative move 
that emphasizes that non-discrimination is not enough to ensure a complete and 
competitive internal market has not taken place so far in the United States. Indeed, the 
US states don’t perceive any barriers to trade as long as they require largely the same 
from their in-state and out-of-state state service providers. State authorities effectively get 
very defensive when confronted with the notion that having an already licensed 
professional from a sister state undergo again a number of licensing requirements 
represents a double burden. The somewhat defiant reply is that if the states wouldn’t keep 
these requirements for out-of-state licensed providers, then the states could simply 
abolish any regulatory standards for professions. As Warner from the Ohio Board of 
Barbers for instance put it, 
So if we have somebody that we didn’t run through a reciprocity process, then we 
might as well not have any rules, if anybody could just come in and start cutting 
hair (personal interview 2010) 
Yet, again it is exactly this double burden that according to the EU Commission 
embodies a significant non-tariff trade barrier. As has been noted above, the Commission 
has led arguments similar to Warner’s ad absurdum by observing that the hair of people 
for instance in the state of Ohio can safely be assumed to not be much different from the 
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hair of people in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania. Thus, a person deemed qualified 
in one state to cut hair can relatively safely be assumed to be qualified to cut hair in the 
other state, too, no matter the amount of training required by the home state. This should 
even more be the case in the US where the cultural and political differences are much 
smaller, leading comparatively to lesser differences in the actual training requirements. 
Last but not least, given their centrifugal effects, reciprocity agreements and the 
closely related interstate compacts have been considered in the EU to be the work of the 
devil. As von Sydow, former EU official, commented,  
Reciprocity is of the devil, because the European treaties already establish in 
principle general reciprocity and therefore bilateral agreements may not be put in 
place (personal interview 2009; my translation).115 
Consequently bilateral reciprocity agreements related to the fulfillment of the 
internal market in the EU would be seen as undermining the overarching goal of the EU 
of creating a complete internal market. And indeed as we see in the United States, the 
preference so far of reciprocity agreements has led to the maintenance of a segmented 
market, where it is difficult for service providers to simply test the water across state 
borders.  
Another non-judicial option besides reciprocity agreements and interstate 
compacts, however, exists, which would potentially lead the US on a path of market 
liberalization comparable to the EU. Congress could preempt the states based on the 
commerce clause, the privileges and immunity clause as well as the supremacy clause. As 
Zimmerman states, “Congress, of course, may enact a complete or partial preemption 
                                                 
115
 “Reciprocity ist des Teufels weil der EG-Vertrag schon die allgemeine reciprocity festlegt und 
deswegen darf es keine bilateralen reciprocity Abkommen geben“ (personal interview 2009). 
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statute based upon its constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several 
states” (Zimmerman 2004, 1).  
This notion of congressional preemption, as already noted in the chapters on 
public procurement, is not far-fetched. In the last decades the United States has 
experienced an increase in congressional preemptions (Zimmerman 2005). As 
Zimmerman observes, “[t]he number of new regulatory interstate compacts has declined 
since 1965, attributable to Congress exercising more frequently its power of preemption 
to remove regulatory authority completely or partially from the states ” (Zimmerman 
2004: 5; my emphasis). This indicates that in the recent past the US Congress has 
intervened in regulatory policy areas and could do so again in the future. 
Congress, though, is not likely to act given that nobody, similar to the European 
Commission, has been making the economic case for services liberalization. While costs 
are present, studies, as have been either written by the EU Commission itself, 
commissioned by it or prompted by its legislative initiative, have not been carried out in 
the US. Thus, there is a dearth of data and knowledge to persuade Congress to intervene 
and/or states and other stakeholders, such as the business community, to seek such 
preemption. 
There is no equivalent single agent in the United States which monitors the 
internal market and argues for the elimination of remaining non-tariff trade barriers. The 
Commerce Department, which very superficially might be considered to play a similar 
role to the DG Internal Market, is not actively monitoring the US internal market and 
seeking out non-tariff barriers to trade to the same degree as the European Commission. 
Indeed, the absence of one single federal agent able to negotiate international trade 
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treaties on important economic issues for the entire US polity has repeatedly led to 
frustrations in the EU.116 As an EU official dealing regularly with transatlantic trade 
relations has remarked, 
So to make a long story short, if we agreed anything with the US, we would have 
to do so with the private bodies [such as professional boards] with whom we are 
also in touch, but it would be non-binding and we would have to do with all [50] 
of them and we could not have one-stop shop, so like one agreement. And so if 
we agreed on something, we would have one solution for the whole of the EU, but 
it would not be the same on the other side (personal interview 2010). 
Thus, the patchwork of different regulatory systems and with competences 
divided across all US states not only hampers internal trade between American sister 
states but also has important repercussions when trying to negotiate international trade 
agreements. Depending on the sector and an individual state’s decision, regulatory 
competence of a specific profession does not necessarily remain in the hands of state 
authorities but can be delegated to professional bodies, complicating the situation on the 
American side even more. 
Given the absence of a federal level agent, which focusing on the entirety of the 
American internal market actively seeks out the elimination of non-tariff barriers to the 
delivery of services, it is unlikely that changes will occur any time soon. The likelihood 
diminishes even more when taking into account that the present actors emphasize either 
state rights, are not able to perceive the role such an agent can play or are hostile vis-à-vis 
federal-level regulation.  
In fact, the EU and the US are characterized by an important ideological 
difference in the nature of their actors’ attitude towards market integration and 
                                                 
116
 Henry Kissinger’s well-known quote, “who do I call if I want to call Europe?”, here finds its equivalent 
in the US when dealing with trade issues where states retain competences and have not been preempted. 
Who do you call, indeed, in America, when trying to negotiate transatlantic services liberalization? 
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organization. Contrary to what someone might suspect based on the notion that the 
member states of the EU are officially independent nation-states, it is in the US were state 
rights are commonly evoked to maintain non-tariff barriers to trade while the EU is 
emblematic of a strong belief in market efficiency, especially among Commission 
personnel. The difference in ideology becomes clear when taking a look at the arguments 
that usually shape debates regarding market integration in the EU and the US. While in 
the EU cost savings and efficiency arguments are used as standard valid arguments, they 
do not feature prominently in the US, where, when asking actors, state rights and distrust 
of federal government receive a more prominent display. And EU official pithily noted, 
So in a number of issues we have problems because of state competence [in the 
US]. And I am also aware from my research on [the] US that of course your 
reasoning [in America] to address something at the federal level is a complete 
different reasoning than in the EU. Where in the EU, for example, efficiency and 
also saving of money are reasons; this is not the case, if I understand it correctly, 
in the US. The independence of states is much more important than here in the 
EU. […] on many issues we are much further advanced on federal, harmonization 
as we call it, than you are in the US (personal interview 2010). 
Indeed, business in the United States has rather been reluctant traditionally to go 
for federal preemption, preferring interstate compacts or reciprocity agreements. 
Zimmerman observes that  
Economic interest groups seeking to discourage congressional exercise of its 
preemption powers are primarily responsible for the establishment of regulatory 
compacts. These groups argue that a compact obviates the need for national 
government regulation since formal interstate action has solved a major problem 
(Zimmerman 2004, 5). 
The president of NABBA also suggests that ideologically Americans in general 
and business people, such as the barbers he represents, are not keen on federal level 
solutions, be they Congressional preemption or even some less intrusive form of national 
testing: 
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If we took all the identity out of each state that is not, I think, what people want. 
They still, you know, it’s like our schools, run by a school board and if they want 
to do snow days they can do it, but they don’t want. In this country right now it 
appears that there is too much federal government and the American people 
would like less. And I think if we push on a national level for national testing, I 
think that probably would be entirely up to the barber administrators, but I think if 
you went right down to the barbers and ask them, they would still like to see it 
controlled to where they go to barber school, they cut hair in their state and 
everybody has to have the same requirement to do it (personal interview; my 
emphasis). 
In the EU, on the other hand, while business was not putting itself way out asking 
for or defending loudly the specific Commission proposals, it was, however, widely seen 
as welcoming the Commission’s approach to market liberalization in services. 
Additionally, while “licensed cosmetologists [for example] have voiced that they 
would like to have their license recognized from one state to the next”, organizations 
representing them don’t perceive that the possibility of federal preemption exist, limiting 
themselves to demand more reciprocity between sister states (personal correspondence 
2010). PBA’s Government Affairs Manager for example explained that they have not 
undertaken any lobbying at the federal level, because they are unsure whether the option 
of preempting states in the regulatory domain exists. She notes that 
A national standard in federal law would remove the state’s rights and ability to 
regulate their own licensing for cosmetologists in their state. The legality of this 
question would have to be researched. I am not sure this can be done without 
violating the state’s ability to oversee their own licenses. […] No we have not 
contacted the U.S. Commerce Department or Congress because this is not a 
federal issue. We do help those that call in by researching their state and the state 
they are moving to so they understand the process and whether or not the state 
accepts their license (personal correspondence 2010).  
Hence, PBA, while lamenting that “there is not a national standard for licensing 
requirements or even continuing education”, it focuses its energy on “state to state 
acceptance of licenses” (personal correspondence 2010). 
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Even less surprising is that other national level organizations, representing mainly 
the state boards of cosmetology as well as barbers have not been advocating for 
congressional preemption. The underlying fear appears to be that such a measure might 
make them superfluous and that individual board members might lose out on influence 
and money. When asked if there is any other reason why states in general and state barber 
boards in particular are not favoring federal-level solutions, such as national testing, 
NABBA president and member of the Ohio Barber Board answered: 
Oh, I think they don’t want to lose control. Like our board for example, we have 
three board members, two of them are barbers, they don’t get paid very much for 
being on the board, but they do the testing and that’s the way it has always been 
and if they didn’t do the testing they would only meet six times a year. So we test 
every two weeks so that they get paid for about 18 days a year for doing this and 
they can see the results. If it were national testing, they would have to travel to the 
exam sites, and I am just not sure how this would all work and I think that might 
be one of the big reasons why the board, the boards would then not have near the 
authority that they had previously. […]  I would say it is control. I don’t think that 
the barbers in the state that they want to give up the control nor do they think that 
their constituents want that. I don’t think that they feel that the licensed barbers 
want that (personal interview 2010). 
Given the concern over state rights and the fear over losing significant local and 
personal control, it is not very surprising that the organizations’ official position is to 
advocate for reciprocity between states instead for advocating for a polity-wide solution. 
Thus, the National-Interstate Council of State Boards of Cosmetology (NIC) together 
with the National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists Association, Inc. (NCA) adopted in 
September 1984 that 
The National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists Association, Inc., and the 
National-Interstate Council of State Boards of Cosmetology, Inc., commit to 
actively pursue the enactment of Legislation which will allow the cosmetologists, 
licensed in good standing in one state, to qualify for licensure to practice in 
another state without examinations (NIC 2010). 
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When contacting NIC directly about creating polity-wide market access for 
cosmetologists and hairdressers instead of reciprocity in varying degrees, the only reply 
was a referral to the official reciprocity statement and the notification that the NIC “is not 
a regulatory entity” and that “questions should be directed to the cosmetology licensing 
entities in each state” (personal correspondence 2010). Symptomatically for the US, to 
inquire about a solution for the entire market, one is referred to all 50 individual states. 
While also working regularly on reciprocity in workshops at annual meetings 
(personal interview 2010), NABBA’s official mission statement is even weaker by not 
outright calling for reciprocity but simply for the promotion of exchange of information 
between licensing boards: 
To promote the exchange of information between state barber boards and state 
agencies examining licensing and regulating the barber industry (NABBA 2011). 
In short, the widespread position in the US is to make reciprocity easier, but not to 
have federal-level interference in the regulatory authority of the states, even if this might 
potentially mean greater market liberalization and creating a true commercial republic. 
The fear that state regulatory authorities would lose all control is exaggerated 
when comparing the situation with the EU. The regulatory bodies did not disappear in the 
EU member states on account of the services directive. The general framework in the EU 
continues to allow for different training and qualification standards and the supervision of 
schools and applicants within a member state. But at the same time it facilitates cross-
border trade for the temporary provisions of services. Nevertheless, as the earlier 
comments by the PBA’s Government Affairs Manager and NABBA’s president indicate, 
the only national option actors in the US can conceptualize, besides reciprocity, is a 
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national (private) test and not a federal-level governmental intervention or across-the-
board policy.  
Yet, a national standard, based on a national test, and not involving federal-level 
involvement, still runs into the problem, similar to reciprocity in general, of needing to be 
approved by every single state legislature or regulatory body in charge of any regulated 
profession. The likelihood of this happening soon or even at all is rather slim. Already 
today there is concern over national testing among barber boards in the United States. As 
NABBA’s president somewhat contemptuously remarks: 
Yeah, there is national testing now and it is pathetic! It’s too big. Big is not 
always better. The national testing, we test people for 40$ to get their license. The 
national testing right now is [between] 500 and 600 dollars. And you have to go 
through a multitude of dealings with people that have no concept of barbering 
(personal interview 2010). 
He goes on to observe that 
No, they [state boards] are not [happy with national testing]. They are very much 
opposing it. And then the ones who don’t show up [to the annual conference], you 
don’t know how they feel, because we surveyed them and sometimes they answer 
and sometimes they don’t. But it’s almost like they are afraid to make a decision, 
because they don’t have a board that comes to meet with us when we have 
national level conferences (personal interview 2010).  
These comments by NABBA’s president show several things. First, national 
testing is seen as “pathetic” and largely worthless. Second, the “too big” remark again 
alludes to an anti-federal attitude in the sense that the national level solutions would be 
too big and too far removed and that national testing people simply do not have a clue 
about barbering. Third, there is no clarity about the position of all sister states in the US, 
because not all even participate in and/or attend national-level organizations and 
conferences. Thus, even if for instance, the annual conference of the National Barber 
Boards would come to a decision comprising all attending members, it would still leave 
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out a significant number of states.117 Fourth, what the official here does not realize or 
proffer is that a truly recognized national test, granting access to all sister states, would in 
the end cost much less than acquiring several licenses from several states as well as that 
the European approach of universal reciprocity, i.e. keeping the laws you have on the 
books in each state, but recognizing the value of each other’s regulations for temporary 
market access, is another potential option. 
In other words, at present there appears to be no conceptualization in the US of 
simply recognizing the equivalence of different state standards at least on a temporary 
basis until a service provider decides to permanently move to another state. Yet, that this 
might be possible, when pressure comes to be exerted or an agent makes corresponding 
demands, is demonstrated by a recent example from Oregon.  
The State of Oregon not long ago changed its administrative rules for tattoo artists 
by granting them temporary market access within its borders. As noted above, states 
usually deny that the permission of temporary services can be granted because of health 
and safety concerns. Service providers therefore are simply not going to be able to 
provide services temporarily without being first licensed by the host state. Indeed, 
granting an out-of-state licensed practitioner temporary market access is considered akin 
to committing political suicide. As Howard Warner from the OBB observes, 
the barbers in Ohio would shoot me. You can’t give somebody an Ohio license 
for that they have to work 1800 hours and they are walking in with 1200 (personal 
interview 2010). 
                                                 
117
 Currently 36 states, Guam and the District of Columbia are members of NIC (personal correspondence, 
November 2010). Thus, same as NABBA, the organization does not comprise every state and “is not a 
regulatory entity” (personal correspondence, 2010). Again the regulatory authority remains with each 
individual state. 
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Then again, when the potential costs of existing non-tariff barriers become 
recognized and corresponding pressure becomes exerted, licensing boards might gain the 
necessary insight to allow for the delivery of temporary services. While so far denying 
temporary market access for hairdressers, OHLA informed me that they “have recently 
established administrative rules allowing out-of-state tattoo artists to provide services at 
tattoo conventions on a temporary basis if they meet qualification standards” (personal 
correspondence 2010). Although tattoos have a more permanent effect on somebody’s 
body than a simple haircut, OHLA was willing to change its rules and practice after 
having “received comment regarding restriction of free trade […] from the tattoo artist 
industry, to which we responded by establishing temporary allowances if qualified” 
(personal correspondence 2010). Apparently tattoo artists complained that they were not 
allowed to practice their art at a convention in Portland. According to the new rules 
(Oregon Administrative Rules 331-565-0080)118, a tattoo artist can now demonstrate his 
talents up to 15 consecutive calendar days, at settings such as fairs, carnivals or bazaars 
after applying for a temporary facility permit and paying the corresponding fees. Thus, 
the temporary market access is not free, as in the EU, but it is a substantial progress in 
comparison to not allowing any temporary access at all without first acquiring a full 
license, involving exams and potentially a number of courses to be taken. The irony of 
letting tattoo artists but not barbers temporarily provide services across state borders, 
however, is lost on regulators and no plans are presently in the making for granting 
temporary market access to barbers or other regulated professions.  
                                                 
118
 Link to OHLA laws and rules for electrology, permanent color and tattoo arts: 
http://www.oregon.gov/OHLA/EPT/EPTlaws_rules.shtml  
 287 
 
 
Nevertheless, the tattoo example in Oregon could become a starting point or 
model at large for the entire US, if somebody would argue for it in a more systematic 
way. But as the previous remarks have shown this is rather unlikely in the absence of a 
federal level agent. The tattoo example is a single incident in one segment of the personal 
appearance industry in the huge services sector occurring in one state. The licensing 
agency did not become active itself, as in Europe, condemning the potential costs 
restrictions on the temporary delivery of services have on the regulated industries. And 
Oregon does not presently plan to extent the temporary access to other sectors, let alone 
pushing for creating temporary market access for all sectors in all states at once. As 
OHLA’s senior policy analyst noted, “licensing cost is not a tariff” and that is that 
(personal correspondence 2010). 
However, it becomes clear that some awareness exists that the only way to create 
a complete internal market in the US comparable to the EU is to undertake a 
comprehensive, horizontal approach including all regulated professions. Indeed, the 
following comment by Howard Warner, NABBA’s president, indicates the necessity of a 
central actor at the federal level, which takes the entire internal market into account and 
not one or two sectors or regions, to facilitate the creation and enactment of a polity-wide 
regime: 
Would they do it to nursing? And to pharmacy? And to engineering? They [need 
to] do it for every licensing in the United States. That’s where it needs to come 
from. If you take all professional licenses because you are not going to single out, 
I don’t know of anybody that is going to single out any one profession and try to 
do that. I appreciate that. But I am thinking bigger maybe. If somebody went from 
a national level and said that all licensing boards in the United States, 
optometrists, pharmacists, everybody. But I don’t think, it’s kind of like high 
universities, Ohio State University is 55,000 people, we are still on a quarter 
system. And, as I understand it, 75% of United States major universities are on 
semesters. Why are we on quarter? You know because the people that govern 
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Ohio State University, the boards, what they say that it worked all these years, It’s 
fine, that’s what they want (personal interview; my emphasis). 
 
What is missing, in short, is an agent similar to the European Commission that 
makes the case, economic and political, for overcoming the status quo by offering a 
solution that allows for a certain degree of flexibility while attempting to guarantee free 
market access across the board. 
Where does it leave us? No systematic opening of the internal market for the 
delivery of temporary services has taken place so far in the United States. Initiatives to 
facilitate market access have been limited to single instances where service providers in a 
specific sector asked for temporary access and to attempts to increase reciprocity 
agreements or create a form of national testing. None of these approaches avoids an 
America à la carte, where market access varies for licensed professionals from other 
states. In the absence of an overarching positive regime, service providers in the US are 
largely left with the costly option of trying to go to the courts to argue that a specific 
regulatory rule is not conform with the commerce clause or the privileges and immunities 
clause.  
While the possibility exists to overcome the present patchwork of regulatory 
systems, actors in the US either do not perceive the existing heterogeneity of regulatory 
systems as substantial non-tariff barriers to trade or believe either nothing can be done 
because they are resigned to it being a state rights issue or are ideologically skeptical that 
federal involvement, such as congressional preemption, could actually improve the 
present situation. To sum up, nobody in the US has challenged the existing paradigm. No 
agent has pushed for change, drawing attention to the shortcomings and calculating the 
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costs of the present system in its entirety as the Commission has done in the European 
Union. 
Conclusion 
By primarily focusing on explaining why the original Bolkestein draft was 
watered down over time, the recent literature on the 2006 Services Directive has failed to 
notice that from a comparative perspective the EU has already succeeded in liberalizing 
the services sector more than the US in many important aspects, notably in facilitating 
service providers to cross state borders to provide their services on a temporary basis and 
thus to test the waters for future economic expansions or moving into another state.  
The difference in outcome appears again largely, while not exclusively, to be due 
to the unique role of the European Commission, which by “pressing for a rather radical 
form of recognition across the board” pushed market opening in services farther than the 
courts, most member states or business desired (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007, 731).  
Indeed, it was the Commission’s major innovation, the combining of the 
horizontal approach to services with the transformation of the principle of mutual 
recognition, which created public and passionate opposition to the ‘country of origin 
principle’ mentioned in the original draft directive in the first place. Despite the 
opposition, however, the Commission succeeded in getting the final service directive 
passed with only minor, cosmetic changes. As this chapter has shown the Commission 
thinks and acts as if the original ‘country of origin principle’ is alive.  
The outcome in the EU is the more remarkable given that a similar success cannot 
be reported for the United States, where one common demos exists. The absence of a 
federal-level actor promoting market integration by highlighting remaining non-tariff 
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barriers to trade and calculating the potential qualitative and quantitative effects on the 
internal market looms again large. While some are aware that the present heterogeneity of 
regulatory systems in the US reduces professional mobility and that reciprocity as it 
stands is a costly and time consuming process, most are unaware or deny that the present 
system poses any significant non-tariff barriers to the provision of services. National 
organizations tend to refer back to the individual states and many are skeptical of federal-
level solutions to the present situation. Some of them are being afraid to lose complete 
control over qualification standards or more prosaically, losing income for not 
supervising tests themselves. None of which is true in the European system. With polity-
wide solutions tending to be seen in the US as ‘bigger is not always better’ and the 
perception ‘that there is too much federal government and the American people would 
like less”, what gets overlooked is that strong central policies can lead to a more open 
market outcome by actually reducing the number of rules and barriers to trade and 
government interference due to the diversity of fifty different regulatory systems. 
Thus, while the EU has successfully put in place a framework to shave off non-
tariff barriers to trade in services, a similar cut to barriers is unlikely to happen any time 
soon in the US in the absence of an agent taking into account the entire internal market in 
the US. To close with the words by Jan Frydman, EU Commission Deputy Head of Unit 
for International Affairs, DG Enterprise and Industry and founder of the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue, what might be needed is “a Cecchini report for the US perhaps” 
(personal interview 2010). To which might be added, what is needed is someone 
commissioning such a study and actually acting upon it.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
GIVING TRADE A LIFT 
“The Directive 95/16 […] means that all member states now are obliged to meet the 
requirements included in the directive. Before the national legal acts regulating this 
market were different. So this created the barriers to trade. If there were different 
provisions in one country and different in another one that was the problem.” 
European Commission Official – DG Industry and Trade, personal interview, 2010 
“Our members have no problems to sell elevators on a state by state basis and quite 
honestly we have never taken a position and we would not want the federal government 
involved.” 
Managing Director of the National Elevator Industry, Inc (NEII ) in America, personal 
interview, 2010 
The general assumption is that the United States of America is the epitome of a 
commercial republic with a complete internal market that due to the “flexibility and 
fluidity in its economic arrangements […] has fostered economic initiative, 
entrepreneurship, and creativity” (Friedman 2008, 88). Though the findings in the 
previous chapter challenge much of the received wisdom about a liberal and integrated 
US economy and interventionist and balkanized European markets, well-informed 
readers might still say that they knew that services and public procurement were not 
especially integrated or liberal in the US. Such readers would still presumably expect that 
the US market for goods is quite liberal and well integrated, and that it is more so than 
the EU even though this is also the area where European integration has clearly gone 
furthest. But this chapter will show that for a substantial category of goods - what I call 
“regulated goods” - the EU has again gone further in crafting centralized and liberalized 
rules. 
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A regulated good is any good that is controlled by a governmental body or 
through a government appointed agency via the specification of technical regulations 
reflecting societal norms. In the context of the EU and this chapter, regulated goods refer 
especially to those industrial sectors, such as automobiles, chemicals, electrical 
equipment, footwear, textiles, toys and others, for which the European Union has 
explicitly adopted legislation, i.e. where the European Union has approximated 
legislation. Based on the European Court of Justice’s Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon 
case law and Article 34 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union119, the right of 
market access for goods is firmly guaranteed and can only be derogated based on clearly 
enunciated health, safety, environment and/or consumer protection concerns. In other 
words where the regulatory objectives of the different member states are considered 
equivalent, a member state must allow a product lawfully produced and marketed in 
another member state into their own market. However, in cases where the regulatory 
objectives of safety and health are not deemed equivalent market access can still be 
guaranteed by passing a polity-wide legislative act guaranteeing those objectives. Those 
goods for which legislative acts have been passed are considered in the EU lingo as 
harmonized or regulated goods. Goods for which no EU legislations have been adopted 
are considered to be goods in the non-harmonized fields. These goods are of course still 
regulated in the member states, but mutual recognition automatically guarantees market 
access polity-wide.120  
                                                 
119
 Article 34 (ex-Article 28 TEC) prohibits “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect […] between Member States. 
 
120
 Pelkmans (2007), however, points out that mutual recognition for non-harmonized goods does not 
always work smoothly in practice due to information and transaction costs. For instance out of ignorance 
might not consider mutual recognition “and thus either refrain from exporting to countries, or do export but 
after adaptations, which is exactly what MR [mutual recognition] aims to avoid” (Pelkmans 2007, 710). 
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This chapter will continue the argument that the EU has adopted rules that open 
exchange to competition more than the United States by taking a closer look at the 
achievement of a full-fledged common product market at the example of mechanical 
engineering, specifically the elevator sector. According to the European Commission, 
Europe is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of machineries commanding 
36% of the world market. Consequently, mechanical engineering “represents one of the 
largest industrial sectors in the European Union, in terms of number of enterprises 
(around 169 000 which are mostly SMEs), employment (3.3 million people), production 
and generation of added value” (Commission 2011d). It is therefore not surprising that it 
has been argued that “the elimination of technical barriers to trade […] is one of the most 
important routes to achieve a unified, genuinely free Internal Market” (Pelkmans 1987, 
249; cf. Mastromarco 1990, 47). The creation of a truly free internal market in goods in 
Europe was the idea behind the ‘new approach’ to technical harmonization in the 1980s 
which subsequently led to a series of directives opening up the common products market 
in the EU. A similar framework, exemplified by the case of elevators, does not exist in 
the US. The regulated goods market in elevators in the United States remains disjointed 
among the great number of states and even local governments.  
Hence, similar dynamics, as has been described in the case studies on public 
procurement and services, can be found in the arena of regulated products. The European 
Union has succeeded in giving trade a lift in the products arena, while in the United 
States, due to the fragmented nature of regulations and regulatory authority, freedom to 
trade is metaphorically stuck in the basement. Substantial technical barriers to trade 
presently persist in the United States.  
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Moreover, while the EU, as indicated by the entry quotes, is ideologically 
committed to the overarching goal of a free market, including the elimination of non-
tariff barriers posed by a great diversity of member state rules, the United States is 
characterized by a general acceptance of the status quo combined with a reluctance to 
perceive federal intervention as a potential solution to remaining non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Indeed, the absence of an agent similar to the European Commission in the US 
with a mandate to identify trade barriers and to push an internal market as well as the 
ideological tendency in the US to distrust federal involvement in markets and to favor 
state rights looms again large to explain the difference in outcomes in the two compound 
polities.  
As the elevator example will illustrate, it is thanks to the ‘new approach’ 
developed by the European Commission that today a regime exists on the European 
continent which simultaneously guarantees companies market access, flexibility and 
innovation as well as the member states’ societal objectives of high levels of safety and 
health. The EU model in the area of regulated goods thus presents a teachable moment 
for the United States’ internal market. It demonstrates that a federal-level agent 
intervening in the market is not reflexively to be dismissed as anti-business, as tends to be 
done in the United States, and can lead to freer markets. This chapter will consequently 
once more point to evidence that there is actually more acceptance of a strong central 
authority in the EU than in the US.  
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European Regime: Safety, Flexibility and Innovation – a Framework 
for Internal Market Freedom 
How to achieve a “fully-fledged common product market, while the Member 
States retain the ultimate responsibility with respect to societal objectives (such as safety 
and health)” has been the “central policy question with respect to technical trade barriers” 
(Pelkmans 1987, 249; emphasis in original). The European Union has achieved these 
twin goals. Today elevators and other regulated goods can be freely sold and serviced 
across the member states of the European Union without member states blocking market 
access by enforcing different standards or codes. Thus, when asked whether it is easier 
nowadays for elevator companies to do business across state borders in the EU than the 
United States, Esfandiar Gharibaan, Vice President for Codes for the Finland-based 
manufacturer Kone International,121 emphatically responded 
My first reaction is a very big “Yes”! The lift directive or say the ‘new approach’ 
to European legislation has removed these technical barriers for trade between the 
members of the European Union (personal interview 2011). 
The legal framework for the free circulation of lifts and corresponding safety 
components is provided today by the so-called Lifts Directive, Directive 95/16/EC. The 
directive applies to all new lifts permanently installed in buildings and constructions for 
carrying passengers or passengers and loads as well as to a number of safety components 
                                                 
121
 This chapter is largely based on a handful of interviews with responsible managers from elevator 
companies and trade organizations. However, of the four largest international elevator companies, only 
German-based ThyssenKrupp and Finnish-based Kone International were willing to discuss the issue. 
American-based Otis, the world’s largest manufacturer of elevators, responded via its manager for 
Worldwide Communications that “Due to the number of requests for information that we receive, we do 
not participate in research interviews of this kind” (personal correspondence 2011; cf. 
http://www.otisworldwide.com/). And the Swiss-based Schindler, the world’s second largest elevator 
company, did not respond to inquiries at all (http://www.us.schindler.com/sec-index/sec-kg.htm).  
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listed in the annex of the directive.122 The 1995 directive, however, was not the first 
directive applicable to elevators in the European Union. Two previous directives dealing 
respectively with electrically and hydraulically operated elevators, Directives 
84/529/EEC and 90/486/EEC, were replaced by the new lifts directive of 1995, which 
also extended the scope to include all elevators regardless of the operating technique 
employed. The original lifts directives were largely the creation of the European 
Commission. The business community provided some input in a consulting capacity, but 
was not the driving force behind the creation and adoption of the original lifts 
directives.123 As Gharibaan observes, 
there the initiative as far I know came from the Commission and the industry was 
consulted. It was not the industry that initiated the first directive. And with the 
introduction of the New Approach, the existing lift directive was transposed, 
converted to ‘new approach’ directive with all the benefits and rules of ‘new 
approach’ (personal interview 2011).  
In short, the European Commission originated the first directive for the 
harmonization of standards in the elevator sector to facilitate free trade and then 
subsequently perfected the free market access for elevators by applying the ‘new 
approach’ to technical standardization. The ‘new approach’ itself was a Commission 
invention of the 1980s as part of the overarching goal to create a complete internal 
market in the ensuing years (cf. Garvey 1986).  
                                                 
122
 The safety of elevators manufactured and installed prior to the entry into force of Directive 95/16/EC 
remain the exclusive responsibility of the EU member states. Yet, the Commission also issued an official 
recommendation a couple of days before the adoption of the lifts directive addressing the safety of existing 
lifts (Commission Recommendation 95/216/EC). 
 
123
 As Dashwood notes the first directives on eliminating technical obstacles to trade through harmonization 
of standards were result of a questionnaire sent out by the Commission “in 1962 to member states, after 
some preliminary work has been carried out on matters thought of as having priority” (Dashwood 1983, 
184). The first list was in the following years extended to include more products. 
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The ‘new approach’ has been developed as a new method for the removal of non-
tariff barriers to trade, specifically those linked to national standards and technical 
specifications.124 Instead of prescribing highly detailed specifications for products, as was 
done previously, directives based on this new regulatory technique for technical 
harmonization are limiting legislation to establishing the mandatory essential 
requirements that products must meet to protect the public goals of health and safety and 
are applied to large families of products, such as machinery, construction products, toys 
and elevators.125 Indeed, the lifts directive is only one of many directives which have 
been created as a result of a new approach to removing technical barriers to trade while 
ensuring a high level of product safety.126 
The new approach was adopted by the European Council in May 1985 (Council 
Resolution 85/C 136/01) with the intent to compensate for the shortcomings of the 
traditional approach to harmonization in the regulated goods sector. It was thus an 
attempt to move away from a broken regulatory system of proliferating directives for 
each separate product that were excessively technical and unable to adapt to commercial 
                                                 
124
 As is frequently the case, the ‘new approach’ was not completely new. The reference-to-standard part of 
the ‘new approach’ was already introduced and tested in the 1973 Low Voltage Directive (Directive 
73/23/EEC). 
 
125
 The new approach to technical harmonization is presently not used for all regulated goods. The 
traditional way of harmonizing products by creating highly detailed legislation for example is still used in 
some sectoral legislation such as cars (Commission 2011b). Indeed, as Dzabirova observes, ”[i]t is an 
inherent part of the New Approach, that if it does not work in a specific sector, one should go back to 
harmonisation in that particular sector” (Dzabirova 2009, 64). Yet, the new default position for regulated 
goods is the ‘new approach’ to technical regulation. 
 
126
 A website maintained together by the EU, EFTA, and the European standardization bodies, such as CEN 
(Comité Européen de Normalisation), CENELEC (Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique) 
and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), list all directives which have been adopted 
following the ‘new approach’. The website also contains a link to other directives based on the principles of 
the ‘new approach’: http://www.newapproach.org/Directives/DirectiveList.asp 
Pelkmans further notes that “a specific variant of New Approach thinking has been developed since the 
mid-1980s” regarding food laws (Pelkmans 2007, 704) 
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innovation in a timely manner. It has been described as “a decisive step towards the 
effective dismantling of barriers to trade in Europe” which “led to a fundamental and 
very rapid transfer of priorities from the national to the European level” (Egan 1998, 
491).127 
Similar to the other internal market sectors discussed in the previous chapters, the 
EU treaties already guarantee largely the free movement of goods and services. However, 
until the invention of the ‘new approach’, harmonization was limited to highly specific 
directives, seriously impeding the fulfillment of a single internal market. Thus, while in 
the previous “one and a half decades the European Commission has tried to pursue an 
ambitious harmonization programme”, the “focus on specific technical aspects of 
products […] fail[ed] to solve all the problems of access in products markets” (Pelkmans 
1987, 251).128 Given the time-consuming nature of the traditional approach, the European 
Commission enacted “on average only a little over ten technical directives a year” over 
the previous fifteen years (Pelkmans 1987, 251; cf. Garvey 1986, 206). This situation was 
especially problematic given that member states tended to erect new regulatory barriers 
faster than the Commission was able to put them down. As Pelkmans observed, “given 
the increase in bureaucratic regulatory capacity in recent decades in all Member States 
and the greater societal preference for environmental and consumer protection, it can 
safely be presumed that the tempo of national regulation has, for many years, exceeded 
by far that of the annual output of ‘aspect-directives’ at EC level with respect to a rather 
limited group of products” (Pelkmans 1987, 251; cf. Dashwood 1983, 203; Egan 1998, 
                                                 
127
 Today goods falling under ‘new’ and ‘old approach’ directives “easily amount to 50 per cent of intra-EU 
trade” (Pelkamns 2007, 704). 
 
128
 This section largely follows the seminal article by Jacques Pelkmans on “The New Approach to 
Technical Harmonization and Standardization” (1987). 
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490; Garvey 1986: 69). Moreover, the pre-‘new approach’ regime was characterized by a 
weak link between the European Union’s own harmonization policy and the European 
standardization bodies. Thus, while standardization bodies, such as CEN (Comité de 
Normalization or European Committee for Standardization), go all the way back to the 
early 1960s, they did not develop long-term programs “to remove the trade-impeding 
effects of different national standards” (Pelkmans 1987, 252). These standards simply 
tended to be private and voluntary in character. In sum, standards developed by the 
European standardization bodies were not mandatory and universally applied while 
European Union harmonization was mandatory and universally applicable within the 
member states but too detailed and to slow to keep up with technological changes and 
new regulations imposed by member states.  
The development of “excessively detailed regulations”129 further represented a 
significant workload for the Commission staff, leading to less attention being paid to 
enforcement and implementation issues in the member states (Pelkmans 1987, 261). 130 
The situation was therefore less than satisfactory. It has led, in the words of Jacques 
Pelkmans, “to profound feelings of frustration and disappointment” with the realization 
“that the individual protectionist was thriving whereas the dynamic exporter, attempting 
to encroach upon other markets, was hampered” (Pelkmans 1987, 253). Yet, the belief 
was and is in the European Union, especially among Commission officials, that “[o]f 
course, the opposite climate should characterize European market integration for the 
benefit of the Community’s economy at large” (Pelkmans 1986, 253).  
                                                 
129
 Dzabirova agrees by stressing the “unnecessary uniformity” of the ‘old approach’ (Dzabirova 2009, 64). 
 
130
 For an extensive list of drawbacks of the traditional approach, cf. Pelkmans and Vollebergh 1986 and 
Pelkmans 1987. 
 300 
 
 
Change started to come about with the proposition by the Commission of a 
Mutual Information Directive in 1981. Adopted two years later as Directive 83/189/EEC 
it formed the cornerstone of the Commission’s later conception and development of the 
‘new approach’ to eliminate technical barriers to trade.131 The 1983 Mutual Information 
Directive and the two-year later Council resolution establishing the ‘new approach’ to 
technical harmonization were both part of the larger parcel of the Commission’s attempts 
in the 1980s “to give a fresh impetus to the European internal market” (Commission 
1998, 10). The realization that its own efforts to harmonize technical regulations and 
standards tended to lack behind member states creation of new regulations led the 
Commission to propose to the member states a pre-adoption screening procedure for new 
technical regulations and standards. The idea was to make it mandatory for member states 
to inform the Commission about any new regulations and standards they were planning to 
draft. This gives the Commission the tool to avoid retroactive harmonization and to 
proactively propose the approximation of legislation before any new barriers to trade due 
to new and divergent national regulations emerge. The directive also enables the 
Commission to put on hold any national legislation on technical regulations and standards 
for a period of time to facilitate prior discussion at the federal level among all member 
states and the Commission. Once the Commission is notified by a draft national technical 
regulation, the member state concerned is strictly obliged to not enact the draft in 
question until the end of a standstill period of three months. Based on the circumstances, 
the standstill period can be extended, especially in the case where the Commission 
announces its intention to adopt its own legal binding act (regulation, directive or 
                                                 
131
 Commission official Tom Garvey refers to the Mutual Information Directive as “[t]he first movement of 
our symphonic approach […] marked ‘allegro con brillo’” to the elimination of technical barriers to trade 
(Garvey 1986, 69).  
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decision). In the latter case, the member state is obliged to postpone any adoption of its 
own regulation or standard for 12 months. 
The ability to proactively intervene in the setting of standards and drafting of 
technical regulations has, in the Commission’s own words, been “revolutionary at the 
time and has remained so” (Commission 1998, 10; Commission 2005, 10). It created an 
“entire philosophy of information exchange, dialogue and cooperation” (Commission 
1998, 11). The originality of the directive mainly rests on the preventive nature of the 
proposed system. The directive specifically allows not only the Commission but also 
each member state to examine and monitor draft regulations by another member state 
during the reflection period. This enables the member states to influence directly each 
others’ internal legislative processes. The original European treaties did not provide for 
such proactive intervention by other member states. Only retroactive monitoring was 
foreseen through the mechanism of infringement procedures. However, they are “very 
rarely implemented” and tend to be more costly as has been argued in the previous 
chapters (Commission 1998, 10). In addition, by charging European standardization 
bodies via an annual contract to oversee the exchange of information on draft regulations 
and standards between national standardization bodies, European standardization bodies 
and the European Commission, the Commission established a direct link between the 
European standardization bodies and its own institutional body.  
Yet, despite the apparent advantage, “[g]etting the Member States to accept a 
system of reciprocal transparency and monitoring in the field of standards and regulations 
was quite a challenge” for the Commission (Commission 1998, 7). In the end, however, 
the member states agreed to participate in a reciprocal transparency and monitoring 
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system in the regulatory arena, acknowledging “the advantages of a procedure which 
allows the others to influence the legislative processes” of other member states 
(Commission 1998: 10). Over time the scope of the directive has been extended and 
amended to cover all agricultural and industrially manufactured products. In 1998 the 
1983 Mutual Information Directive was then codified by Directive 98/34/EC (as 
amended by Directive 98/48/EC) to further extend the transparency and monitoring 
procedures to include the rapidly changing field of information society services and 
products. Similarly the geographical reach of the directive increased by today including 
all member states of the European Economic Area as well as Turkey and Switzerland. 
One of the most immediate and important results deriving from the Mutual 
Information Directive was the trail it blazed for the adoption of the ‘new approach’ to 
technical harmonization by limiting from now on legislative harmonization largely to the 
adoption of essential safety and health requirements and entrusting the drafting of 
technical specifications to the European standardization bodies. In its own documents, the 
Commission admits that it was the 1983 directive in conjunction with the 1979 Cassis de 
Dijon and the subsequently Commission-extracted mutual recognition principle, which 
“was the deciding factor which persuaded it to take the ‘new approach’ to technical 
harmonization” (Commission 1998, 11; cf. Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). As 
Dzabirova observes, “the Commission seiz[ed] upon mutual recognition as a regulatory 
strategy for market integration in the wake of the Cassis de Dijon [by using] the New 
Approach [as] a basis for application of the principle of mutual recognition in the area of 
technical harmonisation and use of standards” (Dzabirova 2009, 65–66).132 Michelle 
                                                 
132
 Similar to the distinction made at the beginning of the Chapter, Pelkmans aregues that we need to 
differentiate between judicial and regulatory mutual recognition. While the ‘new approach’ to technical 
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Egan shares the assessment of the Commission playing the critical role of eliminating 
present and future non-tariff barriers to trade in the arena of regulated goods. She notes 
that “[t]he Commission, as always a ‘purposeful opportunist’ seized the window of 
opportunity created by the Cassis decision to push forward new solutions to address 
technical barriers to trade” (Egan 1998, 490, my emphasis). The actual draft of the ‘new 
approach’ was a joint effort between Commission staff and a group of senior civil 
servants recruited from member states where they were responsible for standardization. 
The ad hoc group of civil servants was named “the ‘Williams Group’ after Eric Williams 
of the Department of Trade and Industry in Britain, who was the Chariman of the group” 
(Garvey 1986, 71). As Commission official Garvey notes, “[t]his ad hoc group worked 
side-by-side with the responsible Commission team in DG III:A1” and they “worked in 
the context of the Community philosophy statement and produced a balanced 
Community-oriented solution with great speed and efficiency” (Garvey 1986, 71).  
The ‘new approach’ creates a new distribution of duties between the European 
Commission and the European standardization bodies. By not developing its own detailed 
technical specifications for the entire polity, but by delegating the task to the European 
standardization bodies, the Commission’s ‘new approach’ allows for business actors to be 
more closely involved in the development of standards through the European 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulation is closely related to mutual recognition it is not the same. Mutual recognition, or judicial mutual 
recognition, refers to whether the regulatory objective in one state for a good is equivalent in another 
member state and when this is essentially the case, a good can be freely imported. In other words a member 
state can still, under certain circumstances, invoke exceptions to free trade by citing different safety, health, 
environment or consumer protection objectives in another member states. Thus, if the regulatory objectives 
are indeed considered non-equivalent, the import of goods can be stopped. Here is where the ingenuity of 
the ‘new approach’ comes into play. By commonly defining objectives “the lack of equivalence can no 
longer be a reason to hinder imports” (Pelkmans 2007, 702). But as Pelkmans concludes, both approaches 
deliver “the quite sensational result […] that existing technical details in national laws, supposedly to be 
enforced by the responsible inspectors or civil servants, cannot be used to block intra-EU imports, except if 
that good does not comply with recognized European standards of clearly violates” the safety and health 
objectives (Pelkmans 2007, 703). 
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standardization bodies (cf. Egan 1998, 485). It allows for “[m]arket participants, and not 
Eurocrats or national civil servants, [to] develop standards for the EU” (Pelkmans 2007, 
703). Therefore the ‘new approach’ is much more consistent with the spirit of subsidiarity 
(Aubry-Caillaud and Gautron 1996). Yet, the ‘new approach’ does not change the formal 
distribution of competences between member states and the federal level as established in 
the EU treaties. The member states ultimately keep intact their responsibility for the 
protection of health and safety of their citizens (cf. Pelkmans 1987). Yet, by devising 
safety, health, environmental protection, and/or consumer protection objectives for the 
entire polity, the European Commission ensures that market interference based on such 
arguments by member states are largely eliminated and that market access for regulated 
goods across state borders is guaranteed. And as Pelkamns points out, by harmonizing 
these objectives “the burden of justification lies with the Member State” (Pelkmans 1987, 
255). In other words, member states have to clearly show why and how a regulated 
product does not fulfill the agreed upon essential requirements for market access. 133 
In practice this means that the European Commission defines the essential 
requirements that a product category must meet to be allowed on the market. These 
essential requirements are mandatory. In its directives, however, the Commission does 
not anymore specify the technical solutions for fulfilling the essential requirement but 
refers to general standards. This reference-to standards approach foresees the European 
standardization bodies, based on the mandate given by the Commission, to develop a new 
standard or identify an already existing one, which will offer technical solutions to meet 
the defined requirements. The standards developed by the European standardization 
                                                 
133
 Member states can only put restrictions on the free movement of goods when they can demonstrate that 
either manufacturers’ declarations are erroneous or that standards contain imperfections or are incorrectly 
applied. 
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bodies, in contrast to the essential requirements, are, however, non-mandatory. Yet, once 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union, they grant a so-called 
presumption of conformity to all products applying these standards. This means that once 
a company chooses to comply with the harmonized standards, every EU member state is 
required to grant free access to its market without further ado. The presumption of 
conformity, as noted above, thus represents a reversal of the burden of proof. It is not up 
to the manufacturer to prove to a national government or public authority at large that its 
product is safe, but to the public authority to prove that it would endanger the public. A 
manufacturer who complies with the technical specifications described in the standards 
set forth by the European standardization bodies cannot be denied market access 
throughout the European Economic Area. Yet, manufacturers are also absolutely free in 
choosing how they are going to meet the essential requirements defined in the directive. 
The standards developed by a European standardization body represent only one way to 
fulfill the essential requirements outlined in a directive. Given that the harmonized 
standards developed by the European standardization bodies are voluntary, a company 
can choose to not follow these standards. In this case, however, the burden of proof that 
the product conforms to the directive rests with the manufacturer. The manufacturer then 
can demonstrate conformity via third party testing or by providing a declaration of 
conformity in combination with a manufacturing surveillance system.134 Once done so, 
the manufacturer has to be granted again complete market access.  
                                                 
134
 The Commission maintains an on-line searchable database called NANDO (New Approach Notified and 
Designated Organizations). The database contains all notified bodies, i.e. organizations designated to carry 
out conformity assessment of essential requirements listed in a directive, which have been accredited by the 
member states or by countries with which the EU has mutual recognition agreements. The database allows 
for searches by directive, country and by type of assessment body. It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/nando. 
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As part of the larger transition to a ‘new approach’ to technical harmonization by 
transferring the development of technical specifications from the Commission to the 
European standardization bodies, the voting mechanism for the adoption of a standard 
within the European standardization bodies were changed from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting, which was also agreed upon by the members of the European Free Trade 
Association. At the time this represented a big step forward given that previously 
harmonization directives were subject to “the traditional Council approach to unanimity 
on technical details” (Pelkmans 1987, 256). This ‘new approach’ therefore also reduced 
the possibility of delaying tactics by member states.135  
The ‘new approach’ to technical harmonization hence combines effectively 
market access and flexibility for innovation with ensuring a high level of product safety. 
The essential requirements, while written specific enough to allow for the assessment 
whether a product meets them or not, are drafted in such a way that they do not become 
outdated with technical progress. Yet, because no technical specifications are included, 
the directives do not require to be regularly updated to keep up with technical progress, as 
was the case with the old approach directives, and allow for different options for 
manufacturers to conform to the stated essential requirements. In short, this framework 
“by combining total harmonization of the objectives at issue (safety, etc.) with a flexible 
approach of the means (standardization) […] leaves room for original solutions in 
existing products and for products innovation” (Pelkmans 1987, 257–58, emphasis in 
original). 
                                                 
135
 Standards in the European standardization bodies, however, are in practice largely developed based on 
consensus (cf. Egan 1998). 
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The ‘new approach’ was modernized in the summer of 2008 when the European 
Union adopted a legislative package comprising three legal instruments to further 
facilitate the free movement of goods within the EU internal market. The system in place 
still had some shortcomings in that, among other things, different ways of controlling 
accredited bodies and different levels of import control and market surveillance persisted 
across the member states (cf. Gorywoda 2009).136 Thus, Decision 768/2008/EC and 
Regulation 765/2008/EC review and update the ‘new approach’ system by reinforcing 
market surveillance mechanisms and the clarity of the EC marking and the conformity of 
the products as well as facilitating the drafting of future directives by creating a 
legislative tool kit setting out common definitions and procedures, such as conformity 
assessment modules. The ‘new legislative framework’ now calls for member states for 
instance to designate a single national accreditation body which in turn is responsible for 
accrediting all conformity assessment bodies operating within its territory. These national 
accreditation organizations must not offer conformity assessment services themselves and 
have to be non-profit organizations. In addition, they must be audited once a year (cf. 
Gorywoda 2009). The third legal instrument creating the ‘new legislative framework’ is 
Regulation 764/2008/EC which lays down procedures relating to the application of 
certain technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another member state. The focus 
of the directive is to overcome some remaining obstacles in the implementation of the 
‘mutual recognition’ principle in the non-harmonized goods area. These are products, 
                                                 
136
 Egan also points out that the ‘new approach’ with delegating primary responsibility for technical 
specifications to European standardization bodies was not without its difficulties and not always led to a 
much faster pace of standard-setting given the speed of technological change (Egan 1998: 495 – 496). To 
avoid shirking and/ or slippage, i.e. a lack of effort on the part of the agent and/or skills in carrying out their 
delegated tasks, the Commission has put in place in its agreements with the European standardization 
bodies a series of budgetary sanctions and regularly checks whether the standards produced by the 
European standardization bodies are fulfilling the essential requirements set forth in the directives (cf. Egan 
1998, 498).  
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such as food items, bicycles, furniture, ladders, etc., which are not subject to EU 
harmonization. They represent about 15% of intra-EU trade goods according to the 
European Commission (Commission 2011c). Based on the regulation, each member 
states is henceforth required to inform the company in detail why it plans to deny market 
access to a specific product, which is legally marketed in another member state. The 
detailed description of “the overriding reasons of public interest for imposing national 
technical rules” and why “less restrictive measures cannot be used” are aimed to provide 
the economic operator with the opportunity to “comment on all relevant aspects of the 
intended decision restricting access to the market” (Regulation 764/2008/EC, recital 22). 
It also attempts again to make sure that the burden of proof rests with the member state 
and not with the economic operator. Overall, the new legislative framework for the single 
market for goods has “an impact on a large number of industrial sectors, representing a 
market volume of around € 1500 billion a year” (Commission 2011c).  
The elevator industry, of course, only represents a small slice of the overall 
amount of the goods industry in Europe. However, it serves as a good illustration on how 
market integration differs in the regulated goods sector between the European Union and 
the United States. According to Kone International’s investor information, “the global 
construction and engineering industry –excluding homebuilding – [was] estimated to 
reach a market value of approximately USD 1.3 trillion in 2008” while “[t]he global 
homebuilding market [was] estimated to reach a value of approximately USD 840 billion 
by 2008” (Kone 2011a). In the same year the global elevator market amounted to the size 
of “approximately EUR 34 billion” (Kone 2011a).137 Forty per cent of the €34 billion 
                                                 
137
 The closely related escalator market amounted to the size of €2 billion in 2008. In that year 500,000 
escalators were in operation of which 42,000 were newly installed throughout the year. 52 per cent of all 
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consisted of new equipment sales while approximately sixty per cent went to the 
modernization and maintenance of existing systems. At the end of that same year 
approximately 9.1 (2007: 8.7) million elevator units were in operation worldwide, of 
which 478,000 (2007: 453,000) were installed in that year (Kone 2011a). Table 3 gives a 
regional break-down of the elevator market:138 
Table 3: Global Elevator Market in 2008 (Source; Kone 2011a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As stated at the beginning of this section, today’s European elevator market is 
regulated by Lift Directive 95/16/EC. Given that the directive is a so-called ‘new 
approach’ directive it creates market access by eliminating barriers posed by member 
state technical regulations and standards. It creates a general framework of high levels of 
consumer and safety protection while at the same time allowing for market flexibility, 
innovation and the updating of standards without prescribing detailed technical solutions 
                                                                                                                                                 
new escalators were installed that year in China. China with 40% and Japan and Korea with a combined 
20% hold the largest shares of the operational global escalator market in 2008. Europe’s global share of 
operating escalator was 19 per cent; the Americas 11 per cent (Kone 2011b). 
 
138
 Due to Europe’s higher population density and the fact that more Europeans tend to live in apartments 
the European elevator market is significantly larger than the North American. Thus, while half of all newly 
installed elevators in Europe are for residential buildings, the market share for office buildings, sports and 
leisure facilities and residential buildings are approximately the same (Kone 2011a). 
 
Elevators in operation (%) New Elevator market (%) 
Total units: 9,100,000 Total units: 478,000 
        
Area 2008 Area 2008 
        
Europe 48% Europe 23% 
Americas 17% Americas 10% 
Japan and Korea 11% Japan and Korea 10% 
China 10% China 40% 
Rest of the world 14% India 4% 
Russia 5% 
Rest of the world 8% 
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at any given time. As the European Lift Association sees it, “the “New Approach” 
procedure had clearly proven to be beneficial for the industry” (Bianchi 2007, 1). The 
Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry wrote the directive and presently oversees 
and manage it. To ensure uniform application of the lift directive, DG Enterprise and 
Industry has further, in close cooperation with a “small Editorial Committee, formed by 
representatives of Member States, Notified Bodies and Industry”, including the European 
Lift Association, written a ‘Guide of Application’, “which can be described as “soft law” 
(Bianchini 2007, 2).139 While not legally binding, this guide “is sometimes considered as 
more “helpful” than the actual directive, since it clarifies details and enables companies 
to make the safest possible products” (Bianchini 2007, 2). Moreover, given that the 
Commission office directly in charge of the lift directive has prepared the guide and 
consulted for approval member states and industry representatives, its content has 
become “the undisputed common understanding” (Bianchini 2007, 2).  
On the whole then the European example here demonstrates that instead of 
hampering free trade, the intervention in the market by a federal-level agent dedicated to 
market liberalization cannot only effectively tear down non-tariff trade barriers and 
facilitate trade across member states but also create a framework which simultaneously 
ensures safety and consumer protection while granting the flexibility cherished by 
business to innovate at a rapid pace. As Kone International Vice President for Codes puts 
it, the European approach 
allows us to develop and introduce innovative solutions and new products into the 
market in a very rapid pace. We don’t have to wait for standards to adapt to new 
technologies. We can bring the new technologies through risk-assessment and 
                                                 
139
 To allow for easy updates, the guide is only available on-line and in English. Member states, however, 
are free to suggest translations. The guide can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/mechanical/files/lifts/lifts_guidelines_en.pdf 
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approval by third party. And when such a solution becomes state-of-the-art then it 
is included in the standards. So lift directive not only harmonized the technical 
regulations between member states, but opened the door for innovative solutions 
and new technologies at a much faster pace than we had ever experienced in 
Europe (personal interview 2011). 
More material discussing the European regime, especially from interviews, will 
follow in the next section once the stark contrast to the American regime is introduced 
below. 
American Regime: Disjointed Market - No Federal-Level Agent, 
No Market Liberalization 
Similar to the market access of regulated professions, the fifty states retain the 
right to regulate the access of goods within their state borders based on safety and health 
concerns. Yet, not only states, but even sub-states’ public authorities, such as 
municipalities, have the right to impose their own codes. Consequently, the United States 
once again resembles a regulatory patchwork quilt which makes market access for goods 
producers more difficult and entails significant, albeit to this day unquantified costs for 
the individual company as well as the American economy at large. The present day 
situation in the United States is especially ironic given that American business 
representatives, such as Dan R. Mastromarco, the Assistant Chief Counsel for Tax Policy 
of the U.S. Small Business Administration, have argued in the past that “[t]he successful 
harmonization, implementation, and enforcement of product standards is of paramount 
importance to the realization of a fully integrated European Community” (Mastromarco 
1990, 47; my emphasis). As Mastromarco further notes, 
Some manufacturers have been forced to modify products and retool in order to 
comply with frequently changing, country-specific requirements. Other firms, 
especially smaller companies, have been discouraged from expanding into new 
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markets. From the consumers’ perspective, the need to have products modified, 
tested, retested, certified, and recertified for export to markets in neighboring 
countries causes delay, stifles competition, increases costs, and may reduce 
product selection. […] Uniform health, safety, and environmental standards, if 
properly implemented, would benefit most exporters to the EC as well as most 
Member State industries by eliminating barriers to the efficient flow of goods, and 
perhaps services, throughout the EC (Mastromarco 1990, 48).  
Yet, the situation today in the United States remains largely similar to the one 
described in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. American elevator companies are regularly 
forced to modify their products and retool in order to comply with the ever-changing 
rules imposed by the great number of jurisdictions within the United States. Thus, 
American business leaders figuratively have tended to only behold the mote in the eye of 
the European internal market while not considering the beam in its own internal market. 
In fact, while a national standardization body, the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME), creates standards for the elevator industry, such as ASME A17.1 
Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, these standards are voluntary.140 No 
overarching framework or harmonization for the entire American internal market exists 
to this day. While some federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Federal Communications Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission and the Department of Agriculture have the power to mandate federal 
standards, a vast amount of all standards, including for many, if not most regulated 
goods, remain in the hands of over 400 nongovernmental standardization bodies 
                                                 
140
 ASME, a not-for-profit membership organization, was founded in 1880. Besides sharing knowledge and 
enabling cooperation between engineers, the organization develops engineering standards. The first 
standard developed by the organization was the Code for the Conduct of Trials of Steam Boilers, in 1914. 
Today ASME has developed over 500 codes and standards, including safety codes for elevators (ASME 
2011). More information available at: http://www.asme.org/ 
 
 313 
 
 
(Mastromarco 1990, 52).141 As Kevin Brinkman, Vice President of Quality and Code 
Compliance for ThyssenKrupp Access, summarizes for the United States in the area of 
elevators 
The regulation actually occurs at the state and sometimes even at the city level. 
What we have here in the US [are] some national standards, but these standards 
are guidelines. [They] are published typically by a separate group and the local 
authorities, the state or the city, whoever governs the elevators for that area, […] 
will come in and say, okay, we are going to adopt for example ASME 17.1 2004 
as our elevator code for this area. They can adopt this standard exactly the way it 
was written or they actually have the authority and come and say, you know what 
we like this code, but 90% of it, but there is some items we don’t like. So we are 
going to go in and modify those to suit our needs. So they can actually change, 
they don’t have to accept that national standard as their guideline. They can 
[accept it exactly] or they can accept a certain year and then not update it for a 
while or they can modify it. So the local authority has the right to change that 
(personal interview 2010).  
He further elaborates that 
if you really got right down to it, there are rules in our country you should not 
discriminate how you do things, but in reality there is some room to play with 
there. The fact [is] that you can set up rules as long as it is not proven that you set 
up the rules to intentionally discriminate against somebody else. You can set up 
the rules to say, here are what my requirements are for an elevator without saying 
why I didn’t, unless you prove that you did this purposely to hurt Otis or hurt 
ThyssenKrupp Access or whoever. You set these rules for safety reasons or 
whatever reasons you had. As long as other companies can adapt to them to meet 
those rules, you haven’t discriminated in the general public opinion at least. 
Legally it might be hard to make this argument as well. So while […] they can’t 
say every elevator has to be made by Otis, that’s discrimination, but they can say 
every elevator has to have these features, because we feel this is necessary for 
safety and whether it is us or OTIS or whoever makes it has to make it to that 
requirement. That’s not considered discrimination here in the US. That’s 
considered setting a standard. It might be harder for us to comply than them but 
that doesn’t mean that they are discriminating unless we can prove that they did it 
intentionally to hurt us (personal interview 2010). 
Brinkman’s counterpart at Kone International, Esfandiar Gharibaan, agrees by 
observing that 
                                                 
141
 According to Mastromarco, the American standardization bodies have been responsible for the issuance 
of around 30,000 voluntary standards by the late 1980s (Mastromaro 1990, 52). 
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in fact the difficulty in the US [is that] we don’t really have harmonized technical 
legislation for lifts at the federal level, and every state and every city has their 
own requirements. So it means that you have to adjust the products where it is 
destined to be used. And that brings a lot of difficulties, a lot of hassle with supply 
of these products. And also the technical legislation is very detailed, the standards 
that have been adopted by the legislation. So we have to fulfill every detail of the 
standards. So it means that when we have a new product, new solutions, new 
innovations, it takes quite, a very long time to introduce into the market, to 
convince all the jurisdiction that the solution is safe and can be used until the 
standards, technical standards catch up with this innovation and become [part] of 
this standard. This process can take years before any new solutions or innovation 
can come into the market! So in fact, the difficulties in the US are non-
harmonized requirements in the jurisdictions, and a second is rigidity of the 
system to introduce new solutions and new technologies (personal interview 2011, 
my emphasis). 
Gharibaan’s comment especially shows that leaving regulations up to the states 
does not generally, as is frequently argued in the United States, lead to successful 
experimentation and innovation. Edward A. Donaghue, Managing Director of the 
National Elevator industry, Inc. (NEII), for instance, strongly contends that regulations 
are simply a state’s rights issues and that any federal government intervention in the 
market would be more than unwelcome. Federal-level regulations are perceived as a 
serious obstacle to innovation and business expansion. As he notes,  
[the regulation of elevators], it’s a state rights issue. […] The states have the right 
to regulate or not to regulate if they want to. It’s up to them. […] and we would 
not want the federal government involved. […] Our organization, every time they 
have discussed that issue, does not wish to engage the federal government in 
regulation of the industry. We prefer the regulations to be where they are 
(personal interview 2010; my emphasis).  
When further questioned why this strong belief against federal government 
involvement in market regulation, he comments that 
We quite honestly feel that if they got involved that the regulations that they 
would put in place would probably not be as easily updated to recognize new and 
advancing technologies than that we can do with the states (personal interview 
2010). 
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Donaghue’s statements illustrates the typical fear in the US that federal 
government intervention in market regulation will only increase the burden on business 
and make innovation harder and decrease an economic operator’s flexibility. While some 
federal steps could, of course, become onerous to business, we can see in the US a variety 
of non-federal regulations that are clearly obstacles to free trade, and we can see in the 
EU a powerful federal agenda that has clearly gotten rid of many such state-level 
obstacles. The common American view that federal action per se will tend to be onerous 
to business can make little sense of these facts on the ground. 
Instead, it is the the American market regime for regulated goods, characterized 
by an absence of a federal-level agent, which is rigid. Innovations take much longer to 
find acceptance across the entire American market. States are not automatically faster in 
adopting new standards and taking into account new technical developments than a 
federal framework regime as set up in the EU. Indeed, in the US no public or private 
federal institution has pushed or intervened to simultaneously facilitate innovations and 
market access. Rather the opposite has so far taken place with the NEII as a federal-level 
industry organization openly proclaiming disaffection for federal government. Thus, as 
the comments show, in the United States it remains possible for state and local authorities 
to hide behind the screen of keeping its own citizens safe to impose technical non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Yet, it is obvious for many practitioners that the differences in 
regulations and standards are not simply kept in place because of safety issues, but that 
other factors tend to play a much larger role. In the conversations with representatives of 
elevator companies, two examples came up which illustrate the parochial nature of the 
American regime, where nobody looks out for the overall benefit of the American 
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economy, but only to the short-term local economic advantage even to the neglect of the 
latest safety standards.  
In the first case, the city of Chicago, in contrast to the rest of the state of Illinois, 
did not update their 1971 elevator code until 1998 although newer standards 
incorporating newer technology and additional safety features were developed in the 
intervening decades. According to ThyssenKrupp Access’s Vice President for Quality 
and Code Compliance located in Chicago, the reason for not adopting the latest safety 
standards was simply to avoid having to pay for training inspectors on the newer codes. 
He remarks that the city of Chicago 
kept the 1971 system, even though the rest of the state has moved on to newer 
codes, because they had a certain quantity of elevator inspectors and the cost to 
retrain them on a newer code was too high So they were saying we are just going 
to inspect the ‘71 code, and they kept it for a long time (personal interview 2010).  
Consequently, elevator manufacturers had to tailor their products and 
maintenance to the Chicago market. 
In the second case, authorities in Massachusetts were reluctant to change. As part 
of the transformation initiated by the North American Free Trade Agreement, attempts 
were undertaken to try to harmonize American and Canadian elevator codes to facilitate 
trade in the long run between the two trading partners. Thus, to harmonize with the 
Canadian CAN/CSA-B44 Safety code for Elevators, ASME recommended taking 
platform lifts out of the A17.1 elevator code and creating an additional code. ASME’s 
A18.1 Safety Standard for Platform Lifts and Stairway Chairlifts was approved and 
designated as an ASME Standard by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 
June 1999. In the absence, however, of a framework law applicable to the entire 
American internal market, as is the case in the EU, standards approved by standardization 
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bodies such, as ANSI and/or AMSE, do not entail presumption of conformity 
guaranteeing market access. Thus, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for instance 
decided to not go along with the changes introduced due to the separation of the codes. 
As Kevin Brinkman from ThyssenKrupp Access observes 
Well, the state of Massachusetts didn’t like some of the changes that were made 
in A18 after it was separated out. So they are still enforcing the rules for platform 
lifts that were in effect in 1996. Even so they have gone to later elevator codes, 
they said we are going to stick to the ’96 platform lift codes, because we don’t 
want to make some of those changes. In that case some of the changes were made 
to address new technologies, accessibility issues, different things. So they said we 
are going to stick to the old ones, because we are used to those, we like them. So 
it is just a preference issue in the state of Mass. I will throw in the fact that the 
state of Mass. is highly union[ized] in the United States and the elevator 
[constructor] union is pretty strong there and I think it may have been for reasons 
that they don’t really like the lifts as well (personal interview 2010). 
In short, in the United States an economic operator cannot simply sell its goods to 
all states even when fulfilling the latest safety standards as developed by American 
standardization bodies. It all depends whether a state or even a municipality has adopted 
the same code. The US thus remains largely characterized by a negative regime of market 
integration, where economic operators are forced to go to the courts to sue for market 
access when a specific rule is perceived as discriminatory. The burden of proof, instead 
of resting with the member state as in the EU, remains in the United States with the 
individual business. No presumption of conformity guaranteeing market access has been 
put in place. Going the judicial route, however, is time-consuming and costly and does 
not in the end assure a solution for the entire market, given the case specific nature of 
most lawsuits. Even large and well-established companies are thinking twice of pursuing 
a judicial route in such a market regime. As a major elevator company representative 
pointed out, 
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Let’s say I am the Illinois company, because that’s where I am sitting today, and 
New York passes a law that I have to do a certain thing, unless I want to take 
them through the legal system and prove that they did that to hurt me that law is 
going to be there. Somebody has to take the initiative to prove that they did this 
intentionally, to hurt somebody. And that costs money. Is it cheaper for me to 
comply or is it cheaper to fight that in court? (personal interview 2010). 
This comment further makes three things obvious. First, it alludes to the 
importance of an agent who actually challenges the status quo and especially who points 
out any potential discriminatory effects of the existing system for the entire internal 
market. Second, if even bigger and well-known companies in the regulated goods sector 
have to think twice about going to the courts, smaller companies with lesser financial 
wherewithal and legal expertise are even more disadvantaged. This for example has been 
repeatedly pointed out by the European Commission, as has been noticed in the previous 
chapters. And third, importantly, a regime based exclusively on judicial recourse 
overlooks that even if there is not an intentional discriminatory effect, the regulations in 
place might still have a significant impact on the polity’s overall economy. In comparison 
therefore the European regime emerges as much more business friendly than the 
American. 
Yet, despite this patchwork quilt of regulations and the apparent drawbacks, 
NEII’s managing director comments that “our members have no problems to sell 
elevators on a state by state basis” (personal interview 2010). When pushed about 
potential costs such a diversity of regulations might have for the economic operators, he 
simply replied  
As I said our members are comfortable with the regulations as they exist on a 
state-wide level and had discussion on and off over the years and have decided 
they, we, would, don’t want to change it. [...] We have been doing business here 
for years and they know how to adapt (personal interview 2010). 
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Moreover, in his opinion it would violate American anti-trust laws for an 
organization such as his to calculate the negative economic impact the existing regime 
might have on the American market. As he contends, 
If that cost has been calculated, that would have been done by the individual 
companies. That’s not the type of information that we as an association are 
allowed to start calculating. It might be a violation of some of the anti-trust laws 
in the United States. We are not getting involved with any type of pricing or cost 
analysis. That is done on a company by company basis (personal interview 2010). 
Yet, companies while having some awareness of the economic burden the present 
regime represents have apparently not undertaken such a polity-wide study. When asked 
whether anybody has ever calculated the costs for the entire industry and the entire polity, 
the common response is “not that I’m aware of” (personal interviews 2010). And even 
the level of costs for the individual company is unclear besides that it is potentially 
substantial. Thus, while feeling accustomed to the existing regime in the United States, 
the companies interviewed did actually express their dissatisfaction with the American 
regime when aware of how the market is regulated in the European Union. As 
ThyssenKrupp Access’s Vice President of Quality and Compliance observes 
I certainly, being on the manufacturing side would love to have the rules 
consistent from state to state. It [would] make my job so much easier” (personal 
interview 2010).  
He goes on to note that while 
we would like to see a uniform standard throughout the country as being a 
manufacturer that doesn’t always exist. So we end up creating options or 
accessories that meet certain market requirements, certain small segments of the 
market (personal interview 2010). 
Companies are therefore rightly concerned about the notable costs involved for 
their business operations due to the fragmented nature of the American regulatory 
system. As one industrial representative remarked 
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There are some [costs] because the different jurisdictions can adopt different 
versions of the standard or sometimes they can modify it. Sometimes we have to 
create special options for this area. There is engineering time involved; sometime 
there is additional inventory we need to hold because of that. Basically, yes there 
are some costs. Is it tremendous? In most cases I would say it is not tremendous 
cost, but there is cost there to develop these options (personal interview 2010). 
A spokesperson for a different international elevator company largely agreed and 
more forcefully stated that  
in principle it is a big burden on the organization, administrative and also on the 
production side. Unfortunately I can’t give you a percentage, but it is considerable 
enough that many, many efforts within the industry tried to harmonize the 
requirements first in different states in the US and second to harmonize at a global 
level to open the trade between the continents, specifically between Europe and 
North America (personal interview 2011; my emphasis). 
Yet, the efforts so far to harmonize requirements has not gone very far from a 
comparative perspective. As NEII’s managing director somewhat cryptically notes: 
Our members have discussed [such harmonization efforts] on occasion, but they 
have concluded to leave it as it is. They prefer it that way. They have their reasons 
and I am not going to go into those reasons, because I believe those reasons are 
confidential within the organization (personal interview 2010). 
The maybe most important effort so far has been the recent attempt to develop 
and introduce a performance-based standard polity-wide as will be described in more 
detail below. 
In short then in the regulatory goods sector, such as the elevator industry, the 
American internal market today is largely a mirror image of the ‘pre-new approach’ era 
in Europe; standards are voluntary and no linkage with a federal framework or a federal 
mandate guaranteeing market access in all fifty states has been established. Economic 
operators are at the mercy of the individual state or local governments, and even adopting 
the highest industrial safety standards are no guarantee for market access. States and local 
authorities can and do keep older standards or modify standards forcing companies to 
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retool in order to comply with the specific requirements of a specific city or state. 
Innovation instead of being promoted is rather hampered. 
So how to explain then this startling difference in outcome between the European 
Union, where every attempt has been undertaken to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade 
in regulated goods and create a truly single market for elevators, and the United States 
where barriers posed by different regulatory standards continue to persist? 
As the previous paragraphs have already indicated, in contrast to the European 
Union, nobody really has calculated what the lost opportunity costs might be for the 
American market due to the different sets of regulations remaining in place all the way 
down to the municipal level. An instigator, an agent, willing to make the effort and take 
the cost of a polity-wide study, such as the Cecchini report in the 1980s or similar more 
directive specific reports as in the case of services and others, is evidently missing. In the 
conversations with industrial representatives two elements repeatedly came up to explain 
why the United States to this day has not succeeded in creating an open, liberalized 
market in the regulated goods sector. The first element is indeed the absence of agent 
willing to take the risk and carry the costs, financial and political, to undertake the 
enterprise of creating a truly internal market in the United States. The second element is 
the mistrust of many actors of more federal government intervention in American society 
in general and in the market in particular. As the NEII president’s remarks above have 
already indicated, federal government intervention is considered to be malevolent and 
damaging to market freedom. 
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Institutional Aspects 
 Interviewees have time after time highlighted that an influential organization 
needs to be present to make the case that the current system of maintaining different 
codes and standards across the United States are akin to non-tariff trade barriers. In the 
absence of such an organization willing to carry the burden of tackling the issue, actors 
simply tend to largely accept the status quo. Thus, while this strong organization making 
the arguments, carrying out or commissioning the research, etc. in the EU is the European 
Commission, a similar actor has not come to the forefront in the US. As noted above, it 
was the European Commission which initiated the first elevator directives and then later 
developed the ‘new approach’ now applicable in the elevator sector today. The European 
elevator industry, while largely supportive of harmonization across Europe and especially 
of the transposition of the ‘new approach’ to elevators, did not initiate or originally 
strongly push for it. Based on the comments from industry representatives a similar 
passively supportive environment, but to a much lesser degree given misgivings about 
federal government intervention, appears to exist in the United States. However, what is 
missing once again is a policy actor not only willing to act but also having the 
institutional standing to act. Indeed, as Susanne Schmidt has argued, the Commission 
does not only use its agenda-setting power to bring about change but also strategically 
uses the European Court of Justice’s decisions to “further its own ends” as well as “its 
role as a guardian of the Treaty to coax the Council of Ministers into action” (Schmidt 
2000, 37). Thus, “[b]y being able to alter the status quo position of member states 
unilaterally, the Commission can improve the chances of getting its proposals accepted in 
the Council” (Schmidt 2000, 55; emphasis in original). This chance, when necessary, 
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comes about by either employing a divide-and-conquer strategy, largely based on 
information asymmetries between the Commission and member states, or by threatening 
“legal uncertainty and fragmentation ensuing from the case-specific transformation of the 
status quo” derived from ECJ cases if an EU-wide solution as proposed by the 
Commission is not put in place (Schmidt 2000, 55). In sum then, “[t]he Commission’s 
broad powers in the administration of European law give it ample scope […] to threaten 
inquiries into established national practices if a government maintains its opposition to 
proposed liberalization measures” (Schmidt 2000, 54–55). 
Indeed, when asked whether anybody has commented on and/or pushed against 
the remaining non-tariff barriers to trade in the regulated goods sector in the United 
States, an industry spokesperson responded, 
Again not that I am aware of. Obviously for those kinds of things to happen, for 
that research to happen or for those arguments to be made, in my opinion at least 
you have to have a pretty strong organization of the different parties. We 
manufacture these lifts, we have other companies that manufacture similar 
products to us and yes, we do have, you mentioned you spoke to National 
Elevator Industry rep, we have a group called AEMA [Accessibility Equipment 
Manufacturers Association], which deals with accessibility equipment, a similar 
type group for the disability market and we do as a group help to develop the 
codes, the standards that are out there. […] Now we really don’t have the, we 
never tried to tackle that bigger picture of you know, trying to take on the states 
and trying to force these kind of things. We haven’t done anything politically I 
guess in this respect (personal interview 2010; my emphasis) 
The same person noted the absence of anybody making a cost-benefit argument 
and taking the lead for the entire industry. He further elaborated, 
One, I don’t think anybody has ever sat down and calculated the costs of doing 
business the way we are doing it today. And two, the leaders have not sat down 
and said, you know what, this is an issue we have to fight and take the fight there. 
Is it possible? I guess it’s possible, because it happened in Europe, but nobody has 
taken the initiative to do that (personal interview 2010; my emphasis). 
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When further presented with the European regulatory regime and the role of the 
European Commission in the European political system, the industrial representative 
strongly assumed that most likely the difference in outcome between the EU and the US 
is indeed the fact that in the United States no institution like the Commission exists to 
fight for internal market liberalization. He remarks, 
Maybe that’s [a commission] what is missing in the US. I don’t know. The [US] 
federal government has not decided to take on this role of fighting for the 
individual companies. I don’t know. [In the EU] they have created this council 
and I assume it’s represented by different countries in Europe, in the US because 
we are one country we either have to have the federal government do that or I 
guess it could be an independent commission of some sort that was set up by 
members, by people in the individual states. Maybe the reason it didn’t change is 
that it doesn’t exist. […] I am not aware of something like a commission or an 
organization that really out there for fighting for the rights of the individual 
companies (personal interview 2010; my emphasis). 
 Gharibaan from Kone International also points to the absence of political will and 
leadership in the United States to initiate and see through a push for internal market 
completion. It is not only the elevator industry which has not given enough attention to 
the American internal market but major industries in America in general. He comments 
that 
As far as I know there has not been that, let’s say, full attention by other major 
industries to come to that harmonization level [as in Europe] (personal interview 
2011).  
He continues on the theme of missing clear and unified leadership in the business 
community by observing, 
That’s maybe also part of the professional industry, not everyone has the 
consensus how to deal with this. Even in the lift industry you have different 
people and some have different views on this subject. So maybe it is also part of 
the industry to get its act together (personal interview 2011). 
Given the dearth of unambiguous business leadership, the absence of an 
institutional agent, such as the Commission, able to pull business groups together and 
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create a focal point by proposing new legal instruments is even more sorely felt. The 
political will and laser-like focus on market integration is absent in the United States. 
Hence, for Kone’s Vice President for Codes 
The whole aspect of this is creating a single market, and that has been the 
fundamental goal of the European Community and political will to create that. So 
we probably don’t have that political element present in the North American 
market at this moment. It is very difficult to initiate such a grandiose scheme, 
legislative reform (personal interview 2011).  
Thus, in the absence of a federal-level agent proposing further market liberalization by 
for instance inventing and proposing a regime that guarantees high levels of safety 
standards and market access while ultimately leaving the authority of protecting one’s 
own citizens to the states as in the EU, it is unlikely that a major change in the American 
market will take place any time soon. Moreover, the negative attitude towards federal 
government in the United States complicates the situation even more and makes a 
channeling of political will rather unlikely in the short-term. 
Ideological Aspects 
Distrusting government, especially federal government, is for many in the US as 
American as apple pie. As Senator Claire McCaskill, Missouri-D, put it last year,  
Distrust of government is an all-American activity. It's something we do as 
Americans and there's nothing wrong with it (cited in Associated Press 2010). 
Senator McCaskill’s comments followed on the heels of the 2010 Pew Research 
study “The People and Their Government”, which noted that nearly 80% of the American 
population does not trust the federal government and has little faith, if any at all, in it to 
solve the nation’s problems (cf. chapter 4; Pew Research Center 2010). Yet, her 
comments are also emblematic for the regulated goods sectors. Thus, while in the United 
States distrust of the federal government has become part of the country’s ideological 
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make-up, a similar level of distrust of federal governance in the EU cannot be found. 
Indeed, as noted previously, an absolute majority of Europeans wants more decision-
making at the European level and trusts European level institutions more than their own 
state institutions (Eurobarometer 73; cf. Caporaso and Kim 2009). Moreover, by 
establishing “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital” as one of the community’s core goals, it 
early on has infused the EU with the notion that market liberalization equals greater 
freedom (Treaty of Rome, Article 3(c)). The Commission personnel, charged by Article 
155 of the Treaty of Rome to enforce and implement the treaty, has taken the mandate to 
pursue market liberalization very seriously and making it part of its institutional DNA. 
Thus, it is common to be exposed to the strong commitment to create a common market 
without any barriers by higher and lower ranking Commission officials. Jan Frydman, the 
Deputy Head of Unit for International Affairs in the Directorate General for Enterprise 
and Industry overseeing the regulated goods sector, emphasizes this political and 
ideological goal of the European Union and its absence in the United States. He observes 
that  
the starting point is of course [that] the EU internal market is a political objective 
as such. So we have an objective that we should have a free movement of goods 
and services and people and capital in the European Union and that is a political 
goal while in the US that is not necessarily as such a goal. […] So there you have 
the starting point of what we do. […] Let’s say, in the US the interstate commerce 
clause, of course, is important, but [it] is based on what should be the 
competences of the state and federal level and not the overarching goal that we 
have of creating free movement of market aspects (personal interview 2010). 
His colleague, Beate Pich, who presently is in charge of overseeing and managing 
the EU Lifts Directive, largely echoed his sentiments that when there are any barriers to 
internal trade then the Commission has to do something to eliminate them. She notes that 
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There was a general policy of the EU to create markets, common market without 
barriers to trade. If there is an assessment that there is a technical barrier existing 
in this or that sector, we have to do something, to cope with this. This is the 
general approach of the EU to eliminate all technical barriers to trade (personal 
interview 2010; my emphasis). 
Thus, while “an improved code of consumer and environmental protection 
legislated at the Community level” was one of the two “ultimate objectives of the ‘new 
approach’”, the first one, in Commission official Garvey’s words, was “the promotion of 
free trade in the unified continental scale market leading to increased efficiency and 
competiveness, industrial development on a European scale, more wealth creation and 
more jobs” (Garvey 1986, 75). 
The European Commission not only makes the assessment that there are still 
remaining barriers to trade, but also has shown the strength on occasion to pursue further 
market liberalization in the face of powerful national political leaders, such as Margaret 
Thatcher. Thus, Lord Cockfield, EU Commissioner in charge of the Internal Market 
under Commission President Jacques Delors in the 1980s, for instance even confronted 
Margaret Thatcher, the person who made him EU Commissioner in the first place. As a 
member of Lord Cockfield’s cabinet recounted, Lord Cockfield was not afraid to 
repeatedly point out to Prime Minister Thatcher that she has signed up and ratified for 
further market integration and centralization. Hence, in the matter of taxation, Sebastian 
Birch reports that 
[the member states] guarded their own illusion, in my view, [that] their own 
freedom to tax as they wish was not a distortion and was therefore not something 
that the single market should affect. Mrs. Thatcher even went so far to claim that 
the Single European Act had said nothing about taxation and [I] had to have it 
read out to her in my hearing by my boss [Lord Cockfield] (personal interview 
2009). 
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One of Mr. Birch’s colleagues in Lord Cockfield’s cabinet, Praveen Moman, 
further noted that without the leadership and especially the belief in market integration, 
economic liberalization to the degree we see in Europe today would simply not have 
taken place. He remarks that 
I think it would not have happened without the Commission. You know whatever 
quite started it in this group [of people around Lord Cockfield and Delors] is 
questionable, but the leadership of the Commission was very strong. They 
believed in it (personal interview 2009; my emphasis). 
Indeed, Lord Cockfield in his own work has strongly expressed that a truly united 
Europe only exists when all barriers are broken down and not those simply posed by 
frontiers. Consequently he justified his efforts to go after any barrier to trade by 
contending that  
If the Community was to become a United Europe […] the frontiers and the 
controls associated with them would have to go. It is useless simplifying the 
controls and leaving the frontiers in place. As long as the frontiers are there they 
will attract controls: each control will be the excuse for some other control 
(Cockfield 1994, as cited in Dzabirova 2009,: 70) 
So while Americans tend to talk about the US being a commercial republic and a 
champion of free trade and business, it appears to be more lip service in comparison to 
the EU, where especially Commission officials take the mantra of a common market very 
seriously. Moreover, large business in the EU strongly favored the ‘new approach’ to 
technical harmonization and welcomed the Commission’s proposal, perceiving it more as 
a friend of than a hindrance to business. Heinz Kröger, representative of UNICE (Union 
des industries de la communauté européenne), even observed that ‘supporting’ the 
Commission’s new approach is too weak a term, because his organization has been 
asking the Commission to go to bats for such a reference-to-standard approach in the 
previous years following the Commission first usage of such an approach in the 1973 
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Low Voltage Directive (Directive 73/23/EEC) (Kröger 1986, 80 and 82). 142 The 
ideological and cultural differences between the EU and the US find their echo more 
specifically in the comments of business leaders in the elevator sector. The Vice 
President for Codes of Kone International declares that 
I agree there is some sort of resistance of, dislike for involvement of federal 
government in the business activities in North America in general. And that 
maybe creates a sort of atmosphere that such an initiative, like the New Approach, 
becomes difficult to establish in North America (personal interview 2011). 
 And his counterpart at ThyssenKrupp Access shares his assessment that different 
norms of legitimate governance prevail in the US and the EU. Kevin Brinkman contends 
that 
Part of it is culture, in my opinion at least. This country [the US] was founded on 
certain principles and beliefs. One of those is that the federal [government] should 
not have authority over all things. We kept in our Constitution […] the right for 
states to […] make their own decisions and have some independence. So part of it 
I think is the culture this country was founded on, in that we have individual 
ideas. And certainly if you look at the opinions of somebody in California and 
then someone in New York they might be totally different. So it’s somewhat the 
individuality we have here that people want to retain their own thing. The states 
want to retain certain rights to make their own decisions. Some of the local 
authorities, they want to say, hey, we have some rights and our Constitution 
allows for that. So I think that’s one reason why we are getting away with the 
differences. It’s one of the reasons why we have the differences (personal 
interview 2010). 
 For the Vice President of Quality and Compliance at ThyssenKrupp Access there 
is no doubt that the reason why the US has not succeeded in creating an internal market 
similar to the European Union in the regulated goods sectors is in the end largely due to 
the absence of an institution clearly mandated to push for market liberalization in the US 
and the different perception of federal government legitimacy. He summarizes, 
                                                 
142
 Kröger writes: “Pourquoi l’UNICE en tant que porte-parole de l’industrie européenne appuie-t-elle la 
nouvelle approche de la Commission ? Et lorsque je dis ‘appuie’, le terme est encore trop faible étant donné 
que l’UNICE appartient à ceux qui depuis des années one demandé à la Commission de favoriser la 
nouvelle approche. Déjà en 1977, l’UNICE, dans un document qu’elle a adressé à la Commission, s’est 
prononcée pour des directives se référant à des normes” (Kröger 1986, 80) 
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It really comes down to somebody at a level, […] maybe some outside 
commission in some point in the future, to come in and say, you know what, this 
is not right, we need  to fight it, we need to take this to whatever method we need 
to get us to match the European model. But it really has to be somebody makes an 
organized effort. I don’t think any individual company can make that fight, it has 
to be organized either by the heads of various smaller companies or some 
commission either appointed by our federal government or maybe a commission 
brought up by members, not only by the elevator industry, but multiple industries 
maybe working together to change those rules. Go back to the culture issue, I 
think the culture here in the US that most of the people would like to see less 
government involvement. We tend to look at how do we avoid that much 
government. [The European approach] might be deemed to go in the direction of 
more government of overseeing everything, therefore this is against what we kind 
of want to see. The people, we want to be more independent, less governed by 
federal level or [even] state levels (personal interview 2010). 
These words by Mr. Brinkman neatly encapsulate and recapitulate the major 
elements contributing to the different paths the American and the European internal 
markets have taken over the last decades. The divergent paths have now even reached a 
point where the European Commission suggests its model to be adopted by the US and 
other countries in the world and where business leaders, such as Mr. Brinkman, express 
not only their admiration for the European model in the regulated goods market, but 
strongly hope for a similar outcome in the US in the future. 
Promoting the European Model 
As was the case with agreeing on trans-polity trade accords in services and in 
public procurement, the European Union and their negotiators from the European 
Commission encounter similar problems when dealing with the United States in 
cooperating in the regulated goods sector. Given the nature of the disjointed market in the 
US where the states retain substantial regulatory authority, no one single person speaks 
for the entire polity, making successful negotiations nearly impossible. Jan Frydman, the 
EU Commission official in charge of monitoring and promoting transatlantic trade for 
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DG Enterprise and Trade, for instances notes that the American regime on occasion poses 
a serious impediment for cooperation in international trade. He remarks in regards to 
regulated goods, such as elevators, that  
These are the kind of things where my colleagues here in my unit are working on. 
We are trying to harmonize [or] to at least minimize the differences in regulation, 
and it could be for any kind of product where we both [the US and the EU] have 
jurisdiction to regulate. […] Lifts or elevators [are] in fact an example where we 
couldn’t cooperate because there are areas […] where we have EU competence. 
Elevators happens to be an area where we [in the EU] managed to agree between 
member states to regulate or to harmonize the rules but when we told the US, 
well, you know, why don’t we cooperate to have the same rules for elevators or 
lifts, then they would say well, that is actually state competence, we, [at the] 
federal [level] have no competence to regulate elevators” (personal interview 
2010). 
 Yet, there is a desire in the US to come up with a similar model to the European 
approach to regulated goods and to promote it throughout the fifty US states. Similar to 
sentiments heard in Europe in the past, the Chief Elevator Inspector for the State of Ohio, 
Norman B. Martin, has expressed his frustrations with the regime in place in the US, 
An elevator is an elevator and if you build an elevator in California, you should be 
able to sell it in Ohio; and if you build it in Ohio, you should be able to sell it in 
Ontario (cited in ASME 2011). 
In fact, the American elevator industry together with the ASME has lately started 
to look into and develop performance-based standards, modeled largely on the EU’s 
notion of safety objectives. Hence, ASME vaunts in one of its brochures its new A17.7 
codes as a “progressive alternative to the prescriptive A17.1 safety code”, because it 
“allows for more flexibility in problem-solving” (ASME 2011). These are the same 
advantages which have been at the center of economic operators’ praise for the EU’s 
‘new approach’ to technical harmonization. Yet, the American A17.7 performance-based 
standards has one major shortcoming vis-à-vis the European model, it does not guarantee 
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market access. Whereas the Lifts Directive ensures a legal framework covering the entire 
polity, economic operators in the US remain confronted with a patchwork quilt of 
regulatory regimes. Not until all jurisdictions in the United States have decided to 
implement this standard would equivalency with the European regime exist. Kone’s Vice 
President for Codes therefore comments that 
It has been a big effort, for the lift industry anyway, to go in the direction of, not 
similar or identical to the European model, but rather introducing what we call a 
performance-based [approach] to technical regulation. So rather than describing 
technical details in the legislation [the idea is to] just describe the safety objective 
to achieve and using the technical specifications with approval [by the] authorities 
to fulfill the safety objective by other means. So that effort has been done, 
actually at this moment there is also a new standard introduced in the US about 
two years ago, it’s A17.7. This is the performance-based code for elevators and 
escalators in the US. But again like any other standard, every state, every 
jurisdiction has to adopt that as a standard before it can be used. As far as I know 
at this moment maybe only 30% of jurisdictions have adopted that standard 
(personal interview 2011; my emphasis). 
Thus, ironically given the common perception of the EU being riddled with 
obstacles to free trade, it is the European Commission that is arguing for market 
liberalization in the regulated goods market abroad along the line of the European model. 
In 2005 on World Standards Day, the Director for Regulatory Policy at the European 
Commission, Mr. Michel Ayral, gave a speech extolling the virtues of the European ‘new 
approach’ to technical harmonization, noting for instance the interest of the Russian 
Federation and China for this model and the EU’s support to internationalize as much as 
possible the European model to eliminate international non-tariff trade barriers to 
regulated goods. Mr. Ayral sums up, 
In the case of the European Union, the political objective for the completion of 
the Internal Market in 1980 called the European Commission for more effective 
and simplified approach to regulate. It required the Commission to develop the 
New Approach. The "New Approach" allowed for more flexible and less stringent 
forms of legislation in areas where, otherwise, any detail would have to be 
determined by the legislative act itself. At this stage, I can confirm that this new 
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approach to legislation was successful and positive. It was rather easy to get a 
political consensus on the common principles of the legislation and to agree that 
their technical transposition should be left to those who have the real expertise 
and knowledge. I believe that cooperation in standardisation could be inspired by 
this experience. On the basis of this background, the Commission is supporting 
activities at international level which recommend the use of voluntary 
international standards, thus opening international markets by removing barriers 
to trade. […]. One could compare this concept with EC New Approach as it 
encourages governmental cooperation on “essential legal requirements”. 
Governments would also identify the relevant international standards and 
conformity assessment requirements needed to meet the common regulatory 
objectives. We most welcome the interest shown by the Russian Federation and 
China for this model. The very positive experience of the “New Approach” has 
demonstrated the capability of standards to simplify EU legislation further, to 
contribute to better regulation and to the integration of the internal market. […] It 
is one of the objectives of the European standardisation policy and it is also 
reflected in the Action Plan to promote the European standards-receptive model 
at the international level (Ayral 2005; my emphasis).  
The Director for Regulatory Policy at the European Commission also observed 
that in the end it was relatively easy to get the member states in the EU on board in 
support of the Commission’s proposal to create a ‘new approach’ to technical 
harmonization. This strong political support given as this section has shown is unlikely 
to materialize in the US as long as no strong institutional actor advances such an agenda 
and a consensus can be found to overcome the inherent anti-federal attitudes in the 
American polity. Yet, as Mr. Ayral’s speech demonstrates, it might be worthwhile for 
the US to study the European approach to also ensure the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers to trade for regulated goods within its own internal market and as a corollary to 
facilitate international trade in the long run. 
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Conclusion 
Even in the goods sector, the European Union once more emerges as the more 
liberalized internal market to the point that for some economic operators familiar with 
both entities the European Union is becoming a business model to be followed by the 
United States. The findings show again that the European Commission has played the 
pivotal role in guaranteeing market access across all member states by developing the 
‘new approach’ to technical harmonization as a result of its own developed understanding 
of the mutual recognition principle. While business has been supportive it has not been 
the driving force behind the regulatory innovations put in place by the Commission. 
Consequently, the absence of a similar actor intervening on behalf of elevator 
companies in particular and of the regulated goods sector more generally is lamented by 
business representatives acquainted with the regulatory regimes in the EU and the US. 
The EU has gone substantially further than the US in creating a centrally-governed and 
liberalized single market in the regulated goods sectors. And it has done so because of an 
unusually strong executive institution with a clear liberalizing mandate. As comments 
from Commission officials have shown, this mandate is taken very seriously. Moreover, 
the regulated goods case has shown once more the greater acceptance of strong central 
authority in the EU than in the United States. Hence, while “a political consensus on the 
common principles” of the ‘new approach’ to technical harmonization proposed by the 
Commission was relatively easily be found in the European Union, commentator after 
commentator observed that in the US the dominant culture is characterized by asking for 
less government overall and not interfering with state rights. Contrary to the EU, in the 
US the federal government is perceived by many as hampering trade and innovation 
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when intervening in the market. Thus, in the absence of an institutional actor actually 
pointing out that a regime like the EU’s in the regulated goods sector ensures the 
retention of the powers of the states to regulate safety but at the same time guarantees 
free internal trade and enables more flexibility and innovation, nothing is likely to change 
in the United States.  
In short, a certain envy of the European single market in regulated goods persists, 
as Kone International’s Vice President for Codes remarks, 
you see very clearly in comparison that the single market in Europe has by far 
much [more] advanced than any other region I am familiar with, including the 
United States. But there are other things than the lift industry, we are very much 
promoting this European approach, even our colleagues in the US are very much 
in favor of adopting similar approach to technical legislation as we have in 
Europe (personal interview 2011).  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
“"Bolkestein go home" was on the banners of the demonstrators”.143 
Arte Journal, August 24, 2010 (my translation) 
This study started out with a little tale about regulation and markets in the two 
major transatlantic polities: the United States and the European Union. This little tale 
showed that the EU has already implemented at the federal level regulations that enshrine 
non-discrimination for out-of-state visitors to museums while in the US discriminatory 
practices in regards to museum entrance fees for out-of-state residents remain in place. 
These European federal-level regulations were part of a larger package of liberalizing 
services across the entire European Union. During the process of passing the new 
European directive on services liberalization, the original draft proposed by the then 
Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein created an outcry among many labor 
unions that feared an “Americanization” of the European market. In fact, during street 
demonstrations in Brussels, protestors held up signs enjoining Bolkestein to go back 
home. However, these protestors did not ask for Commissioner Bolkestein to return to his 
native Netherlands. “Bolkestein go home” was written on large American-style flags.  
These protestors, similar to the assumptions of the vast majority of scholars and pundits, 
thought that the American internal market is the epitome of market integration and 
liberalization, where market liberalization is part of the country’s “cultural DNA of the 
past 400 years” and its “gospel of success” (Brooks 2009). The irony is, though, that, 
even after amending the original Bolkestein directive, the European Union has today 
                                                 
143
 "Bolkestein go home" stand auf den Transparenten der Demonstranten […]. 
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adopted rules more like a single market than the US, both with respect to the 
centralization of the market (having a single set of coherent rules for exchange) and its 
liberalization (adopting rules that open exchange to competition). Moreover, this is true 
not only in the vast services sector but also in other important economic sectors. Perhaps 
most striking of all, these rather clear comparative observations have largely escaped 
most observers. Even the architects of the European Single Market, like Lord Cockfield, 
many of whom actively studied the United States as a model, contributed strongly to a 
discourse in which the US will forever remain the ideal-type end-point for European 
integration. In a speech given at the European University Institute in Florence in 1989, 
Cockfield remarked that it would be a mistake to talk about the European Union “in 
terms of a “United States of Europe”” because the EU will never follow the US in regards 
to centralized authority given that “essentially on the ground […] the United States gives 
far more power to the federal authority than is likely to be necessary or acceptable in 
Europe” (Cockfield 1994, 164). And Sir Andrew Cahn, former member of Lord 
Cockfield’s cabinet and until recently the Chief Executive of UK Trade and Investment, 
the British government department that promotes exports and attracts foreign direct 
investment, cannot believe even to this day that American “state authorities, city 
authorities could only buy stuff produced” within the same state while this is not the case 
in the European Union (personal interview 2009). As he repeatedly stated: “I just don’t 
believe it” (personal interview 2009). 
Yet, contrary to the expectations by experts on the two polities and laymen alike, 
this study has shown that in major economic sectors, public procurement (15 – 20% of 
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GDP), services (70% of GDP) and even in regards to goods, the EU has succeeded to 
eliminate barriers to domestic trade that are still in place in the United States.  
While public procurement, i.e. the purchase of any goods and services by public 
authorities at all levels of government with taxpayer money, accounts for an equally large 
part of the two polities’ internal markets, the European Union and the United States have 
taken two different paths (cf. Chapter III). In the European Union a series of directives 
have over time eliminated any form of official discrimination between member states and 
opened up public procurement to competition across the entire polity. This is not to say 
that in practice the European public procurement regime is as efficient and obstacle-free 
as desired by some of the major actors involved, but simply that legally discrimination 
based on residency is not allowed. In the United States, on the other hand, each state 
retains the right to discriminate against another sister state by putting in place legislation 
to limit the buying and selling of goods and services from and to residents of their own 
states. These discriminatory practices vary from outright prohibition of buying any 
specific goods, such as coal, recycled paper or snowmobiles, from other states to 
enforcing 10 to 15% preference laws that add these percentage amounts to bids coming 
from out of state. The right to discriminate against sister states as proprietor of one’s own 
public domain has become known as the market participant exemption. As long as a state 
acts as a participant in the market instead of as a market regulator, it receives from the 
U.S. Supreme Court a free pass from the dormant commerce clause.  
A similar picture emerges in the arena of services, especially concerning the 
provision of temporary services across state borders. While the actual integration of flows 
on the ground are still generally less across European states than American ones, the 
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many political rules in the services sector are more – and more liberally – integrated in 
Europe. Thus, similar to the dynamics present in the public procurement case, the 
European Union ends up with a more liberal internal market regime in services than the 
United States (cf. Chapter V). Non-tariff barriers to the temporary provision of services 
abound in the United States. In contrast to the EU, practitioners of regulated professions 
already licensed in one US state need to make sure that they are also licensed in the host 
state, too, before legally providing their services even for one single day. A reciprocity 
agreement between two US states does not automatically guarantee market access. 
Practitioners still might be required to pass additional exams, including law exams, as 
well as criminal background checks before being allowed to, for instance, cut 
somebody’s hair across a state border. In the EU, on the other hand, a simple on-line 
notification system has been put in place for those services which are regulated in a host 
state. Once notification is given by a service provider, he or she is largely free to provide 
his or her services up to one year before having to renew the notification. Moreover, 
while the notification system in the EU is free, in the United States the different 
regulatory bodies charge considerable amounts of fees, not only for the license itself but 
as well as for the exams and classes an already licensed out-of-state practitioner needs to 
pass in the host state. Thus, today a service provider in the US would have to go through 
the courts to demonstrate how specific regulations to another state’s market actually pose 
an access barrier and might not be permissible under the commerce clause or the 
privileges and immunities clause. However, such an approach is very expensive, 
especially for individual service providers. 
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The analysis of the goods sector, especially at the example of elevators, also 
challenged the received wisdom that the US market for goods is generally more liberal 
and better integrated than the European market (cf. Chapter VII). Indeed, the European 
Union has implemented a regime for regulated goods, such as elevators, that not only 
facilitates market access across the entire polity for manufacturers but also allows for 
innovation and high level of safety standards. Once fulfilling the essential requirements 
set forth in an EU directive based on the EU’s so-called ‘new approach’ to technical 
harmonization, a manufacturer is free to sell and install his product anywhere within the 
European Economic Area. A similar polity-wide regime that guarantees market access for 
elevator manufacturers is absent in the United States. In the American polity, not only 
states, but even municipalities have the right to and do regularly impose their own codes, 
creating a disjointed market resembling a large patchwork quilt.  
Recent developments indicate that the present trajectories of the European Union 
and the United States are not changing any time soon. Preference laws in public 
procurement for instance continue to proliferate in the United States. At the end of April 
2011, the Oregon House of Representatives unanimously passed House Bill 3000 
allowing contracting agencies within the state to give a preference to procure goods that 
are fabricated or processed, or services that are performed entirely within Oregon of a 
price premium of up to 10 percent more than goods that are not fabricated or processed, 
or services that are not performed entirely within Oregon. A month later the “Buy 
Oregon” bill also passed the Oregon Senate and is presently awaiting the governor’s 
signature. As has been typical in such cases in the United States, nobody has calculated 
what the impact of these kinds of preference laws might be on the entire American 
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market. When any kind of assessments have taken place, they were narrow in focus, only 
paying attention to effects such laws might have on the economy of a single American 
state and not the union as a whole. However, even when the focus was narrowly on one 
state, the potential economic impact were generally considered indeterminate. Not 
surprisingly then, the Oregon Legislative Fiscal Office similarly concludes its very brief 
fiscal impact assessment on the new 10% permissive preference law by observing that it 
“could potentially increase the total cost of procurement for goods and services […] but 
that cost remains unknown” (Stayner and Byerly 2011, 1). 
In the European Union, on the other hand, we see the opposite trend taking place. 
For instance, even in patent policy , which until recently was the one major economic 
area were the United States had established ultimate authority at the central plane of 
government and the EU so far had not,144 the European Union is now moving towards a 
                                                 
144The United States succeeded early on in doing so by providing a constitutional grant of authority to the 
Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 
8). Thus, the two first Patent Acts, the Acts of 1790 and 1793, were federal law, not state law. Before the 
creation and ratification of the US Constitution only “a patent custom existed in a number of states whereby 
exclusive rights were granted by private legislative enactment” (Walterscheid 1997, 63). Thus, “[p]rior to 
the ratification by the requisite nine states in 1788, there was no federal patent law because under the 
articles of Confederation each state retained “every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the 
confederation expressly delegated to the Untied State, in Congress assembled” (Walterscheid 1997: 66; 
Articles of Confederation, Art. II). Thus, the states retained, among other powers, “the right to issue patents 
or otherwise grant rights with respect to inventions and discoveries” (Walterscheid 1997, 67). Why in this 
case the United States has succeeded early on to impose a coherent set of rules polity-wide remains largely 
unclear and somewhat fortuitous. Walterscheid repeatedly emphasizes the fact that “[l]ittle has been 
written” and that “little is actually known about how” the intellectual property clause became included in 
the US Constitution (Walterscheid 1998, 18–19). Nothing in the events leading up to the constitutional 
convention suggests “that a lack of a power in the Congress to issue patents played any role” in convening 
it in the first place. Only one known document apparently exists which hints at this issue in a peripheral 
way. And even this document by James Madison rather highlights that “the lack of uniformity in state laws 
concerning literary property was […] “of inferior moment”” (Walterscheid 1998, 17). Moreover, none of 
the general schemes of governance debated by the Framers nor the first proposals regarding the enumerated 
powers of Congress seemed to have included this clause (Walterscheid 1998, 17). Yet, according to 
Madison’s notes, the clause was adopted without any dissenting voice, or “nem: con” (Walterscheid 1998, 
19). This suggests, on the whole, two possible interpretations. First of all, that the clause met indeed 
universal approval. The second possible interpretation is that the delegates were “tired, wanted to go home, 
and simply did not perceive this particular grant of power to the Congress to warrant any further debate, 
regardless of whether they considered it to have any particular significance” (Walterscheid 1998, 19). 
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single set of coherent rules for exchange with the creation of an union-wide patent.145 
While previous attempts over the last three decades have failed due to disputes over the 
use of national languages, the European Union is now in the process of implementing an 
“EU patent” and establishing an “European and EU patent Court” as proposed by the 
European Commission in 2000 (Pompidou 2011, 2).146 
In short, what has emerged throughout the study is that scholars and pundits have 
it largely wrong in portraying the United States as a commercial republic endeared with 
market liberalization and despising obstacles to free trade among the sister states while 
perceiving the European Union as generally more riddled with internal barriers to trade. It 
turns out that the United States, the land of the free, the home of the unregulated at the 
federal level, has substantially more non-tariff barriers to trade legally in place than the 
European Union which at the federal level has created single sets of coherent rules for 
                                                                                                                                                 
While some authors, such as Prager (1961), pointed out to some lobbying efforts by “interested persons” on 
the delegates, it is not quite clear to what extent interest groups really played a role in the incorporation of 
the clause in the US Constitution. Walterscheid for example notes that it is likely that John Fitch, a 
steamboat inventor, sought to obtain exclusive rights through the federal government and certainly had the 
chance to do so at a most opportune time, but “that there is no specific evidence that he actually did so” 
(Walterscheid 1998, 30 – 31).  
 
145
 Until now, the absence of a community-wide patent based on Community legislation meant that patent 
protection in the European Union was based on two systems: the national patent systems and the European 
patent system (cf. Cannon 2003, 418). 
 
146
 The European Commission repeatedly noted that “[t]he fragmented single market for patents has serious 
consequences for the competitiveness of Europe in relation to the challenges of the US, Japan and emerging 
economic powers such as China” [COM (2007)165 final, 2]. According to Charlie McCreevy, European 
Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, the previous non-union-wide “European patent 
designating 13 countries is about 11 times more expensive than a US patent and 13 times more expensive 
then [sic] a Japanese patent” (Speech/07/206:2). In its economic impact assessments, the Commission 
calculated that “[a]lthough there are differences between Member States and industry sectors, the overall 
“patent premium” for the reviewed Member States amounts to 1% of national GDP for the period 1994-
1996 and had reached 1.16% of GDP during the period 2000 – 2002 [COM (2007)165 final, 2]. The new 
system presently put in place is based on the concept of reinforced cooperation. Reinforced or enhanced 
cooperation. Introduced with the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, allows a minimum of nine member 
states to establish advanced integration in a policy area without the other member states having to join in or 
being able to block it. As of spring 2011, 25 of the EU’s 27 members have signed onto the new EU-wide 
patent regime, with Italy and Spain continuing to refuse to join due to their language concerns. However, it 
can be assumed that it is only a matter of time until the last two member states will also join the regime. 
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exchange in major policy areas and ensured that these rules open up exchange to 
competition. 
What accounts partially for the scholarly myopia is that the literatures on America 
state-building and on European integration have largely foregone systematic comparisons 
due to respective sui generis concerns. Hence, not much empirically-oriented 
comparative work has been done to explain the construction of single markets in the EU 
and the US. However, while there is a dearth of empirical comparative work of the two 
polities, the explanatory frameworks employed to explain one or the other polity’s 
absence or present of a coherent set of rules for market exchange and the degree to how 
much they open exchange to competition are very similar. As I argued (cf. Chapter II), 
these explanations can be divided in three major categories: 1) structuralist-materialist / 
rationalist-functionalist ; 2) institutional and 3) ideational/cultural. Yet, what is highly 
problematic is that all these explanations have been developed by only analyzing one of 
the two polities without attempting to see whether the logic of the arguments hold up 
when employed in a comparative context.  
First, structuralist-materialist / rationalist-functionalist explanations would let us 
expect that institutional outcomes and market integration are either the result of self-
serving agendas of specific interest groups reacting to general structural economic 
pressures or the result of shared interests of many socio-economic groups in functionally 
efficient institutional arrangements. 
Second, institutionalist explanations argue that pre-existing institutional 
arrangements, mediated by the presence or absence of active interest groups, hinder or 
facilitate mobilization in favor of more centralization, or create difficult-to-alter 
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organizational constellations that either lend themselves to more centralization or do not. 
From a broad institutionalist perspective then we should expect that the earlier delegation 
of power to the central government in the US would have created federal entrepreneurs 
with an interest in more central power who should have generated more path-dependent 
dynamics of centralization and liberalization than in the European Union. 
A third perspective comprises ideational and cultural approaches to market 
building. Based on many of the ideational accounts emphasizing the pro-market 
liberalization mindset in the US we should also expect that the US ended to be more 
liberalized than the EU. 
This study, however, has shown that the existing explanations are unable to 
clearly account for the different outcomes the European Union and the United States in 
the three major policy areas examined. Consequently I have proposed a more nuanced 
explanation that combines institutional and ideational elements. I offered here an 
explanation based on an institutional argument playing out in a broad ideational context. I 
have argued that taking the notion of American exceptionalism, in both the liberal or 
cultural nationalist form, and the role of the European Commission as centralization and 
liberalization catalyst due to its comparatively narrow mandate into serious consideration 
does a better job in explaining the cross-polity variation in outcomes. In other words, in 
combination the institutional and ideational elements explain better why the European 
Union has adopted a single set of coherent rules as well as rules that open exchange to 
competition much further than the United States than either of them alone could do. 
The evidence indeed shows that in all three cases the European Commission has 
played the key role in pushing forward and ensuring the creation of a single set of 
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coherent rules for market exchange and the adoption of rules that open exchange to 
competition polity-wide. Business groups were in neither of the cases at the forefront of 
centralizing and/or liberalizing policy areas in the European Union. There is strong 
evidence, especially in the public procurement case, that the Commission has fomented 
its own supportive business environment. Moreover, frequently the European 
Commission made and succeeded in pushing through proposals against the expressed 
interests of some of the major EU member states. As Lord Cockfield has noted in his 
memoirs, the Commission “went further than they [UK government officials] had 
imagined and therein lay the seeds of my disagreement with many of my former 
colleagues in that government” (Cockfield 1994,179). What has been striking in the 
United States is the absence of an actor that takes the entire market of the US polity into 
account and that attempts to estimate the costs of the remaining obstacles to trade. 
Repeatedly throughout the research interviewees have brought up the absence of such an 
institutional actor willing to undertake such work and bear the costs of it. In the EU, on 
the other hand, the Commission has actively researched costs to make its case to the 
national governments for the need to further integrate market sectors. Lord Cockfield 
himself commissioned the Cecchini report on the cost of non-Europe after first laying out 
his and his colleagues’ vision for an open and integrated single market in the now famous 
1985 White Paper (Cockfield 1994). As Lord Cockfield observed 
[With the White Paper] suddenly we had passed from rhetoric to action. The 
vision was no longer just a vision: it was a vision in action. […] A window of 
opportunity had opened. And it was through this window we went. […] Whatever 
the calendar might say, it was the springtime of our youth and of the Community. 
[…] The success of the programme was a triumph of the spirit over the lethargy 
and narrow vision of the past. […] The White Paper was no mere catalogue of 
proposals, it also set out a clear philosophy (Cockfield 1994, 159, 176 and 180). 
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It is this philosophy of market liberalization and the taking advantage of windows 
of opportunities which is still guiding Commission endeavors today. 
Besides the role of the Commission what has also clearly emerged is a different 
attitude towards federal-level government involvement in the market, even if it means 
market liberalization. Societal acceptance of federal level involvement in the market 
appears to be largely greater in the European Union than in the United States. A general 
distrust of federal government in the US was present throughout the interviews and poll 
data. In short, broader norms of legitimate governance favor a centralized authority, even 
a liberalizing central authority, more in the EU than in the US.  
This study has shown that we need to challenge more the assumptions and 
theoretical explanations derived from simply looking at one of the two polities. More 
empirically-oriented, systematic comparisons between the United States and Europe and 
other polities, especially other federal polities, are necessary to test the existing theories 
and to either refine them or to develop new ones. Indeed, it appears that Canada, similar 
to the United States, suffers from non-tariff barriers to trade in services and other sectors 
due to the absence of a federal level agent able to perceive the domestic market in its 
entirety and to negotiate on its behalf with other polities such as the European Union. Jan 
Frydman, Deputy Head of Unit for International Affairs of the EU’s Directorate General 
for Enterprise and Industry, for instance remarked that 
Canada is really even worse - worse in quotation marks - even more difficult than 
the United States. This free trade agreement we are negotiating now with Canada, 
it includes not only customs but also regulatory [elements]. This is the second 
time we try a trade agreement with Canada. The first time I wasn’t negotiating 
myself and we discovered that when we told the Canadians that we would like to 
have a possibility to have our engineers, our architects, and these kinds of 
professions freely establish in Canada and you should then be able to send your 
architects and [so on] to Europe, they said, “this is a great idea, but there is only 
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one problem that in Canada if you are an architect from Vancouver you cannot 
establish yourself in Alberta or anywhere else. We would never be able to agree 
with you, because we don’t even have it ourselves” (personal interview 2010). 
Bolkestein’s home therefore rather appears to be in Europe and not in North 
America. To end therefore this study with the words of Lord Cockfield, 
we have started a process [with the White Paper and the Single Act] that will not, 
and cannot, be stopped (Cockfield 1994, 160). 
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